

Panjab University Research Journal (Arts)

Volume XL

Nos. 1 & 2

April-October 2013

ISSN: 0970-5260



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Research Journal (Arts)

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Chandigarh (India)

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Visual Perception as a Correlate of Spelling Performance

*Raj K. Gupta

Abstract

The present paper investigates relationship in visual perception and performance in spellings. Visual perception having five components viz. perceptual constancy, spatial perception, figure ground perception, directionality & visual motor coordinator is assessed using a test in perception. Spellings have been assessed by a Diagnostic Spelling Test which comprised of 35 word spellings. Descriptive method is utilized in this work. A sample of 200 subjects from 3rd & 4th grades was taken. Findings indicate a significant relationship in performance in spellings and visual perception (total) and its four components. One component, directionality, was not correlated significantly with performance in spellings.

Importance of academic performance in schools cannot be over estimated. Most of school subjects require understanding of spellings, though every subject is not evaluated with respect to performance in spellings. Bad spellings mar the interest in reading a student's writing. Hence, performance in spellings assumes importance. Present paper examines whether visual perception has any contribution to make in learning and performance of spellings.

Perception is an active process of locating and extracting information from the environment. Visual perception is the identification, organization, and interpretation of sensory data received by the individual through the eye (Lerner, 1988). It is the ability to interpret the surrounding environment by processing information that is contained in visible part of environment. Visual perception plays a very important factor in learning in younger years particularly in reading and related matters. Persons with visual perception problems may experience difficulties in visual memory, visual discrimination, figure ground perception, sense of direction, visual sequencing, copying work, position in space, spatial relations, visual-motor processing, retaining visually presented materials, visual closure, visual form constancy etc.

Lerner (1988) mentions sub areas of visual perception as spatial relations, visual discrimination, figure ground discrimination, visual closure and object recognition. Following section of paper presents the association of visual perception and / or its areas with various areas of school performance viz. reading, verbal processing, spellings etc.

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Panjab University Research Journal Arts, Volume XL, April-October 2013

ISSN 0970-5260

Various authors like Getman (1965), Barsch (1968) and Kephart (1971) assume that adequate perceptual motor development is prerequisite to adequate conceptual, language and academic functioning. According to Cratty (1969), activities emphasizing the development of body image help a child in establishing the concept of spatial orientation and shape recognition which is important for excelling in area of spellings. Integration of inputs from all modalities improved their form discrimination power. Subjects could make out difference between 'saw' & 'was' and between 'bad' & 'dab' easily after training in spatial perception.

Pellingrino, Alerton and Shute (1984), in their study on 'spatial ability' found a positive correlation in intelligence and spatial manipulation of things. Carlisle (1987) found that the ninth grade students with perceptual deficits showed less evidence of morphological or rule based knowledge in spelling, than normally achieving fourth graders.

According to Lerner (1988), a perceptual generalization made by children in the pre-reading stage of development is the 'law of object constancy' which makes the child conclude that an object retains the same name and meaning regardless of the position it happens to be in, the direction it faces, slight additions or modifications. A dog is called a dog whatever size, color, nature of fur etc. This generalization needs necessary amendments to be able to read meaningfully. A small modification can make an 'e' from 'c', 'no' from 'on', 'top' from 'pot' etc. The implication is that some students with reading disabilities fail to make the necessary amendments to an earlier perceptual generalization they have formulated.

Richek, List and Lerner (1989) indicate that the kindergarteners' ability to recognize geometric patterns, letters and numbers has been found to be a good predictor of reading. (Spelling skill happens to be basic element of reading skill).

Gardner (1993) was of the view that spatial ability and spatial cognition are the basic building blocks that a child needs in order to develop higher level thinking skills, specifically those that compliment verbal processing skills.

Kulp, Edwards and Mitchell (2002) indicated poor visual memory ability as measured by the test of visual perceptual skills is significantly related to below average reading decoding in second through fourth grade children while controlling for age and verbal ability.

Singh (2004) investigated relationship in visio-spatial perception and academic achievement. He found that both figure ground perception and spatial memory (which he investigated as parts of visual spatial perception) correlated significantly with academic achievement.

Bansal (2005) had two experimental groups in her study on effect of remediation in spatial perception on self esteem and academic performance. First group underwent intervention in directionality, location and spatial relations whereas second group of subjects had remediation in figure ground perception & visual motor coordination. Both the groups improved significantly in spellings as compared to control group. Both the groups did not differ significantly among themselves.

Plaza and Cohen (2005) examined influence of auditory–verbal, visual–verbal, visual, and visual–visual processing speed on reading and spelling. They reported in their study that visual attention was significantly co- related with written language, and that poor readers performed slower on visual matching tasks (which require visual attention and attention is a precursor to perception).

Larsen (2011) reported that children with visual memory deficits did not differ significantly from children without memory deficits on reading or spelling achievement. The criterion used for visual memory deficits was Mean minus one standard deviation in this study.

Asonitou, Koutsouki and Charitou (2010) found early identification and intervention of visual motor difficulties as a precursor of academic performance.

Lopes, Santos, Pereira and Lopes (2013) evaluated the relationship between visual motor coordination and academic achievement in a sample of Portuguese children aged 9–12 years. The study involved 596 urban children from the north of Portugal. The results showed children with insufficient visual motor coordination or disorders exhibited a higher probability of having low academic achievement, compared with those with normal or good visual motor coordination.

According to Learning Centre (2013), people with visual perception disabilities may demonstrate difficulties retaining spelling rules and unusually spelt words, they may spell phonetically. According to Children’s Vision Coalition (2013), children with visual perception problems may have difficulty with letter reversals, learning the alphabet, recognizing the words and understanding basic math concepts.

Pienaar, Barhorst and Twisk (2013) determined the relationship between academic performance and perceptual-motor skills in first grade South African learners and whether low SES (socio-economic status) school type plays a role in such a relationship. It was concluded that visual-motor integration, visual perception, hand control and motor proficiency were closely related to basic academic skills required in the first formal school year, especially among learners in low SES type schools.

The present study investigates the relationship between visual perception and performance in spellings. If spatial perception, which ensues only after examining the stimuli visually, is important in learning spellings, problems in former will lead to problems in spellings. If spatial cognition is building block to complement verbal processing skills, a deficiency in spatial cognition (perception) will lead to corresponding deficiency in verbal processing skills of which spelling ability is an important part.

Based on above argument, following hypothesis is derived

Visual perception and performance in spellings will be significantly co-related. For verifying the above methodology, following methodology has been used.

1.1 **Methodology:**

This piece of research has used descriptive research method. This section of paper deals with description of sample, tools and procedure of the study.

Sample: A sample of 200 subjects from eight schools of Bathinda district was selected from 3rd and 4th standard in rural & urban settings. Schools and subjects were selected randomly. 50 girls and boys were taken from each of third and fourth grades.

Tools: Following two tools were used to collect data:

a) Diagnostic Spelling test (Gupta & Narang, 2005) was used for assessing spelling ability among subjects. It comprised of 35 items and maximum obtainable score was 35. Odd even method of reliability yielded a correlation of .92 ($p < .01$) and test re-test method yielded a value of correlation of .90 ($p < .01$). Criterion validity obtained by correlating with class test in English was .827 ($p < .01$).

b) Test in perception (Gupta, 2008) was utilized for visual perception assessment among subjects. This test has two parts A & B. A part tested perceptual constancy, spatial perception, figure ground perception and directionality. B part dealt with visual motor coordination. Total no. of items in both was 26 (one for sample). Maximum obtainable score in A part was 21 & in B part, it was 14. Total obtainable score was 35. Split half reliability of this test was found to be .92 ($p < .01$). Discrimination index values were used to establish validity.

Procedure: After seeking requisite permissions from principals, subjects were administered spelling test in groups and visual perception test individually. Subjects' attempt was scored as per the instructions in manuals of the tests.

1.2 Results and interpretation:

Means, standard deviations were used to describe data. Product moment method of correlation was utilized to describe & analyze data. t- test was used to examine significance of difference of means of a) rural and urban subjects b) boys and girls c) III and IV standards for both spellings and visual perception.

Table I Means and standard deviations of two variables, t-ratios for various comparisons

Area of performance	Statistics	SETTING		GENDER		GRADE	
		Rural 100	Urban 100	Boys 100	Girls 100	III 100	IV 100
Visual Perception	Mean	37.55	37.10	37.00	37.69	36.65	37.10
	SD	5.22	5.33	5.74	4.53	5.88	4.40
	t-ratio	.814**		.945**		1.02**	
Spelling	Mean	15.00	19.65	16.5	18.1	13.65	20.8
	SD	10.02	10.11	10.11	10.5	9.68	9.70
	t-ratio	3.26*		1.07**		5.18*	

*significant at .01 level

** not significant

Means of all the groups in visual perception were comparable with third grade having lowest (36.65) and girls having highest value (37.69). Variability was highest in third grade (5.88) and lowest in fourth grade (4.40) implying uniformity increased from third to fourth grade. In test on visual perception, none of the following comparisons yielded significant differences a) rural & urban subjects, b) boys and girls, c) third & fourth graders.

Means of spelling performance present a different picture as compared to visual perception, these ranges from 13.65 to 20.8 with third graders scoring the lowest and fourth graders scoring the highest. Variability is quite comparable with lowest among girls (9.68) and highest among boys and urban group (10.11). Analysis of comparisons in performance in spellings shows the following.

Subjects from rural and urban settings is significantly different, ($t=3.26$; $p<.01$), favoring urban settings. Subjects from third and fourth grades differ significantly ($t=5.18$; $p<.01$), in favor of fourth grades as expected due to continued learning from third upto fourth. No significant gender differences exist in spellings performance.

Table II Correlations of various areas of Visual Perception and Spelling Performance

Area	Correlation with Spelling
1. Perceptual constancy	.134 ($p<.05$)
2. Spatial perception	.290 ($p<.01$)
3. Figure ground perception	.134 ($p<.05$)
4. Directionality	.096 (NS)
5. Visual motor coordination	.154 ($p<.05$)
Total	.269 ($p<.01$)

Visual perception in total is positively and significantly co-related with spelling performance ($r=.269$; $p<.01$). This finding agrees with that of earlier reports (Cratty, 1969; Singh, 2004; Bansal, 2005; Learning Centre, 2013; Children’s Vision Coalition, 2013; Kulp et al., 2013) which supports our hypothesis. Lerner (1988, p 420) suggests that if students with spelling problems are helped to strengthen visual perception and memory, visual image of the word can be retained, implying that spelling performance can improve.

When co-relation of sub areas of visual perception and spelling were examined, it was found that directionality did not bear significant relationship with spelling performance. Though spellings must be learnt in particular sequence yet it was not found to be correlated with directionality. A study by Giles and Terrell (2013) on visual sequential memory and spelling ability reported similar results. Verbal sequential memory did not differentiate between bad and good spellers (unless mediated by verbal coding).

Co-relation of visual motor co-ordination, was found to be significant (refer table II). This finding is in line with thinking of various authors (Getman, 1965; Barsch, 1968; Kephart, 1971). Also Bansal (2005) provided intervention in visual motor co-ordination to subjects in one group in her experimental study and found significant improvement in spellings. This finding is also supported by findings from Asonitou et al. (2010), Lopes et al. (2013) and Pienaar et al. (2013).

Correlation of spatial perception and spellings is significant ($t=.290$, $p<.01$). This corroborates findings from Cratty (1969), Singh (2004) and Bansal (2005).

Area of perceptual constancy is significantly correlated with spellings' performance which further supports hypothesis of the study and is in line with Lerner's (1988) proposed implications.

Figure ground perception which is the ability to distinguish an object from its surrounding background, is significantly co-related with spelling performance. Singh (2004) indicates that figure ground perception is significantly correlated with academic achievement, corroborating the hypothesis of the study.

The results of present study point out that IV graders and urban students perform better on spellings whereas in visual perception, gender and settings do not make a difference. Also the hypothesis that visual perception and its components (except directly) are significantly correlated with spellings is confirmed. The present study suggests that children with visual perception problems may be identified early and may be exposed to early intervention to enable them to be more successful in spelling performance, academic achievement and school life.

The author also suggests replication of Larsen's (2011) study to examine whether lowering of defining line to Mean – 1.5 S.D. and lower for visual memory deficits will lead to significantly lower spelling and reading performance. This will examine whether criterion used by him in his research can actually be counted as deficit.

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South East Asia, East Asia & Asia-Pacific in Indian Foreign Policy

*Baljit Singh

Abstract

South East Asian region has emerged from low priority to high priority area in India's foreign policy since 1992. India started cultivating this region through its policy of looking east which has now resulted into the process of engaging east. Its Look East Policy (LEP) has enabled it to engage the East Asian and Asia-Pacific nations besides cultivating ASEAN members. Economic and naval diplomacies have been the major instruments of India's policy towards South East Asia (SEA), East Asia and Asia-Pacific. Its policy towards the SEA has witnessed the diversification of thrust from maritime to continental with Myanmar's joining of ASEAN in 1997, which has made India's North Eastern Region (NER)-as a critical milestone of its LEP. Thereafter, looking east to linking east through its North East Region and Myanmar has become a priority of its policy towards SEA. India's growing proximity with US and increasing competition with China in South East Asia, East Asia and Asia-Pacific regions have further facilitated its engagement with SEA, EA and Asia-Pacific.

Introduction

Changing global economic and strategic reality bridged ideological gap amongst nations and regions across the world. Increasingly blurred ideological barriers between India and SEA initiated both in the process of engaging each other. India articulated its LEP (1992) towards the ASEAN region, which was reciprocated by the Look West Policy (LWP) of the ASEAN nations. India's engagement with ASEAN as a sectoral dialogue partner (1992) was culminated into the signing of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in Goods with ASEAN in 2009. At India-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in New Delhi on December 20-21, 2012, both sides finalized the long-awaited FTA in Services and Investment which was signed in September 2014. Meaning thereby that, both have travelled several milestones to cement their relations ranging from: sectoral (1992) to full dialogue partner (1995); the membership of ASEAN Regional Forum (1996) to India-ASEAN Summit level partner from 2002 onwards; India being a part of East Asia Summit (EAS) since 2005 to India-ASEAN

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Free Trade Agreements in Goods in 2009 and FTA encompassing Services and Investment in September 2014.

India's LEP based on the principle of economic diplomacy enabled it to transcend from economic to strategic cooperation by diversifying its diplomacy from economic to naval domain. In strategic domain, the ASEAN countries are looking towards India not only as a reliable security partner but also as a state which is capable to balance increasing Chinese military influence in the SEA region because ASEAN states do have security threats from China in South China Sea (SCS) but as such they do not have any security problem with India. Rather they believe in India's naval capability to provide security to Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs). However, India's goodwill in SEA is more than China but latter's economic linkages with SEA countries are stronger than India. This leads to a series of questions regarding the subject under discussion. Where did the SEA region figure in India's foreign policy agenda during the cold war period? How does the ASEAN region emerge from low to high priority area for New Delhi? What are the factors and forces driving India closer to SEA, East Asia and Asia-Pacific regions? In this paper an attempt has made to find out the answers of these and related questions.

South East Asia: A Cold War Perspective

Interestingly, India was not much sought after nation in the SEA except its connections with Indochina¹ countries and its bilateral engagements with some states of this region. The cold war constraints could be the major factor for the low priority of this region for India's foreign policy makers. First, this region was sharply divided on ideological lines- as the five founder members of ASEAN were under the influence of capitalist bloc, whereas some states of the SEA region were having inclination towards the socialist ideology and Myanmar was stand alone country. Second, India's preoccupation with its non-aligned image also induced it to keep distance from the ASEAN countries. India was also scared of implications of alliance politics which could have diverted its meager resources from development to war and thereby could have adversely affected its priority of economic growth. Due to that India continued to distance itself from South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was used by Pakistan to consolidate its axis with SEA and the US (Singh 2001: 196). Third, India's perception about the ASEAN was negative, although, it did not condemn the formation of ASEAN but it used to believe that the ASEAN region is an American sphere of influence. However, the ASEAN was established to promote regional economic cooperation but its security sensitivities became obvious at the time of its inauguration in Bangkok in 1967. India was suspicious about the organization's true agenda especially in the context of British government's decision to withdraw from the East of Suez and the uncertain American role in Indochina (Sridharan 1996: 467). Fourth, although, the ASEAN Declaration of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) of 1971 was received positively by India as its objective was to keep the SEA free from great power interference (Ibid) but India's quick decision to recognize Vietnam supported Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea, could not take into account the ASEAN sensitivities on the matter, hence damaged its image in the ASEAN region. Fifth, however, when India

1. The term Indochina is also known as French Indochina, which consists of the three states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia of South East Asian region formerly associated with France. It refers to the intermingling of Indian and Chinese influences in the culture of the region

started viewing ASEAN as an independent entity, the ASEAN states began taking note of India as a Soviet ally because of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1971), and even the ASEAN states suspected Soviet role in determining India's policy towards Vietnam in the early seventies (Batabyal 2003: 66).

Convergence of Interests

Changing strategic and economic scenario at the global and regional level induced India and ASEAN to have a fresh look at their policies towards each other. Further, India and ASEAN discovered each other in the changing strategic and economic landscape of the Asian continent and they needed each other to face emerging reality in Asian continent. Economic reforms in India did not only bring its economy close to the economies of ASEAN states but also initiated India to use economic diplomacy as an instrument of its policy towards this region. Under the leadership of Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, India articulated its LEP towards the ASEAN region and the ASEAN also started evolving ways and means to engage India for regional cooperation at institutional level. In India, the ASEAN is always considered as a gateway to Asia-Pacific, whereas, ASEAN considered India as gateway to Middle Eastern and Central Asian States. When India adopted LEP to strengthen its ties with ASEAN states, the latter reciprocated by LWP (Jha 2008: 3, Nanda 2003).

Its LEP aimed at to renew political linkages with the ASEAN countries; to increase economic intercourse and to forge strategic relations to enhance political, economic and strategic understanding with ASEAN countries in the light of changing Asian and global scenario. In the first phase India's LEP focused primarily on the economic and trade linkages with ASEAN states. India's LEP has now entered into second phase which is characterized by an expanding definition of East: extending from Australia to China and East Asia with ASEAN at its core. This change marked a shift in focus from exclusively economic issues to economic and security issues including joint efforts to protect sea-lanes, coordination on counter terrorism etc. On the economic side, phase-II is also characterized by arrangements for FTAs and establishing of institutional economic linkages between the countries of the region and India (Sinha 2003).

During the last twenty-two years, India has increased its trade with ASEAN substantially. For instance in 1992, its trade with ASEAN was of worth \$ 2.4 billion which was of \$ 44 billion in February 2010 and has reached the target of \$ 80 billion by the end of 2012. India-ASEAN trade is expected to achieve the target of \$ 100 billion by 2015. To boost its trade with SEA countries, India has entered into a Free Trade Agreement in Goods (FTA) with ASEAN on August 13, 2009, which came into force on January 1st 2010. Further the signing of FTA in Services and Investment in September 2014 would provide huge opportunity to Indian professionals to work in SEA besides attracting FDI from ASEAN region. However, due to domestic pressures, India has got 489 agricultural products excluded from the FTA but it is a major step forward. This agreement would reduce the tariff to zero on the products covered under it between 2013 and 2016 (The Tribune 2009). Duty on products included in the sensitive list, including tea, coffee, spice and rubber would be reduced by 2019. Under India-ASEAN FTA, a 10 years period was being provided to prepare the stakeholders of sensitive products to adjust themselves to the gradual lowering of import duty (Chhibber 2009). Although, India is not the equal partner of ASEAN in terms of trade in goods as India's exports are less than its imports from the ASEAN but

India is certainly going to gain from the FTA in long run, notwithstanding its short term disadvantages. ASEAN is India's fourth largest trading partner after the China, US and European Union (EU).

China's economic penetration in ASEAN region is deeper than India as the former is its largest trading partner. In the first half of 2013, China's trade with ASEAN stood at US \$ 210 billion. China-ASEAN FTA envisages removing all tariff barriers by 2015. People Republic of China has already replaced the US as the largest trading partner of ASEAN. China is ahead of India in the ASEAN region in terms of trade and investment due to three reasons: because of its pro-active approach; better network and improved infrastructure. Clearly, the Chinese stole a march over Indians by gaining a foothold not only in ASEAN but also in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Now with greater consciousness of the strategic imperatives, India realizes that it needs to match the Chinese influence across the world and there could be better way to do this, by gaining entry into such trading blocs in which Chinese already have a firm foothold (Kanwar 2010: 11).

From Threat to an Opportunity

During cold war period, India was treated as a security threat by the ASEAN countries. India and ASEAN states were having the diverging security and threat perceptions. Initially, India kept distance from the bipolar politics at global level to ensure its security, whereas, the SEA states pursued the policy of making alliances with US and USSR to ensure its security. India's expanding influence in Indian Ocean and its proximity with Soviet Union were the major sources of insecurity for the ASEAN countries. Changing regional and global strategic reality towards the end of twentieth century has converted India from security threat to security opportunity. Second phase of India's LEP has focused on the strategic element in its policy towards this region. India's membership of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) from 1996 and its active role is looked upon as a useful contribution to the maintenance of security especially in the western flank of ASEAN, fitting the description of the Prime Minister of Singapore at the first ASEAN-India Summit in 2002 that India is another wing of the "ASEAN aircraft" (The Hindu, 2002). The core strategic objective of India in ARF is that it remains to be driven by ASEAN without either being overwhelmed by the US, or dominated by China (Muni & Mohan 2005: 63). There is greater understanding of India's security concerns in the ASEAN region and Pakistan has been deterred from raising Kashmir issue in ARF. Advertent support of ASEAN was tacit when India conducted Pokhran-II in May 1998-as most of the states did not join Japan or Australia for trade embargo. Although, the reactions from western countries were sharp; ASEAN did not pass any resolution against India. Majority of ASEAN members felt that if China can experiment its nuclear weapons or North Korea can do so why not India (Jha 2008: 22-23). To further strength its strategic relations with ASEAN states, India acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003 (Amador et al. 2011: 113).

Generally, it is argued that India and ASEAN are facing the common security threats like piracy, gunrunning, narco-terrorism, poaching, vulnerability of the sea lanes of

communications and terrorism. Large scale piratical attacks not only disrupt the country's sea-borne trade but also threaten its maritime security in a broader perspective. Much of trade between India and ASEAN countries is carried through maritime routes; therefore, the safety of SLOCs is an essential for the growth of maritime trade and over all development of the country concerned. Furthermore, most of the oil supplies to the countries of East and SEA pass through the maritime channels of South and South East Asia (Shekhar 2003: 117). Eastern side of Indian Ocean comprising the area of Bay of Bengal, the Andaman Sea, the Malacca Straits and the maritime region surrounding Indonesia has become increasingly vulnerable to three major maritime dangers like narco-terrorism, piracy and poaching. Similarly Indonesian waters and the Malacca Strait have become prone to maritime piracy, often acting as transit routes for trafficking in arms and drugs (Ibid. 108). In addition to hard naval power, India has also made use of soft naval power to change Indonesia's perception about India, for instance, India's prompt assistance to Aceh with humanitarian aid and medical teams after Tsunami. Recently, Vietnam has entered into the strategic partnership with India and has signed an agreement with latter in which India is allowed to explore oil in SCS.

South China Sea Issue: A Reflection of Power Asymmetry

Contested sovereignty over two chains of islands, the Paracels² and Spratlys³ in SCS has become a perennial source of conflict between some members of ASEAN and China. China's assertive policy in SCS has proved counter-productive because it was fuelling fears of a Chinese threat amongst SEA nations, which forced Beijing to change its strategy in the mid 1990s. Hence onward, Beijing began to show greater tactical flexibility by agreeing to discuss SCS dispute with ASEAN states in a multilateral setting. These discussions by senior officials culminated in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties on

2. The Paracel Islands, which lie off the central coast of Vietnam and southeast of China's Hainan Island, are claimed by both the Chinese and Vietnamese governments. In 1974, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) expelled South Vietnamese forces from the Paracels when Hanoi and Beijing were still normal allies. Since 1975, Hanoi has consistently rejected China's claim to sovereignty over the islands. The Paracels dispute is truly intractable, as Beijing considers the matter closed and refuses to even discuss the issue with Vietnam (See for detail Ian Storey and Carlyle A. Thayer 2010: 57).

3. The Spratlys Archipelago, located in the southern part of South China Sea, is composed of over 170 geographical features, less than 50 of which can be called islands technically. Sovereignty over the features is claimed by five governments: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. Brunei only claims an Exclusive Economic Zones. Sovereignty is contested because of the potential for rich hydrocarbon deposits under the seabed, and because the Spratlys lie adjacent to the vital Sea-Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) that pass through the South China Sea. Since the 1950s, each of the disputants except Brunei has occupied the islands and stationed military forces on insular features in the Spratlys (See for detail Ian Storey and Carlyle A. Thayer 2010: 57-58).

the SCS⁴, signed by ASEAN & China in November 2002(Storey & Carlyle 2010: 58).During 2007-09, the SCS dispute had moved from the back to the middle burner of Asian security despite the 2002 DoC for parties to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes. Recent naval incidents between China and the US raise the possibility that the SCS could once again become a bone of contention if not managed properly (Ibid. 69).The US has again started taking keen interest in SCS dispute as China's assertion there, is hampering her and her allies' interests. Its position on SCS is primarily driven by the freedom of navigation concerns and also by the need to protect commercial activities of its energy companies apart from ensuring security to ASEAN states, which are involved in dispute with China on the SCS.

China has strongly opposed the growing US-Vietnam defence equation and the comfort level with which Vietnam has been courting US to keep China in check in SCS region is worth-mentioning here. Vietnam and Philippines accused China of being domineering in its attitude towards the freedom of navigation and natural-resource exploration along the SCS (Suryanarayana 2011a: 52)and they utilized the Asia Security Summit (2011) in Singapore to demand that China should respect the jurisdictional rights of its neighbours in SCS. Along with other ASEAN countries, they have been contesting China's claim of exclusive sovereignty over the SCS, now they want to engage latter for converting their 2002 joint declaration on SCS issues into a binding principle. Beijing does not respect the principle of sovereign equality of ASEAN states regarding the SCS dispute- as China's Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi asserted that there was little chance of equality in relations with such small countries. He argued that before internalizing maritime dispute with China in SCS, these ASEAN states should remember their economic dependence on China. It was a clear warning to ASEAN states and particularly to Vietnam and Philippines, not to raise the issue of maritime boundary disputes in the first ever meeting of their Defence Ministers, together with Defence Ministers from the US, Russia, South Korea, Japan, China, Australia, New Zealand and India in Hanoi of October 12, 2010 (Parthasarathy 2010: 12).Beijing does not want to negotiate with ASEAN states on the issue of SCS because China has recently defined the SCS- as its *core national interest*, which is not negotiable in the theory of foreign policy.

4.Under the terms of the DoC, the parties pledged to resolve their territorial and maritime boundary claims by peaceful means and exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes including refraining from occupying presently unoccupied features. But this Declaration is neither a binding treaty nor formal code of conduct. As such, the DoC lacks teeth because it does not enumerate sanctions in the event of infringements. Despite these flaws, the DoC did at least represent a political commitment by all the signatories to mitigate tensions, freeze the status quo in terms of occupied features, pursue Confidence Building Measures and work towards a binding agreement (See for detail Ian Storey and Carlyle A. Thayer 2010: 58-59).

ASEAN members involved in dispute with China on SCS are doing the balancing act by engaging the US to protect their interests because on their own, they cannot handle China due to huge gap in the power potential of China and these small ASEAN nations. They have been trying to address this power asymmetry by engaging the US and India but at the same time the ASEAN states do not want the Southeast Asian region to become an arena of contestation amongst the emerging powers from the region and external players present therein. Formation of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF-1994) as mechanism to promote the regional security cooperation has brought the states with widely diverging strategic perceptions and priorities under one umbrella. Main objective of ARF is to engage regional and global players apart from the ASEAN states in a meaningful strategic dialogue in the SEA and Asia-Pacific region, and to avoid strategic competition and conflict therein. It is also aimed at to ensure that the strategic space in this region should not be dominated and hegemonized by any one country either from Asia or from outside. Its purpose is to create shared strategic space in the SEA region by engaging the states with diverse strategic priorities in a common security dialogue. ASEAN states believe in the principles of decision making by consensus. Peaceful negotiations rather than military force and war, quest for good neighbourly relations and the growth of multilateral trade system are the established norms (Kapur 2012: 116) in Southeast Asia.

US response to increasing Chinese assertion on SCS indicates dynamics of evolving power politics in the region. Recently, the US has undertaken military exercises with South Korea to underline its commitment to this region and has even offered to mediate on disputes in the SCS, much to China's surprise because China claims that the SCS constitutes its territorial waters and thereby defining the same as its *core national interest*. Chinese assertion in SCS came as a shock to regional states such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan which also have territorial claims insaid sea. This sea passage is too important to be controlled by a single country and that too by one that is located far away from these waters. Hillary Clinton responded that the US was willing to help in mediating conflicting claims in the SCS, thereby drawing a clear line for China. Being on the sidelines of SCS dispute for the past two decades, the US has now decided to change its posture to reassure its allies in the region that China's growing regional dominance would not go unchallenged. Dispute in SCS is not merely about resources, it is also central to China's ambitions for a blue water navy able to operate away from its shores (Pant 2011a: 10). US along with small ASEAN countries wants to put the system in place in SCS according to United Nations Convention on the Law of Seas of 1982 (UNCLOS), whereas, China does not want the system to be in place because it does not suit to its national interest and Beijing wants to settle the SCS dispute to its favour without recognizing the rights of small littoral states. China desires to pursue unilateralism instead of multilateralism on SCS dispute.

India's interests in SCS are primarily commercial as the ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) has already invested \$ 225 million into Vietnam. As India's trade with Japan and South Korea has been growing, therefore, it is crucial that freedom of navigation is

maintained in SCS through which the trading routes between India and these East Asian countries pass (Borah 2012: 2). Besides this, India's strategic interests in SCS are: to increase its area of influence beyond its immediate surrounding as required by its aspiration of an emerging power, to counter China's String of Pearls policy. While pursuing its interests in SCS, India does not want to annoy China. It is quite obvious from its recent move to dispatch a naval contingent on a goodwill visit to SEA and East Asia, which has made port visit to Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Japan and China. This has happened when tensions have risen in SCS between Philippines and China. Inclusion of China was a strategic move on the part of India to keep channels of communications open with China on the one hand and not to send wrong signals to China on the other, notwithstanding their differences in many areas.

India's Naval Diplomacy

Naval diplomacy has emerged as another instrument of India's policy towards SEA, which means the use of *sea power* in furtherance of diplomatic and political objectives of a country. It comprises of 'naval presence' which involves from warning and coercion to demonstration of goodwill, thus a break from the 19th century popularity of gunboat diplomacy. Indian Navy, similar to other big navies around the world has played a successful role in carrying out its foreign policy objectives. Since 1991, the Indian Navy's interaction with the littoral states of Indian Ocean as well as with other major navies increased exponentially. During the last decade of twentieth century (1991-2000), Indian Navy conducted forty six exercises with the foreign navies, particularly noteworthy are the MALABAR exercise with the US and the MILAN series exercise with friendly navies of the Bay of Bengal littoral (Bhattacharyya 2010: 450). The Role of Indian Navy in diplomatic and benign contexts has been exemplified by the joint naval exercises and joint patrolling of the sea gates and choke points which, has been indicated in the MILAN exercises off the Andaman Islands-headquarters of the Andaman and Nicobar Tri-service command (Prabhakar 2009: 235). These islands in the Bay of Bengal form India's unified command for its forward naval engagement strategy with South East Asia and Asia-Pacific. This naval base which the ASEAN countries used to treat as a security threat during the cold war period has now become a security opportunity for them. Moreover, in 2004, tsunami relief efforts of Indian navy earned goodwill among the SEA neighbours. Indian Navy opened itself by allowing the navies of other states to interact and understand its aspiration to become a major maritime power, which has addressed unfounded fear and apprehension among the neighbouring navies and convinced its friends, particularly SEA states that its rising profile as maritime power is also in their larger interest. MILAN exercises have been conducted nine times; in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014. Indian Navy hosted the ninth biennial MILAN naval exercises for six days in Andaman Sea which were inaugurated at Port Blair on February 4, 2014. Seventeen nations participated in the ninth edition of MILAN naval exercises which included Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Seychelles, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Thailand. It is the biggest edition of MILAN since its inception in 1995. Main objective of India behind the MILAN is to ensure cooperation with the friendly navies from the SEA and Asia-Pacific to ensure the peace and stability in Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific regions.

Besides the multilateral naval exercise MILAN, India is also engaging the several SEA countries especially Indonesia and Vietnam at bilateral level. India and Indonesia have actively engaged each other over the maritime governance involving several inter-linked unconventional threats like piracy, maritime terrorism and trafficking in drugs and arms-pertaining to the safety of SLOCs since 1990s. A large part of the Malacca Strait falls under the territorial water of Indonesia and India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands are only 80 nautical miles away from Aceh, the northern tip of Indonesia. Moreover, the disturbances in the busiest and trouble-prone Strait of Malacca can pose a serious challenge to the maritime security of both India and Indonesia (Shekhar 2010: 484). Indonesia has been cautious about China's attitude on the issue of the Natuna Islands, near the SCS. With China redefining its strategic reach in the region, it is in both India's and Indonesia's interest to have a greater strategic partnership to secure the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Straits from the domination by an external power. To secure Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy is also enhancing its strategic capacity through naval diplomacy and joint naval exercises with the littoral countries (Jha 2008: 440-441). India has already removed the bilateral irritants with Thailand and Indonesia over fishing in Andaman Sea. It has signed memorandum with both the countries regarding this matter and reached out to Myanmar. Consequently, joint patrolling at the funnel of Malacca Straits with Thailand and Indonesia was institutionalized. With Myanmar, Indian Navy gave aircrafts and carried ship visits. Understanding was reached wherein Myanmar invited Indian naval personnel to Coco Islands to dispel latter's concerns over the Chinese build up (Bhattacharyya 2010: 451). Vietnam has also emerged as a major milestone in India's naval diplomacy. On June 27, 2011, the Naval Chief and Deputy Defence Minister Vice-Admiral Nguyen Van Hein of Vietnam visited India. Before his visit Hanoi had permitted Indian naval ships to berth at NhaTrang Port in Southern Vietnam just south of China's new naval base at Sanya on Hainan Island. During his visit, he visited Indian naval dockyards in Mumbai and Vishakhapatnam. Maritime cooperation will be a crucial element in defence cooperation with Vietnam (Parthasarthy 2011: 8). Vietnam along with other Southeast Asian nations perceive India as a benign power whose peaceful rise accrues significant strategic benefits for her to play a larger role in the region (Ghoshal 2012: 9). Vietnam has been interested in procuring maritime surveillance capabilities from India, whereas, India needs Vietnamese cooperation in countering China in SCS and Indian Ocean region (Jha 2011: 58).

ASEAN countries identified India through its nuclear capability and naval strength which could balance China in Asia. It is noteworthy that neither India nor SEA countries have openly expressed concern over China. New Delhi has been prudent enough not to project itself as a balancer against China (Bhattacharyya 2010: 449). ASEAN countries look upon India as a countervailing force to moderate Chinese increasing influence in the region. India's naval capabilities are formidable as its navy is the largest in the Indian Ocean littoral and its economy is one of the fastest growing. It is only country in the region that can match China in terms of size and military power. India's role as a major key player is expected to be strengthened in the regional balance of the twenty-first century (Chatterjee 2007: 71).

East Asia

India's LEP has given it an opportunity to watch its security interests beyond the Straits of Malacca. While providing foot holds in the geo-strategic space of SEA region,

India's LEP has also enabled it to reach East Asia. Indian naval cooperation with the US has improved former's access to East Asia. Further India's involvement in East Asian countries sea-lane security acts as a challenge to China's vested interests in the Indian Ocean region. India's engagement of East Asia is a response to China's strategy of encircling India with a ring of weapon client states including Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, all of whom have been supplied with Chinese weapons(Chatterjee 2007: 72).However, the growing myth among India's strategic community is that China is about to acquire a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean region whereas, the reality is that China is constrained in East Asia, surrounded by the most formidable naval armada ever assembled in world history. American submarines and air-craft-carriers regularly patrol in close proximity to China's eastern seaboard, making the notion of China as an Indian Ocean power a distant aspiration. China remains essentially a continental power (Singh & Sahgal 2010: 8).

In its maritime doctrine released on April 26, 2004, the Indian Navy shifted its doctrine from defending the country's coastline from rival Pakistan to declaring the entire Indian Ocean Region (IOR), from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits, to be its *legitimate area of interest*. New Delhi has already signed agreements with Malaysia and Indonesia regarding naval patrolling of the western end of the strategic Straits of Malacca (Chatterjee 2007: 72).After December 2004 tsunami, the Indian navy was co-opted by the US for a humanitarian core group of just four navies. The other two countries in that core-group were Japan and Australia. Its naval cooperation with US and other states has certainly consolidated India's position in the region. India has been balancing against China since the Chinese invaded Tibet- as desired by its national interest. Threatened by China's rise, India has expanded its naval presence from as far west as the Mozambique Channel to as Far East as the South China Sea. It has been establishing naval staging posts and listening stations on the Island nations of Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Seychelles, as well as military relationship with them, precisely to counter China's own very active military cooperation with these states (Kaplan 2009: 27-28).

Due to India's increasing strategic and economic influence, many in the region see India as a potential contributor to regional stability, manifested most clearly in a successful campaign to include India as a member state in the EAS. India was invited as a formal member of the first EAS Summit held at Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 although China had unsuccessfully campaigned against India's inclusion as it fulfills the conditions set by ASEAN for the membership of EAS. Conditions were substantive relations with ASEAN; full status as a dialogue partner and accession to TAC (Frankel 2011: 12).However, with strong support from Japan and some ASEAN countries, India's participation in EAS was made possible. Both Japan and ASEAN perceived that without India, Australia and New Zealand's participation, EAS would be a China-centric organization (Paul 2008 111).Other members of the EAS are Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and all ten members of ASEAN(Suryanarayana 2007:62).New phase in the LEP is not limited to SEA alone rather it involves the deepening of ties with Australia, Japan and South Korea-all of which are major economies and effective political factors in the region (Muni & Mohan 2004: 322). The EAS further strengthened ASEAN's dialogues with other regional states and allowed India along with Australia and New Zealand to engage not only ASEAN but also with the Plus Three States; China, Japan and South Korea (Amador et al. 2011: 113).For ASEAN countries, India's close integration with East Asian countries is economically,

strategically and politically beneficial. On their own, they do not have the military and economic capability to play a global role, yet their geo-strategic location, with important sea lanes through which major trade flows, has given especially those that straddle these strait, an extra leverage. For China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand these sea lanes are their life lines (Kaul 2010: 433). During his visit to Malaysia on December 12, 2005, Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh said:

India's Look East policy is not merely an external economic policy, it also makes a strategic shift in India's vision of the world and its place in the evolving global economy. Most of all, it is about reaching out to our civilisational neighbours in South East Asia and East Asia (Rajan 2010: 475).

However, China was not in favour of India's inclusion in EAS but it is the only pan-regional forum where both India and China sit at the same table with an opportunity to engage each other in strategic domain. China modified its stand subsequently, with its President Hu Jintao stated in New Delhi in November 2006 that:

Both China and India positively view each others' participation in Asian inter-regional, regional and sub-regional cooperation process. Beijing also stated that it would hold consultation and coordination with India on the subject (PRC Embassy, New Delhi, June 28, 2006 quoted in Rajan 2010: 477).

ASEAN states wish to see all major powers play a positive role in building a peaceful and prosperous region, together with their other ASEAN partners, even as they must invariably adjust to a rising China (Wah 2009: 26). ASEAN wants to be the main reference point in regional security architecture ranging from ARF to EAS. Its centrality in EAS is reaffirmed by the collective decision to rotate the summit venue among the ASEAN members only. India and ASEAN further elevated their ties to the next level by creating a situation for strategic partnership apart from concluding the negotiations regarding free trade agreement in services and investment. While inaugurating the India-ASEAN Summit at New Delhi on December 20, 2012, Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh stated:

We should intensify our political and security consultations, including in regional forums such as the EAS, the ARF and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus. We should work together more purposefully for the evolution of an open, balanced, inclusive and transparent regional architecture (English.sina.com/world/2012/1220/540357.html)

Look East to Linking East

Myanmar's joining of ASEAN transformed India's LEP from within and without by making North East Region (NER) significant for its LEP while bridging physical gap between India and ASEAN region. North Eastern states like Arunchal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur and Nagaland share India's boarder with Myanmar. Besides pursuing economic integration with the ASEAN region, the LEP is now focused on economic development of

these NER states and their gradual economic integration with Myanmar to serve the dual purpose: first to initiate trade with ASEAN region through continental route apart from diversifying the existing maritime trade route and second to prevent the use of Myanmar territory as a safe haven to the anti-Indian elements. India's moves such as the development of infrastructure in the states of NER and in Myanmar and the military assistance to the junta, have all been designed to make India-Myanmar border an area of peace and tranquility in collaboration with Myanmar (Chetty 2010: 456). Development of infrastructure Myanmar includes the construction of roads, railways, island, waterways and ports. First major Indian initiative was the construction of Tamu-Kalemyo-Kalewa Road, a 165kms. highway linking the northeastern Indian border town of Moreh in Manipur with Kalewa on the Chindwin River in Myanmar (Ibid 455). Most ambitious of India venture is the Kaladam Multi-Model Transport project which links ports of India's east and Sittwe port in Myanmar besides connecting Mizoram through river transport and road. This \$ 100 million project would provide an alternative route for transport of goods to NER (Chaudhury 2012). If this project becomes reality, NER would gain an access to the entire SEA region bypassing Bangladesh. By taking the benefit of Myanmar as a gateway to SEA, New Delhi wanted to translate the northeast region from security burden to economic prosperity and opportunity. LEP aims at liberating the NER not only from its presently landlocked and peripheral status but also from governmentalised modes of imaging it (Das 2010: 344).

Myanmar's membership of ASEAN diversified the thrust of India's LEP by providing continental route to connect with SEA region. Prior to that, thrust of India's LEP was the maritime only. Myanmar also acts a buffer between India's volatile north-east region and southern provinces of China. Indo-Myanmar border is eminently suitable for free movement of men and material across international frontiers (Choudhary 2005: 155). Myanmar has become important for India due to three reasons: it provides continental route to its LEP; its role to help India to control insurgency in its NER region and it provides eastern littoral of the Bay of Bengal. Importance of NER in India's LEP in the early years was not realized. Formation of Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand-Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC-1997) and Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC-2000) and inclusion of Myanmar in the ASEAN orbit, brought NER into the geopolitical canvas of New Delhi's LEP (Chakraborti 2010 467). BIMSTEC has been conceived as an instrument for the promotion of trade & tourism in the Bay of Bengal region, whereas, the main trust of MGC has been to promote cooperation amongst Cambodia, Laos, India, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam in the area of human resource development, transport, tourism, communication and culture at large. Interestingly, in all these sub-regional initiatives, India has consciously excluded China because former's growing linkages with countries of the Bay of Bengal region are to counter the increasing influence of latter there (Chatterjee 2007: 75). However, despite the focus of BIMSTEC and MGC on development of infrastructure, sub-regional groupings are still at the initial stage and much needs to be done before positive results can be seen (Kaul 2006: 320-321).

Asia-Pacific Region

Apart from Southeast Asia and East Asia, China is also keen to change power equation by replacing US as dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region. Expanding influence of China in Asia-Pacific region is reality but it is neither taken as a positive development by the countries from this region nor by the US. Clearly, the Chinese stole a march over

India by consolidating its foothold in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Now, with greater consciousness of the strategic imperatives, India realizes that it needs to match the Chinese influence across the world and there could be no better way to do this than gaining entry into such trading blocs (Kanwar 2010: 11). Members of ASEAN and APEC are favourably inclined today towards India than they ever were. While addressing the parliament during his visit to India on November 8, 2010, US President, Obama, urged India to upgrade its policy from “looking east” to “engaging east” because India’s emergence is seen as positive development by Asia-Pacific nations as they believe that India can play a balancing role in East Asia and Asia-Pacific region. It was reflected in Australia’s recent decision to reconsider its ban on the sale of uranium to India (Pant, 2011b: 10). If Australia finally decides to sell uranium to India, it could emerge as a reliable supplier of energy and commodities to India, enabling the development of a similar kind of bilateral relationship that Australia had developed with Japan and China (Panda & Baruah 2010: 211). Now, the strategic priorities of New Delhi and Washington are in alignment as America’s Asia-Pacific policy will come unhinged without Indian support, and Indian desire to effectively balance China will remain just that a desire without American support (Pant, 2011b: 10). The US has been strengthening its alliances with Japan and Australia to maintain a balance vis-à-vis the rising power of China. Chinese strategic thinkers tend to see this, as well as the closer US-India strategic cooperation, as attempts to encircle and conscribe China (Singh 2010: 26). To further strengthen its position, US has already enhanced its military presence in the Asia-Pacific, with 2500 US marines operating out of a de facto base in northern Australia (The Tribune 2011: 15). During his visit to Australia in November 2011, the US President Barack Obama said:

It is appropriate for us to make sure...that the security architecture for the region is updated for the 21st century and this initiative is going to allow us to do that (Ibid).

China is interpreting this development as an attempt by the US to isolate and encircle it with bases in Japan, South Korea and Australia but President Obama stressed that

It is not an attempt to isolate and encircle the PRC because China has not being excluded from the planned Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) on trade. China as a rising power must take on greater responsibilities to ensure free trade and security in the region. It is important for China to play by the rules of the road and, in fact, help underwrite the rules that have allowed so much remarkable economic progress (Ibid).

Beijing does not want to help Washington in writing the rules of the game which suit the national interest of latter rather than the former. Instead, Beijing aspires to write the rules of game according to its own expanding national interests as a rising power in Asia-Pacific. Asia-Pacific region is priority area in US foreign policy. As of now the hold of the US is stronger as compared to China however the latter as a rising power has not only been trying hard to expand its influence but also to replace US, as a major player in this region. However, the US is not ready to lose its primacy to China in Asia-Pacific region rather the recent policy statements from the Washington indicate that after Afghanistan and Iraq, now Asia-Pacific is a priority area for US. To further strengthen its hold over

Asia-Pacific, the US is not only courting with India but also augmenting its presence and strategic infrastructure in the region. The US does not want to confront China in Asia-Pacific provided the latter operates within bounds of existing power structure in the region. However, it does not suit to the stature of rising China to abide by the existing power structure in Asia-Pacific region because, PRC's national interest demands to alter that power structure to its favor. Divergence of strategic national interests between US and China and convergence of the same between US and India in Asia-Pacific is quite visible. Although, India is junior player, in the power hierarchy of said region because after the US, the PRC is second major player there but India has one advantage as compared to China as the nations from the region and the dominant power (US) therein are encouraging India to expand its influence in Asia-Pacific. Whereas, the US and Asia-Pacific nations are afraid of the increasing influence of China in this region.

Conclusion

To conclude, it can be articulated that India's policy towards SEA has witnessed a shift since 1992. ASEAN region being a US area of influence and India being a non-aligned country and subsequently its proximity with Soviet Union kept them apart during the cold war era, notwithstanding this fact that they were having convergence of interests on the expanding influence of China in SEA. While responding to changing economic, political and strategic landscape at global, Asian and SEA levels, India articulated its LEP to engage ASEAN countries. Its LEP has travelled a long journey during the last twenty years and has expanded India's engagement not only with ASEAN states but also with East Asian and Asia-Pacific nations. India's increasing influence in these regions is being projected as a strategy to curtail the expanding influence of China. It is further argued that India is now operating as a partner of US to check increasing Chinese influence in these regions because for US and Asia-Pacific nations the PRC is prospective rival. To have a grasp over the reality prevailing in SEA, East Asia and Asia-Pacific regions, the need is to comprehend the same beyond this established notion.

India's national interest in SEA, East Asia and Asia-Pacific regions demands to collaborate with nations with whom it has convergence of interests and to compete and curtail the influence of those countries with whom, it has divergence of interests. Evolving scenario in these regions has led to the convergence of interests not only between India and ASEAN but also former's convergence of interests with US, Japan, South Korea and Australia in SEA, East Asia and Asia-Pacific regions. However, this convergence of interests amongst the diverse players in these regions is driven by their respective national interests and common threat perception. China's assertive behavior in SCS and ECS apart from its expanding clout in Southeast Asia, East Asia and Asia-Pacific region has become the cause of worry for the states from these regions, US and India. China's national interest demands, to challenge the existing power structure in these regions and to write the new rules of game to her advantage, whereas, the US, ASEAN, East Asian and Asia-Pacific nations want to accommodate China and India and do not want China to establish its hegemony there, rather to construct some shared space wherein they can engage each other to serve their national interests and ensures stability in these regions. US being a major power and dominant player in Asia does not like China's assertion in ASEAN, East Asia and Asia-Pacific regions. Washington wants Beijing to go by the rules of game set by the former in general and international law in particular, which the latter considers, is contrary to its

interest. ASEAN members, US, Japan and Australia are accommodating India with a purpose to moderate China's assertion in SEA, East Asia and Asia-Pacific. Therefore, the LEP has not only enabled India to transcend, SEA beyond Indochina region but has also helped India to engage East Asia and Asia Pacific nations.

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Industrial Development Vis-a-Vis Power Policy of Punjab

*Nisha Bhargava

Abstract

Punjab is known as the food bowl of India basically due to its fertile land and its persevering people. Of late, the state economy is under shadow due to multiple reasons. On many frontiers, the state has performed fairly well. The overall picture however is not so encouraging. The present study reviews the growth of industrial sector in Punjab vis-à-vis state power sector. Data base is secondary. The study concludes that industrial environment in the state is not conducive to industrial growth. Therefore, a suitable industrial policy reflecting efficient governance, streamlining of procedures and rational incentives is a must. Moreover, considering the requirements of a globalised world, where demand for processed food is growing, agro-industry should be promoted on a priority basis. On power sector front, there is an urgent need to improve power supply position and rationalise electricity tariffs.

Section I

Introduction

Punjab, a small state of North-Western India, has made remarkable progress due to its productive land and hard-working people. Generally, development of a state is synonymous with industrial growth. Punjab, however, is an exception since its growth story started with agricultural growth. The state adopted New Agricultural Strategy in the late 1960s. Since then, it has excelled in agriculture owing to assured supply of electricity for irrigation by PSEB and concerted efforts by the state govt. at providing other essential inputs. All these sustained efforts resulted in Green Revolution, which showed its utmost glory in the state of Punjab among other states of India. This transformation on agricultural front brought Punjab in the forefront in terms of various development indicators.

Punjab, has a population of 2.77 crore, which is 2.3 percent of India's population. The population density of Punjab is 550 persons per square km (Census, 2011). Let us take a look at the areas where Punjab has performed well. Considered to be the food bowl of

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India, the state has observed high agricultural productivity for some decades. The state is fairly urbanized and there is a large market for consumer durable goods. The infrastructure development is excellent and is characterized by impressive road network across the length and breadth of state. It was adjudged as one of the best states in India in terms of transport network as per National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER, 2007). Banking facilities are excellent with high saving and investment rates. People's lifestyle is comfortable and only six per cent population lives below poverty line. There are impressive health facilities with a low death rate of six per thousand. Number of educational institutions is very large. A Survey by the India Today magazine has ranked Punjab as the Best State for four consecutive years (2007-2010) regarding infrastructure, consumer markets and agriculture. All these achievements make Punjab appear a flourishing state quite ahead on the path of development. Ludhiana, has been adjudged as the best place for doing business in India as per a World Bank Study (World Bank, 2009). The state achieved the average growth rate of 6.9 percent during the 11th plan as against the target of 5.9 percent (GOP, 2012). Table I shows Sectoral Distribution of Income in Punjab during various years.

Table I: Sector wise Distribution of Income in Punjab (%)

Sector	2004-05	2007-08	2011-12
Primary	32.7	31.2	22.8
Secondary	24.7	27.6	31.7
Tertiary	42.6	41.2	45.5
Total	100	100	100

Source: Dept. of Planning and Economic Survey of Punjab, 2011-12.

The table indicates that tertiary sector provides the major share of income in the state. The shares of secondary and tertiary sectors have been increasing and that of primary sector has been falling during the recent years. However, of late, the Punjab economy is under severe stress due to a variety of reasons. On surface, the state may appear to be developed; the real picture is not so perfect. Strangely, industrial growth began to slow down in the state during the 1990s when the Government of India introduced sweeping economic reforms by opening the Indian economy to imports as well as domestic competition to accelerate economic growth (UNIDO, 2008). During 1990s, the agricultural sector in the state observed a deceleration and this trend had a constraining effect on the industrial sector too. The state economy is facing many challenges due to the era of liberalization on one hand and due to populist policies of the state on the other. The big question today is: Are these policies sustainable?

Objectives and study plan:

The main objective of this study is to review the industrial growth in Punjab economy and find out whether this development is satisfactory and whether the state is doing enough to boost industry in the state. Further an effort is made to assess the role of power sector in the slack growth of industry in the state. Data has been obtained from various secondary sources. The study is broadly divided into three sections. Section I deals with state profile and growth of state's industrial sector. In section II, the growth of power sector in the state is discussed. Section III offers some suggestions to turn around the industrial sector in the state.

Overview of Industrial Growth in Punjab:

At the time of India's partition, the industrially developed western part of Punjab went to Pakistan and the eastern Punjab, which was relatively less industrially advanced, remained with India. However, after independence, there was large scale infrastructure development in the state to rehabilitate the entrepreneurs displaced from Pakistan. This resulted in rapid growth in the number of small scale industries in the state. The key industries of Punjab are- textile and apparel, sugar, dairy, rubber and paper, machinery and parts, chemicals, auto and auto parts, leather, sports goods, steel rolling and re-rolling, IT and electronics and pharmaceuticals.

Today Ludhiana leads the state in industrial progress and produces nearly thirty percent of the total industrial output of Punjab. Around 170 large and medium scale units such as Ranbaxy, M&M, HCL, Nestle, Dell, Hero Group etc. are situated here. Most of the firms manufacturing bicycles and bicycle parts, automobile parts, hosiery goods, sewing machines & parts, home appliances, machine tools and readymade Garments are concentrated here. Around ninety per cent of hosiery production takes place in Ludhiana. Most of the firms producing agricultural implements, power loom weaving, electric fans, pharmaceuticals, and textiles are concentrated in Amritsar. Jalandhar is renowned for surgical instruments, sports goods, pipe fittings, leather goods, publications and rubber products. Hoshiarpur is popular for wood inlay work, rosin & turpentine oil, paints & varnish, pressure cookers, paper and paper board. Most of the steel rolling mills are located in Mandi Gobindgarh. However, small units are dispersed all around the state.

The state has essentially an agrarian economy with a lower industrial output as compared to other states of India. A prominent feature of the industrial scenario of the Punjab is its small sized industrial units which account for eight per cent of registered small units in India. There are nearly 1,60,062 small scale industrial units in the state in addition to 367 large and medium units (Statistical Abstract of Punjab, 2012). The state produces nearly seventy percent of the best quality cotton in India. The following table shows the industrial profile of the state.

Table II: The Industrial Profile of Punjab

Year	No. of Industries	Fixed Capital (Rs.Crore)	Workers Employed	Production (Rs. Crore)
Large/Medium Industries in Punjab				
1980-81	228	727.42	109767	1141
1990-91	373	4003.08	187311	7164
2000-01	629	16435.07	229626	26577
2010-11(P)	425	40000	235000	82000
2011-12(P)	450	45000	250000	95000
2012-13(P)	475	50000	270000	105000
Small Scale Industries in Punjab				
Year	No. of Units	Fixed Capital (Rs. Crore)	No. of Employees	Production (Rs. Crore)
1980-81	43338	332.12	264869	1118
1990-91	160368	1348.78	668845	4050
2000-01	200603	4109.14	897642	18325
2010-11(P)	168000	8600	1020000	54000
2011-12(P)	170000	9000	1040000	60000
2012-13(P)	172000	9400	1060000	64000

Source: Statistical Abstract of Punjab, Various vols.
 Economic Survey of Punjab, 2012-13.
 P = Projected.

The table shows that there has been a steady growth of small scale industries regarding number of units, capital invested, employees and production. However, the growth of large industries has been slow in comparison. There is an impressive institutional framework to support industrial growth in the state. The Department of Industries and Commerce, Punjab State Industrial Development Corporation, Punjab Small Industries &

Export Corporation, Punjab Financial Corporation and Punjab Information & Communication Technology Corporation etc. play pivotal role in promoting industries in the state and providing necessary assistance. There exists a special cell in the Directorate of Industries, “Udyog Sahayak”, to provide single window facility and to ensure speedy clearance to all investment proposals received from NRIs.

The industrial development in state is lopsided. As the state progressed on agricultural front, large industry took a back seat. During the last few years the number of industries has actually declined in Punjab. In some cases, tax incentives (that enhance revenue) and capital subsidies (that cut cost), announced in Himachal Pradesh have attracted industry from Punjab and the shift of pharmaceutical industry from Jalandhar is particularly notable. According to a recent news report (Hindustan Times, 2014), during the last seven years, 18,770 industrial units have been shut down in the state while no new large industry came up. The Table below shows the number of Joint Stock Companies in Punjab and the number of companies that stopped working in recent years:

Table III: No. of Joint Stock Companies in Punjab and the no. of companies that stopped working in recent years:

Year	No. of Jt. Stock Cos.	No. of Cos. that stopped Working
2000	1331	34
2007	14983	441
2008	15003	2269
2009	15655	110
2010	16279	318
2011	11702	693

Source: Statistical Abstract of Punjab-2012

Much of the urban and industrial areas in Punjab have for historical reasons been concentrated in central Punjab which has led to both urban congestion and higher land prices (UNIDO, 2008). This is another reason of slow industrial growth in the state and entrepreneurs prefer to set base in states where land is comparatively cheaper. Prominent industrial houses like the Vardhman and Trident Group have migrated to Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and as far as Maharashtra. Though the New Industrial Policy of the state had promised establishing of a land bank at concessional rates to the industry, the scheme has failed. Moreover, clearances for Change In Land Use are delayed beyond reasonable time frame and this is another reason of low response of industry.

Punjab Enacted Special Economic Zone Act in 2009 to promote industrialisation. During the same year, Government of Punjab notified its industrial policy (GOP, 2009). This Policy included various simplifying provisions for new power connections. It ensured industry that it will give uninterrupted power supply to continuous process industry and will make an effort to provide regular power supply to the industry. The Policy was modified to offer various incentives for small and medium units-such as VAT (Value Added Tax) and CST (Central Sales Tax) Incentives including exemptions from paying Electricity Duty, Stamp Duty and Property Tax. Moreover, the policy included some special incentives regarding power supply such as: (a) Power would be available to units in approved IT Parks, Industrial Focal Points and Industrial Areas and Industrial Estates at the tariff applicable to industry, (b) under some conditions, the payment of electricity duty on power was exempted.

Last year, in order to attract industry to the state, the state government announced its new Industrial Policy, 2013. This policy provides liberal incentives for food processing industry, electronics and information technology, manufacturing, textile industry, small and medium industry. For example, eighty per cent exemption on VAT has been offered to new units located in parks from commencement of production and started after the date of issue of this policy, for a period of 10 years from the date of commencement of production for products made and sold in Punjab. Besides, there will be eighty per cent exemption of CST for the new units located in parks on all IT and electronic hardware products for 10 years. However, very few incentives have been offered to existing industries. Recently, during Progressive Punjab Investors' Summit held at Mohali on 9-10 December 2013, some large industrial investors have expressed their interest to invest in Punjab. The state which was projected as the best investment terminus at the summit, has secured 117 agreements with both domestic and foreign companies involving investments of over Rs 65,000 crore. However, how much of this investment actually materialises in the state is yet to be seen.

Section II

Power Scenario of Punjab and its impact on Industrial development:

Let us have a look at Punjab's power sector. As regards the sources of energy/power, coalmines, natural gas, wind power and oil are not available in Punjab. Coal is transported from distant places to produce thermal power. There is ample scope of solar energy, the commercial utilization of this source, however, is negligible as yet. The biogas can meet the requirements of rural people to a limited extent only. No nuclear plant has been set up in the state due to security considerations (Punjab being a border state). The sources of electricity, available in the state are hydro and thermal. Three perennial rivers flow through the state and are exploited to generate hydroelectricity. Total electricity in the state is provided by the PSPCL's own thermal Plants- Guru Gobind Singh Super Thermal Plant at Ropar, Guru Nanak Dev Thermal Plant at Bhatinda, Guru Hargobind Thermal Plant at Lehra Mohabbat and its own Hydroelectric Plants- Shanan Power house at Joginder Nagar, Ranjit Sagar dam at Shahpur Kandi, UBDC power houses, Mukerian Hydrel Project, Anandpur Sahib Hydrel Channel, Mini and Micro Hydro Power Plants. In addition to that it gets its share from Hydro Power Plants under the control of BBMB. New thermal plants are also under construction at Rajpura, Gidderbaha, Goindwal Sahib and Talwandi Sabo. A

number of bio-mass and agro-waste based power plants are being constructed by private companies in collaboration with PEDDA based on renewable energy. Punjab was projected to become a power surplus state by 2013.

Rural electrification was completed long back and the per capita consumption of electricity in state is the highest among Indian states (Singh *et al.* 2004). Table IV indicates various parameters relating to the power sector of Punjab.

TABLE IV: POWER SECTOR OF PUNJAB: MISCELLANEOUS PARAMETERS

Year	Power Consumption (million units)	Generating capacity (megawatt)	Power Generation (million Kwh)	T & D Loss (%)
2000-01	19,346	5,683	21,528	27.00
2001-02	19,851	5,700	22,188	26.25
2002-03	20,964	5,702	21,760	25.07
2003-04	22,310	5,701	29,654	25.33
2004-05	22,414	5,964	30,080	24.27
2005-06	24,192	5,919	32,658	25.07
2006-07	26,617	6,201	34,984	24.00
2007-08	30,243	6,609	39,039	23.00
2008-09	29,810	6,841	37,225	20.00
2009-10	31,211	6,900	39,976	20.00
2010-11	32,231	7,035	42,418	17.50
2011-12	33,806	6,918	43,153	17.41
2012-13	35,742	7,706	44,188	16.8

Source: 1. Statistical Abstract of Punjab, various vols.
 2. Energy Statistics of Punjab, various vols.
 3. Central Electricity Authority, Delhi.
 4. www.pspcl.in. Last accessed on 17-09-14.

The table indicates that power generation as well as consumption has been steadily increasing whereas capacity additions have been slow. T&D losses have recently shown a decline. Table V shows the percentage share of various consumer categories in power consumption:

Table V: Percentage share of various consumer categories in power consumption

Category	1991	2001	2011	2012
Domestic	13.6	22.02	24.56	25.55
Commercial	2.74	4.74	7.39	7.73
Industrial	36.26	41.95	34.22	34.00
Public Lighting and others	4.53	2.44	2.45	2.40
Agriculture	42.87	28.85	31.38	30.32

Source: Statistical Abstract of Punjab-2012

The table shows that the share of domestic sector in total power consumed has been increasing. This must be due to increased use of consumer durable electrical/electronic appliances due to high levels of income enjoyed by consumers. The share of commercial sector is also increasing indicating growing number of markets and shopping malls. However, there is not much overall improvement in the share of industrial sector. This is due to power shortages as priority sector in Punjab is agriculture and not industry which has to face long hours of compulsory power cuts. Due to this reason, many industries have installed their own captive generation plants. Hence a declining share of industrial sector. However, the share of agricultural sector has been decreasing. We are aware of the fact that transmission and distribution losses in Punjab were earlier clubbed with agricultural consumption. Therefore, agriculture showed the highest share of power consumption. Now, the power supply system is becoming more transparent and T&D losses are also coming down. Therefore, agricultural consumption shows a declining trend. Table VI shows mode wise power generated in Punjab.

Table VI: Mode wise Power Generated in Punjab

Mode	Percentage Share
Thermal power	49.5
Hydro power	42.2
Renewable energy sources	5.4
Nuclear power	2.9
Total	100.00

Source: Central Electricity Authority, August 2012,

The table clearly shows that maximum share of generated power in state is thermal, which pollutes the environment. Hydro power also has a high share. Renewable sources contribute about five per cent power and nuclear power is obtained from state's share in central sector plants.

For many years, the power sector has been facing numerous problems (Bhargava and Gupta, 2011). It is a well-known fact that free power was supplied to agriculture for long years by the erstwhile Punjab State Electricity Board. This is partly responsible for the deteriorated position not only of the power sector but also of the state on various parameters. What makes the matter worse is that the state government does not regularly compensate the PSERC (Punjab State Electricity Regulatory Commission) for providing free power to agriculture. To compensate for this loss, a high price is charged from industrial and commercial consumers. Moreover, these paying consumers are not even provided regular supply and have to face recurrent power cuts during summer months when agriculture enjoys free power. It is pertinent to mention that those consumers who are forced to shift their consumption when the electricity supply utility resorts to power cuts should be shown special consideration. However no such compensation exists in Punjab. The financial implications state's power pricing policy are grave and this policy has crippled the state economy (Bhargava *et al.* 2009). Thus the power scenario in Punjab is quite dismal and is caught up in an inherent crisis.

The Regulatory Process and its outcome:

The PSERC was constituted during the year 1999 and though it started the regulatory process soon afterwards, it has not been able to discharge its duties effectively due to the policy of free/subsidised power to agriculture sector. Tariffs for industry and commerce are many times higher as compared to the agricultural and domestic sector. Following the recommendations of the Expert Group on Power Reforms in Punjab (Haldea, 2003), the Govt. of Punjab took the initiative to reform the PSEB. However, even after the inception of reforms, electricity prices have not come down. With the constitution of PSERC and enactment of Electricity Act (2003), the monopoly of state power utility no longer exists and the consumers now have the option to set up their own captive power plants and can obtain power through open access to the grid system. This has also caused industrial electricity demand from the state electric utility to come down.

The industry in the state has been resisting the unreasonably high price charged from them. According to a news report, the industry strongly opposed the proposed hike of 55 per cent in power tariff and there was a feeling that this proposal of PSPCL will be a severe blow to the sector. Already, industry was being charged Rs 4.47 per unit to Rs 4.95 a unit apart from a fuel surcharge of 8 paise per unit, electricity duty of 13 per cent and 10 paise as octroi. However, power to farm sector, SC domestic consumers and non-SC BPL consumers was free with state providing subsidy to the tune of about Rs 4,200 crore per annum (The Economic Times, 2012). This point was raised by the industry while filing objections with PSERC on Annual Revenue Requirement (ARR) petition filed by Punjab State Power Corporation Limited (PSPCL) in 2012-13. Recently, The PSPCL has sought a 10 per cent hike in tariff next year to cover revenue deficit. Consequently, industry

representatives in Punjab have requested PSERC not to announce any tariff hike since they opined that in all regulatory processes, the commission always favoured PSPCL despite deteriorating industrial scenario in the state. They objected to high cross subsidies, wheeling charges and fuel surcharge (Business Standard, 2014). They feel that these charges as well as power rates are very high in Punjab as compared to neighbouring states and are increased every year. There was no respite from tariff hike even after new thermal plants became critical. The Industrial & Commercial Undertaking (CICU) of Punjab opine that on one hand, PSPCL claims Punjab to be a power surplus state and on the other it is demanding power tariff hike from the regulator which is self-contradictory as now PSPCL will have to purchase less power from outside. They attributed the industrial slackness in the state to high power tariffs. The Federation of Association of Small Industries of India (FASSI) had already expressed a similar view (The Hindustan Times, 2014a). Some segments have also demanded that a retired judge should be appointed the chairman of PSERC so that tariffs can be rationalised. Table VII shows the revenue from sale of power to different consumer categories:

Table VII: Revenue from Sale of Power (In Rs. Crore)

Category	2008-09	2009-2010	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13
Domestic	2642.82	3147.647	3862.63	4460.959	5250.58
Industrial	4268.35	4728.592	4682.721	5147.368	6452.56
Agricultural	0.00	-0.03	520.61	1.63	3.08
Others	2099.29	812.728	922.144	1087.125	1290.86
Total	9010.46	8688.94	9988.10	10697.08	12997.08

Source: http://www.pspcl.in/docs/revenue_from_sale_of_power.htm.
Last accessed on 17-09-14.

It is evident from the table that the state power utility receives maximum revenue from industrial and domestic sector. On the other hand, revenue receipts from agricultural sector are meagre.

Section III

Policy Implications:

After the detailed review of Punjab's industrial Sector and power policy, this study suggests that an appropriate electricity pricing policy is the need of hour. This study does not suggest that subsidies to agriculture should be reduced or withdrawn. Agriculture is subsidised everywhere in the world. However, this subsidy should not be at the cost of other consuming sectors. A rational electricity pricing policy should be followed so that

none of consumer category enjoys undue advantage or bears unnecessary burden. If the state government provides subsidised power to any sector, it must compensate the power corporation for the same.

To solve the problem of power shortage, more power should be generated using renewable sources. The scope of solar energy is ample in the state and it needs to be developed on commercial scale. In fact, Punjab needs to adopt a diverse mix of various renewable and non-renewable sources of power. Though transmission and distribution losses have come down, still these are ruling at 17 per cent and need to be brought down significantly to improve power supply situation in the state. Electricity/energy conservation measures should be widely publicized. There is a potential for energy conservation of 25 percent in the industrial sector. To achieve this, industry should be encouraged to go for energy audit.

It is suggested that small and medium industries should be encouraged and provided policy backup, finance and infrastructure because these have employability potential. Moreover, these can come up in villages as agro and food-processing industries as in today's globalised world; the demand for processed food is increasing. Agricultural sector already provides food to industrial sector and also creates demand for industrial goods through income generation in agriculture. When agricultural season is lean, surplus labour from agriculture can be employed in village industries. This will help to integrate industrial sector with agriculture sector. However, the state cannot truly develop on the basis of small industry only. It also needs large industry such as IT industry, tourism, service industry, healthcare and education. Therefore, the state government should make concerted efforts to boost large industry also. Considering high land prices, industry should be encouraged to come up in border districts. Industrial research should be encouraged in areas of food processing and other agro-industries. The Government should provide subsidised and uninterrupted power supply to industry. This should be accompanied by policy support and streamlining of procedures. Accountable Leadership is need of the hour.

The analysis of Punjab's industrial sector reveals that development of the sector is far from inclusive. The study emphasizes on better governance, rational incentives to industries and the improvement in power supply position of the state. Most of the problems of the state are due to governance failure. It can be a model state if it is governed well. It has brave population capable of sustained hard work. The state has done well on many fronts. However, a state cannot truly embark on the growth path unless its secondary sector is progressing well.

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Engineering and Knowledge Formation in Colonial India: A Case Study of Roorkee Civil Engineering College

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Abstract

From elucidating the exploitative and dominating tendencies in growth of western science in colonial India¹, the history of science in recent times has moved from this monolithic representation of facts to a convergence model that focuses instead on the interaction of western sciences with indigenous forms of knowledge. Historical journey of development of science and technology in India cannot be confined to a particular theoretical framework. Varied interests and ideologies shaped the progress of science in nineteenth century

The focus of this paper is to describe the social and institutional mechanism that led to the formation of the first civil engineering college in India. A complex web of factors ranging from colonial government imperatives to individual aspirations were involved in this institution building exercise. An attempt has been made here to relate those factors with a larger historical picture that was emerging in the educational arena of nineteenth century India.

During the winters of 1847 in a small village, Roorkee, located about 80 miles from the cantonment of Meerut in the North Western Provinces of India a handful of military engineers started giving to the local youths² under tents, instructions in civil engineering with a hope of employing them in the canal department in the coming future.

Canal activities in subsequent stages of their development threw challenges both physical and intellectual in nature. The technical and administrative intricacies of canal irrigation were interwoven into the agrarian structure of north Indian society.³ Local irrigation practices were influential in shaping the patterns of distribution and use of canal waters.⁴ For a military engineer educated in English conditions this was more than a pedagogic crisis whose embedded knowledge had to make space for adjustments that were socially and culturally adaptable to the changed circumstances.

In Britain the education of civil and military engineers was based on divergent set of principles. Whereas the education of the military engineers was formal and organized, civil engineering still carried the impression of the old apprenticeship and pupilage system. With no clear division between different branches of engineering the incipient civil engineers in Britain were mostly drawn from diverse fields of occupation versatile in many forms of

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Panjab University Research Journal Arts, Volume XL, April-October 2013

crafts and skills. Traditional empirical skills were still valued in the process of making a civil engineer and the inclination towards studying nature in all its dimensions kept the nuances of a bridge builder or architect out of academic curricula in Britain. The new sciences that sprang in Oxford and Cambridge from the seventeenth century promoted natural philosophy, geometry, astronomy and mathematics rather than contributing anything to the technical arts whose general diffusion still remained in the hands of craftsmen working in the mills and factories. (Musson and Robinson 32-35).

British government in the nineteenth century entrusted the work of renovating and expanding the dying canals of Mughal and pre Mughal period of Northern India to military engineers of Bengal army. The motive was to remodel the old canals that had become defunct to the rising commercial and political needs of imperial power so as to make them a constant source of revenue maximization. In the coming decades, this network of irrigation projects was to crisscross whole of Northern India affecting the social and economic structure in a major way. (Whitcombe)

Military engineers comprehended the social world around them using their own forms of knowledge and thinking (Cohn 53). The learning process at military seminaries in England was subservient to the needs of imperial expansion. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century British government was engaged in a series of wars in the colonies. Subjects like field engineering including fortification, military surveying and artillery found more relevance in moulding the character of Military engineer during this period. The ideas and practices that engineers used in their formative years of canal construction in northern India were primarily those learnt at military colleges in England.

Belief in universal applicability of western principles led early canal engineers to import and apply laws relating to discharge and flow of water to Indian rivers. For example, while calculating and adjusting the excessive slope of canal waters, Proby Cautley freely applied formula devised by French engineer Dubuat to reach the desired result. (Brown 193-94) Richard Baird Smith while studying the flow of discharge and the corresponding module to control the volume of water to the fields in Italy referred to foreign module as a text book by which our operations must necessarily be guided.⁵ The theoretical proximity of western knowledge was further enhanced by physical examination of their hydraulic systems.

But such enthusiasm was short-lived. As the nature of works extended to civil domains in the nineteenth century particularly the construction of large canal systems in northern India the gaps in the application of exotic hydraulic engineering practices to different topographical environment became evident. The hydraulic theories of Europe were a result of observation and experimentation on rivers of smaller description. In India the engineers had to deal with large rivers usually carrying huge volumes of waters during peak seasons. A different geomorphic structure containing huge mountain torrents, rapids and sandy beds posed a challenge unknown to their European brethren⁶. Experiments grounded on western conceptions received a setback.

Contingent to the success of technical projects was inclusion of practices and procedures that were socially viable. Futility to proceed on purely theoretical concepts of west led engineers to integrate other forms of knowledge than their own in canal works.

Indigenous novelties permeated the western conceptions of irrigation practices and procedures.

Social interaction of British engineers with the peasant community had intellectual consequences as well. In canal works local men called “*lallahs*” formed a composite group who had been traditionally employed by the zamindars to repair and maintain their water courses. They were young men educated in one of the schools and colleges of the provinces in mathematics and other scientific subjects. British engineers in course of their engineering works in northern India found these men well versed in practical aspects of construction but deficient in theory. In 1830s expediency of canal works and shortage of trained men from England led Richard Baird Smith, in-charge of Eastern Jumna Canal, to start giving instructions to these *lallahs* in the theoretical aspects of the civil engineering. James Thomason, Lieutenant Governor of North Western Provinces, on his visit to canal works took hint from this school of Baird Smith and envisioned a broader scheme for establishment of an exclusive college for civil engineers in Roorkee, the site of Ganges canal works.

Social institutions do not grow in isolation. It was in a particular intellectual milieu that Civil Engineering College came up at Roorkee. What particularly affected the organization of college was the level of scientific instruction prevalent and the cultural preparedness to appropriate such knowledge.

Two contradictory trends define the development of science education in India prior to opening of the college. The educational policy of government related to scientific instruction in the nineteenth century was amorphous. Introduced as a liberal and utilitarian project, the development of science education in India became concomitant to the rapid expansion of public works like roads, canals and railways. Signalling the herald of a reformist era, these works were seen as a symbol of modernity and an indication of what western scientific knowledge can achieve in a distant land like India (Adas 194-95). However a large gap existed between the rhetoric of scientific education and its actual implication in colonial context.

Government encouragement of scientific fields like Surveying, Mapping and Medical was constrained by the imperial motives. Engineering classes were started in Bombay and Madras but were mainly for training of artificers, sub-surveyors and assistants and were defunct by the middle of the century due to neglect.⁷ Indians often found their place as subordinates in these enterprises. In general education too, government policy regarding funding of Oriental and Western Studies was never clear and before 1830s a large share was appropriated by classical Subjects like Arabic, Persians and Sanskrit.

On the other hand this period also saw the popularization of sciences owing to efforts of individual and learned societies. The Asiatic Society of Bengal since its inception in 1784 provided a platform for amateur and professional contributors to share their experiences and researches in topics related to natural history, medicine and physics⁸. Many articles related to scientific subjects and survey operations appeared in contemporary journals like *Asiatic Researches*, *Journal of Asiatic society of Bengal*, *Gleanings in Science etc.* From 1830s there was improvement in the teaching of scientific and mathematical subjects. The Hindu College in Calcutta widened its curriculum to include lectures in mechanics and hydrostatics (Kopf 183). Similarly in North Western Provinces, the local educational

committees reported a favourable response of public to subjects like natural philosophy, optics, astronomy, mechanics, hydrostatics, calculus and trigonometry.⁹ Delhi College from 1828 was witness to cultural revivalism and emergence of a hybrid form of knowledge in which scientific education was democratized and localized through translations of European scientific subjects in Urdu language (Pernau).

Thomason's opinion regarding education of civil engineers in India was shaped by certain features that were peculiar to general development of education in the North Western Provinces. In the mid-1830s this province was subjected to revenue settlements under Robert Bird which transferred traditional property rights of landed gentry to peasant cultivators (Bhanu 167). Measurement of land and maintenance of land records was made compulsory under the new arrangements. To properly realize the effect of these changes it was necessary to provide a minimum level of literacy to peasants so that they became aware of their rights and privileges (Bayly 220). On the other hand, the revenue settlement greatly reduced the power of the zamindars and talukadars who had till now wielded powerful influence over educational matters in villages. With the removal of traditional patrons of education and establishment of direct relations with the peasant, any endeavour for education was made contingent to the needs and aspirations of the agricultural community.

In irrigation too, extension of canal waters to agricultural districts of north western provinces widened the ambit of the engineer's work and brought him close to revenue structure and property rights of lands. "The effect of imposing on the irrigation officer the duty of supervising the assessments and the internal distribution of the water supply has been to bring him into a closer and kindlier touch with the cultivators, and to give him a more detailed knowledge of their wants than would have been possible in northern India under any other system of management."¹⁰

"An ideal irrigation officer", was summarized as "someone more than either engineer or revenue officer. He is constantly inspecting every part of the system, looking after both his public works, subordinates on the canal works and banks, and his revenue establishment in the fields and the villages, and hearing all the petitions and complaints of the cultivators."¹¹ Within this idealized description, the role of an engineer extended beyond that of a scientific expert to a paternalistic figure, the success of whose technical knowledge hinged on a more proactive role with the immediate social structure.

Thomason's plan for a Civil Engineering College stood on this congruence of a widely distributed elementary education with a higher form of learning that was responsive to its surroundings. The plan in 1844 which Thomason had suggested at Saharanpur under the guidance of Baird Smith was based on monitorial system where students from Agra and Delhi colleges were to be instructed in levelling, surveying and plan making to act in future as instructor for the local youths employed in canal works. "The intention is, that these youths should impart a portion of their mathematical knowledge to the best of the subordinates in the engineering department, and that these, on the other hand, should communicate to the former the practical acquaintance with the mode of constructing public works, which alone they possess."¹²

But the scheme was hampered by the reluctance of the Military Board and the Council at Calcutta to extend the benefit of secure employment to native engineers like the

judicial and the medical services where inducement of such nature was a source of attraction for young men. "We can at present only respectfully suggest that classes be formed in the government colleges in imitation like institutions in England and the students, according to their progress, be sent out, as they are in England, to acquire practical skill. When individuals come from colleges properly educated, it will be easy for them to provide them with employment suitable to their qualifications, and we would allow every grade in the department of public works to be open to them."¹³ Only on a trial basis some students from the Agra and Delhi colleges were sent under Baird Smith¹⁴ at Saharanpur with upper limit of such students set to four.

This was a challenge to Thomason whose intentions were not confined to a constricted view entertained by government of producing only subordinates for public works but was meant to redistribute technical knowledge to a wider social stratum. "When the mind of the whole people has thus been raised to a sense of the importance of knowledge, it is natural to suppose that many from the mass will advance further, and cultivate literature for the higher rewards it offers, or even for the pleasure which its acquisition occasions."¹⁵ His ideas also found consonance with an increasing number of British and Anglo Indians, and a certain proportion of educated Indians who sought openings in government services for themselves and their sons. Officers of the Company Infantry, with little prospect of service in the field, wished to qualify as engineers; and non commissioned officers of British units hoped to become their subordinates in engineering employment (Sandes 353).

In 1847 the focus of works shifted to Roorkee from Saharanpur where Ganges Canal works were on full swing. Thomason seized this opportunity and reformulated his plan. "The establishment now forming at Roorkee near the Solani aqueduct on the Ganges canal affords peculiar facilities for instructing civil engineers. There are large workshops and extensive and most important structures in course of formation. There are also a library and a model room. Above all a number of scientific and experienced engineer officers are constantly assembled on the spot occasionally resorting there".¹⁶

Lord Hardinge, unlike his predecessor, had a sympathetic opinion about public works and realising the benefits deriving from such a venture gave his consent to the proposal. The college came up in the November of 1847 through a government notification and with it commenced a new chapter in educational history of India.

Roorkee College resembled a close knit social organization in which the experience of previous generation of engineers was internalized within the physical environs of classes and transmitted theoretically and practically by the way of courses and curriculum especially adapted in Indian conditions to the young generation of engineers that had assembled there."Education does not consist in mere book learning, which will pass off to advantage in a set examination. It consists also in the habits of industry, method, observation and practical skill, which can be best acquired amongst such works as those which exist at Roorkee."¹⁷

Students from nearby schools and colleges having passed a certain level of education were wielded into a more practical course of irrigational science whose depth was to be derived from the experience of the nearby works on Ganges Canal¹⁸The sharp boundaries defining the transfer of knowledge in other branches of learning was diluted in the college

where local youths received engineering education along with other Europeans students with prospect of employment open to all classes.

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Winding Down a War: An Anatomy of the US Military Debacle in Afghanistan

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Abstract

The 'winding down' of Afghan war is an unavoidable choice for US President Barack Obama. For political as well as economic reasons; his administration is not in a position to commit a large number of US troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014. President Karzai's denial of signing the bilateral security agreement; the elimination of Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda network from Afghan soil has given Obama enough space for window dressing; and made the US exit from Afghanistan convenient. However, for the battle fatigue Afghans; the re-emergence of Taliban is a harsh reality. For them, war is still on, no matter US leaves or stays. Within this wide frame work, this paper examines the United States' Afghan war policy and offensive military strategies that resulted in a large number of civilian casualties which eventually ensued in failure of 'winning hearts and minds' of Afghans.

The paper argues that the failure of the US war strategists, CIA operatives and coalition forces' commanders in laying down a perfect plan to fight in the hardy battle-fields of Afghanistan has hurt the US military might. The successive US authorities' letdown in grasping the dangers of ignoring a war: miseries of the people against an ineffective and corrupt government for over a decade, and the limitations of using military force in the complex tribal society of Afghanistan has proved counterproductive and cost US, the Afghan war.

Introduction

From time to time various scholars as Grotius, Cicero, Clausewitz, Hobbes, Machiavelli and Erasmus looked at war from various perspectives i.e. ideological, sociological, technological and psychological, but the broad sense of war evolved from the animal state of war through primitive to the civilized and the modern war. Over the years, the conception of war has been defined for various professional purposes by lawyers, diplomats, military experts, historians, sociologists and psychologists. In a broad sense war is 'a violent contact of distinct but similar entities' (Wright, 1942:8). This historical reference of war doesn't make a distinction between a war and a collision of stars, a fight

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Panjab University Research Journal Arts, Volume XL, April-October 2013

ISSN 0970-5260

between a lion and a tiger, a battle between two primitive tribes and hostilities between nations/states. However, in the most appropriate and pertinent way Clausewitz (1832) summarized war as 'an act of violence intended to compel our opponents to fulfill our will', cited in Howard and Paret (1989:75).

Theories of war that define the circumstances in which war can properly be resorted to (*jus ad bellum*) and the methods which can be used in waging a war (*jus in bello*) have developed over the period of time. Wright (1942) asserts that the period of 1492 and 1648 witnessed the medieval idea of chivalry and of a universal order followed by the *Realpolitik* of Machiavelli. From 1648 to 1789 was the period of political absolutism. The period of the 'Thirty Years War' was known as 'the Age of the Judge'. The 'Period of Industrial Nationalism' from 1789 to 1914 saw the treaties of Westphalia, Utrecht and Paris etc. The following age of World Wars and the League of Nations contributed an important change in the conception of war i.e. the initiation of war is illegitimate, until such time as the specified peaceful procedures have been exhausted, according to the Covenant or, in any circumstances, according to the pact.

Justification of US war on Afghanistan

After the UN Security Council condemned the September 11 terrorist attacks and reiterated the inherent right of collective self defense in accordance with the UN Charter, the US President George W. Bush considered the idea of war in Afghanistan as one of the most suitable procedure for enforcing, a just cause like fighting terrorism. He accused Mullah Mohammad Umar for having complicity in Bin Laden's plot to carry out terror attacks. However, the declassified documents of the US State Dept. (2009) reveals that the Taliban leader Mullah Umar had already imposed strict isolation on Bin Laden after the US cruise missile strikes on al-Qaeda's training camps in Afghanistan in 1998. In addition, media reports (2010) imply that the interview of former foreign minister of Afghanistan Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil to the Inter Press Service, which is in public domain, further exposes how Taliban had isolated Bin Laden and moved him to Kandahar, in order to keep him under control. But, for US and NATO countries; the central justification for waging war in Afghanistan was Taliban and al-Qaeda nexus. Gareth (2011) argued that President George W. Bush preferred the military solution instead of dealing with Taliban despite the fact that Taliban was willing to repudiate al-Qaeda as part of the peace settlement.

The hawks in Washington propagated the 'war on terrorism' as a noble cause. They asserted that the war is waged to liberate the Afghan women and bringing terrorists to justice. For them establishing democracy in Afghanistan was a panacea to deal with the threat of extremism/terrorism. They overlooked the consequences of war i.e. the cost of war in terms of civilian casualties and the price that the people of Afghanistan had to pay for their military adventure. They identified victory with morality. However, for the people of Afghanistan; neither the cause was good nor the war itself. After a decade of war, no matter how hard US and its allies are trying to convince the world that from Afghanistan al-Qaeda is gone, Taliban has control over a few pockets, millions of girls are attending schools and people have access to cell phones and public health services, like any other country in the world. Ironically, the war fatigue Afghans, who have witnessed the ugly face of Taliban as well as the US and its allies, feel betrayed. For them the US and its allies, who came to fight the monster (Taliban and al-Qaeda), have themselves become the monster.

Their troops have exhibited insensitive and cruel behavior i.e. burning copies of Koran, urinating on terrorists/insurgents' corpses, bombing and raiding Afghans' homes, killing innocent people and children etc. The US has been preaching sermons of democracy all the while consorting with warlords,² who are accused of grave human rights violations, corruption, drug smuggling and ethnic massacres in Afghanistan. This has further exposed the paradoxes in its policies and practices.

The re-emergence of Taliban in the southern provinces i.e. Helmand, Kandahar, Zabol, and Uruzgan; and in the eastern provinces: Paktia, Khowst, Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan, is one of the harsh realities that they are facing today. Taliban and its allies are gaining control over their lost territories and moving slowly towards the next stage of war: capturing the cities and towns. Though, it is an ironic fact for Afghans to comprehend that the US lead war against terrorism has left them at the mercy of warlords and Taliban almost in the similar way as they were deserted over two decades ago when the USSR withdrew troops and the Mujahedeen, an alliance of insurgents and warlords, lead the country into a bloody civil war. At the moment, however, there are many issues to be debated on failure or success of the US war in Afghanistan but the first and foremost is: Was US in Afghanistan to fight terrorism at large or selectively after Bin Laden and al-Qaeda network? Afghan students studying in Panjab University and colleges in Chandigarh are of the view:

'Had the US been serious about fighting terrorism, it would have gone to where terrorism stems from (the tribal areas across Pak-Afghan border); but instead of doing so, their efforts have remained focused on how to strike a deal with Taliban and its allies.'³

The infuriated Afghans question that when terrorists struck the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 there was not even a single Afghan national involved in these attacks; and as far as the al-Qaeda network is concerned, it is a worldwide phenomenon; so why only Afghanistan was discriminated and invaded? It is true that terrorists don't live on mailing addresses, but neither do they live in the skies. The 9/11 Commission Report (2002) suggests that those, who executed the attacks, were affiliated with al-Qaeda and the maximum numbers of them were from Saudi Arabia, followed by United Arab Emirate, Egypt and Lebanon. But none of these countries were targeted. Therefore, the questioning of Afghans that why their country was the only target, need further examination of the accusations made against the Taliban lead government in Afghanistan in 2001 and the stated US Afghan

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1. Term terrorists/insurgents have been used in the paper for the purpose to distinguish the insurgent groups/allies e.g TNSM etc. from the US State Dept. designated terrorist groups i.e. Taliban, al-Qaeda, TTiP, HIG, Haqqani network.
 2. Term 'warlord' has been used to refer those individuals, who exercise a combination of military, political, and economic power outside a constitutional or legal framework.
 3. Graduate students from Afghanistan studying in the departments: Public Administration, Economics, Political Science of Panjab University, Chandigarh has been interviewed on February 10, 2014. The students were from Kabul, Mazar-e-Sheriff, Kapisa, Paktika and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan. Group interactions/discussions with undergraduate students from Afghanistan studying in colleges in Chandigarh, has also been conducted, February, 15, 2014, in Chandigarh.

war policy objectives. It is in this context the analysis of the US lead Afghan war and its debacle has been carried out.

Research method and data

This paper is divided into three sections. The first section lays out the broad contours of United States' Afghan war policy, within which its stated policy objectives i.e. freedom of women, establishment of democracy and abolition of extremism/terrorism have been examined. For the purpose of descriptive analysis of the US military objectives, a review of the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports, the US State Dept. Reports and Ministry of Defense documents available online on Afghan war, has been done. In addition, an attempt has been made to capture the perception and views of Afghan students studying in Panjab university and colleges in Chandigarh through personal dialogues/interactions and group discussions. However, the author doesn't claim that the views expressed by the respondents represent a complete picture of the situation in the countryside of Afghanistan as most of them were from cities and towns. But, their experiences and insights have contributed to a great extent in conceptualizing the analysis of war through the prism of Afghanistan's socio-cultural milieu.

The second section examines the offensive US military strategies i.e. air attacks, drone strikes, night raids, ground operations that eventually ensued in failure of 'winning hearts and minds' of Afghans. This section mainly relies on secondary data sources i.e. published books, research journals, media reports, wiki leak reports (which are in the public domain), official websites of the US State Dept., Ministry of Defense and the government of Afghanistan.

The third section, analyses the failures of US war strategists, CIA operatives and coalition forces' commanders in laying down a comprehensive and long term plan to fight Taliban and its allies in the tough battle-fields of Afghanistan. For the purpose of comparison, an analysis of British-Afghan wars, USSR military pursuits and the US, NATO/ISAF military operations and strategies has been done. To assess, why the US war strategists failed in comprehending the danger of fighting in the 'graveyard of empires'; this section has considered in detail the relevance of the tribal code of conduct of the Afghan society and especially the role of Pashtunwali in uniting the tribal people across the border, irrespective of the 'Durand Line'.⁴ This section also looks into the failures of US policy makers and strategists in viewing the limitations of narrowing down all the war efforts on Bin Laden and al-Qaeda network while ignoring the danger of Taliban and its allies taking refuge across the tribal areas of (Afghan-Pak border).

4. 'Durand Line' refers to the 2,640 Kilometers long border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It cuts through the Pashtun tribal areas and further south through the Balochistan region, politically dividing ethnic Pashtuns, as well as the Baloch and other ethnic groups, who live on both sides of the border. It demarcates Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan of northern and western Pakistan from the northeastern and southern provinces of Afghanistan. From a geopolitical and geostrategic perspective, it has been described as one of the most dangerous borders in the world.

The concluding section looks into the post US and NATO troops' Afghan scenario and its consequences to the regional as well as the global security. It brings to light the challenges to the transition process in Afghanistan, issues of power sharing with terrorists/insurgent groups; and suggests the way forward.

Section I: A review of Justification of barbarous means for holy ends

a) War to liberate Afghan women

The catastrophic situation of women under the Taliban regime was a good reason to validate military action in Afghanistan. In a radio address on November 18, 2001 Laura Bush, the first lady of US, urged worldwide condemnation of the Taliban and declared, 'Fight against terrorism also a fight for the rights and dignity of women.' Subsequently, in 2001 the US State Dept. released a report that states, the Taliban perpetrated egregious acts of violence against women, including rape, abduction and forced marriages. It is over a decade of US occupation and the noble address of Laura Bush, but the question that most of the Afghan women students studying in Panjab University, Chandigarh were asking was:

'We were caged then and are caged now, we had neither access to justice then nor have we now. We were not allowed to appear in public places without a male relative then and neither now, girls were sold into marriages then and are being sold now; rapes still go unpunished and we are being told by the fundamentalists that a woman should either stay inside the house or in a grave; so what actually has changed for us?'⁵

It is needless to say that waging a war in the name of liberating women is one of the most powerful selling points for the world to buy. The war mongers in Bush administration, realizing that there is nothing easier to sell than the idea of rescuing the helpless women of Afghanistan from the yoke of Taliban, went harping on the issue on almost every platform the western media provided. The most glaring example of this propaganda is, The Time magazine's August 9, 2010 front page display of an Afghan woman's agony, who had her nose and ears chopped off by her husband, asking: 'What happens to women if we leave Afghanistan?'

Bari (2010) reported that Malalai Joya, a former Afghan Parliamentarian, has been routinely displaying the controversial Time Magazine's cover page and questioning the US and NATO/ISAF troops:

While staying in Afghanistan, if you could not stop the President of Afghanistan from passing the 'Rape Law' that allows husbands to starve their wives, if they refuse to obey their sexual demands; and other crimes that are being committed against women (i.e.

5. On the issue of women's plight during the Taliban regime and the successive Karzai lead government in Kabul; and the role of US 'war on terror' to liberate them, women students from Afghanistan studying in Panjab University strongly put forth their views, that substantiate the Afghan women rights' groups claims, in a group interaction with author in Chandigarh, February 12, 2014.

acid attacks, rapes, cutting off nose and ears, burning girls' schools, beating women with lashes in public, accusing them of adultery and executing them in public without even bringing them to the symbolic courts, then why are you here?

Irrefutably, Afghan women are the biggest losers of war be it the USSR lead war in the 1980s, the civil war/the Taliban's war against warlords in 1990s or the recent US lead 'war on terrorism'. The US State Dept. Report (2001) suggests that women comprised over 15 per cent of Afghanistan's highest legislative body in 1977. By the early 1990s before the rise of Taliban 70 per cent of schoolteachers, 50 per cent of government employees, and 40 per cent of doctors in Kabul were women.

It is apt to say here that neither the Afghan society nor Islam promoted intolerance and conservative approach to prevent women from contributing in the development of the country. It was the interference of the super-powers i.e. USA and USSR in the political affairs of Afghanistan in the late 1970s that allowed radical forces Mujahedeen and Taliban to gain ground and oppress women. Taliban prohibited schooling for girls over the age of eight; they shut down women's university, and forced women to quit their jobs. Taliban restricted women access to medical care, enforced a restrictive dress code and curtailed their freedom of movement. Ironically, Afghan women's plight was used to manipulate the world opinion in favor of United States' 'war on terror', but thus far; the US lead Afghan war has failed to liberate them.

b) Democracy to cure all ills

At the time of attacking Afghanistan, US President's rhetoric of establishing democracy, a cornerstone of the US foreign policy, by replacing the barbarous Taliban regime in Kabul had won plaudit around the world. His call for international coalition to fight a war against terrorism was answered by nations of every continent, irrespective of their culture, creed, religion or race. The US State Dept. Report (2002) states:

In Brussels, on October 5; the NATO invoked article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one or more of the allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. 136 countries offered military assistance, 89 countries granted the US military aircrafts overflight authority; 76 countries granted landing rights and 23 countries agreed to host the US and coalition forces involved in military operations in Afghanistan. Military forces from 55 countries increased the US forces in their overall effort.

In addition to the military might, full power i.e. diplomatic, intelligence, economic, law enforcement, financial available to the international community was arranged to counter terrorism. According to the Washington Post (2001), President Bush declared, 'Ours is the cause of freedom. We've defeated freedom's enemies before, and we will defeat them again.' Afghans strong desire for freedom from the savage rule of Taliban; lead them to the streets of Kabul to welcome the US troops, whom they consider their liberators.

In late 2001, the US beaming with an unexpected easy victory over Taliban with the help of Northern Alliance, a conglomerate of militia groups lead by warlords (i.e. Abdul Rashid Dostum, Mohammad Mohaqiq, Ismael Khan, Karim Khalili, Abdul Qadir, Sayed

Hussein Anwari etc.), arranged Bonn conference to shape postwar Afghanistan. Rashid (2008) argues that both the Afghan and international participants were looking forward to shape a representative government, consisting of gender-sensitive approach and accommodating multi ethnic views, in Kabul; but instead of having a strong government at the centre, the US looked the other way round. It saw warlords more cheap and beneficial in the war against al-Qaeda and Taliban; and supported them to hold key government and political positions in Hamid Karzai lead regime in Kabul. The routing of the Taliban left the warlords in place and immeasurably strengthened. They were now considered US allies and were all on the CIA's payroll.

In effect, both the US and Afghanistan Presidents (George W. Bush and Hamid Karzai) came closer to warlords to advance a number of high priority agendas, from security and reconstruction to counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency. But most of the people in Afghanistan view the pattern of bargaining and compromise, a kind of racketeering arrangement between warlord governors and their subordinates; who otherwise would have been a threat to the state, are now shielding it because of the rewards they are getting. It is an indisputable fact that warlords' entry into the government has further lead their way to take control of every political sphere be it 'Wolesi Jirga,' the lower house of Afghan legislature, or 'Loya Jirga', a large 'Jirga' called to discuss a particular important event or else 'Meshrano Jirgas,' the upper house of the Afghan legislature along with various other key government positions. Rashid (2008:132) further states, 'They are all drawn in corruption and have militias, armed to teeth with US supplied modern weaponry.'

Mukhopadhyay (2009:2-3) presents both reason and argument:

The inclusion of warlords in the governmental structures as the chief corrosive agent has been undermining the efforts to reconstruct the state. Warlord governors have not been ideal government officials. They have employed informal power and rules to preserve control over their respective provinces. Informal politics of this kind is the antithesis of a technocratic, rule-based approach and entails considerable costs, from inefficiency to corruption and human rights abuses.

The post conflict reconstruction model that called for democratic elections and economic liberalization as the cornerstones of healthy statehood has, however, been applied to Afghanistan. But other dimensions i.e. building strong institutions of governance based on the rule of law, civil and political rights, institutional checks and balances that transform the fundamental ways in which a state governs its citizens, has not changed the political realities on the ground yet.

c) Elixir to extremism

For US and its allies, the establishment of democracy in Afghanistan may be the ultimate elixir to extremism/terrorism; but unless a strong central government in Kabul is established, it is unlikely to expect major changes taking place. There is no denying of the fact that the present government in Kabul is weak and dependent on the support of warlords to stay in power. Many crucial ministries including defense, interior, finance etc. have been controlled either by warlords or their representatives. The Economist (2010) reported that the people of Afghanistan are losing trust in the present government because of the

wide spread corruption and ineffectiveness of ministries that are enduring domination of the militias of some key ministers and are not even achieving the minimal effectiveness required.

Mukhopadhyay (2009) argues that the people of Afghanistan enthusiastically accepted the 2001 Bonn agreement that called for a new constitution, free and fair elections, independent judiciary, centrally controlled security sector; and an institutional commitment to protect the rights of women, religious groups, and all ethnicities within the country.

However, after the ratification of the constitution followed by presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2005, the people of Afghanistan optimistically looked forward to the second Bonn conference that laid down an interconnected set of state-building activities to bring about security, governance, rule of law, human rights, economic and social development for Afghanistan. But, unfortunately their government could not meet the expectations and failed to provide security from terrorists/insurgents, a precondition for governance and development. The failure of the Karzai lead government in addressing their grievances i.e. corruption, lack of basic facilities, brutal behavior of coalition forces, war crimes, civilian killings etc. has become counterproductive and shaping the views of the people in favor of insurgents.

Section II: A review of the blunt use of military force

a) The Ugly face of war

According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Annual Report (2014: 1-2) on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. A total of 8,615 civilians' casualties with 2,959 deaths and 5,656 injuries were documented in 2013. As compare to 2012, the increase in civilians' death toll was 7 per cent and in injuries 17 per cent recorded in 2013. These findings show similarities with the record high numbers of civilian deaths 3,133 and 4,706 injuries documented in 2011. Ján Kubiš, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Afghanistan and head of UNAMA said, 'Armed conflict took an unrelenting toll on Afghan civilians in 2013.'

The US Congressional Research Service Report (2012) suggests that up to the end of 2011, over 11,864 Afghan civilians lost their lives in military action since 2007, when the UN began reporting statistics of civilians' deaths in war. According to Human Rights Watch (2002) and Cluster Munitions Monitor (2010), between October 7, 2001 and March 18, 2002, the US dropped over 1,228 cluster bombs, containing 248,056 bomblets in Afghanistan. It is an unarguable fact that both the exploded as well as unexploded ammunition has destroyed the fields, irrigation system, and the livestock in the countryside. People have been forced to stay away from their fields for over a decade that has badly affected the agriculture and the livelihood. The World Food Programme (2014) states:

Over 7.4 million people in Afghanistan, nearly a third of the population, are unable to get enough food to live active, healthy lives. About 8.5 million are on the borderline of food insecurity. Either displaced or Internally Displaced People (IDPs), who are in millions, need shelter/housing assistance.

For sure, these statistics will neither ease the guilt of hawks in Washington nor relieve the conscience of military strategists and the people of the US. Afghan war has aggravated the poverty and the poverty in turn has worsened the plight of Afghans. However, these statistics are only restricted to the direct military operations in Afghanistan but it is essential to remind the hawks that war also kill and affect people in numerous indirect ways. Every aspect that is associated with premature death in Afghanistan i.e. poverty, malnutrition, poor sanitation, lack of access to health care or environmental degradation, has been exacerbated by the war. The US war has created many problems than solving e.g. a legacy of amputees, war affected children and other individuals, who lived in the combat zones, lost their family members and relatives need care to overcome the psychological distress.

b) The price for the loss of life

Every civilian's death in Afghanistan needs explanation to their families because those, who died were someone's son, father, mother, brother or husband. It is needless to say, that the trauma of losing family members/relatives is virtually beyond any explanation that the figures of civilians' death can offer. They can be used either in favor or against the war. But, the loss of a breadwinner in a family, which is living on the margins, makes their basic survival difficult. The plight of the injured, who have survived military action, landmines/unexploded remnants of war, and their families, who are supporting a disabled/dependent person for his life, is severe.

Azami (2013) reported that the question: who is killing civilians in Afghanistan is highly politicized. President Karzai has repeatedly been accusing the US and the ISAF for not taking enough care to protect Afghan civilians. However, the civilian deaths can't be partially or completely attributed to a specific belligerent party. There are various incidents that have been reported by the UNAMA (2014) suggesting that the Afghan National Police, Afghan National Army along with anti government insurgent groups, Taliban, Haqqani network and Hizb-I-Islami are also responsible for killing a large number of civilians. But, since the US and NATO/ISAF troops are supposed to be the protectors of the people of Afghanistan; so any harm to the civilians irrespective of any number, small or big, is intolerable.

In the initial years of war, however, the civilian deaths were most often incidental to combat (e.g. civilians caught in crossfire, victim of bombs that had gone astray etc.). But, in the course of war, the Human Rights Watch (2008) reported that the US/NATO/ISAF airstrikes: in Azizabad (in Herat Province) in western Afghanistan killed as many as 92 people in August 2008. The New York Times (2010) reported that in May 2009 airstrikes in Kunduz province killed more than 147 people. These airstrikes, indeed, showcased the brutality of the air-power and earned the worldwide attention and criticism. Malek (2011) reported that the NATO/ISAF forces called in an air support that killed the occupants of two houses including 12 children and two women in Helmand province. The incident brought in President Karzai's disapproval of airstrikes on the houses of the people.

Besides, the ground fires or incidents that occur during night raids carried out by the US, NATO/ISAF forces have annoyed the Afghan people. The students from Afghanistan studying in Panjab University and colleges in Chandigarh argue:

‘The US and its allies pretend to have high regards for human rights, but where is the respect for Afghans’ rights? Their homes are being raided in the nights; they are being terrified and killed and the only justification is offered that they were suspects of supporting terrorists/insurgents, so there is no need to make any hue and cry for their rights. This is a blatant example of hypocrisy of the US and NATO countries.’⁶

There are many incidents of deliberate killings of civilians as well. Crawford (2011:6-7) said, ‘A number of Afghan civilians have been deliberately killed by US soldiers. Recently published ‘trophy’ photographs taken by the US army soldiers, who called themselves a ‘kill team’, show the soldiers posing with their civilian victims.’ Media reports (2010) from various parts of Afghanistan further revealed that in most of the cases when innocent civilians were killed by the US or NATO/ISAF troops, attempts were made to cover-up. In one of such cases, the US Special Forces troops and Afghan forces killed five civilians including two pregnant women and a teenage girl and wounded several in 2010. For the purpose to hide, they used knives to remove the bullets from the bodies of their victims and maintained that those killed were insurgents and the women were killed before the raid, by others.

Many more such cases be it the Ghazni province incident of killing a local driver or Paktika province murder of a deaf man, the slaughter of civilians in other provinces: Helmand, Kunar, Kunduz, Nangarhar Kandahar etc. made public by wiki leaks unravel even more grim picture of the Afghan war than the official portrayal.

c) Hard to win ‘hearts and minds’

Amid the rising number of civilians’ casualties, it has become difficult for US to win ‘hearts and minds’ of the people of Afghanistan. For President Obama, both issues: the resentment among Afghans and the rising death toll of the US military personnel are complex. The US Dept. of Defense (2014) stated that as on February 28, 2014, a total number of US troops’ deaths were 2,310. In addition, Meyer (2014) reported that of the total number of US troops’ deaths reported from the day one in Afghanistan, over 74 per cent have been reported ever since President Obama announced the first increase in the number of US troops deployed in Afghanistan in 2009.

President Obama in his address to the nation on December 1, 2009 said, ‘Taken together, these additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.’

Meyer (2014) reported that since July 2011 the vigorous line of attack of Taliban and its allies has claimed over 608 US troops’ lives, which represents over 28.1 per cent of the total. The number of US troops killed in the past three years is higher than the Bush administration’s whole tenure 575. Undoubtedly, being a commander-in-chief, Obama has

6. On the issue of human rights violations by the US, NATO/ISAF forces; the Afghan students unequivocally criticize the US and its allies. Group interactions/discussions with University and college Students from Afghanistan held on February 24, 2014 in Chandigarh.

to bear a lot of pressure of people and political opponents. In addition, the US CRS (2011) states that the cost of Afghan war which stands over \$444 billion to the US exchequer is a big issue that needs to be taken care of; as the Budget Control Act of 2011 requires reduction in federal spending including defense spending to put the fiscal house in order.

d) Winding down a war

Obama administration's Afghan policy seeks: a) to prevent Afghanistan from turning into a safe haven for terrorists, b) to enable the Afghan government and security forces to defend the country; and govern effectively. The US Congressional Research Service Report (2013) states that fitting in to the Obama's policy objectives and the agreement between President Karzai and Obama in 2013, the US security mission was to change from combat leadership to a 'support role' by the end of June 2013. However, In view of the fact that Afghanistan is still plagued by factionalism, corruption and is far away from resuming the responsibility of security of the country, hence the complete withdrawal of the US troops is in no respect less than a catastrophe.

Karlekar (2012) said, 'It is a tough road that lies ahead in Afghanistan and it will be disastrous if the US and NATO countries lose patience and heart.' It is true to say that Afghanistan is still bracing for a possible disaster as Taliban/Quetta Shura Taliban, Haqqani network, Al-Qaeda, Hikmatyar led Hizb-e-Islami, and other insurgent groups including Pakistan based Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan are constantly challenging the security of Afghanistan. However, President Obama is facing strong opposition of war both within and outside, as such the US has no other straightforward option than 'winding down' the Afghan war.

In order to understand, how the US military might, world's largest and strongest, equipped with the most advanced weaponry available in today's world for any warfare be it in the air, sea, or at land, pitted against an alliance of terrorists, who are illiterate, poor and wedged in the medieval form of fighting has failed to win. The following section of the paper analyses the US and NATO/ISAF forces' strategic and military failures in the Afghan war.

Section III: Anatomy of the US military debacle

Following the quick withdrawal of Taliban from Kabul, President Bush wanted a quick action in order to disrupt al-Qaeda and capture/kill Bin Laden. The vanquishing Taliban was neither pursued nor it was considered, a primary goal. For US military strategists', the combination of the US air power, the Special Operation Forces and the Central Intelligence (CIA) operatives on the ground was merely a link between the Afghan groups i.e. the northern alliance and anti Taliban Pashtun groups, who were attacking Taliban. The purpose of the operation was to help the Northern Alliance and the anti Taliban Pashtun groups to gain control over the territory controlled by Taliban. By the time, Taliban fled from almost all the provincial capitals and Kabul, both the Northern Alliance and anti Pashtun groups had captured over 70 per cent territory of Afghanistan. The US air support proved a decisive blow to uproot the Taliban forces.

Mullah Mohammad Umar, who held the title: ‘Commander of the Faithful’ leaving Qandahar on December 9, 2001 under the Pashtun tribal law marked the end of the Taliban regime. However, the withdrawal of Taliban from Kabul and other cities, where they were vulnerable to US airstrikes was a part of the Taliban and its allies’ commanders’ strategy to harass the enemy through guerrilla tactics and defeat them in the long run. Taliban, knowing well that the real political power in Afghanistan doesn’t come from cities but from the country side, didn’t attempt to protect the cities. Instead, the commanders of Taliban and its allies followed a strategy of dispersing their fighters and holding enough of the countryside to maintain their political influence to fight a guerrilla war in the hardy battlefields of their own choice. On the other hand, it was virtually irrational on the part of US military strategists to expect that the Taliban will risk its fighters by massing for US B-52 strikes.

a) Failure in shaping the enemy

In a war, it is essential to select an aim and to define it with absolute clarity. Sun Tzu (2009:12) said, ‘The art of war is of vital importance. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin.’ Taliban commanders in the country side shaped their enemy and waged a guerrilla war. They knew that their Afghan enemies, the northern alliance, will not pursue them in their strong-holds and over the period of time, their ability to carry out small-scale operations will negate the value of the US airpower; and draw their enemies i.e. the US, NATO/ISAF into a difficult battlefield on unfavorable terms.

Taliban and its allies, having well acquainted with the rough, rugged, deserted and arid terrain of Afghanistan and the people, who are generally honorable, gracious, hospitable and generous; but tricky, mean and bloody-minded for their enemies, lead a war based on deception. Sun Tzu (2009:14) described deception:

‘When able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.’

Initially, Taliban commanders refrained from solidifying their offensive plans until they had adequately shaped their enemy. In each campaign of attacking the enemies’ strategy, they tag along the most effective methods of shaping their enemy through meticulous probing and observation, using close enemy contacts with the aid of spies and agents. On the contrary, the US, NATO/ISAF military commanders and strategists could not grasp the long term strategic plans of their enemy and utterly failed in preventing their enemy to shape them.

b) Failure in hunting down the enemy

After the withdrawal from Kabul and other cities Taliban’s dispersed commanders got enough time to regroup and consolidate their bases in the countryside. Though, between 2001 and 2005, the US and its allies remained offensive against their enemy but at a comparatively low pace. Katzman (2014:8-9) states:

In 2002, from March 2 to 19, the US and Afghan forces carried out ‘Operation Anaconda’ in Shah-i-Kot valley south of Gadrej (Paktia Province) against 800 al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. In March 2003, the US troops launched ‘Operation Valiant Strike’ to

hunt down the suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters in villages around Qandahar. In the subsequent months, the US and Afghan forces launched 'Operation Mountain Viper' and 'Operation Avalanche'. In March 2004, the US and Afghan forces launched 'Operation Mountain Storm' against Taliban insurgents around Uruzgan Province. From December 2004 to February 2005 'Operation Lightning Freedom' was launched, followed by 'Operation Pil (Elephant)' in October 2005, in Kunar Province in eastern Afghanistan.

On the contrary, in the first five years of the war, insurgent/terrorist groups: The Taliban/Quetta Shura Taliban, al-Qaeda, Hikmatyar Faction (HIG), Haqqani Network and the Pakistani groups (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba etc.) followed a strategy of remaining low profile. They kept low level of violence and stayed away from risking themselves in open attacks. For them, the US, NATO/ISAF troops' atrocities: killings of innocent people, raiding houses in the night, bombing homes and marriage parties provided enough of fodder to mobilize both logistical and popular support. Furthermore, the rising numbers of civilian casualties especially women and children even legitimize Taliban's war in the eyes of Afghan people. Taking advantage of people's discontent with the corrupt and inefficient Karzai lead government and strong sentiments against a foreign power occupying their country, Taliban commanders laid down a perfect siege for their enemy.

In 2006, Taliban and its allies intensified attacks in Uruzgan, Helmand, Qandahar and Zabol provinces. Katzman (2014) states that in reaction to the offensive strategy of the Taliban, the US and allied troops launched 'Operation Mountain Lion' in Kunar Province in the eastern Afghanistan and 'Operation Mountain Thrust' with over 10,000 troops in Helmand, Uruzgan and Qandahar provinces. However, in the face of a well coordinated offensive air and land operations lead by the US, NATO/ISAF troops, Taliban and its allies effectively fought pitched battles. Having detailed information about the terrain and well coordinated network of spies and agents, they were able to move swiftly and surprise their enemy by creating conditions unfavorable for them. They attacked their enemy, where it was unprepared; and appeared where they were not expected. Their tactic of surprise and deception secured the maximum fruits of victory in almost all the operations.

c) Failure in combating the offensive strategy of enemy

Accompanied by a series of failures of military operations against the Taliban and its allies, the collapse of the US and British forces in the Helmand Province Operation in 2009, had given a clear indication that the US and NATO/ISAF forces' strategy: 'shape, clear, hold and build' doesn't work. The commanders of Taliban and its allies had always shifted their tactics and targets from one attack to another. They made use of local people as shields while fighting in the countryside and resorted to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), road bombs, suicide attacks, rocket propelled grenades and suicide bombers to achieve their targets in cities or towns. They target coalition forces, high profile government officials, Afghan security forces and their political enemies.

The assassination of Afghanistan's former President and the head of 'Afghan Peace Council' Burhanuddin Rabbani, suggests a strategic shift in Taliban's game plan. The use of turban (headgear) to hide bombs signifies that the use of cultural and traditional symbols that were not until this suicide attack searched out of respect for Afghan traditions, is no more an anathema, if it serves their purpose. It also implies that the Taliban and its allies

are not only fighting a tactical military war; but a political as well. The impact of their strategic shift is enormous. The high profile assaults and killings have incited doubts among Afghans about the ability of the government and security forces to protect them.

To strike at the heart of the US and NATO/ISAF strategy to operate in closer partnership with Afghan soldiers, Taliban and its allies successfully penetrated into the Afghan security forces. Leiby (2012) reported that a spike in fratricidal 'insider attacks' has enforced the top US commanders to put restrictions on joint patrols and other missions. Since 2007, when the phenomenon of 'green on blue killings' started, over 109 troops have been killed. Taliban's success in creating sleeper agents within the Afghan security forces has seriously undermined the coalition forces trust in their local allies. It has also broken down their long stated philosophy that American and NATO troops are here to work 'shoulder to shoulder' with their Afghan partners.

In addition, the Taliban and its allies have also shifted their focus towards attacking the transition process of the country. In the recent years, they have intensified campaigns to assassinate key Afghan government and security officials, who are likely to play leadership roles in the country once the foreign troops depart. By doing so, they are trying to seize every narrative of the victory. Whereas, the coalition forces have lost the strategic plan that Clausewitz (1832) defined as 'the art of employment of battles as a mean to gain the object of war', cited in Hart (1991:319). At present, the US and coalition troops are more hunted than hunters. Their enemies after regaining territorial control in the countryside; have focused on slow entanglement of the urban areas. The attacks in the cities of Kandahar, Khost, Ghazni and Pul-i-Alam in Logar provinces bear witness to the strategic shift in Taliban and its allies' war plan. Dorronsoro (2009:15) reported:

'In Nuristan and Kunar, the US army is evacuating small outposts that are under constant fire from the local population. In July 2008, the insurgent assault on Wanat, in Nuristan's Waygal district, killed nine men. Eight US soldiers were killed in a similar operation in Kamdeh (Nuristan) in October 2009. In both cases, the bases were abandoned. In Panjway (Kandahar), the Canadians evacuated all but two of their outposts in the past few months, basically leaving the district to the Taliban.'

It is, indeed, pertinent to say that the balance of power has clearly shifted in the favor of Taliban and its allies. The alliance of the Taliban, the Haqqani network, Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) with the Pakistani groups i.e. the tribal areas indigenous version of Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan), Lasker-e-Taiba and Tehrik Nefaz-e-Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM), is intact and relentlessly targeting the US, NATO/ISAF troops across the border.

d) Failure in capping the 'bolt-hole'

The unruly Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan that includes seven tribal agencies: Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, Mohmand, Bajaur, North and South Waziristan, was the first escape hatch for al-Qaeda and Taliban after their departure from Afghanistan. Thousands of al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters settled in Waziristan. They created bases and restarted military operations. South Waziristan's high mountains, steep slopes, deep ravines littered with broken rock and shale; and its thick forests provided them perfect

hideout. Rashid (2008:268-269) said, 'From Angur Adda, in South Waziristan, the first headquarter of al-Qaeda, its fighters regularly attacked the US firebases at Shikin and Lawara, just inside Afghanistan and then retreated into Waziristan.'

The core of the insurgent groups in Afghanistan is the Taliban/Quetta Shura (QST) that operates from Quetta in Pakistan headed by Mullah Muhammad Umar. The release of several top Taliban figures close to Umar by Pakistan has helped him restore the leadership circle. Katzman (2014) asserts that Mullah Abdul Ghani Brader, arrested by Pakistan in February 2010 for purportedly trying to engage in negotiations with the Afghan government without Pakistani concurrence, were released in September 2013. Other pragmatists around Umar are: Akhtar Mohammad, a logistic expert and head of the Taliban's senior Shura Council, Shahabuddin Delawar and Noorudin Turabi etc. have also been released by Pakistan since 2012.

The US officials put al-Qaeda fighters' number around 50-100 operating mainly in the eastern provinces: Kunar, Faryab, and Kunduz of Afghanistan and has access to the tribal areas of Pakistan. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar lead Hizb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin (HIG) is ideologically and politically allied with Taliban operates in the provinces: north and east of Kabul and both its fighters and leaders enjoy safe heaven across the border. In addition to Taliban and Hikmatyar faction, another major terrorist/insurgent group of Afghan origin operating from the tribal areas of Pakistan is the Haqqani Faction. This group has a strong network of fighters around 3,000 within Afghanistan's Provinces: Paktika, Paktia and Khost along with the tribal areas of Pakistan. Haqqani group has close ties with the Pakistani Intelligence agency (ISI) and acting as tool of Pakistan's interests. Katzman (2014:16) argues:

The Haqqani network has executed various attacks including the Indian embassy attacks in Kabul (July 2008 and October 2009), Indian consulate attack in Jalalabad. The Intercontinental Hotel attack in Kabul (June 28, 2011), truck bombing in Wardak Province (which injured 77 US soldiers); and attacks on the US embassy and ISAF headquarters in Kabul on September 13, 2011.

Both the Pakistan based terrorist/insurgent groups as well as of Afghan origin operating across the border enjoys people's tacit support. Irrespective of the 'Durand Line' that divides Pakistan and Afghanistan, the people have strong ethnic ties. They intermarry, trade, feud and celebrate with one another. Rashid (2008:265) states:

They all adhere to Pashtunwali, the tribal code of honor and behavior of Pashtuns that includes melmastia, or hospitality, nanawati, or the notion that hospitality can never denied to a fugitive and badal, the right of revenge. There are over three million Pashtuns living in the FATA's seven tribal agencies besides twenty eight million living in Pakistan and fifteen million in Afghanistan.

People living in the semi-autonomous tribal region in the northwestern Pakistan provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan to the east and south, and Afghanistan's provinces: Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktika to the west and north are fiercely independent, ultraconservative with an overwhelming strong sense of pride and honor. Sir Olaf Caroe (1958: xv) in his book *The Pathans* wrote, 'These are the tribes, who never fell under the

effective sway of any recorded imperial authority and form the backbone of the so-called tribal belt.' Pashtun tribesmen still form the hardcore of Taliban in both the countries.

However, neither the US war strategists nor the coalition forces commanders could realize that for tribal people especially the Pashtuns it doesn't matter what map says, for every Pashtun be it in Afghanistan or Pakistan the idea of Pathan ethnic identity is pride, glory and honor.

e) Failure in formulating a plan for battle in the 'graveyard of empires'

Devoid of a comprehensive plan in dealing with their enemy, a network of terrorist/insurgent groups, in the tribal areas across the Afghan-Pak border and the unreceptive population in the countryside, the battle tested wisdom of the US military commanders and strategists botched up the Afghan war. Though, they are not the only one, who should be indicted for committing a blunder in the 'graveyard of empires'. There is a long list of empires from Persian, Greek, Turk, Mughal, British and the Soviet, who time and again tried to subdue Afghans, but all eventually ran into trouble.

In 327 BC, Alexander the great faced fierce resistance of Afghan tribes while leading his army down into the Indus Valley. Eighteen centuries later, Babur, the founder of the Mughal Empire in Delhi, made his way through Khyber, but only after having conformity with Afghan tribes. The British invaded Afghanistan three times: 1839-42, 1878-81 and 1917; on each occasion they were driven out. After British, the USSR tried to test the mettle of Afghans in the 1970s. The retreat of the USSR troops from the hardy battlefields of Afghanistan cost the USSR its prestige of being a superpower and dented its military might irreparably, that in fact proved critical in its disintegration as well. Subsequent to the USSR misadventure, the US and NATO countries entered into the fray in 2001. However, after spilling enormous amount of blood and money for over a decade on Afghan war; the cliché is that US, the world's lone superpower, has met the same fate as its predecessors: the USSR and the Imperialist Great Britain did in the nineteenth and twentieth century's.

The necropolis of history is strewn with various accounts of heroism of Afghans, their love for freedom and enmity with foreign invaders. Dupree (1978), who reviewed the Anglo-Afghan wars, goes over to the main points that contributed to the British disaster: a) the occupation of Afghan territory by foreign troops, b) the placing of unpopular emir/king on the throne, c) and the harsh acts of the British-supported Afghans against their local enemies. The British tried to replace the ruling emir/king with Shah Shuja, a British protégé, during (1839-1842); but failed as the people of Afghanistan put fierce resistance. The ferocious tribes, their harsh tribal culture cost dearly to the British. Elphinstone, (1942: xxi) wrote:

'Their vices are revenge, envy, avarice, rapacity, and obstinacy; on the other hand, they are fond of liberty, faithful to their friends, kind to their dependents, hospitable, brave, hardy, frugal, laborious, and prudent; and they are less deposed than the nations in their neighborhood to falsehood, intrigue, and deceit.'

After British, the Soviets repeated the same mistakes; and tried to establish Barbak karmal in Kabul. The Karmal lead government promised general amnesty, creation of a

coalition government, the promulgation of the fundamental principles i.e. freedom of speech, fair trial etc. But, the people of Afghanistan mistrusted the communist government and saw the Soviet intervention as an invasion. Bearden (2001) stated that to suppress the rebellious forces, the USSR deployed a large number of troops around 120, 000; but as the Soviet troops grew in number so did the Mujahedeen, an alliance of insurgent groups and warlords. After a decade of occupation, when the USSR troops withdrew; over 1.3 million Afghans were killed, 1.5 million injured and over 6 million were made refugees in the world. Kaplan (2001:3) said:

‘There would be two mines for every Afghan who survived the war; between 40 and 120 mines per square mile of Afghan territory. Tens of thousands of civilians, if not more – many of them small children – have already been disabled by mine detonations in Afghanistan. Even though the Russian phase of the war has ended, mines threaten to kill and maim thousands more, some of whom haven’t been born yet.’

In no way in the history of mankind, the mines played such a destructive role as they did in the Soviet lead war in Afghanistan. The mines littered the soil, destroyed the irrigation systems, fields, and livestock. They killed and injured the military personnel, insurgents and the civilians alike. This war was fought between two unequal. The invading troops had all the resources at their disposal, whereas the insurgents mired in medieval era had only their primitiveness, unforgiving tribal culture, fierce status for freedom and Afghan pride to drive out their enemy.

Subsequent to the USSR, the US repeated the same mistakes: a) supporting Hamid Karzai government, which is inefficient, corrupt and has lost legitimacy in the eyes of people, b) foreign troops occupying the Afghan territory, which is an anathema to Afghan culture and c) backing the warlords. The CIA operatives, military commanders and war strategists have so far relied on the same old idea of buying the support of the warlords/Khans and the Mullah/Mufti that played a vital role in the victory of Mujahedeen in the 1980s. But, the ground realities in Afghanistan have changed. People, who have witnessed the bloodbath during the civil war lead by feudal warlords in the 1990s followed by the savage rule of Taliban, have an aversion to warlords’ presence in the central and provincial governments. Afghan students studying in Panjab University and colleges in Chandigarh were of the view:

‘The US rhetoric of establishing democracy is just a mockery. Had they been serious about implementing what they preach to everyone, they wouldn’t have supported the warlords, human right abusers, and war criminals in the Karzai government.’⁷

The lack of understanding of the socio-cultural milieu of the Afghan society and the limitations of the use of military force in the countryside and especially in the tribal

7. For the people around the world, warlords are just like any other ally of the US in its war against Taliban and al-Qaeda, but for the people of Afghanistan they are the perpetrators of massacres; worst human rights abusers, corrupt and a threat to the nascent democracy in their country. The views of Afghan students studying in political science and public administration courses in the Panjab University and colleges in Chandigarh further strengthen the facts put forward by Dipali Mukhopadhyay in her paper: ‘Warlords as Bureaucrats: The Afghan Experience’. Group interactions/discussions with Afghan students studying in Panjab University and colleges in Chandigarh held on February 20, 2014.

areas have made the US military strategists and commanders a prey of the misperception that the Taliban/insurgents are terrorizing the Afghan people; so their support is marginal. The US and the coalition forces have relied on a flawed strategy: ‘shape, clear, hold, and build’ to marginalize the insurgency by separating the Taliban from people and ‘protecting the people from insurgents’ to gain control over the countryside. There is no way, in practice, to separate the insurgents from the population. Afghan people are bound together by their tribal, ethnic, cultural and kin ties. Therefore, even to assume that in the Pashtun areas; Pathans will break the rules of Pashtunwali, a rude system of customary law, and they will go against their fellow tribesmen e.g. the Taliban, Haqqani network or for that matter, other insurgent groups, who share the same ethnicity and are fighting against the coalition forces, is a quite farfetched idea.

In reality, the US and NATO/ISAF troops have been caught up in a bloody, frustrating and long-drawn-out guerrilla warfare in the Afghan battlefields. As a part of Obama’s comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan; the increase in number of US troops has fueled the opposition of the Afghan population. Meyer (2014) states that over 2,162 US service personnel have been killed in and around Afghanistan since 2001. Of that 1,593 casualties that represent 73.7 per cent have occurred since President Obama announced the first increase in the US military troops in Afghanistan, February 17, 2009. Ironically, neither the US military strategists in Pentagon nor the hawks in Washington could realize the danger of fighting a war in Afghanistan, justly called the ‘graveyard of empires’.

The way forward

After analyzing the US and its allies, Afghan war strategies and the causes of their failure in fighting terrorists/insurgents for over a decade, this paper argues that peace and stability in Afghanistan can only be achieved through political settlement. The paper emphasizes a number of issues of settlement with terrorists/insurgent groups: the Haqqanis, Hekmatyar’s outfits and Mullah Umar’s Taliban that raises some basic questions for US policy makers and military strategists to consider: a) President Obama’s policy seeks ‘to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan to prevent its capacity to threaten America and its allies in the future.’ To achieve this end, the separation of network of al-Qaeda from terrorists/insurgent groups is required, but in the present scenario it doesn’t seem to happen. The Haqqani militia mainly comprises of Punjabi jihadi groups i.e. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), who are influenced by al-Qaeda. The emergence of TTiP and its leader Baitullah Mehsood by the end of 2008 was an outcome of al-Qaeda’s support and its relations continue to subsist. In the present scenario, the TTiP, the Haqqani network and al-Qaeda are nowhere near being completely defeated. b) It is, difficult to conceptualize how the talks with terrorists/insurgents having transnational networks and different agendas will help to solve the Afghan turmoil. Al-Qaeda has political, global and non-negotiable objectives while the Afghan terrorist/insurgent groups’ primary objectives are the political control and rebuilding of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. There are, however, possibilities that al-Qaeda will agree to the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Omar, Hekmatyar or even the Haqqani network for participating in talks or a settlement only as a strategic ploy to help its allies to take over Afghanistan. c) From the military aspects; the US and its allies’ withdrawal from Afghanistan will leave behind a vacuum and the Taliban and its allies will try to expand in the areas vacated by the coalition forces. Since, the US and its allies’ military gains are reversible; therefore it is apt

to say that Taliban and its allies will militarily gain. d) In the present scenario the US national security debates, lack a frank and serious discussion over the consequences of terrorists/insurgents dominating Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the US, NATO/ISAF troops. The past experiences prove that Afghanistan after 2014 will be an indubitable source of threat to the regional peace and stability. Taliban believes in military expansion and has an agenda to spread Islamic radicalism in the entire region. For the neighboring countries: Iran, India, Russia and the four of the five Central Asian Republics: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, who have supported the anti Taliban northern alliance, the return of Taliban will be an undesirable development. e) Adjusting Taliban and its allies in the political arrangement of Afghanistan needs extensive groundwork and the people's acceptance.

For the people of Afghanistan, who bore the brunt of Taliban's extreme interpretation of the Sharia or Islamic law that banned every conceivable form of entertainment, women liberties, girls' education are not just things of past. In their memories, Taliban's harassment of foreign aid agencies, arrests of aid workers, insensitive approach towards the people in the drought hit areas in the northern Afghanistan that forced many to eat grass, animal fodder and sell their daughters for food are still fresh. The battle exhausted Afghans, indeed, want the US and NATO troops to leave Afghanistan but they are divided on the issue of sharing power with Taliban. For the non-Pashtun ethnic groups, the destruction of Buddha statues in Bamiyan, Kabul and Ghazni during the Taliban regime still bear witness to the extreme brand of Taliban's Islamic fundamentalism that rejects the idea of tolerance to live with other religious and ethnic groups. Hence, it hardly matter for the people of Afghanistan whether Afghan Taliban, Haqqanis or Hekmatyar formally renounce their ties with al-Qaeda or not; because nothing prevents them from renegeing on their statements.

At the end, this paper further argues that it is essential to focus on regional dynamics for peace and stability in Afghanistan. The key player is Pakistan, which has its own ambitions and interests in the country. Though, it is ostensibly an American ally but it has worked many opposite sides. For Pakistan, Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Umar and the Haqqani network are the primary assets to safeguard its interests in Afghanistan. In strategic terms, Pakistan wanted out of its 'cooperation' with the US to make Haqqanis a part of the solution in Afghanistan. It is essential for the US policy makers and strategists to deal with the issue of terrorists/insurgents enjoying safe havens in Pakistan's tribal areas. However, in no way, the paper argues in favor of US troops presence in large/small numbers without having proper standing of the entirety of Afghanistan's internal problems and the complexities. In the meantime, having bilateral security agreement with the new regime coming to the helm of country's affairs after Karzai lead government needs to consider the importance of stabilizing the country while taking care of Afghans opinion. Afghanistan though is in the process of transition but the most significant questions that remains critical to the future of Afghanistan are: whether the US and NATO countries transitioning a stable, popular and efficient government, a well trained, fighting Afghan army, a stable police force, a functioning bureaucracy and judiciary to the people of Afghanistan if the answers are negative then to expect what assurances can they plausibly give are of no value. The people of Afghanistan bearing the miseries of the ongoing war almost for three and a half decade deserve an honest approach of the US and its allies along with the support and

cooperation of regional stakeholders: India, Iran, Russia and the Central Asian countries in their stride from mayhem to peace and stability.

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Nehru's first experience as Foreign Minister

*M.Rajivlochan

Abstract

This paper briefly looks at Nehru as a minister in-charge of foreign affairs BEFORE India became independent. It focuses closely on the curious case of the Fakir of Ipi with whom Nehru had to face a particularly ticklish foreign policy problem since the Fakir was neither foreign nor a respecter of the government in India and soon, after independence, he became a deadly enemy of the Pakistanis—thus being someone who looked up for support to the government of India.

Nehru's involvement with foreign affairs began much before he became his own foreign minister. Often, those who notice Nehru's leftward turn in the 1920s attribute it to his visit to the USSR and his interaction with the Anti-Imperialist League in Europe. However, that simplistic view misses out the complex thinker that Nehru was, his appreciation of the idea of freedom and liberty, his respect for the freedom and liberty of everyone else as also his deep commitment for people to have a voice of their own—in the field of foreign affairs this translated as not being the echo of the British or any other western power and encouraging the emergence of a distinct Asian voice.

Nehru, whilst he headed the Interim government that was formed in 1946, was also the Minister in charge of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations in the Interim Government that was formed after the Second World War and just preceding independence in August 1947. That was the reason he took so eagerly to the task of formulating a foreign policy in the days after independence. At the time of independence he was already a veteran foreign policy hand.

The formation of a National Government for India

Nehru's experiences in the interim government are important since that government was taken by him and his colleagues sufficiently seriously as a proper government of independent India. This was an India that extended from the borders of Afghanistan to the borders of Burma and not the truncated India that came into being with partition. The idea of the partition, when one looks at the records of the time, was yet not an idea that promoted the division of the country into India and Pakistan.

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The idea of an interim government for India came up soon after the end of the Second World War. Before a government could be put into place there was considerable debate within the Congress and between the Congress and the government of India. This debate gives us an idea about how the Congress looked at the Interim Government, what value the Congress placed on it.

Right from the beginning the Congress was of the view that the government needed to be 'a truly national government' and that suitable changes in rules and regulations needed to be made to ensure that the government had a firm legal footing. The Viceroy would insist that 'an understanding' that the government was national was all that was required. But the Congress wisely insisted that 'understandings' usually are the root cause of 'misunderstandings' and therefore a proper legal framework needed to be put in place on the nature of the Interim Government, its powers and the limits to its power.¹"Dear Lord Wavell', wrote Maulana Azad, the then Congress President to the Viceroy on May 25th, 1946, 'Your Excellency will remember that the demand of the Congress from the very beginning of the present discussions regarding the Interim Government has been that there must be a legal and constitutional change in order to give it the status of a truly National Government. The Working Committee has felt that this is necessary in the interest of a peaceful settlement of the Indian problem. Without such status, the Interim Government would not be in a position to infuse in the Indian people a consciousness of freedom which is today essential. Both Lord Pethick-Lawrence and you have, however, pointed out the difficulties in the way of offering such constitutional change, while at the same time assuring us that the Interim Government would have in fact, if not in law, the status of a truly National Government."

"The Working Committee feel", Azad would continue, "that, after the British Government's declaration that the Constituent Assembly will be the final authority for framing the constitution and any constitution framed by it will be binding, the recognition of Indian independence is imminent. It is inevitable that the Interim Government which is to function during the period of the Constituent Assembly must reflect this recognition. In my last conversation with you, you stated that it was your intention to function as a constitutional head of the Government and that in practice the Interim Government would have the same powers as that of a Cabinet in the Dominions. This, however, is a matter which is so important that it would not be fair either to you or to the Congress Working Committee to let it rest upon what transpired in informal conversations. Even without any change in the law there could be some formal understanding by which the Congress Working Committee may be assured that the Interim Government would in practice function like a Dominion Cabinet."

As far as we are concerned, it was clear that the Congress was looking at the Interim Government as The National Government of India. It would be in that capacity that Nehru acted when he undertook his tasks as the Minister for External Affairs.

Nehru's stature in the Congress was such that the Viceroy insisted on communicating with him in order to carry forward negotiations regarding the Interim Government. However,

1. Times of India, July 1, 1946.

Nehru was much in the Congress mould: a person who insisted that formal decisions be taken formally and that informal understandings and personal opinions not be used for taking formal decisions. After all, the business of governance was serious enough to require the underpinning of formal rules and regulations. It could not be done in an informal manner. On June 12, 1946, Nehru responded to the Viceroy saying that the authority to negotiate and take decisions vested with the President, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and that he could only discuss with the Viceroy his personal opinion of what should be the form of the Interim Government and how it should function. In the meeting that day, between Wavell, the Viceroy, Jinnah and Nehru, the Viceroy made his offer of allowing a "Provisional National Government" to function. That suggestion, however, was not acceptable to the Congress. Azad wrote back to the Viceroy explaining in some detail. "My Committee", Azad said, referring to the All India Congress Committee, "are not prepared to accept any such proposal."

The opposition to the Congress was based on the idea that the Congress wanted to frame a government, along with its ministerial responsibilities, that actually worked. The Viceroy, in contrast, insisted that the government should there be in name alone and not necessarily be responsible for any decision making. "My Committee would also like to point out that a Coalition Government in order to be successful must have some common outlook and programme for the time being. The manner of approach in forming such a government has been such as to leave this out of consideration and my Committee do not feel any confidence that such a coalition can function successfully", wrote Azad to the Viceroy on June 12, 1946. The Congress position was clarified even further by Azad in his letter to the Viceroy of June 14, 1946. By now, the government obduracy in not providing a legal backing to the government was wearing the Congress down. But the Congress still held on to its idea that the Interim Government was going to be a proper government, representative of the interests and aspirations of a fully independent India."Our immediate objective has been and is the independence of India. We have to judge everything by this standard. We suggested that, even though no legal change might be made at this stage, independence in practice might be recognized."²

The idea of an Interim Government that the Congress found so attractive as an opportunity to run the government of India was not entirely supported. The Muslim League hesitated because Jinnah found it difficult to adjust to a government in which the Muslim League may not be an equal partner. The best that he would go, by the end of the year, was to agree to an idea of a 'coalition government' in which the Muslim League was an equal partner. But the more serious opposition had come from the Labour Member in the Viceroy's Council, Dr. B R Ambedkar. Ambedkar found unattractive the idea of any interim government. Earlier, in August 1945, when the idea of the Interim Government had just been floated by the Labour Government in Britain, Ambedkar had been strongly against it. "It should proceed, at once," Ambedkar would say, "with the ultimate problem of establishing a government of the people, by the people and for the people and this should not take more than two years." It was under such circumstances that in September 1946 the Interim Government was formed.

2. Azad to Viceroy, June 14, 1946. Times of India, 25 June 1946.

On September 2, 1946, the Interim Government was formed. In the absence of a proper legal framework underpinning the government no one quite knew how to address the members of this government, what their role was to be and what they could or could not do. Someone insisted on calling Nehru, the head of the government as the 'Vice President of India'³. Others, like the Times of India, described the new Honourable Members were described as Members of the Interim Government. The All India Radio referred to them as a Cabinet and to Pandit Nehru as the Chief Minister. Consequent to the formation of the Interim Government the Executive Council of the Viceroy ceased to be. Many houses in Delhi observed this day with lighting up diyas, 'as on Diwali', reported the newspapers. A large section of the Muslims observed the day as a day of mourning, black flags being much in evidence. Gandhi posed the only troublous queries: if the Muslims did not yet feel at one with the interim government, then efforts should be made, he would say, to befriend the League. The integrational troubles of the Interim Government do not concern us here. The noticeable thing was: this government took itself to be the Government for India. As various observers would soon notice, the ministers took their task particularly seriously and did not let their past as agitators debar them from taking sagacious decisions regarding governance. This is a quality, sagacity of governance, that would especially mark the pronouncements on foreign policy that would soon follow.

One of the first things, though that the Congress party did on the formation of the Interim Government was to lay down the principle of having a difference between the party and the government. On September 23, 1946, the Times of India reported that the CWC had recommended that Nehru resign from the Presidentship of the Congress since he was joining the Interim Government. He did.

The Member for External Affairs

Internationalism

Nehru, as the Member for External affairs in the Interim Government of India, was well aware of the importance of taking positions on important issues of foreign policy. Taking an independent international perspective, morally strong, supportive of the freedom of all including women and people of all races, these would be some of the key points of the policy that Nehru articulated. It was reflected not in some policy document or thought piece but through actions and speeches. One such time that came up was with reference to the passive resistance movement in South Africa. Nehru offered whole hearted moral support of the Indian government to the passive resistance movement that had been started in South Africa.⁴

Pandit Nehru said that the passive resistance movement in South Africa was still continuing in the form in which it was started, namely, peaceful occupation of land in non-exempted areas in civil disobedience of the provisions of the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act. Passive resisters continued to be arrested and charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act. Official figures showed that up to the end of September 733 Indians were convicted and sentenced and 450 had been released after serving their sentences.

3. Times of India, September 3, 1946.

4. Times of India, November 2, 1946.

For the most part uniform sentences of a fine of £ 3 or 30 days' imprisonment had been passed. A telegram received from the Passive Resistance Council on October 24 said that the total number of convictions up to that date was 1269. The movement had caught the imagination of the Indians. It was understood that it had also won the sympathy of the Africans, some of whom had actively joined the movement. Some Europeans had also supported and joined the movement. The people of India and their government, Nehru would add, were fully sympathetic to the movement in South Africa.

Nehru rued that the Government of India were not sending any direct material help to the passive resisters but had taken up the whole case of our countrymen in South Africa in the United Nations Assembly. Nehru explained that he understood that women were taking part in the movement as he offered the moral support of Indians and the government of India to the passive resisters in South Africa.

A Monroe Doctrine for Asia

The closest Nehru came to expounding a theoretical position on the formulation of foreign policy at this time was when on the eve of independence, addressing a public meeting in New Delhi, Nehru referred to the Monroe Doctrine. Just as the doctrine expounded by President Monroe had saved America from foreign aggression for nearly 100 years, he explained to his audience, the time had come to expound a similar doctrine with respect to Asiatic countries. "India's freedom was linked with the freedom of a number of other countries", he added. Nehru was sensitive to the centrality of India in the colonial exploits of England. "Exploitation of India gave an excuse to foreign powers to dominate the weak nations of Asia", he would say. Some small countries were kept under British control because they happened to fall in the route from England to India. India's independence was to portend the independence of these other countries too. "August 15 is a great day not only in the history of India or Asia, but in that of the entire world", Nehru would say and add that the independence of India "marked the definite and final end of an era of imperialism started by the British nearly 150 years ago". Given the centrality of India in the colonial expansion of the British Empire, Nehru saw post-colonial India too to have a major role to play in international politics. India, even before her independence, with Nehru and the Congress at the helm, had begun to raise voice for the protection the liberty of Indonesia. "Foreign armies have no business on the soil of an Asiatic country", he would say. In the case of Indonesian freedom movement, Nehru was clear, that the Dutch colonial rulers had to simply go. He was, he would say, "opposed to the principle to let the armies of one country stay in another"⁵.

Independence for Nehru was to be independent "in action both in our domestic affairs and our foreign relations. We shall take full part in international conferences as a free nation with our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation. We hope to develop close and direct contacts with other nations and to cooperate with them in the furtherance of world peace and freedom".⁶ This was Nehru's first broadcast as the Vice President of the Interim Government on September 7 1946.

5. Glosses from 'Pandit Nehru's Plan to end Aggression', Times of India, August 10, 1947.

6. 'Pandit Nehru's First Broadcast to the Nation', Times of India, September 9, 1946.

Even the completely pro-colonial government Times of India was impressed by Nehru's "remarkable...thorough understanding of the complicated problems' of foreign affairs facing India"⁷. Nehru's foreign policy was marked by restraint, remarked the paper. "Yet he did not compromise any of the principles which the Congress and he have adopted for years past."

Independent India, Nehru would say, was not to be the camp follower of Britain but would, through a process of evolution, develop a foreign policy of her own. Even in the Interim Government Nehru had begun to make "unofficial approaches to foreign countries". What restrained him was legality: without independence it was not possible to establish direct relations with foreign countries.

He placed particular emphasis on India's policy towards Asiatic countries and announced Government's intention to send to the Middle East countries a goodwill delegation as preliminary to the establishment of direct diplomatic relations. That particular delegation to west Asia was to be headed by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad.

By November 1946, Nehru was able to announce to the Assembly that the Soviets had agreed to exchange envoys with India.

When in February Nehru applied for a passport and visa to visit Indonesia the British government denied his those facilities saying it would create even further disturbances in Java⁸.

Direct contact with the North West: Pakistan a useless idea

Nehru's direct contact with the tribal regions of the North West began in 1946 when he started his tours of what was to later become Pakistan. The land was already rife with communal riots. The papers had begun to report riots in small pockets even though there was not yet an idea that there would either be a division of the people or of the land. On January 8, 1946, at Sukkur, addressing a rally of some 50,000 persons, Nehru who had just come from Jacobabad, addressed an audience that had just emerged out of communal riots.

Nehru, the papers reported, regretted the deaths and murders done previously and urged the people to unite and find a solution to the problems of communalism. Speaking of the "Future Azad Hindustan", he said that everybody would be provided with sufficient food, education and all facilities including a house to live. The National Planning Committee, he said, was considering this problem.

Referring to the idea of Pakistan, Pandit Nehru said that Pakistan had not yet been defined. "It was a useless idea and it meant slavery forever".

7. Times of India, September 27, 1946.

8. Times of India, February 9, 1946.

A federation of nations

Nehru went on to suggest that he desired a federation consisting of India, Burma, Malaya, Ceylon, Iran and Afghanistan. 'We alone can frame our own constitution and not the British government and in the Azad Hindustan there will neither be Hindu raj nor Muslim raj. Nehru was in Sukkur campaigning for the Congress for the elections that were in the offing for the Sindh Assembly elections.

It was in this spirit that the Asian Relations Conference was held in Delhi in March 1947. This was organized by the Indian Council of World Affairs, a body that itself had been formed in 1943 'for the objective study of world problems' from an Indian perspective.⁹ Nehru, after coming out of prison had taken an active interest in the working of the Council and had actively worked towards promoting the idea of a conference of Asian countries since August 1946. Nehru hoped a unity between Asian countries would be framed.¹⁰ Towards this end he sought the cooperation of all right thinking Indians. In the process, invitations were sent to some 200 leading Indians to participate in the conference. Nehru made a particular effort to involve Jinnah and the Muslim League. However, Jinnah rebuffed the invite. The Conference was largely attended by all the leading leaders of Asia. Each seemed to find this a unique way of coordinating the efforts of the colonized people to get rid of colonial domination and ensure that the rest of the world took the Asian countries and their concerns seriously. Jinnah was not the only one to be suspicious of the objectives and achievements of the Conference. The extraordinarily successful conference soon attracted the ire of the Soviet Union as well which termed it a waste of time and effort since the nationalists participating in the Conference did not address the overthrow of British economic domination over their respective countries.¹¹

While in foreign affairs Nehru had no hesitation in cooperating with the British he also was clear that if India's ideals and interests demanded an independent line would be followed without hesitation. India's foreign policy needed to be articulated and practiced by Indians and not by the British.

The North West: foreign or national?

That kind of a position brought Nehru face to face with the anomalous relationship that had existed between the government and the tribesmen of the North West Frontier.

Nehru sought to personally make an effort to reach out to the tribesmen who were currently being wooed by the Muslim League in the name of Islam. This was the land that had historically been part of the dynamic of south Asia for many centuries. In the recent past it was within the imperial realm for almost a hundred years. Yet, the colonial regime had found it difficult to keep it subjugated. The idea of independence in these lands was yet to be formulated in a manner that included the lands and people beyond their mountain fastnesses.

9. Times of India, March 21, 1947.

10. Times of India, March 25, 1947.

11. Times of India, June 3, 1947.

Dealing with the problem of the North West Frontier policy Nehru said: “Government propose as soon as practicable to examine in consultation with all the interests concerned, the problem of the tribal areas of the North West Frontier. The question is one of all-India importance, for the tribes are the guardians of the northern doorway to India and the security and well being of these areas is, therefore, a definite factor in the defense of this country.”

“I should like to make it quite clear that in reviewing the problem there is no intention whatever of depriving the tribes of their existing freedom which they have defended so jealously and valiantly for many years; still less to impose any scheme on them against their will, it follows that Government’s approach to the problem will be essentially a friendly one seeking in cooperation and consultation with the tribes’ way and means of solving their economic difficulties, promoting their welfare generally and bringing them into a happy and mutually beneficial association with their neighbours in the settled districts”.

“I have said that the question is one of all-India importance. So it is, but there is a wider aspect to it than this. The tribal areas of the North-West Frontier lie along an international frontier—the frontier which divides India from its friendly neighbor, Afghanistan. From this situation arises an international obligation, for our friends, the Afghans, look to us to preserve peace and order in the tribal areas in the interests of the tranquility of their own country. They may rest assured that in seeking a new approach to the problem the fullest regard will be paid to our obligations”.¹²

The border of the North West Frontier remained an important point of consideration for the government of India then as it remains now between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Nehru weighed in between the two widely touted views—the Forward Policy which said that the border should remain open and India needs to keep a finger in the Afghan pie versus the Close Border Policy that advocated the cessation of movement as far as possible (Scott, 1999). He suggested that the more appropriate and practical would be a compromise between the two policies. This was especially important in the context of the Fakir of Ipi who was asking for support from across the NWFP border.¹³ The Fakir of Ipi was the nickname given by the British colonial rulers to Mirza Ali Khan (b. 1897, d. 1960) of the village of Ipi in the North Waziristan region of present day Pakhtunkhwa. “Among the enemies of the British Empire on the eve of the Second World War the Fakir of Ipi was unique. He was the most determined, implacable single adversary the British Raj in India had to face amongst its own subjects, though he also utterly disregarded the logics of the international situation and unwittingly started a campaign when he had the least chance of attracting international support against the British” (Hauner, 1981). The colonial government launched a campaign to arrest or at least kill Mirza Ali Khan for his opposition to British presence in their lands. Mirza Ali Khan’s favourite way of showing his displeasure at the British presence in the tribal areas was by attacking government offices and personnel as and when he could. Things came to such a pass first when the colonial magisterial court, presided over by a judge who was a Muslim, at the town of Bannu declared invalid a marriage between a Muslim boy and a Hindu girl.

12. Indians for diplomatic missions overseas, Times of India, September 27, 1946

13. For a more detailed account of the Fakir of Ipi and his run ins with the colonial government see (Hauner, 1981)

Nehru would acknowledge that he had received a number of communications from the Fakir of Ipi and his friends and well wishers asking that India be a friend of the Fakir. "It was rather difficult to decipher the signature", Nehru would comment on these letters. But it was clear that the Fakir "wanted to have contacts with (India)".¹⁴ This was Nehru practicing foreign policy within the boundaries of India. But things were not as easy as that.

Visit to tribal areas

In 1946 Nehru decided to visit the tribal areas with a view to understanding the concerns of the tribes as also to persuade the tribal leaders to support the nationalist cause as represented by the Congress.

Preceding his visit to the tribal area Nehru had written in a letter to various Maliks (local tribal leaders and elders) who had approached him: "I am deeply interested in the welfare of the tribal territory, and I hope that I shall be of service to the people of this territory".¹⁵ This was in reply to a telegram sent to him from Shabkadar Fort, addressed by Malik Samar Khan, Malik Atta Khan, Maulana Ghulam Muhammad, Malik Mir Akbar and Malik Mozullah Khan.

The Maliks had written: "We, the residents of the tribal territory of Mohmand, pay our heartiest greetings on the deserved success of getting the reins of government. As brothers, we expect better treatment than from the British, and are prepared to support the cause of freedom with our heart and soul".

Nehru replied that he wanted to be friends with the people of the tribal territories. "It is not our desire to interfere with the freedom they possess, but rather to help them in every way to better their condition. We should like them to come into closer contact with their neighbours in the Frontier Province and in India as a whole, so that we may get to know each other better".

Nehru's visit had come about as a result of the efforts of Dr. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Sahib, the Chief Minister. Dr. Khan Sahib was eager to have Nehru and various Maliks talk to each other face to face in the hope that this might have some influence over the tribal leaders. Dr. Khan Sahib particularly wanted Nehru to meet with the rebellious Fakir of Ipi.

Nehru did not send any communication in writing to the fakir, he informed the Government of India. He did make a public request to anyone who could carry a message to the Fakir of Ipi that India would be very glad to contact the Fakir and to resume friendly relations now that the government was in Indian hands and not that of the British. This was not the first time that the Fakir had approached Nehru. In September 1937 too he had written to Jawaharlal Nehru, then the President of the Indian National Congress, and addressed Nehru as 'the leader of the liberty-loving people and the distinguished Head of the Indian Nation' (Nehru, 1960, p. 251f.)

14. Times of India, November 2, 1946.

15. Times of India, October 2, 1946.

As Nehru's aeroplane landed it was fired upon by tribesmen hidden deep inside the mountains. The tribesmen used an 120 mm cannon that had been stripped from a crashed British aircraft and also used a 3.7 mountain gun as well as rifles. It was the British army that saved Nehru on that day. The British artillery retaliated, reported the Times of India, by firing desultorily throughout the day. 'No casualties have been reported so far'. Officials thought that the firing came from the supporters of the Fakir of Ipi who was supposed to be hiding in the caves of the Waziristan hills near the Afghan border, some 20 miles from Peshawar. The English press, brought up on official press briefings, thought that this firing was a way of the Fakir showing his displeasure at the visit of Nehru. However, the next month, Nehru would report to the Assembly that the Fakir had been trying to get in touch with him through letters.

Nehru flew to Razmak, Miranshah, Wana, among other places in a Harvard Trainer aeroplane piloted by a Wing Commander of the Royal Indian Air Force. At Razmak, Nehru met on the lawns of the Residency hostile tribesmen. Nehru's visit was important in this area because of the kind of hostile relations that the tribals had had with the colonial government for some time past. Even as Nehru left Razmak, a party of Indian soldiers who lined either side of the road from Razmak to Miranshah, through which Nehru passed, clashed with some tribesmen. One sepoy was reportedly killed and three others wounded in the fracas.

Nehru was well aware of the danger that he was about to face. He had come with the intent of motoring all the way from Peshawar to Razmak. The government of Dr. Khan Sahib had made detailed arrangements for sanitizing the route by deploying several thousand troops and Frontier Scouts to protect the convoy on the route. At the last moment Nehru decided to fly the 20 minute hop to Razmak. With a parachute strapped on his back he boarded the Harvard Trainer plane that was piloted by Wing Commander of the RIAF.

The rest of his party including a representative body of British, Indian and American correspondents, travelled by road convoy or were flown to Razmak.

Reception by jirgas

Nehru had a rather cold reception at the two jirgas (meetings) of tribesmen that he attended. At Miranshah, some 400 tribal Maliks walked out of the jirga that had been specially arranged for Pandit Nehru, after barely 15 minutes' of frank discussion. This jirga did not hear Pandit Nehru since they dispersed before there was any occasion for him to speak. But they were addressed by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who told them that the new Indian government meant nothing but good to them and wanted to treat them as brothers. Several Maliks immediately began to speak in protest. Raising their voices, the Maliks, who constituted the jirga, told Dr. Khan Sahib and Nehru: "We are independent now and we mean to remain so. We don't want to go in for politics. The past Indian government have not been fair to Muslims and we don't believe the present Indian government are being fair to them". The Maliks further said: "The Muslims have been ill-treated in India and will take revenge". When told "So you want to keep the foreigners". "No", they replied, "we have lost blood with the British but we don't want to go under any one. We want to stay as we are".¹⁶ After this some 400 Maliks walked out of the jirga and out of the Fort at 16

16. Times of India, October 19, 1946. re.

Nehru stayed back to talk to the RIAF pilots, some of whom had taken part in recent bombing operations in Waziristan in which they lost three Indian pilots and which were carried out with rocket firing Hurricanes.

At the second jirga, at Razmak, Nehru had better luck. Here they heard him out. Nehru told the jirga that he had come there full of love towards them and not to rule over them. The tribesmen told him that they did not consider him as their leader but they considered their leader to be Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League. "We want Jinnah to come here", they said. "We shall place our grievances before him". Discussion was continued for some time but the jirga did not change its views even though they heard Nehru out. During the course of the discussion Nehru lost his temper when one of the Malikis began to castigate Dr. Khan Sahib. Nehru dismissed the meeting at that point saying that he could not tolerate any insults to his colleagues. This meeting had approximately 100 Malikis.

Having dismissed them Nehru is reported to have turned towards the Political Department representatives and asked: "are these pitiful pensioners the people you are afraid of? I can't understand it."

Nehru reached Miranshah on the 17th October 1946. He was accompanied by Dr. Khan Sahib and Mr. Crieghton, Secretary, External affairs Department.

Here he was met with a demonstration asking him to go back. The demonstration against Nehru was organized by Khan Abdul Qayum Khan, of the Frontier Muslim League who was opposed to the visit by Nehru to the tribal areas because he believed that Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was trying to make political capital out of Nehru's visit to the tribal areas.

By now it seems the Fakir, who had been previously in touch with Nehru, decided to send out a feeler. The Fakir of Ipi sent the following message to Nehru during his visit: "I do not desire freedom for myself only, but I want the entire world to be independent and would support all those persons and nations who want to end the British rule and imperialism. I am a companion of all those Muslims and non-Muslims who are keen on independence". "Knowing the very principles of Islam, the Indian Muslims should not put hindrances in the way of freedom. I am keen only for that independence where the Holy Quran is free and the Quranic law is followed".¹⁷

Nehru's visit to the NWFP was coming to an end. This was his first contact with people who definitely did not want to be part of any particular government. He did not seem to have won too many admirers in the NWFP. But he certainly had been persistent in his request to the tribal groups to have them join hands with India and the Congress. He had travelled all over the region. That itself seemed to win him some admiration. Soon after independence the Fakir sent another letter to Nehru. This time he addressed Nehru as 'The King of India' reported the Dawn newspaper of Karachi¹⁸. By now, though, the Fakir was in the territory of newly formed Pakistan.

17. Times of India, October 18, 1946.

18. The Dawn, June 28, 1948.

Conclusion

We clearly notice that Nehru, and perhaps his other colleagues in the Congress too, on the eve of independence were well aware of the larger world around India and the importance of India to world polity. Fully committed to the idea of peace and freedom they did not hesitate to internationalise issues and intervene to the extent possible in international affairs. Nehru even went on to say that a doctrine analogous to the Monroe Doctrine needed to be framed for India and Asia. If there was a fly in this ointment that was being brewed by Nehru and the Congress it came from the North West where the small tribal groups had been setting themselves up in opposition to the government. Nehru's intervention in these regions happened in the form of a personal visit and continued contact with, among others, the Fakir of Ipi. For the Fakir Nehru was the ruler of India. But even with Nehru, the Fakir was clear, he was standing only insofar as Nehru supported the idea of freedom. This idea had little to do with religion and much to do with the fierce independence that the north-west region professed. The Fakir's continued contacts with Nehru and the government of India in the post independence period is not covered in this paper. But that does form an interesting episode in understanding the happenings of the north-west and discovering the continuities therein that haunt that region even in the twenty first century.

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Industry-Academia Interaction in the Realm of Corporate Social Responsibility- Future perspective of Higher Education in India

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Abstract

The present paper puts in perspective how Academia and industry gain mutually from their interaction in the present era of Corporate Social Responsibility. By establishing a positive correlation between the Gross Enrollment Ratio and Economic development of a nation, the paper moves on to discuss the need and justification of the corporate sector to collaborate with the government for the expansion and diversification of Higher Education and research in India. The paper further takes up the recommendations of the NR Narayana Murthy committee on Corporate Participation in Higher Education constituted by the planning commission. The paper then elaborates concept of Corporate Social Responsibility and its role as a catalytic agent in Higher education and concludes with the future road-map in the area with reference to India.

Introduction

The status of Higher Education and research is one of the most important indicators of economic development and growth of any nation. In fact, they are the tools to propel the wheel of a nation's socio-economic development. Recent studies have established a positive correlation between the Gross Enrollment Ratio (hereinafter referred as GER) and Economic development of a nation. The GER of India is close to 19%, which is much lower than the average global GER of 26%. On the other hand the GER of fast developing and developed nations is as high as 84% in the US, 59% in the UK, 55% in Japan and 28% in China. In order to set the pace of economic development by providing quality work force and technology to the industry and to boost the Higher Education System in India, Planning Commission of India has set a target to increase GER to 20% by 2017 and 25% by 2022. In the present scenario, it would be a challenge to achieve this target owing to several reasons. The most important among them are limited availability of Government funds to enhance the access of Higher Education system, difficulty in improvement and upgradation of academic and research standards and poor employability of graduates. The broad deliverables

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Panjab University Research Journal Arts, Volume XL, April-October 2013

ISSN 0970-5260

of the Higher Education System of a country are creation of knowledge, human capital, technology, and trained manpower. Industry is one of the biggest stakeholders in the Higher Education System of given country. Higher Education System provides the industry with skilled workforce, research inputs to develop new technologies, which are ultimately translated into commercial products and services. Therefore, corporate sustainability also lies in development of a robust and world class Higher Education System. The mutual interest of Higher education and Industry calls for a strong and vibrant Industry-Academia interaction and relationship. Rather, being a key stakeholder, the corporate sector needs to collaborate with the government for the expansion and diversification of Higher Education and research in India. The corporate sector is expected to make investments for the creation and development of world-class research infrastructure to meet the contemporary technology challenges being faced by the industry.

Corporate Participation in Higher Education in India

Keeping in view the ever-growing interdependence of Corporate Sector and Higher Education and to further strengthen this engagement to synergize the overall socio-economic development, the Planning Commission of India constituted NR Narayana Murthy committee on Corporate Participation in Higher Education. This committee was constituted in the context of formulation of 12th Five Year Plan (FYP) for higher education to examine and make recommendations on the potential and modalities for corporate participation in higher education and research. The committee strongly advocated the corporate participation in variety of ways for the required quality and quantity expansion in higher education and research activities. It recommended the constitution of a Council for Industry and Higher Education Collaboration (CIHEC), a body comprising business and higher education leaders. The proposed Council is to act as a connecting link between the higher education institutions and corporate sector. It will provide them with structured support to carry out collaborative projects. The committee suggested multidimensional collaboration, which include; setting up Centres of Excellence or Technology Parks, developing new knowledge clusters/hubs within the existing institutions, dedicated funding by industry for sponsored research, doctoral programs, and encouraging collaborative executive Masters and PhD programs for persons from industry. It further recommended setting up The Indian Corporate Higher Education Scholarship Fund with a corpus of Rs 1000 crores to be contributed by top 1000 corporations, National Education Loan Fund of Rs 1,00,000 crores by public sector banks, The Indian Corporate R&D Fund of Rs 5000 crores with joint funding by Government and corporates. The committee emphasised the need for having faculty from the industry. It suggested focussed program for retired employees from corporations (fully funded by the industry) for a second-career in teaching in higher education. It will help in increasing the talent pool of faculty from corporate and partially addressing the problem of shortage of teachers. In order to cater to the growing demand of higher education and to achieve the desired level of GER, the corporate sector having their own R&D establishment should be allowed to set up new universities and institutions leveraging their existing infrastructure and facilities. It may be allowed to collaborate with existing universities also. The major challenge is to develop an enabling environment through policy initiative by government to bring the industry and Academia on a common platform. There is a need to institutionalize the interaction between Industry and Higher Education to pursue their common objectives. In this background, the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility under the Companies

Act 2013 appears to be a good opportunity for achieving the much-desired Industry-Academia partnership in Higher Education.

Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

It needs to be asserted that although the concept of mandatory spending on CSR activities has been introduced recently in the companies Act 2013 but per se, this concept is not new. In the words of Dr. M. Veerappa Moily, former union minister of Corporate Affairs, it is as old as the concept of business and commerce¹. Although, there is no common single universally accepted definition of the term CSR, but the central point is the impact of business on the society and its resources. The roots of CSR lie in Philanthropic activities and sustainable development of Corporate and all other stakeholders in the society. There are two approaches towards the concept of CSR; traditional approach and modern approach. The proponents of traditional approach were of the view that there is only one responsibility of the business towards its society i.e. efficient use of resources. Whereas, the modern theorists like Peter Drucker, Melvin and others advocated the concept of CSR. They were of the view that there is intensive involvement of public interest in the policies, actions, and activities of ever expanding corporate sector. Due regard to social aspect and demands of society, helps in creating a favourable environment for business and enhancing corporate reputation and goodwill. That is why, even before the enactment of mandatory provisions of CSR in the Companies Act 2013, many big corporate houses in India like Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO), Cement Corporation of India (CCI), Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), assuming their corporate social responsibility, have been supporting various programmes and projects of community development and social welfare voluntarily. Recognising the social obligation of the business, the Parliament while replacing the century old legislation on companies have incorporated the mandatory provision of CSR in the Companies Act 2013.

1. http://www.iica.in/images/Speech_of_Minister.pdf last checked on 21 September 2014.

Speech of Dr. M. Veerappa Moily, Union Minister for Corporate Affairs at Indian Institute of Corporate Affairs, during First National CSR Conclave on “Corporate Social Responsibility - Private Sector Perspective”

“The concept of parting with a portion of one’s surplus wealth for the good of society is neither modern nor a Western import into India. From around 600BC, the merchant was considered an asset to society and was treated with respect and civility as is recorded in our ancient texts. Over the centuries, this strong tradition of charity in almost all the business communities of India has acquired a secular character. During India’s freedom struggle businesses made political donations and also contributed towards many of the social and cultural causes. Many of the leading businessmen came under the spell of Mahatma Gandhi and his theory of trusteeship of wealth. They contributed liberally to his programmes for the removal of untouchability, women’s emancipation and rural reconstruction.”

A snapshot of various provisions on CSR under Companies Act 2013

The concept of corporate social responsibility has been incorporated under section 135² of the Companies Act 2013. It requires mandatory spending of 2% of the net profit by specified

2 135. Corporate Social Responsibility

- (1) Every company having net worth of rupees five hundred crore or more, or turnover of rupees on thousand crores or more or a net profit of rupees five crore or more during any financial year shall constitute a Corporate Social Responsibility Committee of the Board consisting of three or more directors, out of which at least one director shall be an independent director.
- (2) The Board's report under sub-section (3) of section 134 shall disclose the composition of the Corporate Social Responsibility Committee.
- (3) The Corporate Social Responsibility Committee shall,-
 - (a) formulate and recommend to the Board, a Corporate Social Responsibility Policy which shall indicate the activities to be undertaken by the company as specified in Schedule VII;
 - (b) recommend the amount of expenditure to be incurred on the activities referred to in clause (a); and
 - (c) monitor the Corporate Social Responsibility Policy of the company from time to time.
- (4) The Board of every company referred to in sub-section (1) shall,-
 - (a) after taking into account the recommendations made by the Corporate Social Responsibility Committee, approve the Corporate Social Responsibility Policy for the company and disclose contents of such Policy in its report and also place it on the company's website, if any, in such manner as may be prescribed; and
 - (b) ensure that the activities as are included in Corporate Social Responsibility Policy of the company are undertaken by the company.
- (5) The Board of every company referred to in sub-section (1), shall ensure that the company spends, in every financial year, at least two per cent. of the average net profits of the company made during the three immediately preceding financial years, in pursuance of its Corporate Social Responsibility Policy:

Provided that the company shall give preference to the local area and areas around it where it operates, for spending the amount earmarked for Corporate Social Responsibility activities:

Provided further that if the company fails to spend such amount, the Board shall, in its report made under clause (o) of sub-section (3) of section 134, specify the reasons for not spending the amount.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section “average net profit” shall be calculated in accordance with the provisions of section 198.

Companies as a part of CSR spending. It is applicable on every company including its holding or subsidiary and a foreign company if it fulfils any of the following criteria:

- Company having a net worth of rupees five hundred crores or more, or
- Company having turnover of rupees one thousand crores or more or
- Company having a net profit of rupees five crores or more

Such companies shall constitute a Corporate Social Responsibility Committee of the Board consisting of three or more directors, out of which at least one director shall be an independent director to perform following functions:

- Formulate and recommend to the Board the CSR Policy indicating the activities to be undertaken by the company as specified in schedule VII of the Act.
- Recommend the amount of expenditure under CSR Policy.
- Prepare transparent monitoring mechanism for ensuring implementation of the projects, programmes, and activities under CSR Policy.
- Ensuring that atleast two percent of average net profit is spent on CSR activities.

To give effect to the above provisions, the Central government notified the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules 2014, which are effective from 1-4-2014. As per these rules, the activities to be undertaken by the Company shall be recommended by CSR Committee in consonance with the CSR Policy. The rules further state that the CSR Policy should include activities, project or programs as specified in schedule VII of the Act. The rules specifically exclude the following expenditure from the scope of admissible CSR spending:

Activities undertaken by the company in pursuance of normal course of business.

- Expenditure on projects, programs or activities undertaken by the Company out of India.
- Expenditure on activities that benefit only the employees of Company and their families.
- Contribution of any amount directly or indirectly to any political party.
- The expenditure on any project/programme not in conformity with the activities which fall within schedule VII of the Act.

CSR a catalyst for Industry-Academia Partnership

As explained above the major problems of higher education which are staring in our face are limited Government support to provide required academic and research infrastructure, indigent academic and research standards and poor employability of graduates. All these problems can be addressed and resolved to a large extent if, industry comes forward to partner with the Academia. The role of Higher Education and Industry is complementary to each other. Industry and Academia are natural allies in the sense that Higher Education creates human capital, knowledge and technology, which is commercially used by the industry for economic activities. The Industry in turn creates employment opportunities on one hand and on the other hand raises the policy, research and technological problems to be solved by the Academia. That is why, the policy makers had been strongly advocating the idea of well-structured Industry-Academia partnership. However, the desired results in this regard have not been achieved yet. In this background the mandatory spending by corporate sector as a part of Corporate Social Responsibility (as required under new Companies Act 2013) can act as a catalyst for the much desired Industry-Academia Partnership.

As already explained, Section 135 of the Companies Act 2013 read with CSR Rules 2014 makes it mandatory for specified companies to spend two percent of its average net profit for CSR activities. The schedule VII³ provides basket of activities, that a company may undertake in satisfaction of its Corporate Social Responsibility. Among other social

3. MCA notification dated 27th Feb 2014

1. Eradicating hunger, poverty, and malnutrition, promoting preventive health care, sanitation and providing safe drinking water.
2. Promoting education, including special education and employment enhancing vocation skills among children, women, elderly, and differently abled and livelihood enhancement projects.
3. Promoting gender equality, empowering women, setting up homes and hostels for women, and orphans, setting up old age homes, day care centres, and such other facilities for senior citizens and measures for reducing inequalities faced socially, and economically backward groups.
4. Ensuring environmental sustainability, ecological balance, protection of flora and fauna, animal welfare, agro forestry, conservation of natural resources and maintaining quality of soil, air and water.
5. Protection of national heritage, art, and culture including restoration of buildings and sites of historical importance and works of art, setting up public libraries, promotion and development of traditional arts and handicrafts
6. Measures for the benefit of armed forces veterans, war widows, and their dependents.
7. Training to promote rural sports, nationally recognized sports, Paralympics sports and Olympic sport.
8. Contribution to Prime Minister's National Relief Fund or any other fund set up by the Central Government for socio-economic development and relief and welfare of the scheduled castes and the Scheduled tribes and other backward classes, minorities, and women.
9. Contribution or funds provided to technology incubators located within academic institutions which are approved by the Central Government.
10. Rural Development Projects.

objects, Schedule VII includes two important subjects, which has direct bearing on the Industry-Academia Interaction i.e. promotion of education & vocational skills and setting up of technology incubators within academic institutions. Leveraging this situation, the institutions of Higher Education should endeavour to tap resources now available under CSR spending. At present there are more than 1.3 million companies registered under the companies act. As per the estimates given by the industry and the Indian Institute of Corporate Affairs (IICA), 10,000 to 16,000 companies would be covered under the CSR provisions. It would entail an estimated yearly spending of Rs 27,000 crores for the programmes and projects covered under the CSR ambit. Although, CSR funding is not likely to be allocated for Higher Education alone as it is expected to be channelized for other equally important social objects also. But even if, we expect a moderate fraction of 20% to 25% for Higher Education, it amounts to spending of Rs 5,400 to Rs 6000 crores annually, which is a huge amount in absolute terms. In relative terms, it can be compared with the funds allocated by the Ministry of Human Resource Development under their flagship programme for the development of Higher education & research; Rashtriya Uchchar Shiksha Abhiyan (RUSA). The total central allocation under RUSA for the remaining three years of the 12th five year plan (FYP) is Rs 16,227 crores⁵ i.e Rs 5,409 crores annually. Therefore, annual allocation of RUSA is even lesser than the estimated annual CSR spending on Higher Education. Thus CSR itself offers a great opportunity for the Academia to mobilize resources effectively for the promotion and up gradation of academic and research standards. We need to realize that the concept of mandatory CSR spending is new and the seekers for this emerging opportunity are a large section of society with varied social objectives. Therefore, it is right time for academia to pull up their strings to stake their claim over the expected CSR spending by corporate sector. In view of the mutual interest and stakes of Industry involved in the development of Higher Education System, Industry is likely to respond positively for any proposal of Academia under the ambit of CSR activities especially for Institutions with proven record of accomplishment, standing and excellence. Once the industry and Academia start executing the collaborative projects and programmes under the CSR mandate, the desired Industry-Academia interaction would be inevitable. This interaction should not be limited to the extent of pursuing collaborative specific research problems rather it should percolate to the level of curricula design, syllabus framing, pedagogical techniques, identification of relevant research area and skill development.

Future Road Map

The expected huge CSR spending in social sector not only offers an emerging opportunity for Higher Education sector but it also poses a challenge to mobilize an appropriate share and utilize it effectively within definite time framework. CSR spending takes into its sweep diverse social objectives including education. Each company having fulfilled specified condition is to constitute a CSR committee consisting of 3 Directors one of them being independent director. This committee is responsible to formulate the CSR policy of the company and recommend the amount to be spent on various activities as specified in schedule VII of the Companies act 2013. This committee is also responsible to monitor the transparent implementation of the projects & programmes approved under the CSR spending. The Higher education Institutions need to take proactive steps and gear up their administrative machinery to take on this challenge and grab the opportunity. For this, Higher Education Institutions should constitute an internal committee called CSR Resource

Mobilization Committee (CSR-RMC) headed by the head of the institution and comprises senior faculty members, alumni and officers from administration and finance. The involvement of Alumni from industry in such committees would facilitate the interaction between the Academia and corporate sector. The CSR-RMC should coordinate and interface with the CSR committees of the companies to give them input so that companies may cover the programmes concerning to Higher Education while preparing their CSR policy. Here alumni from industry can play a pivotal role. This is not a onetime exercise, rather the CSR-RMC should prepare a long term holistic development plan for the institution and identify various projects, programmes and activities wherein the industry can be associated not only as fund contributor but also as a stakeholder. After formulation of such plan the CSR-RMC need to submit such plan in the shape of a project proposal to be considered by the companies under CSR spending projects. The constant liaison between CSR committees of corporate sector and the CSR-RMC of the Academia will usher into a well-structured and institutionalized form of Industry-Academia interaction. In the end, I would like to conclude that by bringing statutory provision of CSR spending, the Government has opened a new window for the Academia and now it all depends upon the initiative of the Institutions of Higher Education to realize this opportunity and go for the golden handshake between Industry and Academia.

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Writers as Precursors of Technology

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Abstract

The fusion of technology and culture may be traced to the times when the first cave paintings were made. Art and technology are inseparable in that all artists are technicians and all technicians are artists as well. Neither can exist without the other. Evolution and development of literary forms have been in consonance with the progress of technology. Moreover there have been examples in the history of literature to prove that many a time literary artists did anticipate innovations in technology. The present study suggests that the monologues of Hamlet led to the stream of consciousness device in James Joyce which further led to the concept of links. The concept of hyperlinked texts so often used by us may be traced to the "links of association" widely used by Charles Dickens. Having access to unlimited information and knowledge we are faced with a crisis of imagination, the mammoth task of contemplating a web of interconnected computers all over the world. The vertiginous waves of technological change made it possible for the artists to see into the future and it began to be realized that technological acceleration might not bring contentment but better understanding it definitely would.

Technology and art both are a means of investigation and as such naturally overlap. Both involve ideas, theories, and hypotheses that are tried and tested in places where mind and hand come together—the laboratory and the studio. Artists like technicians and scientists, study—languages, people, culture, history, religion, mythology— and learn to transfigure information into something else. Even in ancient Greece, the word for art was *techne*, from which *technique* and *technology* have been derived—terms that may be applied to scientific as well as artistic practices. European Art abounds in examples of artists who were technicians and scientists as well. Leonardo da Vinci, painter and draftsman of the Renaissance Age, is best known as an artist whose works were justified by scientific research. He had studied physiology and anatomy in order to create convincing images of the human form. He believed that the moral, ethical and righteous meanings of his narrative paintings would emerge only through the accurate representation of human gesture and expression. For him science and art were different routes leading to a higher spiritual truth. His *Sketch of Uterus with Foetus* (c. 1511–13) is one among the several thousand sketches he produced

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during his lifetime indicative of the inextricable link between artistic and scientific investigation. These extraordinary drawings are venerated examples of the Renaissance concept of the assimilation of all disciplines. *The Astronomer* (1668) by Dutch painter Johannes Vermeer is another example of the intimate connection between science and art. Vermeer's painting celebrates an astronomer. Yet it also celebrates the work of artists and the materials of the world. The painting in the background was created by a local artist; the Middle Eastern carpet on the table was crafted by a foreign artist; Vermeer's own paints and brushes were produced by local artisans. The globe at which the astronomer gazes proves the link between science and art most pertinently, as it shows this astronomer's—and his culture's—blended interest in finely crafted objects and scientific systems, such as astronomy.

The role of intuition in the formulation of a theory or hypothesis, the application of a principle of geometry, besides the use of a tough method for recording observed experience, has formed the basis for many scientific developments in the past. Albert Einstein, in "Essays in Science," stated, "Man tries to make for himself in the fashion that suits him best, a simplified and intelligible picture of the world; he then tries to some extent to substitute this cosmos of his for the world of experience, and thus to overcome it. This is what the painter, the poet, the speculative philosopher and the natural scientist do, each in his own fashion." (Einstein, 1918)

Technology has had a lasting impact on culture and literature, modifying and enriching it all through. Literary figures from the earliest times have shown that they were technicians as well. The connection, though centuries old, has become more apparent thanks to the pace at which advances in technology are going on. Writing on tree-barks and leaves gave way to the invention of paper that eventually led to books. With the passage of time the emergence of newspapers revolutionized the entire communication system that was to be enriched further by the radio, television and films, followed by computers and internet. As the stages grew more condensed, they began to interfere with the lives of individual human beings.

It was in the twentieth century that exposure to media changed human lives in a big way. The understanding of form to content, medium to message and engineering to craft was no doubt facilitated. Living in a world dominated by radio and television and then switching over to computers and internet was by no means a smooth process. The real always was superior to the virtual, the images to the text and live images were preferred to historical events. The vertiginous waves of technological change made it possible for us to see into the future. It began to be realized that technological acceleration might not bring contentment, but better understanding it definitely would.

The fusion of art and technology sprouts from this accelerated vision.

Media has evolved and is evolving so rapidly that both the inventors as well as the users have been blessed into a holistic unit- as if "a seminar on creative writing is being organized in a science lab" (Johnson, p.7). The boundaries seem to be receding fast. There are no artists working in an interface medium who are not, in one way or the other, engineers as well. Craftsmen of interface culture seem to have risen above imperious divisions. They

are a fusion of artists and engineers- novelists and fiction writers have been kept at an end different from the mechanics.

It is interesting to note that in the history of modern interface there are examples to show that mass audience and creative innovation coexist- maybe as rarities in Dickens' novels in Victorian Age, Alfred Hitchcock's films in 1950s and the singing career of the Beatles. Dreaming up metaphors for machines has a long history. In every age latest technology is understood by bringing to mind images of familiar things thereby forming a comparison between machines and organisms. The Manchester factories were seen by Dickens as mechanical jungles, populated by serpents of smoke and steam engines with a head like "an elephant" (Dickens, 1854, p. 65). Thoreau visualized pensively the devilish Iron Horse cutting its way through the American landscape. Thackeray considered the British Railway system as arteries coursing through the body politic. In the Victorian Age the novel shaped our understanding of the new towns coming up around the steel factories and the cotton mills but in the nineteen fifties television served as a guide to the new suburbs created by the automobiles. The novels of the Victorian Age were largely set against the backdrop of the Industrial Revolution and the hazards of industrialization. The metaforms process and contextualize the information overload and as such they tend to serve as buffers and translators. Narratives of the ancient times acculturate their readers to the industrial age by building complicated structures involving cause and effect with working class orphans, old aristocrats, idle speculators and scavengers. Thus the intricate and carefully interwoven stories were a means of renewing a sense of connection of unity to a culture that completely underwent a change during the last fifty years. The novel provided a connection to all the confusing new social realities.

In his dystopia *Brave New World* (1932), Aldous Huxley seems to have somewhat presaged genetic engineering, reproductive technology, sleep- learning and psychological manipulation- all combining to change society. In the World State, babies were mass-produced in state- controlled hatchery and conditioning centres where the genetic make-up and even the social position of all citizens was pre- determined. Through a series of acclimatization in temperature, chemical X-rays and hormonal modifications made during the growth of the foetus, children were engineered for the future. "Alpha" and "Beta" were the two higher classes in the social hierarchy and as such the foetuses chosen to be members of the classes were allowed to develop naturally and were provided stimulants as they grew in "decanting bottles". On the other hand those chosen to be the members of lower classes ("Gamma", "Delta" and "Epsilon") were subjugated to chemical interference so as to cause stunted physical as well as mental growth. Every single Alpha or Beta was the result of a distinct fertilized egg developing into a unique foetus. However, the members of the lower classes generated from a single egg having produced as many as 96 children. The process was known as "Bokanovsky Process". In this case a single ovary could produce thousands of children. Moreover the birth rate of the lower classes could be further be accentuated by a technique called "Podsnap Technique" wherein all eggs in the ovary would mature simultaneously so that the ovaries could be put to optimum use within a time span of two years (this, of course was inspired by Ford's theory of mass production). The state remained an efficient and harmonious state as the majority of citizens of World State had been, in a calculated way, controlled in their mental and physical abilities. As such they were easy to control.

Genetic engineering is a term that has come into use in recent years as biologists have begun to manipulate the proteins present in cells, RNA and DNA that determine the inherited characteristics of individuals. It would be pertinent to mention that *Brave New World* had been written before the structure of DNA was known. Although Huxley did not use the term genetic engineering as such, yet he has succeeded in explaining how the new world propagated the stipulated number of people artificially for specific qualities. Several biological techniques have been described to control the population of World State. Through his book, Huxley talked of the dangers which are obvious- the possible misuse of Biology, Physiology and even Psychology to achieve homogeneity and stability as a result thereof. Since the fundamental premise behind science is the search for truth, the state considers it as a threat to its supremacy; therefore it censors and limits science in the meanwhile resorting to such drastic steps as the surgical removal of ovaries, sleep - learning (hypnopaedia) etc. As a writer of science fiction, Huxley has warned against scientific utopianism. State control over new and powerful technologies may be disastrous, he seems to have warned.

During the various phases of literary development one platform or genre gives way to another, the older form struggling to match the beats and methods of the new ones. There is something pre-eminent about this pull. The older medium endeavoring to transform itself into the new but the traditions working against this pull. The story of Satan in *Paradise Lost*, the dashing villain in Milton's book is the story of a character ahead of his times. About two centuries later Shelley described Milton's Satan as the original rebel. The first *bad guy* was unacceptable in the age of Milton but he became the celebrated hero of the nineteenth century novel, *Pamela*, *Tom Jones* and *Joseph Andrews* to name a few. Milton's Lucifer is the ancestor of Flaubert's Fredric Moreau. Just as Hamlet is the precursor of the present day malaise of paralyzed soul-searching, Satan is the source of the modern appeal for the illicit. The underlying principle is that at the point of transition, some messages evolve faster and, in the process, anticipate another medium.

The history of cultural innovation is filled with improbable accords. James Joyce revolutionized the working of a novel when he published *Ulysses*, proving that he was a highly skilled technician, a wizard who could fiddle around with the book as none before him had done. However, the stream of consciousness device pioneered by him in *Ulysses* originates from the dramatic monologue of Shakespearean drama. Hamlet's famous soliloquy from Act II (ii) would continue to put in words the dilemma often experienced by man before initiating a new act:

“To be, or not to be—that is the question:
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles
And by opposing end them.”

One of the most famous examples of stream of consciousness narration in the last chapter of *Ulysses*, in which Molly Bloom delivers a 4,391-word sentence, reminds us of the dramatic monologue of Hamlet. It ends thus:

“...I was a Flower of the mountain yes when I put the rose in my hair like the Andalusian girls used or shall I wear a red yes and how he kissed me under the Moorish wall and I thought well as well him as another and then I asked him with my eyes to ask again yes and then he asked me would I yes to say yes my mountain flower and first I put my arms around him yes and drew him down to me so he could feel my breasts all perfume yes and his heart was going like mad and yes I said yes I will Yes.” (Joyce, p. 932-33).

The narrative attempts to put in words, by foregoing standard syntax and describe something closer to the thoughts occurring in our brains. Joyce avoids the use of punctuation in this chapter and as such he is able to portray the “stream” that William James talked about, and, while the excerpted passage may initially seem difficult to understand at first, the effect of the internal thought process is conspicuous enough.

In yet another example, we see the young hero of Joyce’s novel *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (1914) wandering the streets of Dublin’s red light district in a state of lusty confusion:

“The wasting fires of lust sprang up again his blood was in revolt. He wandered up and down the dark slimy streets peering into the gloom of lanes and doorways, listening eagerly for any sound. He moaned to himself like some baffled prowling beast. He wanted to sin with another of his kind, to force another being to sin with him and to exult with her in sin. He felt some dark presence moving irresistibly upon him from the darkness, a presence subtle and murmurous as a flood filling him wholly with itself. “ (Joyce, p. 99)

Joyce might just have described the character walking down the street or he might have offered some paraphrase of what was going on in the character’s mind. But by using the stream of consciousness technique, he brings the reader into close proximity with the character’s actual thoughts as they’re occurring, thereby creating an intimate knowledge of the struggle of Stephen Dedalus.

Bitmapping and links in the modern day technical usage may very well be considered technological descendents of literary lineage as stream of consciousness. These metaforms have come to occupy every facet of modern life. Link, a method of controlling and transferring data between various routines in a program or between various devices in a computer system of drawing connections between things, is also a way of drawing connections between things. In the age of hypertext fiction, links play the same role in understanding disjointed things as conjunctions in understanding parts of an otherwise disjointed sentence. “Links of Association” was a favorite phrase with Charles Dickens. In *Great Expectations*, it plays a major role. In Dickens, the link takes the form of passing resemblance. Characters go on tripping across strangers trying to think of some kind of vague semblance but are not somehow able to place them. There are several such moments in the book creating an atmosphere of half-memories and haunting experience. This spiritual

quality may be read as a precursor to the obscurity underlying modernism and the stream of consciousness technique. Pip thinks of his mysterious and ethereal friend and love interest Estella in these words, "What was it that was borne in upon my mind when she stood still and looked attentively at me?... What was it?" (Dickens, p.228) These links (of association) are essential to our understanding of Dickens as they lead us to the two key themes in his novels, that is, orphans and inheritances. Orphans were the protagonists in inheritance plots.

For a reader in the twentieth century these links are important as they deal with radically different social groups. Apart from the great degree of sentimentality, the heroic quality of Dickens' books is amazing in the sense that he endeavored to see the whole society therein. He thus built in a form large enough to interlink the lives of characters as diverse as street urchins, school teachers, circus folk, convicts, aged nobility, ladies-in-waiting and rising young gentlemen. Basing his narratives on the broad divisions of society impacted by the Industrial Revolution, Dickens experimented on such a wide canvas as no novelist before him had dared to do. The magic and gambit required to comprehend an affinity between a baroness and a street urchin was the stock device used by Dickens- the link of association. The readers of the time accepted these links as these provided them with solace from the confusion and divisiveness prevalent in the society and escape into the world of fairytales.

Hypertext links, the descendents of these "links of association", help the twenty-first century readers to explore the vast arenas of knowledge hitherto unknown to them by clicking onto one link after the other. As Dickens led his readers into a world of imagination, the modern reader is led to delve deep into oceans of undiscovered worlds of knowledge. But today's overbearing question is not, "What connects all these confusing new social realities?" It is, rather, "What does all this information *mean*?" Having access to unlimited information and knowledge we are faced with a crisis of imagination, the mammoth task of contemplating a web of interconnected computers all over the world.

Basing on his experience and expertise in the humanities and on the Web, Steven Johnson (1997) demonstrates how interfaces - buttons, graphics, and words on the computer screen through which we control information - influence our everyday lives. He also traces their roots to Victorian novels, early cinema, and even medieval urban planning. The result is a rich cultural and historical tableau in which today's interfaces take their rightful place in the lineage of artistic innovation. In his book *Interface Culture*, he brings new intellectual depth to the discussion how technology has transformed society. In *Interface Culture: How New Technology Transforms the Way We Create and Communicate*, Johnson, a founding editor of the influential Webzine FEED, elucidates on the practical and metaphorical ramifications of the computer interface as no one before him has ever done. For him, the interface is not just a convenience - a way to copy files, launch programs, or approach a machine through the eye of a modem out into cyberspace. It is an art form, a window on culture, history, and technology. The tendency in discussions of art and technology is to assume basic difference and to move carefully toward common ground. Difference between art and technology is nothing but manmade contortion that set in and assumed the semblance of reliability during bygone periods of gradual change. So much so that Steven Johnson concludes his comparison of Joyce with Gutenberg by stressing, "They were both artists.

They were both engineers. Only the four hundred years that separated them kept their shared condition from view.” (Johnson, p. 3)

Technology and culture-each is inconceivable without the other. So much so that it would not be an exaggeration to say that the progression of culture in the absence of technology can neither be recorded nor appreciated. The very fact that we can gain access to works of art that are centuries old, with a mere click on our computers, laptops or ipads and can appreciate them brings the discussion to full circle. Technology has become a dynamic means of conserving our art, artifacts and culture in the digitalized form. Conversely culture is the genesis of modern technology.

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The Astronomer (1668) by Johannes Vermeer

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Sketch of Uterus with Foetus (1511-13) by Leonardo da Vinci.

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Contested Domains: The Naxalite Movement and the Construction of the India's Freedom

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Abstract

The paper is regarding the interpretation of the objective conditions of India on the part of the Naxalites. Besides the identification of the primary contradictions in the Indian society, the Naxalite leaders sought to understand the sovereignty of India in terms of the nature and character of freedom struggle and the economic policies of the postcolonial government. They characterized the Indian bourgeoisie as comprador. On top of that the general understanding was that the Indian freedom was fake and explained how the major Indian leaders remained opposed to any revolutionary struggle in the country during colonial times. The paper brings together various writings which appeared in the official journal of the Naxalites, Liberation, and argues that the movement created a contested view of Indian freedom.

The Naxalite movement emerged in 1967 as a reaction to the perceived revisionism and counter-revolutionary acts of the then major communist parties, namely CPI and CPI (M). It was the twentieth year of India's Independence and the disillusionment with the then ruling and dominant political party – the Congress – began to surface the example of which was that in the Fourth Lok Sabha elections its strength decreased from 358 in 1962 to 282 and it lost majority in eight of the then seventeen states. It could be characterised as 'revolution of rising expectations' or in other words, the people of India showed their dissatisfaction with the Congress Party. The important event for our purpose is that after the split in the CPI in 1964 the new communist party, CPI (M) had decided to participate in the general elections. In West Bengal it emerged as the largest party after the elections and formed the government in the state in coalition with the Bangla Congress. The Maoist cadres in the CPI (M) were active in certain areas of West Bengal, who after the formation of the United Front government in the state initiated the forcible occupation of the land of the landlords in the Siliguri subdivision of the Darjeeling district. The very act evoked the state response in which the tribal peasants and party workers clashed with the police. In view of the fact that one of the coalition partners was the CPI (M), the brutal suppression of the movement led to a strong reaction of the Maoist cadres who left the party. The Chinese communist party supported the Maoists by christening the event as the "Spring Thunder over India", which further encouraged the communists to break away from the

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Panjab University Research Journal Arts, Volume XL, April-October 2013

ISSN 0970-5260

CPI (M). All break away groups in the country began to coordinate their activities by forming the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR). In 1969, on the birth centenary of Lenin, most of the groups declared the formation of party, namely CPI (ML) and initiated the revolutionary struggle by adopting the strategy of armed struggle and the tactics of the “annihilation of class enemies” as formulated by its leader, Charu Mazumdar. After the formation of party the armed struggle extended to most of the parts of the rural India with West Bengal, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh being the epicentre of the movement. Soon after 1970 the movement shifted to urban areas particularly Calcutta. The first phase of the Naxalite movement ended in 1972 when Charu Mazumdar was arrested. He died of cardiac arrest in the police custody. At the time of Charu Mazumdar’s death splits had already occurred in the party and the second phase began with the emergence of numerous factions of the Naxalites most of which were propagating the combination of the open and underground struggles. At present the Naxalite movement is divided and faction-ridden. However, the Naxalites who draw tremendous media attention are those who persisted with the line of Charu Mazumdar and have evolved their struggle by learning from experiences.

The present paper is an attempt to explicate the notion of freedom that could be understood from writings, documents and party programme published during the first phase of the Naxalite movement. An attempt shall also be made to see whether the theoretical position of the Naxalite movement has undergone a change though it is difficult to identify the clear cut position of various groups and the author is also handicapped by the non-availability of certain documents related to the present phase of the movement. However, let us begin by understanding the theoretical context that necessitates the construction of alternative notions that contest with the dominant/prevalent notions (in this case, of freedom).

I

Let me start with a quote from Marx (1975:161) thus: “Do not say that social movement excludes political movement. There is never a political movement which is not at the same time social”. Marx articulated this idea in the context of class societies, as he was of the view that movements activate specific classes, because their appeal would inevitably be oriented towards certain issues that would invariably be confronting certain class privileges. Social and political movements, in the modern era are rarely spontaneous. Conversely, the movements are consciously planned and led by its leaders. Movements have ideology/interest and an orientation towards change. The Naxalite movement was a communist movement that was oriented towards bringing people’s democratic revolution. In the communist tradition the organisation of revolutionary struggle necessitates the examination of the objective and subjective conditions of the society to adopt and develop an appropriate strategy for the successful achievement of the objective, that is, a complete transformation of the society through the socialisation of means of production. Such a radical orientation demands comprehensive critique of the existing conditions, which in the Marxist history of revolutionary struggles of the 20th century was *a priori* in the sense that it depended on the basic model of class struggle as articulated in various writings of Karl Marx. The notion of the class exploitation and tendency in the rate of profit to fall leading to the economic crisis in capitalism constitute the objective conditions in the classical Marxian sense, whereas the emergence of class consciousness is the needed subjective factor that is based on various conditions one of which is the political party. Lenin (1972),

in *What is to be Done*, made it clear that class consciousness is imputed by the revolutionary party on the masses. This Leninist assertion was endorsed by Lukacs (1971) in a theoretically more articulated way. It becomes clear that the subjective conditions are a result of the propagandist work of the political party – a modern prince - according to Gramsci (1978).

In the light of the above discussion, it may be argued that there is logical necessity in the communist movement to construct objective conditions in the manner that the objective conditions are shown as marked by the widespread suppression and exploitation of the large mass of the people. Freedom is regarded as peripheral to the masses who are struggling to survive. In view of the fact that Marxism takes into account the freedom of wage labour in terms of the destruction of traditional bondages, this freedom is generally presented in the form of alienated labour. Marx (1973) was clear that though the worker is free to sell his labour, but the same labour turns into commodity and becomes the means to his survival. Therefore, so long as there is private ownership of the means of production, the realisation of real freedom in which a person would be a poet in the morning and fisherman in the noon and worker in the afternoon cannot be achieved.

In the light of the availability of such a powerful theoretical basis for the analysis of the objective conditions within the Marxian framework, all the communist parties have tended to analyse their own societies. In a country like India, the situation has been much more complex than the classical Marxist analysis of capitalism could show. India, at the time of Independence was an underdeveloped society with nascent capitalism. The leaders of Independent India initiated development planning through five years plans by opting for the mixed economy model in which the dominant role of public sector was emphasised and ensured. In a nutshell, feudalism and capitalism coexisted and the primary concern was to transform society from former to latter without much pain. The introduction of universal suffrage and democratic institutions through Constitution was the major legitimating force of the Indian state. The Indian state in certain respects emerged as a proactive agency to bring social change by ending certain forms of discrimination and initiating egalitarian processes. Land reforms, community development programmes, abolition of untouchability, electoral process, modernisation of economy, etc. provided the basis of legitimacy to the emerging liberal state. Such conditions marginalised any attempt to building the critique of the oppressive character of the state as there was a need for some time to change the old system. Obviously, twenty years after independence could become the ideal time for such a critique, because it was possible to analyse the failure of the state in certain respects one of which was rampant poverty of large number of people. The Naxalite movement constructed its notion of freedom in various ways two of which could be important for our purpose. These were: the evaluation of freedom struggle led by Congress party and other right wing parties, and secondly, analysis of the freedom India got in 1947.

II.

In this section, we propose to present the way the Naxalite movement analysed the freedom struggle under the leadership of the Congress party. Much before the arrival of Gandhi on the national scene the struggle for freedom was broadly divided into two ideologies. The one that articulated and advocated the revolutionary and militant path got acceptance with the Naxalite movement, whereas the Congress-led nationalist movement came under severe criticism from the Naxalite intellectuals. Let us examine various aspects

of the way the freedom struggle was examined by the Naxalites. To begin with, the events of 1857 were regarded as the first war of Independence. The birth of the Congress party was understood as the result of the aftermath of 1857. Choudhary (1971:30) wrote, “The Indian National Congress, which owes its birth in 1885 to the initiative of a British administrator, A. O. Hume, has been neither Indian in its outlook nor nationalist in its aspirations at any time during its long life”. He (ibid.) wrote,

It was the spectre of 1857 that was haunting the British rulers and it was out of fear of that spectre that they fathered this bastard child and named it Indian National Congress. It was designed to ward off the threat of “revolutionary situation based on violence” that could overthrow the imperialist rule: it was designed to be an effective weapon for sabotaging an agrarian revolution. And whether under the leadership of Gokhale, Tilak, Gandhi, Das, the “Netaji” or the Nehrus, the Congress has always played the role for which it was brought on to the Indian political stage by its British masters. Its role was not to organize and lead an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution but to sabotage any such revolution that might threaten the rule of imperialism and its main prop – feudalism.

It is clear from the above evaluation of the birth of the Indian National Congress that it was considered not an agent of freedom struggle for India but an instrument to perpetuate the imperialist rule in the country. The issue that emerges from the observation on the origin of the Indian National Congress is that the reasons for its birth could be different from the trajectory of the movement it led against British colonialism. Choudhary (ibid.) continues to offer further evidence by arguing that the acid test for the Congress in the beginning of the 20th century was the partition of Bengal in reaction to which the Swadeshi movement was launched and he views the movement not as a struggle for freedom but reuniting the two parts of divided Bengal. Choudhary (ibid.: 31) then quotes from the speech in a public meeting on October 16, 1905, by one of the leaders Chitranjan Das (Deshbandhu), later on published in Rabindranath Tagore’s Journal, *Bhandar* thus

Let us not waste any more time in fruitless debates. We have got to sustain this Swadeshi movement by every means possible. All our hopes are placed on it. There are many humorists in our country who ask: ‘What do you propose to do? Do you intend to overthrow the rule of the Company...? It is very easy to answer this question. We want nothing but to make men of ourselves. Our relationship with the British is only the relationship between the king and his subjects.....

Choudhary (ibid. 31) shows that time and again the Indian National Congress demonstrated its loyalty to the British an example of which may be cited here:

The Congress session held in Calcutta at the end of 1917 adopted a resolution “that the Congress, speaking on behalf of the united people of India, begs respectfully to convey to His Majesty the King-

Emperor their deep loyalty and profound attachment to the Throne, their unswerving allegiance to the British connection and their firm resolve to stand by the British Empire at all hazards and at all costs". It was from this year, 1917 that Chitranjan Das began to play a leading role in the affairs of the Congress.

The Naxalites took notice of the recruitment drive in the army in which Gandhi involved himself during the First World War. The evidence of the loyalty of the Indian National Congress to the British Raj was available even towards the end of the second decade of the 20th century particularly in its annual session in 1918 at Delhi in which the party "conveyed its loyalty to the King and congratulations on the 'successful termination of the war which was waged for the liberty and freedom of all the peoples of the world'" (Choudhury *ibid.* 31). The situation began to change dramatically in 1919 and the worst happened when the Jallianwala Bagh massacre occurred on April 13, 1919. What was the reaction of Gandhi and the Congress? The Naxalite position was as follows:

Gandhi and the Congress were scared out of their wits by this heroic revolt: he condemned it in no uncertain terms and called off the passive resistance movement in the middle of April, that is, within a week of the *hartal* (Choudhury *ibid.*:31)

The position of Gandhi with regard to the massacre of Jallianwala Bagh could be subjected to great polemical debate in the context of nationalist movement. The Naxalites were, however, clear that Gandhi, Das and other Congress leaders were basically imperialist stooges. All of them betrayed the large mass of Indian people by diffusing the revolutionary situations time and again. They misled people by diverting their revolutionary vigour towards ideologically crafted compromises. One such thing was "Progressive non-violent non-cooperation". Gandhi's notion of *swaraj* (self-rule) and his commitment to achieve it by 1921 was subjected to examination by the Naxalites.

What did *swaraj* mean? Did it mean national independence, freedom from the British rule? Though this word was conveniently vague, it never meant national independence. Gandhi defined 'swaraj' as "Self-Government within the Empire, if possible – and outside, if necessary". When, at the Ahmedabad session of the Congress in 1921, Hasrat Mohani proposed to define *swaraj* as "complete independence, free from all foreign control", Gandhi immediately lashed out at him: "The levity with which the proposition has been taken by some of you has grieved me. It has grieved me because it shows lack of responsibility..." (Choudhury *ibid.* 33).

For the Naxalite ideologue Gandhi and the Congress betrayed the nation by snubbing and denting the true revolutionary spirit of the Indian masses. The Naxalite perspective on Gandhi and congress could be summed up in the following lines of Choudhury (*ibid.* 36): "Das, Gandhi and the Congress always tried to prevent the outbreak of such a revolution. They never hesitated to work as the accomplices of the British imperialists and Indian princes and landlords in putting down any rising of the people with fire and sword".

The Indian National Congress was not a homogenous whole with a single ideological orientation. As a matter of fact there have been socialists and other radicals working in the Congress and never kept their positions hidden from the party leadership. The Naxalite position with regard to the dominant trend in the Congress revolved around specific leaders. It is equally important to know whether some leaders who are believed to be committed to some kind of armed struggle were appreciated by the Naxalites. One such leader, as the trajectory of the events of his life indicates, was Subhash Chander Bose. Bose belonged to the opposite camp of Gandhi within the Congress and he escaped from India to seek the help of Nazi Germany and then finally landed at Japan. The Japanese helped him to form the *Azad Hind Fauz* (Indian National Army) to fight against the British. In certain measures, Bose qualified to be the leader who fitted into the militant ideology of the Naxalites. However, the Naxalite intellectuals understood him in an entirely different way. In the present discussion an attempt shall be made to highlight only two aspects of Bose, that is, his relationship with Gandhi and his armed struggle against the British. In the April-June, 1971 issue of *Liberation* an article by Sasanka appeared that provided at length the perspective of the Naxalites on Subhash Bose. Let us first take the issue of Gandhi-Bose conflict. The following observations (Sasanka 1971: 51) would provide us an initial insight into how the entire issue was viewed by the extreme left:

The Gandhi group believed that British imperialism would never be defeated and India would never go out of British hands. Therefore, it would take an anti-British stand only to the extent it was absolutely necessary to hoodwink the masses and, in the event of Britain getting involved in a war, even that pretence of an opposition to the British would be put in cold storage. But the Subhas group assessed that although the British were sole masters of India, the Japanese-German-Italian group would steadily grow strong internationally and at one stage snatch away India from the British by precipitating a war. The Subhas group, therefore, thought that it must be ready for the change it anticipated, that it must become the favourites of the future new masters of India by giving demonstration of its anti-British stance beforehand and must be able to provide evidence of having done quite much to facilitate the advent of new masters.

It is clear from the above, according to the Naxalites, Subhash Bose was no different from Gandhi in terms of his commitment to the real freedom for India. He was only anticipating the arrival of new colonial rulers of India in the fast changing scenario of the world. There was still another commonality between the two. Sasanka (Ibid. 52) writes, "...there was an understanding between the two and that was fundamental. Both groups were opposed to the Soviet Union, opposed to communism and to the masses of workers and peasants". The subsequent developments show the formation of the *Azad Hind Fauj* in collaboration with the fascist and imperialist forces at the time when Soviet Union was attacked by the Nazi Germany. It clearly showed the anti-worker and anti-liberation stance of Subhas Bose. It is quite clear that the Naxalite perspective on the freedom struggle led by the Indian National Congress was basically anti-people and a farce. Most of the leaders of the movement were primarily the stooges of the British colonial masters.

The transformation of the perspective into an action occurred during the movement when the statues of the nationalist leaders and the social reformers of the 19th century Bengal came under the attack of the Naxalite youth. Banerjee (1980: 235) provides the instance of this iconoclasm thus “The target chosen by the young rebels were pictures and busts of Gandhi, Rammohan Roy, Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar, Vivekananda and other bourgeois political leaders and social reformers, in public squares and institutions of Calcutta and other towns”. Saroj Dutta – the CPI (ML) ideologue – wrote, “This is not a negative action. They are destroying statues to build new statues. They are demolishing Gandhi’s statue to put up the statue of Rani of Jhansi; they are destroying Gandhighat to build Mangalghat” (c.f. Banerjee *ibid.*: 234).

The programme of the CPI (ML) as adopted at the party Congress in May 1970 was clearly the source of all the evaluations of the freedom struggle under the leadership of Gandhi and Congress Party thus “Beginning from the Champaran peasant struggle, the Gandhian leadership representing the upper bourgeoisie and feudal class with its ideology of ahimsa, Satyagraha, passive resistance and Charkha sought to tailor the National movement to serve the interests of the British imperialist rule and its feudal lackeys” (CPI (ML) 1971: 60)

It is clear from the above discussion that the Naxalite movement contributed towards the understanding of the freedom struggle of India as waged under the leadership of Gandhi and other Congress leaders. In the process of constructing the critique of the freedom struggle of one type, the movement ideologically shifted towards the glorification and acceptance of the revolutionary struggle or armed uprisings against the British rule. The strength of the critique of the Gandhian way of freedom struggle could be gauged in terms of the reaction which the youth showed under the influence of Naxalite movement. If the dominant discourse in the post-independent India was that Gandhi and the Congress Party brought Independence owing to the hegemony of the latter, then it is possible to anticipate the way the Indian freedom was understood by the Naxalites. There are certain historical facts that the Naxalites conveniently forgot in analysing the struggle for freedom. Most of the political ideologies were developed within the Congress party. Even the communists moved away from the Congress in 1941.

III.

In this section an attempt would be made to examine the way the Naxalite leadership understood the character of Independence the country achieved in 1947. It is possible to predict the characterisation that Naxalites might have attributed to the “freedom of 1947”. The stand of CPI (ML) was unambiguous with regard to the “tryst with destiny” thus “The sham independence declared in 1947 was nothing but a replacement of the colonial and semi-feudal set-up with a semi-colonial and semifeudal one” (1971: 61).

There was no real freedom for the people of the country. One set of exploiters had been replaced by another set of oppressors. On top of that the successors of colonial rulers were the lackeys of the imperialist masters. At the time of the emergence of the Naxalite movement the world was divided between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries also called as capitalist bloc and socialist bloc respectively. The CPI (ML) departed from the positions held by other communist parties with regard to the status of Soviet

Union. For the Naxalites Soviet Union was revisionist and had become social imperialist, because it had abandoned the project of international revolution. Immediately after the “sham independence” the leaders of India sold themselves to the imperialist powers as is evident from the following statement:

US imperialism and Soviet Social imperialism have brought the vital sectors of the economy of our country under their control. US imperialism collaborates mainly with private capitalism and is now penetrating into the industries in the state sector, while Soviet Social imperialism has brought under its control mainly the industries in the state sector and is at the same time trying to enter into collaboration with private capital (CPI(ML) 1971: 61).

The domination of imperialist forces had rendered the project of sovereignty of the Indian state impotent. The bourgeoisie has developed comprador character and lost any nationalist and autonomous status. Being predominantly a peasant society the primary contradiction is between feudalism and large mass of peasantry the resolution of which would resolve all other contradictions. The CPI (ML) also focussed its attention on the project of nation-building put in place after 1947 by the Indian state in the form of “national integration”. The party argued that the Indian state had been denying Kashmiris, Nagas and Mizos the right of self-determination. Similarly, equal status to all languages had been denied and Hindi was promoted at the cost of many languages. The CPI (ML) was clear and assertive with regard to the levels of subjugation that different sections of the society had been facing. Therefore, the Indian revolution was to be the People’s Democratic Revolution, which was to be brought about under the leadership of working class. Only after the People’s Democratic Revolution the real freedom would be achieved. The People’s Democratic state would ensure certain actions to achieve freedom and equality for all. Some of these tasks it would carry were: confiscation of all lands of the landlords and liquidation of all imperialist debt through the confiscation of all enterprises of foreign capital as well as of the comprador-bureaucrat capitalists; unity of India through the right of self-determination; and equal status to all languages.

Freedom was promised in the party programme of the CPI (ML) and it was not the freedom that could be understood in the abstract and libertarian sense, but it was concrete in the sense that it promised the national minorities, linguistic groups, peasants and working classes and to the people of India a right to determine its future and status. Sovereignty of the Indian state was the most crucial element in the Naxalites’ construction of the notion of freedom. In other words, no other country should determine the destiny of India. However, certain components of its programme presented a paradox that could only confuse people. According to the CPI (ML), the Indian path to the successful people’s democratic revolution was basically the way the Chinese succeeded in bringing revolution; hence the slogan “Chinese path is our path”. On top of that the slogan that “Chinese chairman is our chairman” betrayed any sign of the Naxalites’ sincerity in bringing about sovereignty.

The Naxalites also confronted the most important institution of the Indian state, namely, elections. All over the democratic world the practice of choosing the leaders through elections was regarded as the democratic way of electing the government. The Communist Party of India chose to participate in election in 1952 by rejecting the general strike approach.

Later on after the split in 1964 the newly emerged party called Communist Party of India (Marxist) decided to participate in elections in 1967. In a way, the communist movement in India did not have the courage to reject electoral-democratic process not because it was the easy way to revolution, but largely due to the fact that it was the most powerful legitimising process to elect the government after India had become a republic in 1950. However, the communist parties tended to consider the parliamentary path to socialism quite positively after the Khrushchev declaration after the death of Stalin. The Naxalites, in the initial stages, rejected the elections/parliamentary path to socialism. For them both the CPI and CPI (M) had betrayed the revolution by joining the bourgeois democracy. Charu Mazumdar and his comrades were critical of the communists adopting parliamentary path to socialism. In consistency with the position against the elections, the CPI (ML) also adopted the path of armed struggle that was to be carried out clandestinely. The rights enshrined in the Constitution with regard to assembly and agitation/strike were even tactically rejected.

One dimension of the Naxalite movement that has not been mentioned so far is the splits that it experienced over a period of time. The period between 1967 and 1972 is generally attributed to the domineering influence of Charu Mazumdar-led CPI (ML) though some Maoist leaders like T. Nagi Reddy and Chandra Pulla Reddy had not joined the party. The position held by these leaders with regard to the post independent India's economic subjugation was no different from the CPI (ML). T. Nagi Reddy's book sought to show that India had been mortgaged. However, T. Nagi Reddy's group - later on emerged as UCCRI (ML)¹ - adopted the line of the combination of open "legal" struggles with the underground, clandestine work. Within the CPI (ML) the major split occurred in the life time of Charu Mazumdar and after his death it was identified with one of the leaders named Satyanarain Singh². In 1977 Singh's party that also adopted the same name came out with the document in which it characterised the Central Committee of the CPI (ML) as the victim of subjectivism and voluntarism by totally rejecting the elections. It (1978:400-401) stated thus

The party, particularly the Central Committee, confused the parliamentary path peddled by the revisionists with participation in and utilisation of the parliamentary institutions by the revolutionary Marxists for exposing the real nature of bourgeois parliaments, for educating the backward sections of the people about the necessity of armed struggle for the overthrow of their enemies, for organising and mobilising the broad masses in revolutionary struggles and for wrecking the bourgeois parliament from within.

Satyanarain Singh's group was not the only one to repudiate the boycott of elections/legal struggles. Some other Naxalite groups also joined this perception, but unlike Satyanarain Singh group's position they tried to combine the open with the secret struggles along the lines. After the death of Charu Mazumdar, the CPI (ML) now called CC (Central Committee) withdrew the line of annihilation of class enemies and under the leadership of Vinod Misra organised the Indian People's Front (IPF) as an open/legal organisation though it continued the underground revolutionary activities along with it. However, some groups later on reiterated their support to the Charu Mazumdar's line (e.g. Sita Ramahia's group) and have been continuing with the same by changing certain tactical modes of action.

Peoples' War Group (PWG) and Maoist Unity Centre are such groups. The two merged to form CPI (Maoist) some years back. At present CPI (Maoist) is identified with the Naxalite movement. It is carrying out the armed struggle and is quite strong in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand and Bihar. The CPI (Maoist), despite its dominant position in terms of influence and the level of armed struggle, is also plagued by splits. Some of the break away groups view the post-independence period in a different way from the CPI (Maoist). The Jharkhand Prastuti Committee (JPC) is one of such groups. (Chakravarti (2008: 296) informs about this group thus "The 'zonal commander', Ramapati, there with a group of 70 rebels, announced to assembled villagers that CPI(Maoist) were traitors, that they believed the Indian tricolour was a symbol of false independence from British rule. The JPC believed it to be the true symbol". Many Naxalite break away groups began to form in the late 1970s (Judge 1992). There could be more than thirty factions at present, though the Naxalite is become synonymous with the CPI (Maoist)

In the end of this section, there is a need to discuss the position of Charu Mazumdar with regard to the line of annihilation of class enemies and the use of traditional weapons to carry out the action. It is now well established that his emphasis on the use of traditional weapons to liquidate the class enemy was an outdated though it was believed that he emphasised the use of traditional weapons because of the convenience with which these could be transported from one place to the other without getting detected. There was still another dimension of the emphasis on the use of traditional weapons that is related with the issue of freedom. Let us quote Mazumdar (1978: 294) thus

Why am I against taking up fire-arms now? Is it not our dream that landless and poor peasants will take up rifles on their shoulders and march forward? Yet the use of firearms at this stage, instead of releasing the initiative of the peasant masses to annihilate the class enemy, stifles it. If guerrilla fighters start the battle of annihilation with their conventional weapons, the common landless and poor peasants will come forward with bare hands and join the battle of annihilation. A common landless peasant, ground[ed] down by age-old oppression, will see the light and avenge himself on class enemy. His initiative will be released.

The above quote from Mazumdar's speech provides an important insight into the social psychology of the poor and landless peasants. In the idiom of the left activism, it may be christened as subjective condition of the peasantry. The idea that Mazumdar articulated is related with the way the oppression is internalised to the extent that it enslaves the minds of the people and destroys their ability to even think of rebelling against their existential conditions. An intimate encounter with the act of the liquidation of the oppressor by using conventional weapons would create liberating effect on the oppressed peasant. In the entire Naxalite movement this kind of articulation of freeing oneself from the subjugated and enslaved mind through an act of violence did not occur again. Closely analysing this dimension of freedom of the mind, one is reminded of Fanon (1963), who talks about liberating effect of violence in the colonial situation. Fanon (Ibid.) treats colonialism not simply at the political and economic plane, but considers it existential in which the black

man experiences the loss of his psyche. By killing the colonial master he is not simply killing his oppressor, but also realising his own psyche.

IV

In this section, it is proposed to examine the contemporary scenario that has implications for the freedom of the country. The phase that began after the collapse of Soviet Union is called the period of globalisation. In the specific context of India, it coincides with the era of privatisation and liberalisation. Following the crisis of balance of payments in 1991 the Indian government had to approach the World Bank that insisted on the restructuring of the Indian economy. The restructuring of economy paved the way for the entry of MNCs in a big way. Globalisation, which is defined as the movement of people, goods and capital across nation-state boundaries tended to combine the privatisation and liberalisation in one dominant pattern in which the domination of the developed countries over the rest of the world seems a foregone conclusion. How have the Naxalites understood and interpreted the globalisation and its implications for the sovereignty of India? In view of the fact that there are large number of Naxalite groups having different views on the Indian society, the attempt in this paper is limited to very few comments and interpretations. However, the underlying current seems to be the same, that is, globalisation is another name for the US imperialism with some visible differences. Mahil³ (2005: 148) presents the Naxalite viewpoint in the following manner: 'There are two views about what has happened after 1947. According to one view, held by the exploiting classes and their political parties such as Congress, Bhartya Janata Party, Janata Dal, Akali Dal and rightist communists, the imperialist power left the country, the country got the independence after which the country has really done very well. According to another view, held by exploited people and their representative communist parties, there was an agreement between the imperialist power and the local comprador capitalist and feudal lords, which was anti-nation and anti-people. Though the imperialist power left the country, yet its control, exploitation and domination continued. From a colony India became semi-colonial.

Mahil (ibid. 152) defines globalisation as the process of economic domination of the Multinational Companies (MNCs). On the occasion of 50th year of India's independence in 1997, he wrote, "Today, when the ruling classes are celebrating freedom, it is the responsibility of the working people to take up the incomplete work of Bhagat Singh, Gadhar Party martyrs and Kirti party to bring real and complete freedom so that there is an end to the exploitation of man by man by waging and sharpening revolutionary struggle" (ibid. 163).

From the perspective of another Naxalite group⁴, Ghosh (2001: 82) provides the similar insight into the contemporary scene thus

Imperialism, mainly US imperialism, has a determining influence on all sectors of the Indian economy – agriculture, industry, technology, trade, tariff, currency, even the kind of food that we eat and the price we must pay for it. Our culture which is unity of two opposites – the feudal (the living proof of it are RSS and SIMI – like organisations) and the democratic (the ceaseless stream of anti-imperialist anti-feudal struggles of our people have given a democratic content to our culture) – is also

permeated with dregs of imperialist culture. Much of our literature, new media, most of our films and television broadcasts, bear ample testimony to it.

It may be commented that the Naxalites' understanding of the current phase of Indian economic development under globalisation regime is an extension of the subjugation of the Indian economy and political sovereignty at the hands of the US imperialism. Ghosh, interestingly, refers to the issue of culture that is an important aspect of Indian contemporary reality.

V

In this final concluding section, it is worthwhile to state succinctly the Naxalite construction of freedom. As an agrarian movement, the Naxalite movement was the first in the history of the 20th century movements that covered most of the country. It highlighted that the agrarian distress that emerged out of the failure of the Indian state to successfully implement the land reforms. The Ministry of Home Affairs (1986), Government of India, brought out a document in which the Naxalite violence was attributed to the failure of the state governments in implementing the land reforms enactments effectively. As a political movement, it questioned the legitimacy of the communist parties as the custodians of the workers' and peasants' interests and aspirations. Theoretically speaking, the Naxalite movement sought to delegitimise the Indian state by claiming that it was against the poor peasants and workers in terms of its class position and interests. For the Naxalite movement, the legitimate claim to use violence as a means to bring revolution was predicated upon the critique of the Indian state. The line of general mass upsurge adopted under the leadership of B. T. Ranadive in 1948, immediately after Independence, failed miserably. One of the major reasons for its short life could be the historical fact of the freedom that the country had achieved. The Naxalite movement emerged at a historical juncture when the Congress as the sole representative of the Indian masses began to lose its popularity, as it had failed to eradicate poverty, implement land reforms and develop the country.

The critique of the freedom struggle under the leadership of Gandhi and Indian National Congress was the focus point of the Naxalite movement. The Naxalites also regarded the freedom at midnight in 1947 as fake. The globalisation process, for most of the Naxalite groups is an intensification of the subjugation of the Indian state to US imperialism.

It is clear from the above that the notion of freedom in India has been a contested domain in which different political ideologies constructed their own notions of what freedom means. Any normative concept is likely to evoke different kinds of response. Freedom in the liberal sense may be understood in terms of a constitutional guarantee to the citizens as their right. The unit of liberal notion of freedom is individual and tends to cover all shades of actions. In the most general sense of the term one may say that freedom has something to do with freedom of action until the individual does not violate the law. It also implies that the individual freedom could be curtailed by the enactment of law. However, in the liberal-capitalist economy the freedom is seen in isolation from the economic dimension.

The Marxist critique of liberal notion emerges from the simple argument, that is, if a person does not have means to survive with dignity his freedom is hollow and meaningless. Interestingly, Marx's views on the role of capitalism for the individual are generally forgotten. Marx's starting point is the freedom to the wage labourer in the capitalist system. However, the property relations in the capitalist society render the freedom meaningless by adding the real threat of starvation. Work becomes enslavement and he feels free when he is out of work.

The Naxalite movement constructed the notion of freedom in the economic and political sense. It recognised the right of nationalities and linguistic communities to have the freedom of asserting their autonomy. For the Indian nation sovereignty, both political and economic, was the most crucial component of the notion of freedom. Its leader, Charu Mazumdar, sought to understand centuries' old system of oppression that had been internalised over a long period of time. He thought that the revolutionary violence would have a cathartic effect on the subjective conditions of the people. Obviously, the struggle for freedom had to cover long distances and overcome various obstacles, but all in the name of the individual.

Notes

1. The Unity Centre of Communist Revolutionaries of India (Marxist-Leninist).
2. It was later on called the CPI (ML) – SN Singh group.
3. Mahil writes from the perspective of the CPI (ML) - Chandra Pulla Reddy Group.
4. UCCRI (ML).

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Backwardness and Other Backward Classes: Making Sense of the Paradox

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Abstract

Based on the empirical investigation, the present paper examines the socio-economic profile of the OBCs in Punjab to look into its implications for the reservation policy. Comprised of 69 castes, the OBCs are a highly heterogeneous category characterized by hierarchy of status and diversity of occupations. There are landowning castes as well as entrepreneurial castes. Some OBCs castes have lost their traditional occupational relevance as a result of the process of development. It has been argued that the reservation policy framework has to treat these different castes differently. The release of caste data collected in 2011 census operations may facilitate the whole exercise.

The caste phenomenon in India has been subject to serious analysis from various perspectives. In the simplest terms, caste existed in the predominance of the village economy and it tended to correspond with various occupations at the local levels. Distinction between varna and caste has been analytically made in the existing sociological literature. However, Srinivas (1960) may be mentioned here for the sake of illustration. According to Srinivas, Varna identity is immutable, whereas castes are dynamic and have been undergoing changes in history. Varna scheme is simple according to which there is fourfold division of society, keeping the untouchables outside the varna scheme. The Other Backward Classes or Backward Castes basically belong to the shudra varna, who were artisans/ cultivators/ labourers but were not involved in polluting occupations. It is a social layer in between the *dwija*- twice born - castes and the untouchable castes. Among the artisans are goldsmith, blacksmith, carpenter, oil presser, weaver, waterman, barber, tailor, washerman, etc. They were socially disadvantaged in terms of occupational mobility and in the past they also suffered from different degrees of ritual prohibitions, remained devoid of 'tradition of literacy' (Sheth 2004). Land ownership remains the prerogative of a few select castes among them. However, untouchability and isolation have never been their problem (Lal 2003). But the significant issue is that the OBCs are not a cohesive social group, either on the basis of objective criteria or in terms of subjective perceptions (Gudavarthy 2012). Thus,

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the OBCs are sociologically distinct in terms of being internally heterogeneous, and socially and economically differentiated.

One may argue that in the process of development most of the caste groups could avail the benefits of development but how could these middle level caste groups have been further reduced to destitution? We find that their backwardness has resulted due to the development process of Indian economy initiated during the British rule. The artisans are found everywhere in the world but their experience did not remain the same. The artisans of England, the country first to undergo industrialization, were trained to work in factories, their skills were not allowed to go waste; rather were modified according to the new requirements. The development process of Japan though started late yet their rate of industrial development remained very rapid. Tracing their quick emergence we find that since the middle of 19th century, the Tonyas (intermediaries) increasingly operated as entrepreneurs in the Japanese society who started regulating the production of craftsmen. During Meiji restoration period small producers adapted to the new conditions, in fact, 'mechanization reached the drawing room of the craftsmen' by taking to manufacturing of modern goods (Custer 1997:297). It shows that the factory system of production did not completely replace the network of small producers. The Japanization means appropriation of workers' knowledge. Custer writes "The skilled worker was the repository of human techniques required in the labour process. The craftsmen/ women- the potter, the tanner, the smith and so on- combined in mind and body the concepts and physical dexterities of the speciality" (ibid.: 304). Even in automobile sector the share of production that is subcontracted amounts to at least 70 percent. The multinationals in manufacturing cars depend upon the outsiders; particularly the women for the interior of the cars through putting out system at piece rates, thus the skills of none were lost to technological development (ibid.). In the process, the artisanal production was not expropriated through the process of primitive accumulation of capital.

The socio-economic environment rapidly changed during the British rule and it altered the framework of traditional relationship between the artisans and landowners significantly. The industrialization and modernization processes initiated during the colonial rule displaced their artisanal skills in the market situation. The weavers and leather workers faced lot of difficulties. The services of blacksmith and carpenter became less remunerative. In the initial stages, acquisition of land and turning to agriculture was the most obvious recourse taken by the artisans. The lohar, tarkhan, julaha, kumhar, chamar and later suniara took to agriculture activities as landowners, tenants and non-cultivating proprietors. But the process of acquisition of land by the artisan castes was hampered by the provision of the Alienation of Land Act 1901 which did not include them as agriculturalists and therefore not entitled to purchase land or to get it on mortgage (Sharma 1996). Thus they were forced to look for alternative employment available in factories as workers in the urban areas. In the process some of the artisanal groups disappeared, others (julahas and kumhars) could just survive by taking to petty trading, whereas a few others (lohars and tarkhans) could modify their skills and were able to meet the demands of the emerging market. Some of them also availed educational opportunities which provided them jobs in government offices. Some like lohar and tarkhan were chosen by the British officers to be sent to their colonies to carry out railway expansion works etc in Africa, and Latin America. The very development process brought poverty and misery for most of these skilful artisans. The traditional set up

guaranteed the artisan just a living and it was in the interest of dominant section that they do not move out of the system. Their *biradari* (fraternity of hereditary artisans) also discouraged them from entering into new occupations. Those who dared were the object of ridicule and could even be ostracized (Sharma 1996).

In the early 20th century the backward classes started organizing and mobilizing themselves and culminated into an anti- Brahmin movement in South India. The movement succeeded in obtaining a series of concessions and reservations for the backward classes from the British Government and Princely rulers. As far back as in 1918 the Princely state of Mysore declared all non- brahmins communities as backward classes and allocated to them caste wise quota of seats in colleges and in jobs in state services. Sheth(2004) marks it as the beginning of the system of reservations in India. As a result, Gudavarthy(2012) informs that bulk of these people hold professional jobs and are also well versed in English and enjoy urban lifestyle.

The Government of independent India under the constitution was bound to provide justice and promote the welfare of all its citizens. Learning from the earlier experiences of reservations, the article 340 of the Indian Constitution dealt with the socially and educationally backward classes including their process of identification. In order to determine the criteria to be adopted in considering some sections of the people of India as socially and educationally backward, the first backward class commission- the Kalelkar Commission was set up in 1953. But its report was rejected by the Government of India on the ground that it did not apply objective tests for identifying the backward classes. Then in 1979 the Mandal Commission was set up and the commission adopted 11 criteria which could be grouped under social, educational and economic in order to identify OBCs. In India, the backward classes constitute a category of people who are for the most part officially listed and given special recognition in a variety of contexts (Beteille 1991). The other backward classes constitute about 50 percent of the population of India¹. To uplift their status 27 percent reservations were provided to them in higher education and in public sector employment. The recommendation of 27 percent reservation for OBCs after running through rough weather for long time was finally implemented in 2008. Therefore, other backward classes are also known as Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs).

The issue of reservations for OBCs had constantly remained under one or the other controversy. The identification of backward classes poses many problems. In the Indian context backwardness is viewed as an attribute not of individuals but of certain clearly defined social segments in which membership is acquired by birth (Beteille 1991). There are three main aspects of backwardness: social, economic and educational. In reality backward classes are not classes at all but an aggregate of closed status groups (Beteille *ibid.*). To quantify the backwardness, certain parameters are to be formulated particularly the doctrine of creamy layer. Each state of India varies in terms of educational level, economic development and degree of social stratification. Thus, the right to decide the backwardness of the classes with regard to OBCs was given to the states(Surgirtha 2008). The Mandal Commission prepared a list of 2399 backward castes or communities on the basis of 1931 Census data. The Central Government made the option of acceptance of the Mandal Commission's recommendations at the discretion of the respective states. Also if the states' lists differ from the list of Mandal commission, then the list of state would prevail.

The list of the OBCs is dynamic, as castes and communities can be added or removed depending upon their socio-economic and educational development. A creamy layer (an exclusion criterion) amongst them has been fixed by the Supreme Court of India from time to time. Starting from one lakh rupees of annual income to rupees four and half lakh till recent times has now enhanced to earning rupees six lakh annually for a period of three consecutive years was not entitled to these reservations. Also a simple graduation or professional is deemed to be educationally forward. Thus the creamy layer defined by the Supreme Court becomes one of the parameters to identify the other backward classes for reservation. Creamy layer becomes the filter in official terms. Therefore, the OBC is a political term and used for administrative purposes. Two institutions namely National Backward Class Finance and Development Corporation (NBCFD) and the National Commission for Backward Classes (NCBC) were established for the welfare of OBCs. The matter of reservation in government jobs and in education for the OBCs was left to the state governments. Each state has different figures of communities entitled for positive discrimination based on the population of the state. The states have prepared their lists of OBCs. Sometimes a specific community is entitled for rights in a particular state but not in another state of India. Punjab state's list consists of 69 castes categorized as OBCs who belong to Hindu, Sikh, Christian and Buddhist religions. The OBCs consist of castes engaged in varying occupations such as artisan, service, cultivation, and labour.

Punjab

The present study examined the development of OBCs of Punjab, focusing mainly on rural areas of Punjab, because other than the cultivators they were dependent on agriculture by providing various services, both skilled and unskilled under the well established *jajmani* system. The first issue for examination is to understand the disappearance of *jajmani* relations and its effect on the artisans. The second issue relates to the reservation policy of the state and the possible and probable benefits to the OBCs in terms of acquisition of skills followed by getting the government jobs. The broad objective formulated for the study was to analyse the changes taking place in their social status, particularly with regard to their level of education, occupational status besides their way of life and social world view.

Methodologically speaking, this is an empirical study which has been conducted in the villages of Punjab. The exploratory survey revealed that just a few OBC families representing two to three such castes are found in each village. Thus it was decided to randomly select the considerable number of villages of Amritsar and Tarn Taran² districts. Each of the districts has 8 blocks, out of which 4 blocks of Amritsar district and 3 blocks of Tarn Taran were randomly selected. The study has been carried out in 44 different villages of these blocks in which 14 different OBCs (Table 1) are represented. In all 270 respondents have been interviewed with the help of an interview schedule keeping in view the representation of diverse categories of OBCs. As already mentioned, there are 69 different caste groups categorised as the OBCs in Punjab. Some of these caste groups are specific to one region of Punjab, while some others are found exclusively in urban areas. Their spread shows that there is a peculiarity with regard to concentration of these groups according to the areas even within Punjab. Same trend is found at all India level. Sometimes it cut across the religious categories. In Punjab Dalit Christians and Muslims belonging to particular castes are categorised as OBCs.

Table-1: Caste Groups amongst OBCs represented in the Study

Caste Groups	Number	Percentage
Landowner-cum-cultivators Lobana (30) and Kamboj (24)	54	20.00
Artisans Kumhar (38), Tarkhan (32), Lohar(20), Julaha (12), Chhimba (16)	118	43.70
Servicemen (Skilled and Unskilled) Jhiwar (31), Dhobi (2), Teli (3), Nai (39)	75	27.78
Pastoralist Gujjar	7	2.59
Converted Dalits Christians (Masih) (3) and Muslims (Mirasi) (13)	16	5.93
Total	270	100

Note: Figures in the brackets are actual number of the respondents

Table –1 shows diversity in the category of the OBCs, which has a qualitatively distinct character from the diverse castes among the dalits. One of the dominant features of these caste groups is that despite being identified as OBCs there is nothing common among them. One of the common features of all dalit castes is that they face exclusion in relation to touch and commensality both theoretically and historically. Such a practice does not exist in the case of all the OBCs, but the converted dalits face exclusion similar to the dalits despite religious conversion. There is also a long range in the social status they enjoy in the society. For example, lobana and kamboj do not face social discrimination and in many of villages they are the dominant landowning castes. There is also an interesting case of the tarkhan caste. Most of the members of the tarkhan caste are Sikhs and known by the name of ramgarhia. Till 1990s the ramgarhia caste belonged to the general category. The Hindu counterparts known by the name of lohar were OBCs. The ramgarhia began to demand for the OBC status, particularly after the Mandal commission recommendations provided for reservation quota for the OBCs. There is also the mahatms, who were earlier the OBCs, but later on recognised as the scheduled castes. The artisan castes are the central in the existence of the OBCs.

The artisans constituted nearly one fifth of the total population of Punjab as per census of 1931. Most of these artisans were Muslims, who after partition migrated to the west Punjab in Pakistan. The population of artisan castes is small and they lack the possibility of forming a successful interest group. Moreover, they are highly diverse and vary in the status scale of the Punjabi society. They failed to cope up with the powerful forces of technological advancement, which began their economic ruin by making their occupations redundant extends in the late 19th century to late 20th century. About the artisan castes

included in the sample in this study, Gadgil's (1974) account is aptly suitable, who informs that these groups started giving up their occupations even before the independence of country. In Punjab where British rule came relatively later, the process of decline of the skills starts from the second half of the 19th century. When the machine made goods from Britain began pouring in the local markets, the artisanal castes started taking to agriculture or becoming labourers in agriculture or industry. Their pauperization may be explained due to the impact of industrialization, and the repeated famines. The famines affected the weavers the most and some of them could never take to their hereditary occupation later on. In this process the weavers were the first to be affected and carpenters and blacksmiths were the last to retain their hereditary occupations.

The work of lohars and tarkhans remained relevant in the villages of Punjab till the Green Revolution ushered in Punjab in 1970s, while many other artisan groups, by then, had virtually lost their traditional jobs and were in a bad condition and their number was decaying. Blacksmiths and carpenters could find relevance of their work in the factories in the urban areas thus became entrepreneurs and workers (Judge and Bal 1996). For other artisans, driven out of their hereditary occupations, unskilled labour was the only alternative. Thus they were reduced to poverty affecting the life chances. Fuchs (1981) is of the view that they were mainly the artisan or manual workers in this culture. They were well skilled in arts, in singing, playing musical instruments, and dancing. They were also the painters and sculptors of this culture. Wonderful architectures, artistic paintings and sculptures in palaces, caves and temples were conceived and produced by the forefathers of these artisans. Some of the secondary sources, such as Ibbetson (1974), Gadgil (1974), and Singh (2003) have explored the origin, occupation and changes amongst the OBCs (listed in the Table-1) and have found that that all these middle castes claim a higher ritual status.

Social Profile

The personal and family profile of these OBCs respondents depicts that 90 percent are following Sikh religion, others include Hindus (4.44%), Muslim (4.07%), and Christians (1.11%). Nearly 81 percent of them are married. Large numbers of families are extended in nature as one of parent or brother/sister is living with the respondents. It is significant to note that only 19 percent of them have joint families and 13 percent live in nuclear families, but the size of families is large in the case of almost 90 percent of the respondents. Maintaining such a large family size may have its consequences for the standard of living of its members. Large number, i.e., 84 percent of the respondents, belongs to the village they are residing now. For others Indo-Pak partition remained the main reason to migrate to their present village. The last 20 years have remained significant so far as the mobility of the people is concerned due to the augmentation of the availability of work and business avenues.

The ownership pattern helps us to assess the quality of life of the people. About 97 percent own the houses, but 69 percent of them are pucca ones, and 6 percent of them live in mud houses, while others live in semi-pucca houses. 87 percent have separate kitchen, 84 percent have separate toilet, 94 percent have water tap or pump facility. The cooking gas is used by 86 percent of the households. Another 96 percent have television set in the house and another 95 percent have mobile phones. Fridge is also in use in 80 percent of the houses of the respondents. It may be stated that the household amenities and possession of

vehicles is fairly good as compared to their stated income. The consumption pattern goes well with the general pattern of Punjabis as they are known for their overwhelming expenditure on consumer goods. Respondents belonging to two caste groups- Lobanas and Kamboj -are small land owners, owning up to 6 acres of land. Traditionally, they have been growing vegetables for marketing purposes. Half of them also have milch animals in their house.

Education

The level of the education of the people indicates the level of their development. To uplift the status of OBCs, the Government of India implemented the reservation policy in higher educational institutes. As per the Central Educational Institutions(CEIs) Reservations in Admissions Act, 2006, 27 percent of the total seats are reserved for OBCs, however, eliminating a small fraction of people whose annual income is more than Rupees 6 lakh. This act has provided for a unique provision of increasing seats. Thus increasing the total intake of students does not lead to cutting of seats for general category students. It is significant to note that in most of the higher educational institutes the reserved seats for OBCs remain unfulfilled due to their lack of awareness and resources and Babu(2010) even suggests a comprehensive review of CEIs act. As the level of education goes up, an inevitable change in occupation also takes place. The total literacy achieved in Punjab according to Census of 2011 is 76.68 percent which is higher than the national figures. What it shows that more than the $\frac{3}{4}$ of the people of Punjab have got some level of education. But it is to be seen that what proportion of educational opportunities have percolated to various OBCs in Punjab. As Ray and Majumdar(2010) have found in their study that specific groups are excluded from the process of capability formation(educational attainment) and income earning opportunities due to various forms of discrimination. This exclusion and backwardness transcend the boundary of the current generation and spills over to successive generations as well. There are also provisions for scholarships for the OBC students for graduation and post-graduate studies, besides student scholarship schemes for them for joining public and private professional courses. Even there are schemes for remedial and coaching classes for the OBC students through universities and colleges. Above all, there are research fellowships for the OBC students. It shows that the Government of India is making all efforts to bring equity and their inclusion in the mainstream. The nature and content of efforts made by the Government of India with regard to the OBCs suggest that education is regarded as the major indicator of backwardness.

The level of education of respondents and their fathers has been compared in the Table 2. It was expected that the level of education would go up with the new generation. The data in the Table – 2 fully support this conjecture. The data were also collected regarding the educational level of the grandfathers of the respondents. It was found that 85 percent of them were illiterate, and 7.40 percent were just literates. The maximum level of education

Table:2 Educational Levels of Fathers and Respondents

Fathers' Education/ Respondents' Education	Illiterate	Primary	Middle	Matriculation	Higher Secondary/ plusTwo	B.A.	M.A.	Total
Illiterate	31 (83.79)	21 (67.74)	28 (62.22)	52 (56.52)	23 (45.10)	5 (38.46)	-	158(58.52)
Literate	3 (8.11)	2 (6.45)	2 (4.44)	5 (5.43)	3 (5.88)	-	-	15(5.56)
Primary	1 (2.70)	4 (12.90)	10 (22.22)	20 (21.74)	7 (13.73)	2 (15.38)	1 (100)	45(16.67)
Middle	2 (5.40)	3 (9.68)	3 (6.67)	9 (9.78)	13 (25.49)	2 (15.38)	-	32(11.85)
Matric	-	-	1 (2.22)	5 (5.43)	2 (3.92)	3 (23.08)	-	11(4.07)
Plus Two	-	1 (3.23)	1 (2.22)	1 (1.09)	3 (5.88)	-	-	6(2.22)
B.A.	-	-	-	-	-	1 (7.69)	-	1(.37)
Total	37 (13.70)	31 (11.48)	45 (16.66)	92 (34.07)	51 (16.67)	13 (4.81)	1 (0.37)	270 (100)

remained up to matriculation. In the generation of fathers, illiteracy was reduced to 58 percent amongst them. In the present generation it has further reduced to nearly 14 percent. The marker of change started appearing in the generation of father, but still 95 percent of them have had only school education. Data were also collected on the levels of education of all the real brothers and sisters of the respondents. Interestingly, only 27 percent of the respondents' all brothers and sisters are educated and 20 percent literate, while 15 percent siblings are illiterate. The level of education amongst their women though gives a dismal picture, yet there is gradual improvement in attaining the education in successive generations. Even in the case of children only 2 percent have as yet got post graduation degree.

Table: 3 Educational Level of the Respondents according to Castes

Education Caste Groups	Illiterate	Primary	Middle	Matriculation	+2	Graduate	Post graduate	Total
Landowner-cum-cultivators	7 (12.96)	4 (7.41)	9 (16.67)	19 (35.18)	9 (16.67)	5 (9.26)	1 (1.85)	54 (20.00)
Artisans	7 (5.93)	12 (10.17)	20 (16.95)	48 (40.48)	24 (20.34)	7 (5.93)	-	118 (43.70)
Servicemen (Skilled and Unskilled)	7 (9.33)	11 (14.67)	15 (20)	23 (30.67)	18 (24)	1 (1.33)	-	75 (27.78)
Pastoralist	7 (100)	-	-	-	-	-	-	7 (2.59)
Converted Dalits	9 (56.25)	4 (25)	1 (6.25)	2 (12.5)	-	-	-	16 (5.93)
Total	37 (13.70)	31 (11.48)	45 (16.67)	92 (34.07)	51 (18.89)	13 (4.81)	1(.37) -	270 (100)

Further it has been tried to find out whether the low level of education is prevalent amongst all the backward caste groups or it is restricted to a few of them. Table 3 reveals considerable variations in the educational levels of the various caste groups. For example, the pastoralist caste, Gujjar, has cent per cent illiteracy. Gujjar has been a nomadic caste rearing cattle till recently, as a result the literacy has been almost absent among the members of this caste. The second caste group which is low in the educational level is that of the converted Dalits. The most interesting information which the data reveal is that the artisan castes have done even better than the landowning castes.

One may argue that why the Government has given them the reservation for higher education without any similar provision at the school level. In this regard, the data given in Table -3 could provide certain insights into this issue. It is clear that they are able to get education up to school level, and thereafter there is need for reservations for their higher education. Majority of them do not have the ability to send their children to institutions of

higher learning. They seem unaware of reservations and obviously, the urban residents would be more able to avail educational opportunities and have information on reservations. Even the study of Ray and Majumdar(2010) based on 50th and 61st rounds of National Sample Survey Organization informs that 45 percent of the OBCs are illiterate in India, though their educational mobility is significantly higher in states like Mizoram, Goa, Kerala, Sikkim, Meghalaya, Tripura, Assam, Pondicherry, Tamil Nadu, Himachal, Punjab and Maharashtra. Despite the affirmative action to provide them space in the mainstream, these groups tend to remain excluded. Thus, it is important to have an account of rural OBCs who are less privileged to avail the benefits of the opportunities and reservations. Prevailing disparities between the rural and urban regions in India, it is likely that the rural OBCs would be marginalized in reaping the benefits of affirmative action of the government. Sundaram(2006) has proposed that it would have been better had the reservation/ incentives were given to OBCs at the school level. It is at the school stage that we need to provide more resources to raise the proportion of the population acquiring the basic qualification for entry into higher education. Goyal and Singh (2014), on the basis of their study, suggest that to make reservations effective and inclusive, the state must ensure access to quality and affordable elementary and secondary education to all as a prerequisite. Moreover, in the context of privatization of education is that to what extent we can bring equality by providing educational opportunities in this scenario. Now state has ceased to be the main player in terms of providing education and employment.

Occupation

The OBCs are mainly drawn from artisan caste groups who had been performing very vital functions for the society. They excelled in their skills whether material or metal, art and craft, singing and dancing. Table-4 shows the hereditary occupation of each caste group covered in the present study. Some of these groups were working under jajmani system, under which the caste was expected to provide certain specialized services to group of families – jajmans -who in return provided them customary dues fixed by the traditional norms from time to time depending upon the significance and the necessity of the services. Such economic relations amongst the families were carried out in Punjab under the locally called *sepidari* system. In the village social system the landowner is producer of goods and all other artisan castes were subordinate to him and hence facilitating the production of goods. With the emergence of capitalism significant changes occurred in such relationships. By the mid 20th century the jajmani relations started disappearing from the Punjab villages and the process was accelerated with the advent of green revolution in the late-1960s. The modern sources of energy, mechanization of agriculture and availability of machine made goods in the local market made their traditional skills redundant. Most of the artisans finding their skills not relevant in the modern system of production preferred to become workers in nearby foundries and workshops. Thus, over time many of the hereditary occupations of caste groups were lost.

Table:4- Caste and the Memory of their Hereditary Occupation.

Caste	Hereditary occupation
Chhimba	Dying and sewing/ stitching clothes
Nai	Barber/ acted as messenger or go- between to fix up the marriage matches and dates
Gujjar	Milkmen(rearing buffalos and selling milk)
Lohar	Blacksmith/ Chakki (flour mill)
Julaha	Weaver and Dying the cloth
Mirasi	Singing and dancing at Jajman's place on auspicious occasions by narrating genealogy of the family
Kamboj	Farming, growing vegetables for sale
Kumhar	Potters/ making earthen utensils/ business of grains/ labour
Mehra/Jhiwar	Kahar/ water carrier/Cooking food on auspicious occasions
Tarkhan	Carpenter also found overlapping with mason/ Blacksmith
Teli	Oil Presser
Dhobi	Dying clothes/Washerman
Lobana	Farming/ petty shopkeeper
Christian	Labour(the converted scheduled castes)/ menial jobs

It is pertinent to learn when did the traditional occupations start disappearing? We find that most of the grandfathers of the respondents were carrying on these hereditary occupations except for 1.11 per cent, who joined army, and 20%, who became labourers. In the generation of fathers of the respondents, more number of people experienced change in their hereditary occupations. As compared to grandfathers, 5.55 percent of the fathers of the respondents joined army/ police / postal services and quite a few of them became petty and small shopkeepers. Interestingly, the occupations of the respondent are far more dispersed than their fathers and grandfathers. One may observe substantial horizontal occupational mobility but very little vertical occupational mobility. Actually a large number of them were reduced to labour jobs. Further the respondents were asked whether they were carrying the same occupation as of their grandfathers and fathers or have changed to non- hereditary occupations. Three fourth of the respondents mentioned that they have not changed the occupation which implies that they, by and large, with little modification or

diversification were carrying the same occupation as of their forefathers. One fourth of them (65 respondents) changed their occupations. All those who have changed have entered into 24 different types of occupations, including service, business and labour. But the change in occupations has occurred during the last 20 years, and the trend actually accelerated during the last one decade. It was important to know the reasons why they changed their occupations and when asked many of them came up with more than one reason (Table 5).

Table 5: Reasons for change of Occupation

Reasons	Number(65)	Percentage
Needs were not fulfilled/ less income/poverty	34	37.36
Traditional/hereditary occupation was not profitable and more time consuming, labour intensive	25	27.47
Present occupation more profitable/ less labour, more returns/ wages are high	13	14.28
Division of land/shop, got better work, purchased land	13	14.28
Physical labour replaced by machines, learnt new skills	4	4.39
Did not reply	2	2.20
Total	91*	100

* Multiple responses

On the basis of data (Table 5) we may argue that the hereditary or traditional occupations have ceased to be profitable in modern times. As a result, most of the artisanal groups have been ridden by poverty. Thus the time consuming, labour intensive and less income generating hereditary occupations forced them to opt for non-hereditary occupations. Nearly 33 percent of them have started small shops selling variety of goods, 16 percent have taken to government jobs and 14 percent of them have gone to foreign countries, while rest of them have taken to variety of low prestige occupations. Deshpande (2006) argues that advantaged and disadvantaged are randomly distributed amongst the OBCs, thus they need to focus on groups rather on individuals. She calculated CDI (Caste Development Index) on the basis of NFHS (National Family Health Survey) data (1998-99) based on 5 indicators, namely landholding, occupational attainment, educational attainment, consumer durable ownership, and asset ownership both in rural and urban India. The CDI for the OBCs was less than the others in virtually all states of India. Caste disparities in occupational attainment are clear. 61% are agricultural and manual labourers. Among high level administrative jobs the proportion of OBCs is 8%. The present study also reveals that none of the OBCs is carrying high prestige occupation³ that is, prestige category I and II. There are 32 different occupations which respondents are carrying which fall in medium

and mainly, the low prestige categories. Comparing the occupation with their caste group, we do find that Kumhar, Lobana and Kamboj are mainly concentrated in the middle of the occupational prestige categories. Whereas, majority of the Nai, Mirasi and Teli caste groups are concentrated in the lowest prestige category. Further, their income level also indicates that Mirasi and Teli have low monthly family income, that is, up to 4000 rupees. Relatively, Lobana, Kamboj and Kumhar have higher income levels, i.e., around Rs.10000 per month. Majority of Lohar, Tarkhan, Nai and Jhiwar also have low level of Income.

We may now explore how with change in occupation some by modifying the skills and other landing up in unskilled jobs their socio- economic status has been affected. Out of the total, 148 (55%) respondents replied that they do find improvement in the status of family. Other 33 percent of them mentioned that there was no change in the status of family. While rest of them did not introduce any change thus the question does not apply to them. All those who found improvement in their status have mentioned various reasons, which have been presented in Table- 6. One of the major changes they have experienced is that their economic status has improved, besides enhancing their self-esteem.

Table-6: Nature of Changes taken place in the family

Changes	Number	Percentage
Financial Position improved	81	52.26
Elders were engaged in low status and low paid jobs	19	12.26
In the past, foodgrains were received after six months, now getting wages on daily or monthly basis	18	11.61
Children are well settled	10	6.45
In the past upper caste people used to ignore us, now their attitude has changed	8	5.16
We had kachcha houses, now live under better conditions	6	3.87
Children settled abroad	3	1.94
Children studying in good schools	2	1.29
Earlier the whole family was engaged in work	1	0.64
Total	148	100

It is generally understood that some of the enterprising people might have moved up in the hierarchy and there would be some who could not adjust with the new developments. Exploring the corporate social mobility of the caste groups we find that 41 percent of the respondents confirmed that there has been upward mobility of the caste

groups and 57 percent shared that there was no change in the socio- economic status of their caste group over the time. The major changes, according to them, which are the result of numerous work opportunities, are: now people have more money than they had in past and the standard of living of the people has improved. The houses are pucca with most of the modern amenities. The level of education amongst the children has gone up. There is also political participation at the local level. Youngsters have gone abroad and are earning enough.

On Reservation Policy

As Government of India provides reservation for the OBCs in higher education and in public sector jobs, information was collected on the awareness of such a policy among the respondents. Surprisingly, only 10 percent of the respondents were aware, whereas 90 percent respondents expressed ignorance about it. All those who said that they were aware of it were asked to inform in detail about various provisions under the reservation policy. A large number, i.e., 85 percent, said that there was some reservation of seats in education and in government jobs, but none could tell the proportion of reservation, which is 27 percent. Out of the total only 3 respondents had availed the reservation either in education or in a job. During the field work it was observed that quite a few persons in each village had got the fake certificates of being scheduled castes prepared and were availing the privileges. The poor amongst the OBCs required some facilities at the school level which they got through the false claim of being scheduled castes. Even when the respondents were probed further, just one percent of the respondents could tell about somebody from the village that availed the reservation.

It remains important to mention that stigma attached to reservation policy could have travelled to the OBCs, for it exists in the case of the scheduled castes. It may not hold valid in the case of OBCs. Gudavarthy(2012: 58) has worked on both scheduled castes and the OBCs. He argues “backwardness, unlike untouchability, does not produce a victim-subject and whose subjective perception is not constructed either with self- contempt or a stigmatized victimhood. It seems to instead produce a citizen capable of speaking and asserting the language of rights, legal and constitutional entitlements, and pointing towards the limitations of planning and public policy in the past”. Similarly, Hooda(2001) corroborates that majority of backward caste respondents expressed the belief that increased representation in government services and professions enhanced their caste status and SEBCs label is no more considered as stigmatizing. We have number of instances from South India (which has a rather long history of reservation policy) such as Lingayat, Nayar, Kamma have emerged as dominant. Similarly, Yadavs of U.P. and Bihar and Jats of U.P. have emerged as dominant castes. It is pertinent to argue that we find lot of inter- group variations amongst the OBCs. Their heterogeneity raises many concerns for governance.

Issues and Concerns

The empirical reality of India reveals that the reservation itself is politicised getting included in the list of the OBC category becomes the basis of politics of many political parties and organizations. Palshikar(2008) through the experience of last two decades shows that many groups like Lingayat and Jats have been included in OBC category as they carry political clout. The demand of the Gujjars for exclusion from the OBC category and inclusion

in Scheduled Tribe category demonstrates the inability of the OBC category to accommodate the interests of many communities. The Government of Maharashtra in 2004 in the wake of then Lok Sabha elections announced to include nine more castes in the state list of OBCs. It included Kunbi Maratha as the possible beneficiaries of OBC reservations. On behalf of the Marathas the state invented a caste category Kunbi- Maratha (Deshpande 2004). In case of Punjab, Rai Sikhs were excluded and put in the Scheduled Caste category and the Ramgarhias - the entrepreneurial class and the most mobile caste in Punjab who so far opted out of the reservations were added to the list of OBCs in recent times. As the list for OBCs would expand to add more number of caste groups, there is a probability that the share for each caste to get reservation would decline. Some groups, particularly in Maharashtra, have also suggested fragmenting the proportion for each caste, but in that case there is a chance for some castes getting nothing, i.e., it may remain less than one. Over the time some castes for not getting properly represented chose to be included in the list of scheduled caste and scheduled tribes. There is politics of reservation both for recipients and the politicians (Palshikar 2008). For instance, in Punjab, the list of OBCs has gradually grown bigger.

The list of OBCs has been prepared on the basis of 1931 census, which was the last to enumerate the castes in India. The Supreme Court of India has pointed out that the 1931 data base is not valid for determining backward castes in the recent times. In 2011, caste census has been conducted but this again has been done by delinking it from the main census. Sundaram(2006) has pointed out to another anomaly on the basis of NSS 55th round surveys, 1999-2000. He finds that the estimated share of OBCs in rural India is fewer than 38 per cent and in urban India they are less than 31 percent and thus the share of the OBCs in the all India population would be a little over 36 percent. Even according to recent NSS round the proportion is found to be nearing 41 percent. This is substantially below the 52 percent share of the OBCs projected by the Mandal Commission and hence the recommendation of 27 percent to OBCs.

A number of issues have been raised with regard to their status, available resources and opportunities on the basis of existing literature. Some issues for governance need to be addressed. Is the list of the OBCs exhaustive of all backward classes? There is enlisting of some castes twice under different names. Should some of the castes like Dhobi, Mirasi and Teli be given more privileges than others? And castes like Lobana and Kamboj are doing much better than the others. Should such groups be removed from the list so that they do not enjoy the benefits of the reservation? From the point of governance long list of 69 caste groups be adequate for OBC status. But 69 OBC castes competing for 27 percent reservation would surely leave nothing for most backward castes, like Teli, Dhobi and Mirasi.

Besides that there are other types of discrepancies in the list of OBCs. The latest list of OBCs still shows Rai Sikhs as OBC on serial No. 24 and the list of scheduled castes also include Rai Sikh at No. 39. Similarly, in the list of OBC it is written Weaver (Julaha) at serial No. 17 and also in the list of scheduled caste on serial No. 19 it is Kabir Panthi or Julaha and at Sr. No 19 it is Megh. On number 55 it is Penja. The hereditary occupation of all these caste groups was weaving. Is it simply an administrative delay of updating the lists or it was designed to avail the facilities from wherever they are available? Some persons may avail the reservation wherever they could get. Some backward castes have

been listed twice or thrice in the list of a state. For instance, Lohar in the list of Punjab OBCs is written twice at Sr. Nos. 31 and 51. An interaction with the Chairman Backward Classes Commission, Punjab, reveals that Doom- Mirasi and now Rababiya claim to have same origin, but they are treated differently by the state. Dooms are SCs, Mirasi are OBCs and Rababiyas claim to be the descendents of Bhai Mardana - a respectable status in Sikh history from Mirasi caste. Should they be included in OBCs or SCs? Rabaiyas are Mirasi who play the *rabab* – a traditional musical instrument. Is it a question of more benefits or of status? Many backward castes have emerged as dominant castes, such as Jats of Punjab and Yadavs of U.P. and Bihar. The Suniaras are an important artisanal group and are goldsmiths. They are kept out of the OBC list in Punjab. In the liberalized economy of India and under the de-regulation of gold the traditional Suniaras are the sufferers and their economic conditions have drastically come down. Despite very detailed review of the indicators taken by the commissions, many dominant and prosperous castes got themselves recognized as backward.

Chaudhary(2004) raises the question is caste an appropriate indicator of deprivation? Census of 1911 provides data for 8 twice-born castes, 27 intermediate and shudra castes, all of which are now considered OBCs. In 1911 the literacy rate was only one percent for OBCs while the work participation rate was 42 percent for high castes and 54 percent for the OBCs. Doubtlessly, the caste is a good indicator of deprivation. But these averages conceal the enormous heterogeneity within the OBCs. Protagonists of caste politics plead that the problem of heterogeneity can be tackled if the OBCs are arranged according to backwardness and split into more backward and most backward and sub quota within the total quota. The economic status of households varies a great deal with each caste. The data of varied castes show that within each caste group we may find landowners and labour, e.g. Brahmin in U.P. an upper caste were in debt, doing labour and were destitute. Thus Intra-caste variations in economic condition were enormous. Some argue that it is not economic backwardness but it is social backwardness. Most of the backward castes are middle castes. They never suffered ritual purity- pollution; rather in villages they had mutually exclusive, durable, and multiple (Mandelbaum 1972) relations with landowner families. In Punjab, like Ramgarhia- the most skilful people took up the practices of upper / dominant caste and broke away themselves from Lohar and Tarkhan and in 1931 census returned themselves as Ramgarhias. They had education, got into good jobs and became economically well off due to socio- historical reasons (Saberwal 1976, Bal 1995). Yet another argument by Natraj (2010) is on the need to enumerate all the castes but he also doubts that there is a likelihood of respondents not knowing whether they belong to OBCs. Who are the OBCs in a particular state? There is possibility of not knowing exactly their status and the legal provision bestowed on them. For instance, Gujjars are scheduled tribe in Jammu and Kashmir and in Punjab they are OBCs.

Owing to the enumeration of castes through census 2011, it is likely that some nominally represented but most backward castes may be identified and the focus of the states would be shifted to the upliftment of these marginally represented groups who genuinely need the affirmative action of the state. Teli, Mirasi and Dhobi are the caste groups who with the changing times are suffering from extreme poverty. Their destitute

conditions points towards rethinking and planning afresh for this group. Mirasi in other states like Haryana are included in the category of scheduled castes. In Punjab they may be considered as most backward class and accordingly, more privileges under reservation should be given to them. However, the groups like Lobana and Kamboj have done much better than others in terms of education, and occupational mobility. We may argue that in the process of development overall change has even taken place in the case of backward classes. But the category of OBCs has sharp internal cleavages. Some of the groups over the time have attained status enhancement while some others have lagged behind. Therefore, there is a need to review and rationalize the list periodically. We may argue that it is due to extended list of OBCs with internal heterogeneity and differentiation that the affirmative action of the state failed to uplift their status.

Notes:

(The research has been carried out under the UGC-SAP(DRS-II) programme of the Department of Sociology, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar. The Author is grateful to Professor Paramjit Singh Judge, Head, Department of Sociology, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar for his guidance, encouragement and intellectual insights.)

1. Mandal Commission estimated that OBCs form almost 52 percent of the population. National Sample Surveys(NSS) have documented the number of individuals identifying themselves as OBC at 36 percent in 1999-2000, at 41 percent in 2004-05 and 2009-10 of the country's population. According to NSS (2004-05) estimates the total OBCs population in Punjab is 40.14 per cent out of which rural areas having 21.34 percent and urban areas with 18.8 percent. Beteille's study(1991) accounts for more than 30 percent of India's population as backward classes.
2. Tarn Taran is a newly carved district of Punjab, which before June the 8th, 2006 was a part of the Amritsar district.
3. The Occupational Prestige hierarchy in the present study has been taken from D'Souza, 1985). Some of the occupations which are not included by D'Souza have been incorporated at an equivalent level.

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The Sanatanist Concern for Hindu Identity

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Abstract

The focus of this paper is the Sanatanist concern for Hindu identity in the late nineteenth and twentieth century in the Punjab. It is essential to point out that the political and administrative acts of imperial and provincial governments enhancing communal competitiveness over languages, education, services and membership of representative bodies reinforced a distinctive Hindu consciousness which the Sanatanists came to share with other associations concerned with Hindus and Hinduism. It is essential to point out that this segment of Punjabi Hindus inspite of being numerically most dominant has not received scholarly attention.

The Sanatanists in an effort to broaden their base came to use the term Hindu for all the non-Muslim and non-Christian Indians in the early twentieth century. In this context, the attitude and relations of the Sanatanists towards the Sikhs on one hand, and the Muslims and the Christians on the other are examined to understand their effort to create an overarching Hindu identity

Consciousness of Hindu identity during the late nineteenth and early twentieth was growing in India. The Sanatanists of the Punjab were becoming acutely aware of this identity due to competition among different communities in the fields of education, services, professions and representative bodies. This awareness was sharpened by decrease in Hindu population under colonial rule. In 1881 the percentage of Hindus in the total population of the Punjab was nearly 43, but in 1931 it was less than 26. They felt the need to broaden the base of 'Hindu'.

At the meeting of the Hindu Mahasabha at Hardwar in 1921, an eminent Sanatanist, Pandit Din Dayalu Sharma suggested the following defining characteristics of a 'Hindu': faith in the principle of rebirth, faith in a religion born in India, Sanskrit as the language of the sacred scripture, pilgrimage centres in India, culture rooted in India, and veneration for the cow. Din Dayalu's definition was deliberately inclusive so that the Sanatan Dharmis, Aryas, Brahmos, Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists were all covered. For defining Hindu identity, 'Vedutva' was replaced by 'Hindutva' to broaden the base. ¹ Din Dayalu proposed the term 'Hindu' for all non-Muslim and non-Christian 'Indians'. The term 'Hindutva' brought them under one umbrella.

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Panjab University Research Journal Arts, Volume XL, April-October 2013
ISSN 0970-5260

For the Sanatanists, the Muslims and Christians were clearly out but all other Indians could be included. This was the undercurrent of the Sanatanist claim that the Sikhs were 'Hindu'. The Sanatanist attitude towards Muslims, Christians and Sikhs was informed by their conception of Hindu identity.

I

Like the other communities of the Punjab the Muslims too became aware and set up socio-religious associations for their betterment. Influenced by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the Anjuman-i-Islamia was established at Lahore in 1869. It was followed by the Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam in 1884 with the primary objective of propagating Islam and conducting socio-religious reform. This organization participated in controversies involving Christian missionaries and Hindu societies. They appointed preachers and published tracts to repudiate anti-Islamic propaganda.² The mission of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of the Ahmadiya movement in the Punjab, was spread of Islam through propagation (*tabligh*).³ The instrument of *tabligh* was used as a counter measure, to prevent the reconversion (*shuddhi*) of Malkana Rajputs by Hindu Mahasabha and Rajput Upkarni Maha Sabha in 1923. A society known as Jamiat-i-Tabligh-ul-Islam was formed with its headquarters at Ambala in June 1923. Soon this movement spread to other parts of the Punjab.⁴

The Muslims and Christians stood bracketed in the eyes of the Sanatanists. Their religious beliefs and practices were different and inferior and yet they were converting Hindus to their faith. They had practically no social relations with the Hindus and they were eaters of beef. They were not patriotic though they lived in India.

The Sanatanists identified the Muslim rulers of medieval India with the Muslim community as a monolithic whole. They were responsible for the ills of India. Pandit Sharda Ram Phillauri, the precursor of the Sanatan Dharm Movement in the second half of the nineteenth century, explained the practice of early marriage in the Hindu society with reference to the establishment of Muslim rule in India. They used to abduct all beautiful girls but they spared married women. Consequently, the Hindus began to get their daughters married off at the age of nine or ten.⁵ The report of the Bharat Dharm Mahamandal, the first Sanatanist institution, talked of nearly seven hundred years of Muslim rule as a period of 'unbearable difficulties' for the people of India. However, the report appreciated Akbar and regarded him as a just ruler. Akbar was praised for the ban he imposed on cow slaughter. Aurangzeb on the other hand committed any ill-deeds, including destroying many temples.⁶ Akbar was praised for the ban he imposed on cow slaughter.⁷ Pandit Madhav Prasad Mishr (1871-1907), another important Sanatanist, denounced the Muslim rulers like Mahmud Ghazni, Sikandar Lodhi, Babur, Shah Jahan, Aurangzeb and Ahmad Shah Durrani for desecrating Hindu temples and pilgrimage centres and constructing mosques in their place.⁸ The *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak* maintained that 'certain tyrannical Muhammadan kings broke the idols of Hindus and converted their temples into mosques'.⁹

The *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak* asserted that 'Islam was spread in India with the sword'.¹⁰ Gulshan Rai, a well-known Sanatanist, expressed the minority view when he stated that only stray individual rulers might have forcibly converted the people of India, but they could not have brought about mass conversions by force. The distribution of Muslim population in India indicated that conversions took place mostly in the areas which were

formerly the centres of Buddhism. At the time of Kanishka, the North West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Western Punjab and Sind were dominated by Buddhism. He put forth an interesting view point on conversions to Islam. Gulshan Rai drew the inference that the Buddhists in India and not the Hindus were converted to Islam.¹¹

Pandit Shardha Ram had no appreciation for the beliefs and practices of Islam, and he did not regard the *Qur'an* as a revealed scripture. He rejected the common claim made by Muslims that faith in the Prophet Muhammad alone could lead to the right path. According to the Hindu Shastras, no prophet was needed for *mukti*. All those who worshipped God with devotion and acted in accordance with the Vedas, Shruti and Smriti attained to release from the cycle of rebirth and death.¹² The report of the Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha of 1928 criticized the Muslims of Jarao in the Gurgaon district for forcibly trying to convert the Chamars to Islam. As a result, the Chamars left their village and took shelter with the Hindus of Mashadpur.¹³

In Shardha Ram's view, Muslims could be converted as a separate group that followed certain provisions laid down by the Dharmshastras. Even so, the Hindus could not eat or drink with them as they did not belong to their clan (*gotra*). If a Hindu associated with a Muslim, he should bathe according to the prescriptions of the *dharm* to remain a Hindu.¹⁴ For Gulshan Rai, Islam in India had failed to break caste. 'It could not but assimilate many of the customs and manners of the Hindus'. The restrictions laid down in Hinduism had more or less been adopted by Indian Muslims with the exception of interdining. The Hindu position on commensality was defended by Gulshan Rai:

A Bania will not take his meals in the kitchen of a Khatri. A Kayastha would not take his meals in the house of a Bania or a Khatri and *vice-versa*. A Khatri would not smoke from the *huqa* of a Brahman and a Brahman would not smoke from the *huqa* of a Arora.

Therefore, the Muslims should not complain that the Hindus did not eat with them. Although a Hindu could not accept cooked articles of food from a Muslim, he could accept dry things and fruit from Muslims. He went on to suggest that if the Muslims discarded eating beef 'the day would not be far off when even water would be acceptable from the hands of Mussalmans'.¹⁵

The Sanatanists argued that Muslim criticism of Hindu beliefs and practices was not valid. The *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak* contended that even though Muslims denounced Hindus as idol-worshippers (*butparast*), they themselves claimed to remain worshippers of God despite their worship of the *tazias*,¹⁶ *tombs* and the *Ka'aba*. Hindus could not be considered idolators if they worshipped Rama and Krishna, which for them were the names of God. In defence against criticism by Muslims, the *Parcharak* explained that the Hindus could not be 'held guilty of impropriety' if they carried on worship in a mosque which had hitherto been 'the haunt of owls'. This was in reference to a deserted mosque in Mewar which was used as a temple. The *Parcharak* opposed the proposal of the Muslims that Hindus should give up the observance of the festival of Dusherra as it clashed with the Muslim festival of Muharram. It was unfair to urge that the Hindu festival of rejoicing which had begun before some new religions and nations were born, should be sacrificed for the sake of the newly instituted festival of mourning.¹⁷ The report of the Sanatan Dharm

Pratinidhi Sabha accused the Muslims of causing obstruction in the observance of Hindu religious practices. The license for the *nagar kirtan* to be conducted by the Sanatan Dharm Yuvak Sabha in Sharakpur in the Sheikhpura district had been revoked due to the complaint of the Muslims to the superintendent of police.¹⁸

The *Sanatan Dharm Gazette* was gratified to note that the Muslims were beginning to realize that the destruction of a useful animal like the cow was injurious to their interests.¹⁹ A section of the Muslims were praised for 'endeavoring to prove that the killing of cows' was against the 'Muhammadan religion'.²⁰ At the same time, the *Sanatan Dharm Gazette* remarked that the riots at Calcutta, Gujrat and Sialkot showed that some of the Prophet's followers were 'fomenting religious antipathies between the Hindus and Muhammadans by killing cows' which were sacred in the eyes of the Hindus.²¹ The report of the Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha denounced the Muslims for damaging Hindu-Muslim unity by obtaining permission to open a cow slaughter house in Fazilka in the Ferozepore district.²² Attitude towards the cow was a serious matter for the Sanatanists.

Then there was the issue of language, for controversy between Hindus and Muslims. Madhav Prasad Mishr contended that the Muslims were trying to give a religious colour to the issue of Hindi versus Urdu in the law courts by saying that the Hindus supported *nagari* not because of its utility but because it was their religious language (*dharmbhasha*). He asserted that if the Hindus had regarded *nagari* to be their religious language, the preachers (*dharm pracharaks*) of *dharm sabhas* in the Punjab would not have delivered sermons on Vedic religion in Persian; the prayer book of Sandhya would not have been published in Urdu; the offices of the *sabhas* would not be using the '*mlechch*' language; and Hindu periodicals like the *Sanatan Dharm Gazette* would not have been published in Urdu.²³

Gulshan Rai criticized the Muslim publicists for asserting that Urdu written in the Persian script was used by the majority of people in northern India. This false propaganda was intended to mislead the European officials. Gulshan Rai favoured the use of Hindi which could also be called Hindustani as the common standardized language of text books in the schools for both Hindus and Muslims. It included Persian, Arabic, Turkish and English words in the *devanagri* script. He also asserted that all books on ancient Hindu history, philosophy, astronomy, Aryurvedic medicine, literature, poetry, drama, stories and fiction were written in *devanagri* script.²⁴

Indian patriotism was extremely important in the eyes of the Sanatanists. Gulshan Rai suggested that Indian Muslims should form alliance with Hindus and not with the people of Turkey, Arabia or Egypt. India was 'their motherland' and it would be the land of their descendants. Religion alone could not form a nation. The 'ridiculous idea' of a nationality based on religion, without paying any regard to country was bound to fail. Gulshan Rai argued that Muslims did not constitute a 'homogenous whole' and they were mostly 'Indian' in origin and upbringing. The customs and manners of a Muslim of a province had more affinity with the other people of that province than with those of the Muslims of other provinces. The Jats and Rajputs of the Punjab had no affinity with the Mappillas of Madras; the Namasudras and Koch Sheikhs of Bengal had customs and manners different from those of the Samas and Sumras of Sind; and the Baloch and Pathans of the north almost looked with contempt upon the commercial transactions of the Khojas and Memons of Bombay.²⁵

The Sanatanist critique of Christianity reflects their effort to project the superiority of Hindu scriptures and beliefs. In Shardha Ram's view it was inappropriate to refer to Christianity in comparison with the *dwija dharm* as the former was an insignificant, contemptible and a coarse faith. There was not a single good point in Christianity which was not present in the Hindu faith. According to him, the only two things present in Christianity which were absent in Hindu *dharm* were drinking alcohol and eating leftover food and meat.²⁶ Jesus Christ could not be the son of God.²⁷ The claim of the Christians that salvation could be attained only through Christ was false. According to the Hindu Shastras there was no need of a prophet to attain salvation. The doors of salvation were open to all those who were true devotees of God and whose actions were in accordance with the Vedas, Shruti and the Smriti.²⁸ Pandit Mulraj Sharma Nagar, a Sanatanist writer, ridiculed the teachings of Christianity and asserted that they were never fully observed. The tie between the norm and the observances was ensured by Hindu sages who had spelt out details for each occasion. The Christian belief that all the people who did not follow their faith would remain in hell forever was a false assumption.²⁹

The most dangerous dimension of the Christian missions in the Punjab was the possibility of their success in the area of conversion. The *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak* implored the Hindus to wake up to the dangers of the activities of the Christian missionaries. The 'Hindus of the lower castes fall an easy prey to the machinations of Christian Missionaries who resorted to all sorts of means to seduce the followers of other faiths'. It was alleged that the missionaries spent large sums of money in entrapping a single non-Christian, and when money and persuasions failed they used force. They even resorted to trickery by adopting Hindu, Muslim or Sikh names and mixing with people to pervert their religion. It was conceded that the Christians attracted the untouchables by helping them, educating their children and teaching them ways of improving their economic status. The *Parcharak* appealed to the Sanatanists to undertake the work of reforming the untouchables by appointing special preachers to prevent them from converting to Christianity.³⁰

The report of the Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha denounced the Christians for trying to convert the untouchables to Christianity.³¹ Mulraj Sharma accused the Christians of having double standards. Although the Christian missionaries were opponents of the caste system, they themselves did not give equal status to the converted Christians. They married only with foreigners to maintain the purity of their race. Even if a marriage between a foreigner and a local Christian did take place, the offspring of this union was not given equal status and was termed Eurasian.³²

Shardha Ram stated that if a Hindu associated with a Christian, he should bathe according to the prescriptions of the *dharm*.³³ The notion of interdining with Christians was rejected; the principles of Hindu *dharm* did not permit it. To reinforce the point, Shardha Ram asserted that the Hindus did not accept food even from one another.³⁴ The report of the Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha expressed displeasure with the British for encouraging kine-slaughter by granting permission to open a cow slaughter house in Fazilka in the Ferozepore district.³⁵ As the Christians were considered outsiders, the Sanatanists implied that they should be patriotic towards the country they lived in. However, as the number of Christians was insignificant in the Punjab, they did not appear to pose a threat to the Hindus. Politically, the Sanatanists were not so concerned with them as with Muslims.

II

The Sanatanist attitude towards the Sikhs was quite different from their attitude towards Muslims and Christians. Among other things, the Sanatanists felt that the relative proportion of Hindus in the Punjab would be enhanced if the Sikhs were treated as Hindus. In their view, the Sikhs did not have a distinct identity. Among the Sikhs, however, the consciousness of a distinct Sikh identity was growing and they responded by insisting that Sikhs were not 'Hindu'. The Singh reformers, called 'neo-Sikhs' by others,³⁶ played a crucial role in sharpening a distinct Sikh identity.³⁷ The number of Sikhs was increasing during the early twentieth century. In 1881, there were 2,000,000 Sikhs in the Punjab. In 1931, there were 4,000,000. Their percentage in the total population rose from about 8 in 1881 to over 13 in 1931.³⁸

Significantly, the earliest Sanatanist leader, Pandit Sharda Ram Phillauri, did not show any anxiety to include Sikhs in the category of 'Hindu' in his *Sikhan de Raj di Vithya* (The Story of Sikh Rule) published in 1866.³⁹ In its report of 1889, the Bharat Dharm Mahamandal did not show any interest in the issue of the identity of the Sikhs.⁴⁰ Before the end of the century, however, some Hindus and Sikhs had begun to argue or to assert that the Sikhs were 'Hindu'.

Two publications in support of the view that Sikhs were Hindus bore the title *Sikh Hindu Hain*. Written in Punjabi by Bawa Narain Singh and Lala Thakar Das, these tracts were published in 1899.⁴¹ Publications of this nature continued to appear from time to time.

The Sanatanists contended that the Sikh rulers of Patiala, Jind, Nabha and Kapurthala were of the opinion that the Sikhs were Hindus and subject to the Hindu law. In 1899 the Maharaja of Patiala was praised by the *Sanatan Dharm Gazette* for openly declaring that it was a mistake to suppose that the Hindus and Sikhs constituted separate 'nations' because the Khalsa always sacrificed their lives for the protection of the Hindu religion. The Sanatanists hoped that Maharaja of Patiala would emulate his Gurus and his predecessors and support the cause of the Hindu religion in every possible way. Lala Hari Chand, a Collector in the Kapurthala state, argued that Sikhism was 'an offshoot of the Hindu religion'.⁴²

It was in response to such arguments, assertions and assumptions that Bhai Kahn Singh Nabha wrote his *Ham Hindu Nahin* ('We are not Hindus') in 1897. This book was first published in *devanagri* to address the Hindus. A year later, its Punjabi version came out in Gurmukhi under the same title. New and revised editions were published subsequently.⁴³ The *Ham Hindu Nahin* is in the form of a dialogue between a Hindu and a Sikh. All possible arguments in support of the proposition that Sikhs were Hindu come from the Hindu protagonist, while the arguments in support of the proposition that Sikhs have an identity distinct from Hindus come from the Sikh protagonist. The whole range of arguments used on both sides in the debate during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is thus reflected in this work.

Significantly, the views expressed by the Hindu protagonist are squarely embedded in the Sanatanist position. Contrary to the generally held view, this comprehensive statement

on the 'Hindu' position is essentially different from that upheld by the Aryas. The most important argument put forth by the Hindu protagonist was that the authority and sanctity of the Vedas was acknowledged by the Sikh Gurus. They also referred to the Shastras, Smritis and Puranas with approval. There was a reference also to the six schools of philosophy. Thus, the Brahmanical scriptures were not rejected in the *Adi Granth*. Another line of argument was that since Guru Nanak was a Bedi, his ancestors at one time were known for their knowledge of the Vedas and their adherence to the Vedic *dharm*. Here, the *Bachittar Natak* was quoted: 'they who mastered the Veda came to be known as Bedi; they propagated actions based on *dharm*.'⁴⁴

Similarly, it was contended that writings in the *Dasam Granth* made it clear that Guru Gobind Singh believed in *avtars*. A verse carried the import that one could be freed from transmigration by worshipping Krishna. The *Chandi Charitar* composed by the tenth Guru in praise of Goddess Chandi was cited by the Hindu protagonist. He argued further that the Goddess (*bhagwati*) is the first to be invoked in the Sikh prayer (*ardas*).⁴⁵

On the related point of idol worship, the Hindu argues that according to the *Granth Sahib*, Namdev had attained to God through the worship of an idol and that Dhanna found God in a piece of stone. The references to Dhanna and Namdev in the *Vars* of Bhai Gurdas also suggested that the Sikhs had no objection to idol worship. Regarding the *Granth Sahib* as the physical form of the Guru and offering *karah* by way of *bhog* to the *Granth* was similar to idol worship.⁴⁶

Certain other practices were shared by the Sikhs with Hindus. For example, Guru Nanak had observed his father's *shradha* a couple of days before his own death. The Sikh Gurus used to go to sacred places for pilgrimage. In a composition of Guru Amar Das there are clear instructions regarding what was to be done after his death, including the *katha* of the *Garud Puran* by Keso Gopal. This verse also referred to *pind*, *pattal*, *kriya*, *diwa*, and *phull*. This was meant to show that these practices were observed by both Hindus and Sikhs. It was asserted that no injunction of the Gurus forbade the Sikhs to perform their rites in accordance with the Hindu Shastras, and there was no injunction to have separate Sikh rites (*gurmaryada*). The *chhands*, *ghorian* and *lavan*, composed by the Gurus and recited by the Sikhs at the time of marriage were not meant to be taken literally for the actual conduct of rites (*vivhar*) because they were metaphors. Even if it was conceded that Sikhs have their own *sanskars*, symbols like the *kesh* and *kachh* were adopted as temporary measures in a situation of armed conflict. They were no longer necessary. Had it been necessary to keep uncut hair, the first nine Gurus too would have kept uncut hair.⁴⁷

The claim that the Sikhs did not subscribe to the *varnashrama* ideal was contested with reference to Guru Nanak's supposed regret about the obliteration of *varnamaryada* in his days. He castigated the Khatri for discarding his *dharm* and adopting the language of the *mlechch*: 'the whole world has become one caste, and there is no *dharm* left'. In the *Janamsakhi* of Bhai Bala, Lalo, a Tarkhan, and therefore a Shudra, presumed that Guru Nanak himself would not eat food cooked by him, and suggested that the Guru might prepare his own food. The issue of the sacred thread had a bearing on the question of *varnamaryada*. A composition by Guru Nanak was cited to confirm that he used to wear the sacred thread. In the *Sukhmani* by Guru Arjan the Sikhs are said to have been instructed to revere the Pandit who understood the Vedas, Smritis and Puranas. The *Bachittar Natak*

states that Guru Tegh Bahadur sacrificed his life to save the *tilak* and *janeo* of the Hindus. Guru Gobind Singh wrote the *Savvyee* in praise of Brahmans and instructed his followers to give charity (*dan*) to them.⁴⁸

Continuing in this vein, the Hindu participant raises three more points. The first relates to the basic principles of Hindu *dharm*, which he maintained were acceptable to the Sikhs. They regarded the Vedas as true, and believed in God, good and evil, heaven and hell. The Sikhs also believed in *mukti* as release from transmigration, *varnashrama* as the ideal social order, cremation of the dead and protection of the cow, and they upheld the ideas of purity and pollution. The second issue raised by the Hindu protagonist of this debate is that even if Sikh *dharm*, Sikh principles and Sikh rites and ceremonies were taken to be different from those of the Hindus, the Sikhs were governed by the Hindu law. Thirdly, on altogether a different plane, it is suggested that it is not really politic on the part of the Sikhs to 'separate' themselves from the Hindus as all such attempts increased mutual hostility. The Sikhs were small in number and were bound to suffer great loss through separation from the Hindus. Thus, by aligning themselves with the Hindus, who had become important under the British rule, the Sikhs could increase their own importance.⁴⁹

Some more arguments were added in support of the Hindu position. The Sikhs were Hindu because they had emerged from amongst the Hindus; they ate food with Hindus; they entered into matrimony with Hindus; and they lived in 'Hindustan'.⁵⁰ In a different line of argument, the Hindu protagonist brings in evidence of the Sikh scriptures. '*Hindu salah* *salahan*' in the *Granth Sahib* to contend that Hindu beliefs and practices are approved. The *Chhakkey Chhand* attributed to Guru Gobind Singh is quoted to the effect that the Khalsa Panth was meant to spread Hindu *dharm*. Therefore, the Sikh *mat* was a Hindu Panth, like the *bairagi* and *sanyasi* Panths. Furthermore, the Sikhs who equated Panth with *qaum* did not realize that it was necessary to have large numbers to be a *qaum*. The Sikhs counted merely in lakhs. The Hindu participant maintained that the innumerable *sakhis* proved that Sikhs were Hindu and asserted that Guru Tegh Bahadur sacrificed his life for the sake of Hindus because he was himself a Hindu.⁵¹ Bhai Kahn Singh Nabha refuted these arguments by using a wide range of pre-colonial Sikh literature.⁵²

The issue of Sikh identity vis-a-vis Hindus was sharpened further by some other developments, like contest over Sardar Dyal Singh Majithia's Will, removal of idols from the precincts of the Golden Temple, and the Anand Marriage Act. Dyal Singh Majithia, a leading Brahmo and founder of *The Tribune* died in September 1898 and left his wealth to a Trust. His widow contested the Will, claiming that the Hindu law of inheritance under which he had given his property in trust did not apply to a Sikh. But the Chief Court of the Punjab ruled that Dyal Singh was, in fact, a Hindu. Throughout 1898, 1899 and 1900, this issue was argued in public meetings, in the press and through pamphlets.⁵³ The *Khalsa Bahadur* of 1900 noted that the Sikhs were angry at the case having being decided according to Hindu law and declared that Sikhs were not Hindu. The learned men among the Sikhs were advised in the press to compile a *Khalsa Dharm Shastra*.⁵⁴ The Bharat Dharm Mahamandal also took notice of this issue and passed a resolution in a meeting at Delhi, asserting that the ten Gurus of the Sikhs from Guru Nanak to Guru Gobind Singh were Hindus. Furthermore, the letters written by Baba Khem Singh Bedi, a descendant of Guru Nanak, and Bawa Sumer Singh (Bhalla), a descendant of Guru Amar Das, were read out in the same meeting to the effect that Sikhs were Hindu.⁵⁵

An extremely important issue related to the question of distinct identity of the Sikhs was the controversy over the removal of idols from the precincts of the Golden Temple in May 1905. On 1 May, 1905, the manager (*sarbarah*) of the Golden Temple, Sardar Arur Singh, issued orders prohibiting the Brahmans from sitting on the *parikrama* with the idols for worship and also prohibited them from washing their clothes in the tank, besides spitting and rinsing their mouth in it. However, they could bathe, do *puja* and apply *tilak*.⁵⁶ While complying grudgingly with it, the Sanatanists declared in a public notice (*ishtihar*) that Guru Nanak and the other Sikh Gurus were Hindus. A meeting of the Hindus of Amritsar was held on 4 May 1905. It was resolved in the meeting that the manager of the Golden Temple had offended the feelings of Hindus by his unlawful interference with their right to conduct idol worship (*thakur puja*) around the sacred tank. The Golden Temple, which was founded by Guru Ram Das, was especially held in veneration by all classes of Hindus of whom the 'Sanatan dharmis' formed the majority. They claimed that they had been performing their religious rites such as bathing, meditation, worshipping the idols, singing hymns, delivering sermons in accordance with the orthodox beliefs of their own religion 'from ancient times' at the Golden Temple.⁵⁷ They contended that the manager's order was arbitrary (*Aurangzebi hukum*). It had also wounded the feelings of all the Sahajdhari Sikhs who were more numerous than the Keshdhari Sikhs who were said to belong to the 'sect' of Guru Gobind Singh alone, and whose temples were situated only in Abchalnagar and Patna. Guru Ram Das was Ram Das (i.e. not a Singh), and being a leader of the Hindus, was also a leader of the Keshdhari Sikhs.⁵⁸

On 6 May 1905 the Brahmans returned with the idols to the Golden Temple. The matter was reported to the police by the manager and another order was issued by him on 7 May which was finally complied with.⁵⁹ But the Sanatanists continued to appeal to the government for over a year, and memorials were sent to the Lieutenant Governor. Seth Radha Krishan of Amritsar presented a petition signed by 13,000 Hindus and Sikhs of Amritsar, disapproving the action as 'not in accordance of the great majority of the Sikhs'. It was maintained that a small minority of the 'reformed' or 'heretical' Sikhs, who called themselves 'Tat-Khalsa' ('neo-Sikhs'), held that the Sikh doctrines did not allow idols to be displayed in their temples. There was no reason that for their sake the majority of the Sanatanist Sikhs should be offended even if it is admitted for the sake of argument that Sikhism in its purist form is opposed to idolatry.⁶⁰ The memorialists warned the authorities that 'the unprecedented step taken by the manager would create endless dissensions, disputes and sectarian animosity'.⁶¹ Interestingly, while Raja Hira Singh of Nabha was against the removal of the idols, his son Tikka Ripudaman Singh and the latter's one time tutor, Bhai Kahn Singh of Nabha, and Raja Randhir Singh of Jind approved of the action.⁶²

The *Sanatan Dharm Gazette* had denounced the series of articles by Dit Singh which the *Khalsa Akhbar* of Lahore was publishing against Hinduism. It was asserted in the *Sanatan Dharm Gazette* that these articles did not reflect the views of the Khalsa Panth; they merely represented the personal views of the editor of the paper who was a Ramdasia by caste and was attacking the Hindus because they had refused to admit him into their society.⁶³ Certain members of the Managing Committee of the Khalsa College at Amritsar were blamed by the *Akhbar-i Am* for the unsatisfactory condition of that premier institution simply because the sympathies of seven-eighth of the Sikh population had been alienated by the assertion that Sikhs were not Hindus.⁶⁴ The Tat-Khalsa, were alleged to have insulted Hindu gods and goddesses in lectures delivered at *dharmasals* (Gurdwaras) in 1906.⁶⁵ The

Sanatanists asserted that the Tat-Khalsa had arisen into prominence on account of their 'iconoclastic' and 'anti-caste' postures. ⁶⁶ The *Akhbar-i Am* denounced the radical Sikh reformers for throwing away a Shivling installed in a temple situated in the *parikrama* of the Golden Temple. Similarly, a painting in another temple representing Guru Gobind Singh standing with folded hands before the Goddess, was 'obliterated' with ink. It was observed that such occurrences were becoming frequent and could one day lead to a riot. ⁶⁷ The *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak* reported that in the religious debate held at the Sanatan Dharm Debating Club at Amritsar between the Hindus and the Tat-Khalsa, the latter conducted themselves in an 'unbecoming manner' and stooped low enough to 'abuse'. ⁶⁸ Likewise, the *Sanatan Dharm Patrika* accused a Sikh named Arjan Singh of wounding the religious sentiments of the Sanatanists in a Punjabi poem in which he calls himself brother-in-law of Krishna. ⁶⁹

Pandit Mulraj Sharma condemned the Tat-Khalsa for having sought to legalize the Anand marriage ceremony of the Sikhs. In his view, the Sanatanist marriage ceremony was the oldest and the most appropriate and the earlier generations of Sikhs had followed that ceremony. If the traditional Hindu ceremony was declared unlawful then the marriages of ancestors and their progeny too would become unlawful. ⁷⁰ Mulraj wished to preserve the dominance of the Brahman priest who presided over the traditional marriage ceremony as against the Anand marriage ceremony that did away with the Brahman priest.

Understandably, the Sanatanists did not support the movement for the reform of Gurdwara ⁷¹ as their custodians (*mahants*) had been recognized by the government as the owners of the Gurdwara properties. All the Gurdwaras, the *Sanatan Dharm Patrika* contended, 'which were in the possession of the Akalis should be boycotted and new temples of their own should be established'. The Hindus were also urged to seek legal help to obtain rights in temples and properties attached to the Gurdwaras, which were built with their hard earned money. ⁷² Gopi Nath, the editor of the *Akhbar-i Am* asserted that the 'action of the Akalis in reforming the Gurdwaras by force, in utter disregard of law and the religious rights of other sections, is neither proper nor lawful'. If the Akalis did not mend their ways the government would have to take notice of their 'revolutionary activities' and the whole Akali movement might be held to be 'seditious'. The editor remarked that by taking possession of the Darbar Sahib, Nankana Sahib, and Guru-Ka-Bagh, the Akalis had made the defeat of the government known far and wide. Furthermore, he contended that if the present state of affairs was allowed to continue the rights of no section of Punjabis would be safe in the hands of the Akalis. ⁷³ Opposing the Gurdwara Act of 1925, the *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak* maintained that the erstwhile Udasi custodians of the Gurdwaras should have the Gurdwara Act repealed by instituting regular proceedings regarding those shrines which had been taken away under the Act. The Sanatanists also urged the Punjab Government to 'compensate' the Udasis for the 'wrongs' done to them under the Act. ⁷⁴

Furthermore, the Akalis were criticized for not following the caste system and recognizing the authority of the Brahmans. It was pointed out at the Brahman Conference held at Lahore in 1923 that the Akalis were harassing Brahmans and other Hindus in the villages. At places where only a few Brahmans and Khatriis lived, the Akalis asked them to embrace Sikhism. Thus, the Akalis had allegedly 'surpassed even (what was done in) the times of the Muhammadans'. They also demolished certain Hindu temples. ⁷⁵ The annual report of the Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha denounced the Akalis for stealing and breaking

the image of Sri Satya Narayan at Loralai in the north-west and the image of Radhikaji at Garh Fateh Shah at Lyallpur. They had forcibly occupied a Panchyati *dharmshala* and converted it into a Gurdwara in *muhalla* Gawal Mandi in Rawalpindi. The Akalis had forcibly occupied a *dharmshala* in Daska and renamed it as the Gurdwara of Waryam Singh. The Akalis were condemned for disrupting the programme of *prachar* of the Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha at Talalangg, Rawalpindi, Kohat and Peshawar. The Pratinidhi Sabha claimed that Banda Singh Bahadur was a Hindu and celebrated the day of Shiromani Banda Vairagi's sacrifice with great fervour.⁷⁶

Gulshan Rai presented the standard Hindu argument on the issue of Hindu-Sikh relationship. He argued that the Sikh movement was in itself a result of the great Vaishnava movement which had started in the Ganges valley in the fifteenth century. Guru Nanak and his nine successors established in the north-west a spiritual empire in the hearts of the Hindus. It could not be denied that the Sikh Gurus re-awakened the Hindus to 'the past glories of the Aryan race'. The result was that a new spirit was aroused and the followers of the Gurus eventually succeeded in weakening the empire of the Mughals and rescued the country from the grasp of Ahmad Shah Abdali. For Gulshan Rai, the Sikhs were a 'reforming body within the Hindu community'. Under Hinduism, each individual was free to worship a separate god of his own. He further added that in a family one member may be an orthodox Hindu, another may be a Sikh, and still another may be an Arya Samajist or a Brahmo Samajist or a follower of the Radha Swami sect. Gulshan Rai pointed out that when the Punjab was annexed to the British empire in India in 1849, the Sikhs formed a part of the Hindu community just as the Arya Samaj, Brahmo Samaj and Dev Samaj today formed a part of the Hindu community. But gradually during the last fifty years, certain forces brought about a cleavage between the Hindus and the Sikhs. Referring to the Arya Samaj, Gulshan Rai remarked that a protestant section of the people among the Hindus began publicly to ridicule and abuse the Sikh Gurus and offended the Sikh community. These differences between the Hindus and the Sikhs were fully exploited by the Europeans who tried to interpret the sacred books of the Sikhs in such a manner as to induce them to believe that they were not a reforming body within Hinduism, but an altogether separate community. As a result, the Sikh community, an overwhelming majority of whom are Jats, a military caste, had gone out of the Hindu fold. From the military point of view it had been a great blow to the Hindus.⁷⁷

In 1936, Pandit Sukhlal, a Sahajdhari Sikh and a preacher (*updeshak*) of the Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha published his *Guru Sahibo ka Dharm* in *devanagri* script and dedicated this work to Goswami Ganesh Dutt. His professed purpose in writing this tract was to protect all those Sikhs from sin who believed that Sikhs were distinct from Hindus. With 500 examples, he sought to prove that the Gurus and the *Granth Sahib* approved of Hindu scriptures and incarnations, the practice of idol worship and *shradha*, marriage and death rites, pilgrimages and fasts, cow protection, the caste system, the ritual of the sacred thread, the supremacy of the Brahmans and their right to receive charity. Sukhlal provided a list of books on Sikh religious literature that he had used to prove his point.⁷⁸

Goswami Ganesh Dutt, the General Secretary of the Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha Punjab, reiterated after independence that the Sikh faith was born from the Hindu religion. The temples and Gurdwaras were one. If a Hindu had four sons the eldest was made a Sikh. The Sahajdhari Sikhs revered and recited the *Granth Sahib*. He added that the

British policy of divide and rule was responsible for separating the Hindus and the Sikhs. The British tried to create a wedge between them by giving the Sikhs separate voting rights and jobs. However, the Hindus and Sikhs were complementary to each other: the Hindus possessed brain and money and the Sikhs possessed physical strength.⁷⁹

III

Let me conclude by stating that the majority of Sanatanists were not so much concerned with Muslims and Christians, whom they regarded as outsiders, both literally and metaphorically, as with the Sikhs whom they liked to regard as Hindu.

The Muslim past was stereotypically projected as a reign of terror and suppression, which gave rise to many evils. The contemporary Muslims and Christians were bracketed by the Sanatanists as different from the Hindus in terms of religious beliefs and practices, social customs and attitudes, and lack of patriotism. The Sanatanists could have no social interactions with them. Both were held responsible for cow slaughter. The Muslims were explicitly denounced by the Sanatanists for failing to show patriotism towards the country they resided in. They were criticized also for favouring Urdu against Hindi. The Sanatanists were reticent in denouncing the Christians perhaps because they did not want to displease the British.

With a growing awareness of Hindu consciousness, the Sanatanists attempted to broaden their base by claiming that Sikhs were Hindu. However, they faced opposition from the Sikhs who rejected the claim and proclaimed their distinct identity. The Sanatanists criticized the Sikhs as the core of their religious and social practices were rejected by them. *Ham Hindu Nahin* presents a comprehensive argument against the claim that Sikhs were Hindu. Other issues like the case regarding Sardar Dyal Singh Majithia's Will, removal of idols from the precincts of the Golden Temple in 1905 and the Anand Marriage Act sharpened the debate on Sikh identity. The Sanatanists opposed the Gurdwara Reform movement and clashed with the Akalis. Gradually, they adopted a milder tone but continued to insist that Sikhs were Hindu. Even after independence this debate continued.

Endnotes

1. Harihar Swaroop Sharma, *Vyakhyan Wachaspati Pandit Din Dayal Sharma: Smarak Granth*, New Delhi: Dev Publishing House, 1985, pp. 327-28. (Henceforth cited as *Smarak Granth*).
2. Ikram Ali Malik, 'Muslim Anjumans and Communitarian Consciousness', *Five Punjabi Centuries: Polity, Economy, Society and Culture, c. 1500-1990*, (ed.), Indu Banga, New Delhi: Manohar, 1997, pp. 114, 120.
3. Spencer Lavan, *The Ahmadiyah Movement: A History and Perspective*, Delhi: Manohar, 1974, pp. 31, 190.
4. R.K. Ghai, 'Tabligh and Shuddhi Movements in the Nineteen Twenties', *The Panjab Past and Present*, vol. XX, April 1986, Patiala: Department of Punjab Historical Studies, Punjab University, 1986, pp. 222, 223-24.

5. Shardha Ram Phillauri, *Bhagyawati* (1877), New Delhi: Shardha Prakashan, (rpt) 1973, pp. 9-10.
6. *Report of the Bharat Dharm Mahamandal*, 1889, Mathura: Lala Hari Prasad Press, 1889, pp. 7, 76.
7. *The Bharat Pratap*, March 1903, *Selections from the Native Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1903, vol. XVI, p. 113.
8. Madhav Prasad Mishr, 'Ayodhya', *Madhav Mishr Nibandh Mala: A Collection of Essays*, I, (eds.), Chaturvedi Dwarka Prasad Sharma and Shri Jhabarmal Sharma. Prayag: Indian Press Limited, 1936, pp. 14, 15, 18; Madhav Prasad Mishr, 'Mathura', pp. 33, 34.
9. *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak*, 1 December 1913, *Selections from the Indian Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1914, vol. XXVII, pp. 22-23.
10. *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak*, 16 August 1923, *Punjab Press Abstracts*, 1923, vol. XXXVI, p. 451.
11. Gulshan Rai Bhatnagar, *The Hindu Problem in the Punjab*, Lahore: Sanatan Dharm Collage, 1934, pp. 14-15.
12. Shardha Ram Phillauri, *Dharm Samvad* (1876), (ed.), Harmohinder Singh Bedi (*Shraddha Ram Phillauri Granthawali*, vol. II), Delhi: Nirmal Publications, 1997, pp. 102-03, 113.
13. *Annual Report of the Shri Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha Punjab*, 1928, Lahore: Goswami Ganesh Dutt, 1928, p. 81.
14. Shardha Ram Phillauri, *Dharm Raksha*, Ludhiana: Jamuna Prasad Sahib Dharm Sahayak Press, 1876, pp. 3-15, 32-47, 76-87. It is interesting to note that Shardha Ram in the 1870s saw no harm in learning Persian. He quoted a *shloka* to the effect that a wise man learns all kinds of languages so that he can learn from conversation with the wise.
15. Gulshan Rai Bhatnagar, 'Panjab Mussalmans a Separate Race and Nationality', *The Panjabee*, 30 May 1912, Gulshan Rai, *Reflections on a Few Punjab Political Problems*, Lahore: Mercantile Electric Press, 1920, pp. 111-12.
16. Tazia is a replica of Imam Husain's tomb made generally of bamboo and paper, carried in processions by the mourners; *tazias* made of wood, silver or gold are generally kept in Imambaras. S. Ali Nadeem Rezavi, 'The Shia Muslims', *Religious Movements and Institutions in Medieval India*, vol VII, part 2, (ed.), J.S. Grewal, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 295.
17. *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak*, 1 December 1913, *Selections from the Indian Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1914, vol. XXVII, pp. 22-23. *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak*, 24 April 1917, *Selections from the Indian Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1917, vol. XXX, p. 341.
18. *Annual Report of the Shri Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha Punjab*, 1928, p. 81.
19. *Sanatan Dharm Gazette*, 30 August 1905, *Selections from the Native Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1905, vol. XVIII, p. 245.

20. *Sanatan Dharm Gazette*, 13 September 1905, *Selections from the Native Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1905, vol. XVIII, p. 257. For Sanatanist appreciation of the Muslims for promoting cow protection, see also, *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak*, 8 March and 24 May 1913, *Selections from the Indian Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1913, vol. XXVI, pp. 255, 486.
21. *Sanatan Dharm Gazette*, 21 February 1906, *Selections from the Native Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1906, vol. XIX, pp. 58-59.
22. *Annual Report of the Shri Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha Punjab*, 1928, p. 24.
23. Madhav Prasad Mishr, 'Adalat mein Nagari', *Madhav Mishr Nibandh Mala*, pp. 21-22, 23.
24. *The Tribune*, 3 January 1936, pp. 10, 15.
25. Gulshan Rai Bhatnagar, 'Are Indian Mussalmans a Homogenous People', *The Punjabee*, 20 July 1912, Gulshan Rai, *Reflections on a Few Punjab Political Problems*, pp. 114, 115.
26. Tulsi Deva, *The Shraddha Prakash or The Life of the Late Pandit Shraddha Ram of Phillour*, part I, Lahore: Punjab Economical Press, 1896, p. 32.
27. *Ibid*, p. 52.
28. Phillauri, *Dharm Samvad*, pp. 102-03.
29. Pandit Mulraj Sharma Nagar, *Hindu Dharm Darpanam*, II, Lahore: Vidhya Prakash Press, 1922, pp. 14, 170, 211.
30. *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak*, 1 June 1916, *Selections from the Indian Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1916, vol. XXIX, p. 490. *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak*, 8 July 1917, *Selections from the Indian Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1917, vol. XXX, p. 593.
31. *Annual Report of the Shri Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha Punjab*, 1928, p. 138.
32. Nagar, *Hindu Dharm Darpanam*, II, p. 78.
33. Phillauri, *Dharm Raksha*, pp. 32-47.
34. Tulsi Deva, *Shraddha Prakash*, p. 52.
35. *Annual Report of the Shri Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha Punjab*, 1928, p. 24.
36. In 1911, David Petrie the British intelligence officer, thought of the 'neo-Sikhs' as a source of 'disaffection' among the Sikhs. He equated these neo-Sikhs with the Tat-Khalsa or the Singh reformers. J. S. Grewal, *The Sikhs of the Punjab*, (The New Cambridge History of India II.3), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 150.
37. Important leaders of the Lahore Singh Sabha reformists were Bhai Kahn Singh (1867-1938), Bhai Dit Singh Gaini (1853-1901) and Bhai Vir Singh.
38. Grewal, *The Sikhs of the Punjab*, p. 137.
39. Shardha Ram Phillauri, *Sikhan de Raj di Vithya* (1865), (ed.), Pritam Singh, Jullundur: Hind Publishing Limited, 1956.
40. *Report of the Bharat Dharm Mahamandal*, 1889.

41. N. Gerald Barrier, *The Sikhs and Their Literature*, Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1970, pp. 28, 39.
42. *Sanatan Dharm Gazette*, 15 January 1899, *Selections from the Vernacular Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1899, vol. XII, p. 97. *Akhbar-i Am*, 26 February and 5 May 1900, *Selections from the Vernacular Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1900, vol. XIII, pp. 108, 231.
43. Bhai Kahn Singh, *Ham Hindu Nahin*, Amritsar: Dharam Parchar Committee (SGPC), 1981 (reprint of the 5th edition of 1920). Henceforth cited as *Ham Hindu Nahin*. The Punjabi work was addressed to those Sikhs who believed that Sikhs were 'Hindus'. They were ignorant of Sikh scripture and Sikh history. In 1920 the fifth edition of *Ham Hindu Nahin* was brought out. It was one of the most influential Sikh publications in the early decades of the twentieth century. It has been reprinted and published several times afterwards for wide dissemination. The author, Bhai Kahn Singh Nabha, is looked upon as a venerable scholar and his book a classic statement of Sikh identity. He was associated with the Lahore Singh Sabha and the Panch Khalsa Diwan as a radical protagonist of the Singh Sabha movement. J. S. Grewal, 'Nabha's *Ham Hindu Nahin*: A Declaration of Sikh Ethnicity', *Sikh Identity: Continuity and Change*, (eds.), Pashaura Singh and N. Gerald Barrier, New Delhi: Manohar, 2001, pp. 231, 232.
44. Grewal, 'Nabha's *Ham Hindu Nahin*: A Declaration of Sikh Ethnicity', pp. 234-35. See also text in *Ham Hindu Nahin*, pp. 58, 59, 59-60, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64. For scriptures see *Sanatan Dharm Gazette*, 5 May 1900, *Selections from the Vernacular Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1900, vol. XIII, p. 231.
45. Grewal, 'Nabha's *Ham Hindu Nahin*: A Declaration of Sikh Ethnicity', p. 235. See also text in *Ham Hindu Nahin*, pp. 86-87, 87, 97, 100. Since the term used in Gurmukhi is *bhagauti*, the Hindu participant suggested that Guru Gobind Singh originally wrote it in Persian script in which it was hard to make a distinction between *bhagwati* and *bhagauti*, and the Gurmukhi scribe accepted the latter reading out of ignorance. For incarnations see *Sanatan Dharm Gazette*, 4 March 1901, *Selections from the Native Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1901, vol. XIV, p. 153. *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak*, 16 June 1912, *Selections from the Native Newspapers published in the Punjab*, vol. XXV, pp. 519-20.
46. Grewal, 'Nabha's *Ham Hindu Nahin*: A Declaration of Sikh Ethnicity', pp. 235-36. See also text in *Ham Hindu Nahin*, pp. 108, 109. For idol worship see *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak*, 16 January 1917, *Selections from the Indian Newspapers published in the Panjab*, 1917, vol. XXX, p. 86. Nagar, *Hindu Dharm Darpanam*, II, p. 225.
47. Grewal, 'Nabha's *Ham Hindu Nahin*: A Declaration of Sikh Ethnicity', p. 236. See also text in *Ham Hindu Nahin*, pp. 132, 146, 151. For pilgrimage and *shradha* see *Sanatan Dharm Gazette*, 4 March 1901, *Selections from the Native Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1901, vol. XIV, p. 153.
48. Grewal, 'Nabha's *Ham Hindu Nahin*: A Declaration of Sikh Ethnicity', p. 235. See also text in *Ham Hindu Nahin*, pp. 69, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82.

49. Grewal, 'Nabha's *Ham Hindu Nahin*: A Declaration of Sikh Ethnicity', p. 236. See also text in *Ham Hindu Nahin*, pp. 152, 153, 158.
50. Grewal, 'Nabha's *Ham Hindu Nahin*: A Declaration of Sikh Ethnicity', p. 232. See also text in *Ham Hindu Nahin*, pp. 34-47.
51. Grewal, 'Nabha's *Ham Hindu Nahin*: A Declaration of Sikh Ethnicity', pp. 233-34. See also text in *Ham Hindu Nahin*, pp. 51-55. For sacrifice made by Sikh Gurus see *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak*, 24 June 1912, Selections from the Native Newspapers published in the Punjab, 1912, vol. XXV, p. 544.
52. Grewal, 'Nabha's *Ham Hindu Nahin*: A Declaration of Sikh Ethnicity', pp. 233, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243. See also text in *Ham Hindu Nahin*, pp. 55-163.
53. Kenneth W. Jones, *Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 19th Century Punjab*, New Delhi: Manohar, (rpt) 1989, p. 206.
54. *Khalsa Bahadur*, 4 June 1900, *Selections from the Vernacular Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1900, vol. XIII, p. 291.
55. *Smarak Granth*, p. 160.
56. Punjab State Archives, Chandigarh, *Home General, Confidential*, file no. 3/51, 1906, Reg: Idols in the Amritsar Golden Temple, pp. 229, 230. There is evidence to show that even in the past similar orders were issued. An order dated 29 January 1878 was passed by Sardar Mangal Singh, the then Manager, which stated that the 'worship of idols in the Darbar Sahib is opposed to custom and the ancient rule' and in the 'Darbar Sahib only Sri Guru Granth Sahib is worshipped'. Ibid, p. 242. Raja of Jind is reported to have said that the Brahmans had been expelled thrice within the last thirty years from the precincts of the Darbar Sahib. Despite the documents forbidding the worship of idols within the compound of the Golden Temple, the Brahmans returned again and again for their selfish motives. Ibid, p. 171.
57. PSA, Chandigarh, *Home General, Confidential*, file no. 3/51, 1906, Reg: Idols in the Amritsar Golden Temple, pp. 21, 22. The Hindus of Amritsar were supported by the Hindus of Hoshiarpur who conducted a meeting in the premises of the Sanatan Dharm Sabha in Hoshiarpur to protest against the actions of Sardar Arur Singh, pp. 77-78.
58. PSA, Chandigarh, *Home General, Confidential*, file no. 3/51, 1906, Reg: Idols in the Amritsar Golden Temple, pp. 51-53.
59. Ibid, pp. 233, 234, 235, 236.
60. Ibid, p. 262.
61. Ibid, p. 265.
62. Ibid, pp. 3, 149, 156-57, 171.
63. *Sanatan Dharm Gazette*, August 1898, *Selections from the Vernacular Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1898, vol. XI, p. 570.

64. *Akhbar-i Am*, 19 May 1899, *Selections from the Vernacular Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1899, vol. XII, p. 295.
65. *Sanatan Dharm Gazette*, 28 February 1906, *Selections from the Native Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1906, vol. XIX, p. 63.
66. PSA, Chandigarh, *Home General, Confidential*, file no. 3/51, 1906, Reg: Idols in the Amritsar Golden Temple, p. 265.
67. *Akhbar-i Am*, 10 April 1900, *Selections from the Vernacular Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1900, vol. XIII, p. 200.
68. *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak*, 1 May 1912, *Selections from the Native Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1912, vol. XXV, p. 384.
69. *Sanatan Dharm Patrika*, 20 Jan 1918, *Selections from the Indian Newspapers published in the Punjab*, 1918, vol. XXXI, pp. 57, 126.
70. Nagar, *Hindu Dharm Darpanam*, II, pp. 226, 227. An important concern of the Singh reformers was the Anand Marriage Bill that was introduced in the Imperial Legislative Council in 1908 to give legal recognition to the Sikh ceremony of marriage. Not only the Arya Samaj but also many Sikhs were opposed to the Bill, including the *granthis* of the Golden Temple. The Anand marriage was regarded as an innovation of the Singh reformers by the opponents of the Bill. Hundreds of communications were sent to the government for and against the Bill. In October 1909 the Bill was passed. Grewal, *The Sikhs of the Punjab*, p. 151.
71. Three Sikh organizations, the Central Sikh League, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee and Shiromani Akali Dal started a non-violent struggle against the government for the control of Gurdwaras which culminated in the passage of a Bill in the Legislative Council in July 1925 and came into force on 1 November 1925. This Sikh Gurdwaras Reform Act recognized the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee as the legal authority to manage and control the Sikh Gurdwaras. Grewal, *The Sikhs of the Punjab*, pp. 157, 158, 159, 162.
72. *Sanatan Dharm Patrika*, 29 May 1921, *Punjab Press Abstracts*, 1921, vol. XXXIV, p. 273.
73. *Akhbar-i Am*, 29 November and 6 December 1922, *Punjab Press Abstracts*, 1922, vol. XXXV, pp. 610, 624.
74. *Sanatan Dharm Parcharak*, 16 January 1926, *Report on Newspapers and Periodicals in the Punjab*, 1926, pp. 44-45.
75. *Bharat*, 20 June 1923, *Punjab Press Abstracts*, 1923, vol. XXXVI, p. 342.
76. *Annual Report of the Shri Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha Punjab*, 1928, pp. 23, 79, 80, 81. Reiterating the claim that Sikhs were Hindus, a preacher of the Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha of the Punjab, Sant Mangal Singh in 1928 maintained that the ten Gurus were Sanatan Dharmis and they delivered the sermon of *sanatan dharm* in the Darbar Sahib. Ibid, p. 26.
77. Gulshan Rai Bhatnagar, *The Hindu Problem in the Punjab*, pp. 16-17, 22, 26, 45.
78. Pandit Sukhlal, *Guru Sahibo ka Dharm*, Lahore: Basant Printing Press, 1936. Books on Sikh religious literature mentioned are: *Janamsakhi Bhai Bale Wali*, *Adi Granth*, *Dasam Granth*,

Bani of Bhai Gurdas, Bani of Bhai Mani Singh, Mukammal Sausakhi, Gurbilas Pathshahi Chhey, Gurbilas Pathshahi Das, Surya Prakash, Panth Prakash (1st and 2nd ed) and Khalsa Twarikh. Ibid, p. iii. At the end of this work there is an advertisement that lists' other works of Sukhlal in Hindi and Punjabi. The works of Hindi are: *Tat-Khalsa ki Pol, Sikho ki Bajbul Arz, Navin Singh Shiksha, Khalsa Kuriti Nivaran, Shri Gurughar mein Durga Pujan, Shri Gurughar mein Dan Vidhi* and *Anand Nirnay*. A few have been translated into Punjabi. The work in Punjabi is *Jehi Ruh tehe Farishte*. Many of the works were reprinted.

79. Goswami Ganesh Dutt, 'Lecture in 1956', Bhagwati Prasad Madhav (ed.), *Goswami Ganesh Dutt: Smriti Granth*, New Delhi: Sri Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha Punjab, 1969, pp. 409-10.
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