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In Defence of Development State in India

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In the recent times discourse on market economy and political democracy have been very intense. In the realms of authoritative structures of knowledge and prevailing patterns of social thinking these were taken as inherently virtuous and therefore indispensable for modern day polities. Since the 1980s, with 'Washington Consensus' becoming conventional wisdom, the neo-liberal economic orthodoxy projected capitalism and democracy as a composite whole, whereby the later was seen facilitating the former. The organization of national political economies, ideally, was to be sought on these lines. In this post-communist world, largely characterized by liberal triumphant mood of Francis Fukuyama as a new phase of history, the range of national choices was found to be limited to one or another variety of capitalism. Thus in the backdrop of the failure of socialist model of development in erstwhile Soviet Union, it was hard to find scholars who could find remedies for the economic ills world was suffering from, away from capitalism except that a more humane and possibly more regulated form of capitalism was desirable. With such a discourse assuming dominant position market and free trade were projected as virtue and necessity. Following this a large number of countries were seen moulding their models of development on capitalist lines.

Since 1980s, India has also been profoundly inclined towards market mechanism. On the basis of relative importance of the state and market the independent India's economic journey can be divided into two broad phases. The first phase from independence till 1970s was marked by large public sector, trade protection and import substitution strategy. The second phase, following it became more visible since 1991, the year that heralded a model which transformed India from import substituting industrialization towards trade led growth. Consequently to such measures the Indian economy in the recent years emerged as one of the fastest growing economies of the world. India's economy hardly grew in the first half of the twentieth century, following independence it grew at a moderate rate of 3-4 per cent per annum while growth acceleration has been phenomenal in the recent years. The neo-liberal interpretation of India's recent growth experience underlines the process of economic liberalization, which began earnestly in 1991, as the major catalyst in India's growth story. The argument is that India's earlier sluggish growth was largely product of a highly interventionist state and misguided import substitution trading regime. This kind of thinking is line with the view that state intervention is detrimental to both economic growth and

human development. Such a view was internalised as state did not deliver on development agenda which was seen as proof of inadequacy of state-dominated development strategies. The failures of mixed economies were also attributed to government intervention. Realising the inadequacy of state centric model the developing countries embraced neo-liberal policies at a large scale.

This paper examines the nature and limitations of neo-liberal discourse beyond the 'opaque' structure of existing world view underpinned by prevailing beliefs and patterns of thinking. The analytical foundations of this world view are provided by neo-liberal economic orthodoxy. The proponents of orthodoxy are quite critical of the statist model of development pursued by many countries in the 1950s and the 1960s. They manipulatively overstressed the issues of moderate growth and persistence of poverty and designated it as structural failure of state dominated economies, while undermining the instrumental role played by developmental state to improve human agency. Furthermore, the orthodox liberal assessment of successful cases suggests that the states which integrated most deeply into the global economy through trade liberalization grew the faster. In this context too the achievements are over emphasized and highlighted while the shortcomings and failures are ignored and misrepresented.

This paper is divided into three parts. The first part analyses the neo-liberal analysis of the demise of statist model of development in the developing world. The second part examines developmental state as principal agent of development in post independent India. It also examines the demise of development state in India and its implications for social justice and equity. The third part assesses the instrumental value of developmental state through the prism of normative justifications.

The Demise of Development State: Myth and Reality

The virtues of market economy as stressed by the proponents of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy have come to occupy centre stage in the context of economic reforms in the contemporary world. The proponents of orthodoxy believe that free play of forces in the market leads to efficient allocation of resources and promotes competitiveness boosting production and growth. In the developing world it emerged in opposition to the development strategies based on state planning and intervention - to promote growth and improvement in living conditions of the masses - which had dominated the period from 1950s to 1970s. Here it is often linked to the so-called 'Washington Consensus' (privatization and deregulation; trade and financial liberalization; shrinking the role of the state; encouraging foreign direct investment) and to the 'structural adjustment' programmes promoted by IMF and the World Bank. The orthodoxy firmly believes that global economic integration will improve economic performance in the developing countries. As these countries reduce barriers to trade and capital flows, the expectation is that economic growth will increase which in turn will reduce poverty and improve the quality of life for the vast majority of people in the developing world.

However, there is no convincing evidence to suggest that openness, in the form of low barriers to trade and capital flows, leads to such positive consequences. In reality, growth acceleration in a sustainable mode took place in few countries; it did not occur in many others, despite their drive for opening up trade and financial systems to the global market. In fact the more successful countries tended to be rather cautious in pursuing trade and financial reforms (Ocampo and Vos, 2008: 1). The successful developing countries determined their own pace of change; 'each made sure as it grew that the benefits were shared equitably; each rejected the basic tenets of the 'Washington Consensus', which argued for a minimalist role for the state and rapid privatization and liberalization' (Stiglitz, 2007: 296). Furthermore, evidence suggests that the economies that have done well in the post World War II period have all succeeded through their 'own particular brand of heterodox policies'. Macroeconomic stability and high investment rates have been common, but beyond that, many details differ. This too should be a 'warning against trying to fit all developing countries into a straitjacket of policies that have only recently become conventional wisdom' (Rodrik, 2007: 308).

In recent years the realization has grown that the 'Washington Consensus' has not worked very well in many places and the outcomes of its prescriptions, if measured at a scale, ranged from moderate success to catastrophe (McClean and McMillan, 2008: 258). The 1980s, in which the 'embedded liberalism' of the early post World War II years gave way to 'Washington consensus', have been described as the 'lost decade' for the majority of Southern states, with sub-Saharan Africa suffering the most. Over the whole decade, developing countries as a group faced a 10 per cent decline in their per capita GDP. Despite the negative performance of many countries within the South, some of them experienced sustained economic growth over the 1980s. China's economy grew at 9.4 per cent per annum, while India and South-East Asia averaged 5.5 per cent per annum (Thomson, 2005: 649- 50). But what is crucial to understand is that these countries tended to be rather cautious in pursuing neo-liberal policies, and what is more, in all of them the 'visible hand of the state was more in evidence than the invisible hand of the market' (Stiglitz, 2007: 296).

It has been now clearly manifested that the projection of successful cases by neo-liberal economic orthodoxy is largely manipulated and misrepresented. Nevertheless one puzzle still exists that instead of failure of neo-liberal policies as such since the 1980s more and more developing countries are embracing neo-liberal policies. In this context the foregoing analysis thus raised a fundamental question: If neo-liberal policies appeared to have such negative results for the majority of developing countries why have they been so widely adopted?

Through the 1970s and 1980s to present times there has been a major debt crisis between the poor and developing south and rich and industrialized North. Prior to the late 1970s, the rate of industrial growth was higher in the developing world as a whole in comparison to the developed capitalist countries taken as a group. Many developing countries

exhibited an impressive economic performance, and average per capita incomes in many developing countries were rising. The first oil shock of 1973 constrained the balance of payments situation of many developing countries (as majority of these countries were importers of oil) and compelled them to undertake large-scale borrowing of recycled petrodollars from Western commercial banks in an attempt to sustain their rates of economic growth. Furthermore, during the 1980s there was a serious regression in much of developing world as a result of rich countries' strategy for dealing with the second oil price hike in 1979, which resulted in massive rise in interest rates and steep falls in commodity prices in the early 1980s. These changes precipitated the debt crisis (Thomas, 2005: 653-54).

The debt crisis came about primarily as a result of excessive and unwise lending by Western banks. The poor developing countries were unable to pay off the interest on these debts, let alone the debt itself. They were compelled by the circumstances to turn to major global financial institutions for assistance. For these poor indebted countries, the condition for assistance was that they would implement neo-liberal policies. With commitment that these policies will be implemented and continued, the IMF and the World Bank were agree to provide aid to continue with debt repayment (Hobden & Johns, 2008: 152). Thus, in the aftermath of the debt crisis of the 1980s many developing countries opened up their economies, liberalized and deregulated, more as a result of 'coercive liberalization' than of a democratic policy choice (Woods, 2005: 341). In the 1990s, this continued with what Dani Rodrik called 'forced harmonization', whereby, for instance, in the case of trade negotiations on intellectual property 'developing countries were coerced into an agreement which transfers billions of dollars' worth of monopoly profits from poor courtiers to rich countries under the guise of protecting the property rights of inventors' (Rodrik, 2007: 309).

Thus one obvious bias of the orthodoxy is its overstress on state failures and its neglect of market failures. When the third world countries were struggling to maintain their growth rates - partially because of internal and partially because of external factors - the orthodoxy designated it as 'structural failure' and the IMF with the World Bank worked in an unprecedented fashion to coerced these developing countries into a straitjacket of neo-liberal policies through their 'structural adjustment programmes'. On the contrary, when the neo-liberal model of Anglo-America is struggling since 2008 – primarily because of its internal contradictions – the orthodoxy is describing it as a 'crisis' in the capitalist economies. What is more interesting; the prophet of neo-liberalism, the United States of America, is intervening to stabilize its economy. All this indicates about the skills of orthodoxy to use the 'power of discourse' in its favour which has deep rooted political implications.

The Demise of development State in India

In his famous speech on India's 'tryst with destiny' on the eve of independence in August 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru reminded the country that task ahead included 'the ending of poverty, ignorance, disease and inequality of opportunity' (Sen, 2007: 1). In this way, the acceptance of the method of government planning for development - and more fundamentally the treatment of development as a concern of the state – was an important factor in the strategy of development. Economic development was defined as a rise in the levels of living conditions of the masses. Planning aimed at achieving development which was to bring about such a rise, and all policy measures in the plans were to sub-serve this end (Myrdal, 1968: 741-42).

In all the plans that spelt out goals of development in early post independence period, this line of thinking was prominent. The First Five Year Plan began by stating developmental ideals with reference to the Directive Principles enshrined in the constitution. The Planning Commission stressed the economic concerns stating:

'In terms of these directive principles, the State is to regard the raising of the level of nutrition and standard of living of the people as among its primary duties. The economic policy of the state must be governed by the obligation placed upon it to secure that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to adequate means of livelihood. The state has to endeavour, within the limits of its economic capacity and the stage of development reached, to make effective provisions for securing the right to work, the right to education and the right to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness, disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want' (Planning Commission, 1951: 11).

The prioritization of human welfare as an overarching goal was the principal element in state's economic philosophy which legitimized the post colonial state. This was also the period of the 'formation of a developmental state which intervened in the economy, planning and guiding its growth and trying directly to promote the welfare of the population'. It meant considerable state intervention in the economy through the progressive taxation of personal incomes and corporate sector and provision of public services by the state (Chatterjee, 2010: 4).

This line of thinking remained the cornerstone of India's strategy for development in the post independence years. But over time, particularly since 1991, Indian economy has moved away from this traditional line of thinking. The adoption of neo-liberal ideology also known as pro-market reforms has come in a big way which emphasizes the process of economic liberalization in India that began earnestly in 1991. The undertone of new model is that India's earlier sluggish growth was largely the product of a highly interventionist state and of a misguided import substitution trading regime. India adopted pro-market strategy and liberalised its economy that incidentally has improved capital accumulation and efficiency; thus in turn propelling India into the ranks of the world's fastest growers.

While widely accepted, this pro-market mould is unable to explain some key empirical anomalies in India's developmental record. A class of political economists is dubious about widely embraced argument that India's recent growth acceleration is a result of the adoption of neo-liberal policies. Their arguments are surmised as follow: Firstly, economic growth in India started accelerating a decade prior to liberalization of 1991. Secondly, what eventually triggered the upward shift in the growth rate of the economy around 1980 was a slow but sure adoption of a new strategy of development. The three main components of this strategy were: 'prioritization of economic growth as a state goal; supporting big business to achieve this goal; and taming India's activist labour'. Thirdly, while this model shared some policies recommended by the 'Washington Consensus' on development (for example, emphasis on deregulation and disinvestment in public sector), it was considerably 'more statist and more explicitly growth-oriented; it was also more pro-business than pro-market' (Kohli, 2009: 140-163; Subramanian, 2009: 1-48; Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2002: 8-18).

Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi dominated the Indian political economy scene during the 1980s. This was also the decade, in which India's economy made a breakthrough, moving beyond the 'Hindu growth rate' to a more rapidly growing economy (Kohli, 2009: 158-63). Nevertheless, during the same period Indira Gandhi followed by Rajiv Gandhi moved the Indian state away from its socialist ambitions to a growth-promoting state that worked with the corporate sector. Thus the Congress abandoned its commitment to redistribution and recommitted itself to a 'growth first' model of development. However, both Indira and Rajiv Gandhi kept up public investments. In 1991, with another important liberalizing shift, integration with the global economy also picked up in a big way. India in the post-liberalization period has stood with 'the winners of the new economy, without compensating those who are being left behind' (Kohli, 2010: 502-3).

The proponents of reforms argue that in the wake of the balance of payments crisis of 1990-91, India had no option but turn to the multilateral institutions for support and adopt an IMF- style adjustment strategy. But a class of critical economists argue that the crisis was almost entirely speculative in origin, having little to do with the developments in the real sectors of the economy. They claimed that India could have managed her payments and restored confidence in her currency with a relatively low-conditionality IMF loan, 'without going in for the whole gamut of structural adjustment measures'. The reason that India did go in for structural adjustment was not because of any objective 'necessity' being faced by the economy but because the liberalization lobby, consisting of the Fund and the Bank as well as elements within the Indian government and business class considered this, "a heaven-sent opportunity to tie the country down to structural adjustment, to jettison altogether, and not just rectify, the dirigisme regime which had prevailed since independence". In other words, the radical shift in economic structure that is considered as an event of historical significance was 'achieved as a salient coup, behind everybody's back as it were, by trapping the country into structural adjustment'. It is interesting that the

government never brought out a white paper on the balance of payments crisis as demanded by several opposition parties at the time of reforms (Patnaik and Chandersheker, 2010: 55-57). Thus the crisis was converted into an opportunity to introduce some fundamental changes in the content and approach to economic policy.

When this fundamental policy shift was announced in may 1991, the main forces supporting such a shift included the 'narrow political leadership, the technocratic political elite, a segment of Indian capital, and external actors, expressing their preferences mainly in the form of policy conditionalities set by the IMF' (Kohli, 2009: 169). But, in spite of limited support this political gambit succeeded because the Indian executive used some political skills to clock change (which tends to cause anxiety among those privileged by the status quo) in the appearances of continuity. In other words, the change was introduced within a context which appears to favour continuity (Jenkins, 1999:173, 176-78). Thus since the 1991 neo-liberal policies in India have been justified in deontological terms and if the argument ever shifted to access the instrumental value of these policies the ultimate standard used by the government is economic growth. Nevertheless, although economic growth has in disputably picked up in the post reform period, evidence of a marked acceleration in the rate of poverty reduction is harder to find, with the implication that inequality among various classes and social groups is on the rise. This paradox is acknowledged by the Planning Commission: "The rapid growth achieved in the past several years demonstrates that we have learnt how to bring about growth, but we have yet to achieve comparable success in inclusiveness"(Planning Commission, 2008: iii).

In this context the evidence suggests that the trickle-down effect of growth has been weak in the post reform period. The rate of decline in poverty has not accelerated along with the growth in GDP, and the incidence of poverty among some marginalised groups, such as the Scheduled Tribes (STs), has hardly declined (Planning Commission, 2008: 02). There are apprehensions about poverty reducing effect of growth since the recent high growth is marked by its 'lagging agriculture sector, worsening rural-urban disparity, and growing regional imbalances'. The worst aspect is that growth is located neither in the sector in which labour is concentrated that is agriculture nor in the states in which poverty levels are high(Radhakrishna, Ravi & Reddy, 2010: 21).

The evidence suggests that prior to the 1990s economic growth in India tended to reduce poverty. Thus, the population well below the poverty line, as well as near the poverty line, benefited from growth during this period. There was no convincing evidence that economic growth in India before the 1990s tended to be associated with rising overall inequality. It could not be construed that the pre-1990s growth in India tended to leave the poor behind. Surely the bigger concern for India's poor was that too little growth was occurring (The World Bank, 2011:49).

Growth in itself should not be an objective of economic policy. It is an instrument for enhancing a society's economic welfare. The twin objectives of India's economic policy

in the post independence years were growth in national income and improvement in the living conditions of the ordinary people. But as the above analysis suggests although the economic growth has picked up considerably in the post reform period, the gains of rapid growth have not reached all parts of the country and all sections of the people in an equitable manner. The real failure is that India has failed to transform its growth into development, which would have brought about an improvement in the living conditions of the ordinary people.

Defence of the Development State

In *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics*, Immanuel Kant argues for the necessity of treating people as 'end in themselves', rather than mere as means to other ends: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case an end withal, never as means only". This principle of treating people as an 'end in themselves' is Kant's formula for expressing moral equality of individuals (Kant, 1987: 56-57). But, this principle has importance in many contexts - even in analysing quality of human progress and methods assigned to attain it. Human beings are not only the end of development process, but they also happen to be – directly or indirectly – the primary means of all production. This dual role of human beings often leads to confusion of ends and means while planning and policy making. Indeed it can, and frequently does, take the form of focusing on economic production or growth as the essence of human progress, treating people as means or instruments in the production process for producing commodities – through an augmentation of human capital (Sen, 2009: 3).

The primary difference between the economic growth and the human development paradigm is that the former focuses exclusively on material production while the later embraces the enlargement of all human capacities and choices - 'whether economic, social, cultural or political'. The human development paradigm is dubious about the presumed automatic link between expanding income and expanding human choices. The trickle-down effect of economic growth thus depends not only on quantity but equally on quality and distribution of such growth. A link between growth and human development can be created consciously through deliberate public policy - 'such as public spending on social services and fiscal policy to redistribute income and assets'. This link may not exist in the *laissez faire* market mechanism, which can further marginalize the naturally and socially disadvantaged individuals and groups of society (Haq, 2009: 17-18).

In context of the above discussion one thing is clear that the questions regarding the issue of human development are not confined only to economic sphere but they are also important political questions. They are political because conscious public policy - in the form of affirmative action programmes - can only be formulated and effectively implemented by the state. If Rawls in his theory of justice claims that a redistribution of resources is necessary in the cause of equality then he is usually also claiming that the state should formulate public policy to achieve this end. Furthermore, economic activity does not

take place independently of its political context. Politics and political institutions provide the framework within which people become rich and poor. This may be consequence of the strategies of development that a similar economic performance in the aggregate could lead to inclusive development in one situation, and growth which bypass the majority of people in another situation. It is clear that institutional arrangements which mediate between economic development on the one hand and social development on the other are critical.

The development strategy embraced by the Indian state during Nehruvian era was more complimentary to the conception of development stipulated by Human development paradigm. In Kantian terminology it conceived the human beings as an end in themselves not mere means to some other end. Under this vision growth was a necessary mean to the ultimate end of human development. As we have noted earlier the trickle-down effect of growth was strong in the pre-reform period. Thus people were both the creators and beneficiaries of economic growth. Furthermore, the state was considered as the primary instrument for converting economic growth into human development. Since 1991, Indian state has moved away from this traditional line of thinking. In early 1980s the state began to retreat from redistributive concerns and prioritized economic growth as its primary goal. However, both Indira and Rajiv Gandhi kept up public investments in agriculture which helped to improve the living conditions of the rural masses. Since 1991, when external liberalization picked up speed, the state has embraced economic growth as its overarching objective and placed the issue of human development at derivative position. The state has downplayed redistributive measures and slowly but surely curtailed public investments and social expenditures. Therefore, the 1980s was the period when the end-mean confusion evolved in the process of planning and policy making, and finally, in the 1990s, Indian state embraced economic growth as its ultimate end. Thus, in the post reform period the national leadership has always appeared to justify process of economic liberalization in terms of achievements of higher growth, what is more, the concerns of quality and distribution has become secondary issues of importance.

In the real world, both market failure and government failure are facts of life. The juxtaposition of state and market in an either-or mode, as if there is a possibility of choice, is misleading. The World Bank in its *World Development Report (1997)* shows why this extreme view is at odds with the evidence of the world's development success, 'be it the development of the today's industrial economies in the nineteenth century or the post war growth "miracles" of East Asia'. Far from supporting a minimalist approach to the state, history and experience reveals that development requires an effective state. Furthermore, the evidence shows that the state has grown everywhere in the last century. What is crucial to understand in spite of a strong rhetoric in favour of minimalist state in the developed world the state has grown more rapidly in the industrial societies particularly since the 1980s (The World Bank, 1997: 1-2). What is more, the relationship between the state and the market cannot be defined once-and-for-all in any dogmatic manner but must change over

time in an adaptive manner as the situational factors change. In this context, it is important to remember that markets are good servants but bad masters. What is more, efficient markets need effective states. It is, therefore, necessary to reformulate the questions about the economic role of the state. The real question is no longer about the size of the state (how big?) or the degree of state intervention (what sort?). The question is now about the nature of the state intervention (what sort?) and the quality of performance of the state (how good?) (Nayyar, 2008: 83-84).

Conclusion

Adam Smith is considered to be the father of modern economics and is proponent of capitalism. Smith has written in his famous book '*An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*' that an "invisible hand" will rescue capitalism, whenever there is a crisis. Looking at the magnitude of financial destruction across the world during the current crisis the proponents of capitalism has started wondering, 'where is Adam Smith's invisible hand'. They feared that the 'invisible hand' really became invisible when the 'cradle of capitalism' - United States - shivered in the later part of 2008, especially after the demise of Lehman Brothers. However, ultimately the co-ordinated efforts of the governments and the central bankers across the world have taken up the task of addressing the unprecedented crisis of global credit markets and capital markets (Thunuguntla, 2010:102).

In this context the long term prospects of developing countries are clouded by persistent global structural imbalances and fragilities culminated since 2008. Even if the crisis in the developed industrialised countries is fully resolved, developing countries are likely to encounter a much less favourable global economic environment in the future than they did before the onset of the global meltdown. Indeed, they may even face less favourable conditions than those prevailing since the onset of the crisis, 'notably with respect to interest rates, capital flows, and commodity prices. Thus, to repeat the spectacular previous growth levels the developing countries need to improve their growth strategies, 'rebalance domestic and external sources of growth, and reduce their dependence on foreign markets and capital'. This requires, 'abandoning the Washington Consensus in practice, not just in rhetoric, and seeking strategic rather than full integration with the global economy' (Akyuz, 2014: 38-47).

It may be noted that no bank or financial institution in India collapsed due the global crisis. This is because of the basic strength of the mixed economic system of India having public and private sector. Effective regulation or market intervention is there in most of the economic and financial sectors in India. Compared to USA, UK, Japan and other developed countries the impact of the global crisis was mild in India. Thus, India has been saved from the catastrophic effects of the global financial crisis because of the remains of the developmental state which left after the gradual liberalization process. All these incidents caution the national leadership of India against the retreat from the development state.

Furthermore, human development has not been one of India's successes, even though growth rates picked up after 1980s, and may have accelerated further in the last few years. Economic growth thus needed to be converted into human development. It is essential to remember that the well-being of humankind is the essence of development. Therefore, development must bring about an improvement in the living conditions of the masses. It should ensure the provision of basic human needs for all, not just food and clothing but also shelter, health care, and education. This simple but powerful proposition is often forgotten in the pursuit of material wealth and the conventional concerns of economics. Yet, people view the world through the optic of their living conditions and daily lives. The litmus test for the performance of an economy, hence government, is neither economic growth, nor economic efficiency, indeed not even equity in an abstract sense, but whether or not it meets the basic needs and the growing aspirations of people. Thus, nutrition, health, education, and sanitation for the vast majority of Indians would require efficient public service delivery for the poor who are not within the purview of the market.

A globalizing state needed welfare to a greater extent than a closed economy, because globalization and specialization can produce growth and social disruption. The states of Scandinavia, which were more dependent on the world economy than the United States, also played a more central role in securing their citizens lives. As India's promising economic growth becomes more dependent on the global economy, the state will need to produce not only competitive firms but will also need to secure its citizens from ravages of uncertainty. Ensuring growth with redistribution in India would require the transformation of state-society relations towards a more inclusive growth paradigm

This brings in Nehruvian paradigm of developmental state which stands for state intervention ensuring inclusive growth including all sections and classes particularly the worst off. In his model state power was sought to be used to convert economic growth into human development. But the Indian state in the recent times has moved away from such a vision and has prioritized economic growth as its ultimate goal, leading to more exclusive development policy in which the growth has bypassed the majority. However, with criticism of the trickle-down effect of growth becoming more pronounced the government introduced the measures like MGNREGA which has led to claims of poverty getting reduced especially in the worst off states. Such a state intervention is integral part of Nehruvian vision. However, for Nehru improving lives of the masses was the cardinal objective while government now takes such measures only in selective cases. One may try to project the improvement in poverty reduction in the recent years as a by-product of neo-liberal reforms; however, the role of state intervention cannot be denied. There appears to be some kind of 'renaissance' of Nehruvian vision of developmental state at the scholarly level. However, such a vision is yet to become the guiding principle for the formulation of governmental policies which is the need of the time.

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Transgressing Exclusionary National Identities: Revisiting Tagore's Critique of Nationalism

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Tagore's lectures on "Nationalism", namely, "Nationalism in the West", "Nationalism in Japan", "Nationalism in India" and "International Relations", were delivered during 1916-17 when he visited Japan and USA as a part of his lecture tours. These were the years when major European nation-states were engaged in an intense and prolonged war in which they had also involved their colonies. Delivered in the backdrop of the First World War, these lectures can be read as an eloquent critique of the ideas of 'Nation', 'Nation-State' and the ideology of nationalism. It may be relevant to keep in view that these lectures were delivered before Gandhi emerged as an eminent political leader on the Indian national scene. The Indian Nationalist Movement for Independence from the colonial British rule gained strength by becoming a mass movement under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress during the early middle years of the decade of the 1920s.

Tagore's disenchantment with the ideas of the 'Nation' and 'Nationalism' had started much earlier, sometime by 1907. His critique of 'nationalism' is primarily a result of his finding it antithetical to what he regarded as the socio-cultural and spiritual roots of the Indian civilization. His despair with the ideology of nationalism perhaps grew from the negative aspects of the "Swadeshi" movement launched in protest against the partition of Bengal in 1905, in which he had actively participated. The partition of Bengal had evoked strong protests from the politicized sections of educated Bengalis and Vande Mataram became the hymn of resistance. Swadeshi movement of 1905-07 was a great stride in the annals of earlier 20th century Indian history. Tagore wrote patriotic songs in praise of the glory of 'Golden Bengal' and sang them in public meetings. "Amar Sonal Bangla", written during this phase of protest, became very popular. The British rulers became suspect of Tagore's aims and intentions and viewed him as a 'subversive nationalist'. Ezra Pound had quipped "Tagore has sung Bengal into a Nation". Subsequently, this song was adopted as the National Anthem of Bangla Desh in 1972. Indian National Anthem is also a part of another song written by Tagore. It is ironic that poems written by Tagore, before he became a staunch critic of nationalism, were adopted as the national anthems of two nation-states, and he is acknowledged and venerated as the national poet of both India and Bangla Desh.

In critiquing the ideology of nationalism and nation-state, Tagore made it explicitly clear that his understanding of 'Nation', 'National' and 'Nationalism' had evolved and transformed over the years. This is evident from the following remarks in his lecture on 'Indian Nationalism':

“India has never had a real sense of nationalism. Even though from childhood I had been taught that the idolatry of Nation is almost better than reverence for God and humanity, I believe I have outgrown that teaching, and it is my conviction that my countrymen will gain truly their India by fighting against that education which teaches them that a country is greater than the ideals of humanity.”

In view of Tagore's above remark, it may be helpful to locate the evolution of Tagore's understanding of nationalism in the socio-cultural context of the times in which he was born and lived. Revisiting Tagore's life and thought, particularly his engagement with Indian nationalism, in all its complexity, is important in the context of today's urgent need for inter-cultural dialogue in the era of exclusionary politics of identity, within India and abroad, and the challenges to various cultures presented by forces of economic globalization. The issues and difficulties that Tagore addressed a century ago continue to engage us even today, and perhaps in more critical and dangerous circumstances. Tagore's writings, expounding his vision of cosmopolitan humanism, can be situated in the complex tapestry of colonial orientalist projections of ancient Indian civilization, Tagore's understanding of the cultural, linguistic and religious pluralism as a distinctive feature of Indian civilization, demands of modern science and technology, and his reflections on the transformations that were taking place in the world politics and economy. Tagore has to be understood as a colonial intellectual who had the vision and courage to transcend the restrictive boundaries of the local colonized 'self' and the alien colonial 'other' in his quest for a universal humanist vision of global harmony and peace. The cosmopolitan humanist approach that Tagore articulated to critique the exclusionary, narrow sectarian ideology of nationalism demands a serious engagement today.

In his essay on "The Religion of An Artist", elaborating on the early influences in his life, Tagore underlined the 'currents of three movements' that met in the 'life of our country'. One of the currents was the reformist movement in religion, launched by Raja Rammohan Roy, and, Tagore speaks of his father as a 'great leader' in that movement, creating "an atmosphere of advent of new ideals, which at the same time were old, older than all the things of which that age was proud." The second current was "the literary revolution that happened in Bengal ... which aroused our literature from age long sleep", of which "Bankimchandra Chatterjee was the first pioneer." And the third movement, according to Tagore, "was yet another movement started about this time called the **national**. It was not

fully political, but it began to give voice to the mind of our people trying to assert their own personality. It was a voice of impatience at the humiliation constantly heaped upon us by people who were not oriental, and who had especially at that time, the habit of sharply dividing the human world into the good and the bad, according to the hemispheres to which they belonged.” (Emphasis added)

Elaborating on the damage done by the Christian missionaries and the colonial rule to the indigenous traditions and local cultures, Tagore adds that a spirit of distrust and contempt had been generated in the minds of the young about “all things that had come to them as inheritance from the past. ... The national movement was started to proclaim that we must not be indiscriminate in our rejection of the past. This ... movement ... set out with a great courage to deny and to oppose all pride in mere borrowings.” Tagore proudly states that the members of his family were active in all these three movements, and that he was born and brought up in the atmosphere of the confluence of all the three movements. Tagore's involvement with the 'nationalist movement began early in his life. He started participating in the *Swadeshi Melas* also known as *Hindu Melas* alongwith his elder brothers and sisters from 1875 onwards. He also participated in the annual meetings of the Indian National Congress held in Calcutta in 1886, 1896 and 1906. In the 1896 Congress session, he had presented his own musical composition of Bankim's *Vande Mataram*.

Tagore's father was an important leader of the new religious movement in Bengal, preaching strict monotheism based on the teachings of Upanishads. Talking about his childhood, Tagore recalled that “I had a deep sense, almost from infancy, of the Beauty of Nature, an intimate feeling of companionship with the trees and the clouds, and felt in tune with the musical touch of seasons in the air. At the same time, I had a peculiar susceptibility to human kindness. All these craved expression.” Lived experience of rural life and landscapes in his early childhood and youth, closeness to nature during his formative years had a lifelong impact on Tagore. These formative experiences generated in Tagore deeper feelings for folk culture, music and poetry of Bengal, songs of the Bauls, and the splendid beauty of the golden Bengal. In his other memoirs of his childhood, youth and writings on education, Tagore has acknowledged the deep influence of the monistic spiritual vision of the Upanishads, Buddhist thought, devotional poetry of the saint-poets from various parts of India, including the Sufis and the Sikh Gurus, and his reading of the classical western literature and modern social philosophy in the development of his thinking. “The conventional code of life for our family ... became a confluence of three cultures : The Hindu, the Mohammedan, and the British. ... I came to a world in which the modern city-bred spirit of progress had just begun driving its triumphal car over the luscious green life of our ancient village community.” These varied sources of intellectual and spiritual influences, and the new life experiences in Calcutta and Europe, enabled Tagore to make his own choices and provide a creative blend of the best from the East and the West.

Tagore's thinking on social and political issues of his times is marked by the tensions and dilemmas faced by the colonial subjects in their encounter with the colonial condition. British agrarian policies had resulted in widespread misery in rural areas of Bengal. British manufactured goods glutted the markets, bringing disaster for thousands of local craftsmen and artisans. To legitimize their economic and political domination, the colonial rulers in India had projected their role as a 'civilising mission'. They claimed their (European) civilization as the "enlightened" one, which had taken upon itself the responsibility of 'liberating/emancipating' the colonial subjects from their 'ignorance' and 'despotism'. The colonial discourse used the western modern categories to characterize the colonial people by defining, categorizing, analyzing, imagining, constructing and regulating their practices and institutions in their own terms to serve their vested interests.

Indians studying in the institutions set up by the colonial administration and Christian missionaries were encouraged to accept that their past was stagnant and there was nothing worthy of emulation from their own cultural and social heritage. The colonial discourse eroded the self-confidence of the native colonial subjects by undermining their belief-systems, cultural practices and social institutions besides unleashing the processes of economic exploitation and political subjugation. The colonial construction of Oriental India had two facets : Firstly, the colonial India was inferior and needed to be modernized Secondly, the distinctness of ancient India was seen in terms of its mystical spiritualism and other worldliness. India was presented as one of the most ancient and rich civilizations, and was projected as Europe's 'other'. In constructing and glorifying the narrative of a pristine and pure Indian civilization, prior to the arrival of Islam on the Indian soil, the emergence of Islamic India was presented as a period of an alien domination resulting in the decline of the Hindu India. The period of the Islamic rulers and Mughal empire was narrated as a period of despotic, foreign and imperial rule in India. The colonial construction of Indian history, in terms of Hindu, Muslim and British hegemony during different periods, turned out to be an important source of an increase in mutual distrust and hostility among Hindus and Muslim middle classes. The colonial historiography contributed to the construction of homogenized images of Hindus and Muslims as distinct rival communities in competition for pursuing and protecting their antagonistic interests.

The ideas of nation, nation-state and the ideology of nationalism were introduced in India during the colonial period with the spread of English education, European science and technology, western political thought and colonial British administration. It may be pertinent to note here that the rise of the ideology of nationalism is a recent phenomenon. It started in the West in the 18th century, and emerged as a strong political ideology between 1815-1920 with the drawing, and redrawing of boundaries of nation-states in Europe. Many of the historians and analysts of the rise of nationalism, such as Renan, Kohn, Hastings, Hobsbawm,

Gellner and Anderson have discussed the evolution of nationalism and nation-states as socio-political constructions in response to the rise of industrialism, capitalism, colonialism, urbanization, democracy and print-technology. During the early phase of industrial capitalism and colonialism, nation-states were needed as engines/instruments/tools of capitalist accumulation, for organizing efficient systems of production for trade and commerce, control over raw materials for industrial production, and access to natural resources. In order to accumulate successfully, bourgeoisie needed a new state formation, a nation-state, to discipline its work force and protect its economic interests. Nations were constructed by circulating myths to bring a sense of unity among the pre-existing cultures and ethnic communities for creating new political identities.

A national identity, as a collective identity, for the formation of a nation-state, is inherently particularistic and exclusionary. Howsoever broadly it may be conceived, a national identity revolves around a centre that excludes others because each nation-state views itself as a separate and distinct, sovereign political entity, independent of other nations and possibly in opposition to them. An absolute commitment to a clear separation between one's own 'nation' and 'other nations' is divisive and exclusionary irrespective of the geographical, economic, cultural or religious criteria in terms of which a nation is defined. The question of Indian Identity, whether India is a nation or not, whether India is a plurality of nations, or a nation in the making, raises questions about what it means for individuals and communities to identify themselves in terms of a nationality or a nation with a sense of belonging in the past and a hope for sharing that belonging in the future. Such an identification is possible only when there are lived experiences, memories, perceptions and hopes of shared values, interests, traditions and future visions. The partition of India in 1947 is seen by many as an instance that idea of India as one people, one nation, a unity in diversity, so eloquently championed during the struggle for independence did not work.

The formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 was initially aimed at seeking concessions and favors from the Crown for improving the conditions of their service to the British Empire. During the early years after the formation of the Indian National Congress, the delegate members mainly consisted of representatives from the regional organizations of westernized educated professionals in Bengal, Bombay and Madras. Initially they conceived their identity more in terms of their new professions and regional and ethnic origins. Gradually their ambitions, aspirations and influence extended beyond their local territories and professions. They started seeing themselves as representatives of the Indian Nation seeking a better treatment for the Indian subjects of the empire. Tagore was not much in sympathy with the approach of this so-called intelligentsia within the congress for their main concern with seeking a larger representation in the Council House and a greater say in the local municipal governance. Tagore's disappointment with such narrow focus on political and

administrative matters was so intense that he wrote years later : “In the beginning of our political agitation in India ... there was a party known as the Indian Congress, it had no real programme. ... They wanted scraps of things, but they had no constructive ideal.”

In pursuing their agendas of seeking concessions and acceptance of their demands from colonial rulers, many representatives of Hindu and Muslim Aristocracy and Middle Classes started seeing their religious communities as distinct and separate nations, whose interests were in conflict with each other. As a result, two rival models of mobilization emerged during early 20th century. In 1906, two rival organizations, known as Hindu Maha Sabha and the Muslim League were formed to protect and promote the interests of Hindus and Muslims respectively. Both these organizations spoke of two different nations and demanded for the establishment of two different nation-states after the freedom from the British rule. This projected/perceived split between the past history and the futuristic aspirations and apprehensions of the two communities ultimately concluded in the partition and creation of India and Pakistan as separate nation-states.

For the purpose of mobilizing the different strata and sections of Indian people, the Congress repeatedly assured them that their respective regional, ethnic, linguistic and other identities will be respected in independent India. The challenge of creating and sustaining the encompassing pan-Indian identity in the post-independent era, without threatening the other identities, was not given sufficient attention. The idea of India as a unitary nation, and the consequential ideology of a secular Indian nationalism remained a pious wish throughout the period of freedom struggle, and seems to remain so even today. How long can India afford to linger on in the state of suspense as a “nation in the making” – still waiting to be found.

Many of the past and currently ongoing social and political struggles in India are mobilized and justified using the idiom of self-determination and emancipation from diverse forms of exploitation and subjugation. In championing the cause of distinctive identities, many pioneers and spokespersons of such movements do not hesitate from constructing narratives of the past, through selective reconstructions to suit their own vantage points and vested interests, following the style and method of colonial orientalists. Similarly, the post-colonial Indian nation-state and its ruling elites demand from the people a crude political and social commitment for loyalty and obedience as if they are the subjects of a colonial state and not equal citizens of a democratic republic. Such a demand is asserted and enforced without any dialogical engagement with the people to convince them of their justification or necessity. During the post independence period, the colonial policy of co-options, adjustments and favours remains intact in the name of maintaining ‘national interests’ and safeguarding ‘national security’.

Tagore had held the view that India is neither a nation nor it has any need to blindly imitate the western political ideology of nationalism in envisaging a future for itself. Way back in the late 19th and early 20th century, Tagore was remarkably astute in acknowledging and underlining the multiculturalism of Indian civilization. Tagore's apathy towards participation in active politics grew from his complete rejection of the immoral and devious politics of nation-states in the West and the disapproval of the nationalist politics which was guided by the model of the 'Nation' created by the colonial master and was being reproduced in its political practice. In a letter written to William Rothenstein (dated October 6, 1920), Tagore wrote : "**I have nothing to do directly with politics, ...** I am not a nationalist, moderate or immoderate in my political doctrine or inspiration. But **politics is not a mere abstraction, it has its personality and it does intrude into my life where I am human.** It kills and maims individuals, it tells lies, it uses its sacred sword of justice for the purpose of massacre, it spreads misery broadcast over centuries of exploitation, and **I cannot say to myself *Poet, you have nothing to do with these facts, for they belong to politics***" ... (emphasis added). For Tagore, it is not possible for a political person to remain completely non-political in the face of injustice, deceit, violence, oppression and denial of individual and social freedom. He must question and criticize any such politics. In certain circumstances, he may be left with no other option but to seek refuge in such critical thinking and practice which opens his door to all humanity for a dialogue across cultures to seek the rejuvenation of the spirit of creativity, freedom, truth and harmony. For Tagore, emancipation from colonial exploitation, eradication of inegalitarian social hierarchies and practices, pursuing the goals of harmony and peace in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual society with deeply entrenched vast economic and cultural disparities, is not possible without a serious engagement in inter-civilisational, inter-cultural dialogues in the spirit of openness, equality and reciprocity.

For Tagore, there was a need of continuous and constant rejection of sectarian narrowness, chauvinism of locality and ethnicity, language and communal divide. He believed that a humanistic universalist education was necessary for achieving such goals. An important issue for Tagore was not 'how to unite by wiping out all differences' but 'how to unite with all differences intact' by acknowledging and respecting them. In Tagore's view, such a goal could be achieved through proper education. For achieving his goals through education, Tagore chose to establish pedagogical institutions, Shantiniketan, Shriniketan and Viswabharati for evolving a decolonized humanist attitude among the youth and children. The aim of Tagore was to practice a pedagogy of decolonization for opening a new cultural space beyond institutional political reforms. Commenting upon Tagore's vision and practice of education, Martha Nussbaum has acknowledged and appreciated that "Tagore's school developed strategies to make students global citizens, able to think responsibly about the future of humanity as a whole."

Tagore's objection to the ideology of nationalism and nation-state as an institution lies in the very purpose they serve. The fact that a 'nation' and a 'nation-state' are social constructs for bringing a mechanical collective union for serving the narrow and sectarian interests of greed and profit through increasing social control and power is unacceptable to Tagore. He abhorred the tyranny of evil and violence indulged in by nation-states against their own members and outsiders. For Tagore, there is no possibility of "good nationalism" as all nationalisms flourish on "fierce self-idolatry". For Tagore, India's identity does not depend on ethnicity, religion, language or political form – all of which form the bases of modern nation states. Tagore did not want the freedom fighters in India to blindly follow the horrifying features of the European nation-states and their ideology of nationalism. Tagore's struggle for decolonization of Indian Psyche has largely remained unnoticed as he did not reject the positive aspects of western civilization to condemn the brutalities of the colonial administration. His critique of nationalism was not incompatible with his endeavour for the decolonization of Indian culture and polity, and the poetry he wrote to celebrate his love for Bengal. Tagore loved the beauty of Bengal and articulated his deep love through his poems and other artistic works. He did not see any contradiction between being a Bengali, an Indian, an Asian and a global citizen. Tagore's vision of universal humanism aimed at creating a new world culture by spreading spiritual values of harmony, tolerance, conflict-resolution through dialogue and co-operation, respect for differences, celebration of joys and beauty of life, and quest for peace. Tagore was convinced from his own experience that it is possible for human beings to learn and constructively absorb from different cultures and civilizations.

Tagore holds a significant place in India's quest for its identity during the colonial period. He joined this quest during its middle phase by attempting to redefine the aims of this quest and searching for new directions. Rejecting the exclusionary binaries of East-West, Traditional-Modern, Past-Present, Old-New, Religion-Science, Self-Other, Tagore strove to build a bridge between the so-called opposite poles of the ancient wisdom of humanistic spiritualism and modern scientific knowledge, between man and man, man and machine, man and nature, and man and divinity. Tagore could see that colonial ideology of nationalism and the quest for a national identity tended to mirror each other. He was of the view that main tenets of Indian nationalism, as articulated by various leaders of the anti-colonial struggle were distorted and perverse echoes of the master's own voice. He could sense the violent aggressiveness underlying the passions of nationalism in Europe, and in the Swadeshi movement at home in India. Therefore, it is not surprising that the themes of loss of self and the struggles for rediscovering/making the self anew, of aggression and violence between the contenders, lure of blind cultural revivalism and its perils, problematic of external and internal freedom, conflict and harmony, masculine and feminine are used

by him in his fictional works for meditations on the complexity of the situations that we have to confront in our struggle for decolonization. It is interesting to note that Tagore's major novels, *Gora*, *Ghare Baire*, and *Char Adhyaya*, reflecting his engagements with the dilemmas arising from the conflicting demands of tradition and modernity, self and the other, local and alien, inner and external, home and the world, in the context of anti-colonial struggle, anticipated the critique that he developed subsequently in his lectures on nationalism. Tagore was for creativity, spontaneity, empathy and acknowledgement of differences. He was of the view that the nation-state was "an organizing system and a structure of power" for controlling and regulating the lives of people as "compressed bales of humanity which have their use and high market value." Tagore's critique of the working of the nation-state had anticipated the unfortunate metamorphosis of living human beings as mere "human resources" in the service of the 'national interest' and 'development of the nation'.

Society, according to Tagore, has "no ulterior purpose" as it is a "spontaneous self-expression of man as a social being." In opposing and rejecting the idea of India as a nation, Tagore envisaged a future for India in which "social relations are not mechanical and impersonal but based on love and cooperation." Tagore insisted that there was a clear distinction between the spheres of the state and society in the ancient Indian understanding of social life, and the ways in which everyday social life in India remained relatively autonomous from the ongoing changes in the affairs of the state. Tagore was aware of the exclusivist and hierarchical structures of Indian society, and the need for reforms. He wanted these issues and concerns to be addressed by the civil society through education and movements for social reform rather than be handed over to the nation-state which is ever ready to usurp the spheres of civil society to expand its power and greater control over the social sphere.

Tagore's strong critique and rejection of the model of nation-state and ideology of nationalism did not have much impact on the nationalist politics in India. Perhaps the same can be said about the politics in post-colonial societies. The emergence of the European Union and the new forms of relations of cooperation among the nation-states of Europe are not guided by Tagore's vision of value based politics for the spiritual and moral development of the people as members of the global human community. However, Tagore's critique of nationalism and nation-state can open the possibility of restructuring political institutions for building new bonds of cooperation among people within the existing nation-states and among the post-colonial nation-states in South Asia. In exploring such possibilities, we must not forget that though our collective identities are not simply givens as such for all times, they were/are constructed, established and reproduced in an intricate web of natural, cultural, technological, social, economic and political circumstances and relations. In being recognized and acknowledged in different settings and contexts that we live through, our

identities do not remain static or constant. Whether I see myself, or I am being seen as a Punjabi, Asameese, Bengali, Bihari, Maratha, Telgu, Tamil, Gujarati and so on, or a Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, Sikh or Christian, or an Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, or an Asian, African, European, American, depends upon the diverse conditions in which I find myself, and in terms of which we (me and others) see and make ourselves. For an acknowledgement of one's identity, there is the need of a conjunction between the self-ascription and the acceptance of that ascription from the other(s). Any self-ascription may be acknowledged, ignored, questioned, confirmed, rejected or denied by the other(s). Confirmation from the other(s) who share and acknowledge their collective identity with me comes as a form of attestation, validation and social affirmation. In the world of nation-states, these affirmations and denials are determined by the asymmetry of structures of power within and among the nation states. The merit of Tagore was to show us through his own example that it is possible to be a Bengali, an Indian, an Asian, and a Global Citizen at the same time by seeking and acknowledging the worth of our being human with dignity, and by celebrating our cultural differences as spontaneous expressions of human imagination and creativity.

Interpreting the electoral verdict of 2014 Lok Sabha Elections in India: A Significant Shift in the Nature of Electoral Politics

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Introduction

The results of the 2014 Lok Sabha election (National/Parliamentary elections) in India should not be analysed or interpreted merely in terms of which party won and which party lost the election. The 2014 Lok Sabha needs to be analysed keeping in mind of an unprecedented victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The results were not surprising as there was almost a consensus amongst all political analysts and pollsters on at least one issue which party (BJP) is ahead in the electoral race of 2014 and Congress would be defeated in these elections. The only question in debate was how big or small would be the victory of the BJP, will the party be able to get majority on its own, how short would be the BJP from the majority mark and will Congress be able to win respectable number of seats, and lastly, is Congress tally going to be in two digit or in three digits. There was also some curiosity about the prospects of the newly formed Aam Adami Party (AAP).

The results surprised most political analyst and pollsters in India. The BJP not only registered a convincing victory, it managed to win majority of the seats (282 of the total 543 seat), while Congress got decimated, with its lowest ever tally of seats (44 seats) and lowest vote share (19.6 percent). This is after 30 years of electoral history in India that a political party won majority of seats in the Lok Sabha election, the previous one was in 1984 when Congress riding on the sympathy wave after the assassination of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi won 415 seats and polled 48.01 per cent votes. Not only did Congress perform badly during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, the AAP also performed poorly, managing to win only four of the 432 seats the party contested and managed to get a national vote share of only 2.04 percent. More than its defeat, what came a big setback for the AAP was that of its 432 candidates, the party lost security deposit in as many as 414 Lok Sabha seats. Barring the three regional parties Mamata Banerjee led Trinamool Congress in West Bengal, Jayalalitha led AIDMK in Tamil Nadu and Biju Patniak led Biju Janata Dal in Orissa, none others could manage to make their presence felt in these elections.

But more than the electoral verdict, the 2014 Lok Sabha elections seem to be very different, in some way a landmark election in the electoral history of India at least during last two three decades. There are several factors which makes this election different from many other election held during last few decades. The enormous increase in electoral participation amongst various section of voters was one of the unique feature of the 2014 Lok Sabha election which is analysed in great details in section I of the paper. The second section

of the paper analyses the results of the 2014 Lok Sabha elections to establish the fact, that not only is BJP's victory convincing, in fact in these elections the voters voted in more decisive manner for the winner compared to the past elections. Using the findings from the National Election Study 2014 (NES 2014)) the third section of the paper analyses the dominant social cleavages in Indian elections and their voting patterns during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. Comparing data from the past elections this section also analyses patterns of shifts in support base of different political parties amongst various social cleavages. In the fourth section of the paper an effort has been made to analyse the possible reasons for the shift amongst various sections of voters, dissatisfaction with the ruling UPA government due to price rise and corruption being the foremost. The leadership advantage which the BJP had over the Congress in the form of Narendra Modi being projected as the Prime Ministerial candidate by the BJP also results in this phenomenal shift in the voters from Congress to the BJP in 2014.

Section I: The Increased Turnout: Increased Electoral Participation

One of the highlight of the 2014 Lok Sabha elections in India is the very high turnout which this election witnessed. The 2014 Lok Sabha election witnessed a turnout of 66.4 percent, nearly 8 percent higher compared to the previous Lok Sabha elections held in 2009 (58 percent turnout). Not only did the turnout increased by 8 percent during the 2014 elections compared to previous elections (2009) in fact this election witnessed the highest ever turnout in the history of Lok Sabha election in India, the previous best being 64 percent during the 1984 Lok Sabha elections held under some kind of sympathy wave in favour of the Congress, which was held after the assassination of Indira Gandhi.

The increased turnout during the 2014 Lok Sabha election in India confirms the Lipton and Rokkan theory who talked about various methods of people showing their protest and anger against the ruling party. People normally use both channels of protests, at times such protests and conflict are expressed through demonstration, strike, sabotage or direct violence. Such protests and anguish against the ruling party are also channelized through voting in elections or putting pressure on legitimately elected government.

While in India there are various channels available to the people like protest, demonstration, bandh/hartal, (strike) sabotage, to show unhappiness or their protest against any policies of the government issue but the number of people who participate in such protest remains limited. If people are reluctant to vent their anger against the government through participation in strike, for them voting in elections seems to be a legitimate channel for putting pressure on legitimately elected government.

The past few years India witnessed voters using both forms of protest. A couple of years before the 2014 Lok Sabha election, India witnessed large number of people especially in the urban locations (small and medium size towns along with big cities) coming out to protest against the ruling government mainly on the issue of charges of corruption against the government. Cities like Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Bangalore and several such cities

witnessed large scale demonstrations against the ruling government. While the voters used these non violent protest as an effective means to put pressure on the legitimately elected government, but the voters also used the occasion of the 2014 Lok Sabha elections and few state assembly elections (election in province) to vent their anger against the policies of the ruling government by way of coming out in large numbers to largely vote against the government. Along with other factors one of the factor which contributed for a very high turnout during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections and in various elections in the province few years before the Lok Sabha election was the anger of the people against the policies of the then ruling party.

The campaign undertaken by the BJP to spread the message of mis-governance of the Congress led UPA government was clearly and evidently communicated and understood by the people at large compared to the message which Congress wanted to spread amongst the voters of the achievement of the government. The voters in general were attracted by the campaign of the BJP and the twenty four hour media coverage of the campaign with Narendra Modi in the centre of the media coverage resulted in large scale mobilisation of the voters to vote which helped the BJP in achieving a resounding victory. The analysis of these results establishes a clear relationship between turnout and electoral outcome which benefited the BJP.

An increased turnout would automatically mean higher participation of voters from various groups, but the two groups amongst whom the turnout increased dramatically in Indian elections 2014 were the women and the first time young voters (between 18-22 years of age). A glimpse of the electoral participation of women in Indian elections indicate, voting has been lower amongst Indian women compared to Indian men in all the Lok Sabha elections held in the country since 1952, though the elections held in recent decades have witnessed considerable narrowing down of the gap between the men turnout and women turnout. More and more women had begun to participate in much bigger numbers in Indian election in recent decades. The Lok Sabha elections held soon after the independence of India (1947) elections witnessed women turnout lower by more than 10 percent compared to men turnout, but the 2014 elections witnessed a very high increase in women turnout. The women turnout was only marginally less (1.4 percent) compared to men turnout. But it is important to note that this did not happen suddenly, the gap between men and women turnout had narrowed down significantly (4 percent) during the 2009 Lok Sabha elections and the trend of increasing women turnout continued during the assembly elections held in various states since then. In fact, in many states (provinces) like Bihar, Orissa and Himachal Pradesh the women turnout was higher compared to the men turnout during the assembly elections held in these states in recent years. Though women failed to outnumber men in voting during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, but there was a dramatic rise in women turnout between 2009 and 2014 Lok Sabha elections.

Another section of voters which participated in voting very enthusiastically were the young voters, those aged between 18-23 years, who had the opportunity to vote for the first time during the Lok Sabha elections. They constitute large proportion of voters in India due to relatively higher growth rate of population. Many of these voters have been hugely dissatisfied with the policies of the Congress led UPA government which had failed in generating employment opportunities especially for the urban educated youth. Due to spread of education these youth add to the employable population year after year and the lack of employment opportunities result in gradual increase in the numbers of unemployed youth. This is the workforce some of which also participate in the protest, strike and demonstration to vent their anguish, but even among them large numbers choose to use the democratic method of expressing protest.

Indian have had regular elections both for electing the national government and for electing the government in different provinces. These young voters amongst whom unemployment have remained a constant problem always had an opportunity available to them to show their protest through democratic means by voting in or out a government, but they had never voted in as big number as one would have expected, but the 2014 Lok Sabha election marks a departure in this trend. Findings of the survey data has indicated that turnout amongst the young voters (18-25 years) have remained lower by nearly 4-5 percent compared to the average turnout in all the Lok Sabha elections held in India since 1996. The 2014 Lok Sabha is remarkable in respect of youth voting as in this election the turnout amongst the young voter was nearly two percent higher compared to the average turnout. Anguish against the ruling government led by Congress and personal appeal of the BJP leader Narendra Modi resulted in mobilising large number of young voters to vote in these elections.

The urban (big cities) turnout still remained lower compared to the turnout in villages or in small and medium towns, but the gap between the urban and the rural turnout narrowed down in this election compared to past few elections. Clearly the urban constituencies which were sites of more articulated anger resulting in protest and strikes witnessed relatively higher increase in voter's turnout.

Going by the pattern of voter's turnout and electoral outcome during elections held in India in early decades, there is a pattern of higher turnout resulting in defeat of the ruling party in successive election. The relation of higher turnout an indicator of an anti incumbency vote remained very strong for many decades as large number of government were voted out of power when voters turned out in large number to vote. But the pattern seems to have changed during last decade or so. The elections in various provinces (state assembly elections) held during last decade or little more than that indicated, governments getting re-elected in-spice of higher turnout and vice-versa. Most of the assembly elections witnessed higher turnout compared to the previous elections in the state, but in-spice of

that many governments got re-elected. Analysis of the turnout and electoral verdict indicate a strong relationship between turnout and electoral verdict, higher the turnout, greater were the electoral gains for the BJP and its allies. The BJP along with its allies swept the elections in constituencies which witnessed 15 percent or more increase in turnout compared to the 2009 Lok Sabha elections. Of the 70 such Lok Sabha seats where turnout increased by more than 15 percent, BJP and its allies managed to win 67 of those seats.

The results from the 2014 Lok Sabha elections and its correlation with the figures for turnout in different constituencies clearly indicate, the Indian voters punished the Congress led UPA government for its mis-governance. Large numbers of voters felt that they did not benefit from the Congress led UPA government which supports Rochester model which talks about how the voters reward the incumbents from whom they have benefitted and punish the ones from whom they have not. It also talks about how campaign serves as an effective tool for mobilising voters for or against a party. The campaign undertaken by BJP before the 2014 Lok Sabha elections in India actually become a criteria for evaluation by the voters and thus it was purposive in order to win the elections with such majority.

Table 1: Figures for turnout in Indian Elections

Year	Voter Turnout(in %)
1952	61
1957	62
1962	55
1967	61
1971	55
1977	61
1980	57
1984	64
1989	62
1991	57
1996	58
1998	62
1999	60
2004	58
2009	58
2014	66

(All figures in percent)

Table 2: Gap between men and women turnout (1952-2014)

Year	Male	Female	Gender gap
1962	63	47	16
1967	67	56	11
1971	61	49	12
1977	66	55	11
1980	62	51	11
1984	68	59	9
1989	66	57	9
1991	62	51	11
1996	62	53	9
1998	66	58	8
1999	64	56	8
2004	62	53	9
2009	60	56	4
2014	67	66	1

(All figures in percent)

Table 3: Turnout amongst young voters

Year of Lok Sabha Election	Turnout among Youth Voters	Average turnout
1996	54	58
1998	60	62
1999	57	60
2004	55	58
2009	54	58
2014	68	66

(All figures in percent)

Table 4: Turnout in rural and urban constituencies

	Turnout in 2014	Turnout in 2009	Difference in turnout
All Constituencies	66	58	8
Urban Constituencies	61	52	9
Semi -Urban Constituencies	69	61	8
Rural Constituencies	67	59	8

(All figures in percent)

Table 5: Turnout and Election Results

Turnout increase in 2014 compared to 2009 Lok Sabha elections	Number of Seats	Seats won by BJP led NDA
15% points and above	70	67
10-14.99% points	145	125
0.1-9.99% points	267	123
No change/decline in turnout	61	21

(All figures in percent)

Section II: A more decisive victory than it seems: Elections results

From the analysis in the previous section it is clear that the BJP performed much better in constituencies which registered higher turnout compared to constituencies which registered comparatively lower turnout, but that hardly suggest that BJP's victory was lopsided. In fact BJP victory is more convincing than what looks like from the number of seat it won, while on the other hand the Congress defeat is much worse than it is reflected from the number of seats which the party managed to win. The BJP polled 31.3 percent votes and won 282 of the 543 seats. Compared to the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, the vote share of BJP increased by 12.3 percent and its tally of seats increased by 116 seats. In the electoral history of India, it is after 30 years that a single party managed to get a majority on its own in the Lok Sabha. The last time when a single party won a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha elections was during the 1984 Lok Sabha elections when Congress riding on the post Indira Gandhi assassination wave managed to win 415 seats and polled 48.01 percent votes. The 2014 Lok Sabha elections was also significant with regard to change in the vote share of any single party between two Lok Sabha elections in India. The BJP's vote increased by 12.3 percent, it was in 1977 Lok Sabha elections that the Congress vote share went down by little more than 9 percent, which was repeated in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections.

More than that, the BJP increased its vote share in all the states except for **Punjab**. The party which was seen largely as urban based party expanded its support base in the rural constituencies. The vote share of BJP increased both in rural as well as in urban constituencies.

The victory of the BJP was more decisive than one may be inclined to believe. The 2014 Lok Sabha witnessed not only greater participation of the voters, it also witnessed increased participation of the political actors. Compared to the 363 political parties contesting the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, the 2014 Lok Sabha elections witnessed largest number of political parties contesting the 2014 Lok Sabha elections (464 parties). Larger number of political parties in the electoral fray could have resulted in greater fragmentation of votes, votes may have got divided amongst various parties which in turn may have resulted in victory and defeat being decided by smaller margins compared to the past. Not only the BJP candidates, but all winners irrespective of their party, registered more convincing victories in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections compared to what we have seen in the recent past especially during the post **Mandal era**. The average gap between the winner and the runner-up have been 15.2 percent in 2014 which during last few Lok Sabha elections was at an average of about 10 percent. The victory margin of BJP winner was much bigger compared to winner of many other parties except for All India Anna Dramuk Party (AIDMK) Trinmool Congress (TMC)..

The Congress defeat is much worse than what could be imagined from the number of seats the party won. The average victory margin of a Congress candidate was 8 percent, much lower compared to the average victory margin of the BJP candidate which was at 18 percent. Of the total 44 seats won by the Congress, its candidates won by over 1 lakh votes only in 13 Lok Sabha constituencies. In 15 constituencies, its candidate won only marginally by less than **twenty thousand votes**. The tally of seats for the Congress could have gone down to 10-12 in case party had managed to get 2 or 3 percent less votes that it managed to poll in recent elections.

Table 6: Table of Elections Results 2014

Parties	Contested	Seats won	Vote(%)	Vote change over from 2009 (in %)
Congress allies	75	14	3.70	-9.81
Congress	464	44	19.3	-9.25
BJP Allies	114	54	7.2	-0.3
BJP	428	282	31.1	+12.25
Others	6806	132	26.2	+2.46

(All figures in percent)

Table 7: Increase in vote share of BJP in Rural/Urban constituencies

	BJP's Vote share (%)		Increase in vote share
	2009	2014	
Rural	18	30	12
Semi Urban	19	30	11
Urban	25	39	14

(All figures in percent)

Table 8: BJP's expansion in different regions of India

Regions	Total Seats	BJP		BJP Allies	
		Vote%	Seats	Vote%	Seat
Hindi Speaking states	225	43.7	190	2.2	11
Western India	78	38.5	53	15.4	19
Rest of India	240	17.3	39	9.7	24
Overall	543	31.0	282	7.4	54

Table 9: Change in vote share of the BJP, state wise

Vote Share (% votes polled)			
States	2009	2014	Change 2009-2014
Uttar Pradesh	18	42	25
Uttarakhand	34	55	22
Assam	16	37	20
Rajasthan	37	55	18
Haryana	17	35	18
Bihar	14	29	16
Jammu and Kashmir	19	32	14
Gujarat	47	59	13

Vote Share (% votes polled)			
States	2009	2014	Change 2009-2014
Jharkhand	28	40	13
NCT of Delhi	34	46	12
West Bengal	6	17	11
Madhya Pradesh	44	54	11
Maharashtra	18	27	9
Goa	45	53	9
Andhra Pradesh	3	9	6
Orissa	17	22	5
Chhatisgarh	45	49	4
Tamil Nadu	2	6	3
Kerala	7	10	3
Tripura	3	6	3
Karnataka	42	43	1
Punjab	10	9	-1

(All figures in percent)

Table 10: Change in vote share for any party between two elections since 1952

	Change in vote share of Congress (in %)	Change in vote share of BJP (in %)
1952 to '57	+2.80	-
1957 to '62	-3.06	-
1962 to '67	-3.94	-

	Change in vote share of Congress (in %)	Change in vote share of BJP (in %)
1967 to '71	+2.90	-
1971 to '77	-9.16	-
1977 to '80	+8.17	-
1980 to '84	+5.32	-
1984 to '89	-8.48	+3.96
1989 to '91	-2.89	+8.68
1991 to '96	-7.84	+0.05
1996 to '98	-2.98	+5.30
1998 to '99	+2.48	-1.84
1999 to '04	-1.77	-1.59
2004 to '09	+2.03	-3.35
2009 to '14	-9.26	+12.24

{All figures in percent)

Chart 1: Average victory margin (1952-2014)



(All figures in percent)

Table 11: Victory margin of BJP and other parties 2014 Lok Sabha Election (All figures in percent)

All India 2014 (543 seats)	15
In Seats where BJP won (282 seats)	18
In Seats where BJP Allies Won (73 Seats)	12
In Seats where Congress Won (44 Seats)	8
In Seats where AIADMK Won (37 Seats)	17
In Seats Where AITC Won (32 Seats)	13
In Uttar Pradesh where the BJP+ won seats (73 seats)	18
In Bihar where the BJP+ won seats (31 seats)	12
In Maharashtra where the BJP+ won seats (42 seats)	21

Section III: Social Cleavages and Voting in India: A shift in the social cleavage based voting during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections

There are different considerations for different people while voting. The voting choice is very often shaped by voters individual caste, community, religion, his or her party's choice, likeness for a particular candidate in a particular constituency, region and various such considerations. While all such considerations work in the mind of Indian voters while voting, the country being so diverse socially, economically, geographically, and politically, it may be appropriate to look at all these cleavages into three main paradigms i.e. the sociological approach, the party identification models and rational choice theory.

The problems which generally arise are from the regional differences which are visible in our country, the social variables and attitudinal measures often specified but they do not think about the influences which lead to the development of thoughts and attitudes. The sociological theory emphasizes the impact of social structure suggesting that the social group memberships influence the voting choices. It emphasizes on the theory that there is an impact of group identities along with their attitudes and interest on voting during elections. The voters are considered to be instrumental hence they vote for parties which best represent their interests or interest of their caste-community or group. Lipton and Rokkan also talked about the social cleavages which frame the political parties in power.

Party identification model talks about the voters to be expressive rather than instrumental. Party affiliations are taken to be framed from socialization and the voters have a long standing affiliation from which they do not waver. Rational choice theory of

voting indicates that voting by individuals depends on the cost-benefit analysis whereby the voting choices made are very individualistic. But it still leaves a space for party identification and sociological approach since social identities play a role to in shaping the individuals attitudes, behaviour and perceptions.

Indian being a multi party democracy, with various kinds of diversities, it is difficult to say which theory in particular defines voting patterns in Indian elections more so especially during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. The voting behavior of Indian voters seems to be an assemblage of the above mentioned all the three theories though in different degrees, though the application of party identification is not clear or rather diplomatic. Findings of the survey conducted by the CSDS indicate only a tiny proportion of voters seems to identify closely with one or the other political party, so there is hardly any question of party identification being the dominant theory of voting to describe how Indians voted during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections.

The voting during the 2014 Lok Sabah elections and even of the past elections both at the national level and at the state level could best be described to reflect the social cleavage theory of voting as voters from various caste-communities remained sharply polarised for or against a political party and voted almost en-block for that party. Compared to past elections, during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, slightly larger proportion of voters may have voted keeping in mind their individual or groups benefit, but even in these elections, the caste based voting was predominant reinforcing the social cleavage theory of voting in Indian elections. While voters from some caste communities who had voted for the BJP even in the past was more sharply polarised in favour of the BJP, the 2014 Lok Sabha elections also witnessed a significant shift in the voting preference of voters of various caste- communities from one party to another.

The 2014 Lok Sabha elections witnessed unprecedented shift in the voting patterns of voters. Not only did this election witnessed highest polarisation of the Upper Caste voters in favour of the BJP and its allies, this election also witnessed decisive shift amongst the voters belonging to the Other Backward Castes (OBC). The Dalits also voted for the BJP and its allies in sizeable numbers. Compared to the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, when only 12 percent Dalits voted for the BJP, nearly 24 percent Dalits voted for the BJP during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. This shift amongst the Dalit voters was largely due to the alliance of Dalit leader Ram Vilas Paswan's Lok Jan Shakti party in Bihar and induction of another leader from Uttar Pradesh, Udit Raj, into the party, who successfully contested the Lok Sabha elections from Delhi. This election also witnessed major shift amongst the Adivasi

towards the BJP. For the first time the Young voters (18-25 years) voted in a decisive manner for a party (BJP), in all previous Lok Sabha elections (since 1996), the young voters had remained as divided as voters of other age group. Hardly any party got more votes amongst the young voters compared to their average national vote share.

The 2014 Lok Sabha elections also witnessed economic class emerging as an important social cleavage in voting. These elections also witnessed a major shift in the voting preference of voters from different economic classes. The voters belonging to the lower and the poor class have been the core supporters of the Congress during past many years. The Congress even used the slogan “Congress Haath, Garib ke Saath” to make this point amongst the voters that Congress cares much more for the poor people in India compared to any other party. No wonder large numbers of poor and lower class voters voted for the Congress even when the party performed relatively badly (1998 and 1999 Lok Sabha elections). The Congress always had a lead over other parties amongst the poor and the lower class voters, but this election witnessed BJP making inroads even amongst Congress core supporters, the BJP took lead over the Congress amongst the poor and the lower class voters. This was possible because, the most significant shift towards the BJP was witnessed amongst the Urban poor and the Urban lower class voters. Amongst the Urban poor, those living in small and medium scale towns, there was 13 percent shift towards the BJP compared to the 2009 elections. Similarly amongst the Lower income class voters, living in small towns and big cities, 35 percent voted for the BJP, a significant shift of 20 percent in favour of the BJP compared to the previous Lok Sabha elections. Amongst the Middle and Upper Class voters, the shift was more in villages than in towns and cities since they had voted for the BJP in sizeable numbers even in the past. The loss in support base of the Congress was amongst voters of all classes, but it was the largest amongst the urban poor, most amongst those living in big metropolitan cities like Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore or Chennai.

Table 12: Shift in the votes of different communities for BJP (All figures in percent)

Community	Votes 2014 (in %)	Change since 2009 (in %)
Upper castes	47	+18
Dalits	24	+12
OBC	34	+13
Tribals	38	+14
Muslims	8	+4

(All figures in percent)

Table 13: Class by vote for Congress and BJP 2009-2014

	BJP		Congress	
	2014	Change from 2009	2014	Change from 2009
Poor	24	+8	20	-7
Lower	31	+12	19	-10
Rich	32	+10	20	-9
Middle	38	+13	17	-12

(All figures in percent)

IV: Explaining the Outcome: What resulted in this massive shift in the voters

This was simply not a routine election, such a massive shift amongst the voters, that too amongst the core supporters of the Congress who had remained loyal to the party for many decades was due to twin factors. The first and foremost, large scale dissatisfaction of the people during the past 10 years of Congress led United Front Government and at the same time an attraction for the BJP as a national alternative. The dissatisfaction with ruling Congress led UPA government was besides other factors, largely due to rising prices and corruption scandals during the UPA government. It is important to note that the dissatisfaction with the ruling UPA was not much couple of years ago, in-fact the findings of the CSDS surveys indicate the opinion of the voters on the performance of the work done by the UPA government was positive, the net figure was 18 (figures for positive opinion minus figures for negative opinion) but slowly and gradually the dissatisfaction against the government started growing and it was at its peak few months before election. Findings of the survey indicate, it was 15 percent negative in January. Though the negative opinion on government's overall performance declined somewhat close to the day of elections (March) but that was not enough to tilt the balance in favour of the Congress.

People may be unhappy about various things, but the findings of the survey clearly indicate that one of the main issues which angered large sections of Indian voters was the rising prices of essential commodities which pinched the pocket of voters cutting across class, locality age and community. Findings of the survey indicate 85 percent voters mentioned prices have gone up during last few years. This view was shared equally amongst the rich and the poor voters. Price rise was also an issue which influenced voting decision of large number of voters. As per survey estimates, 20 percent mentioned that their voting decision was influenced by the issue of price rise, 16 percent mentioned development, 12 percent mentioned corruption, 7 percent mentioned issue of civic amenities like road water and electricity while another 7 percent voters mentioned issue of unemployment as the

guiding factor for their voting. There were 16 percent voters who mentioned various other issues and 23 percent voters could not access which factor has the most influence on their voting during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. Besides the price rise, what also angered the voters was the shared belief that the government was corrupt. People shared this negative view about the government since last few years, but what made the situation even worse for the ruling party was the growing belief that the government is corrupt and corruption has increased under the present Congress led UPA government. In the survey, 41 percent voters believed that UPA government was very corrupt, 74 percent also believed that corruption has also increased under the UPA government. This view was shared equally amongst the voters cutting various sections.

Table 14: Dissatisfaction with the UPA government (all figures in percent)

Years	Net satisfaction with the UPA (%)
2011 (Jul)	18
2013 (Jul)	-2
2014 (Jan)	-15
2014 (March)	-6

Chart 2.1: UPA government was corrupt



2.2: Corruption has increased under the UPA (all figures in percent)



The reason for this big shift amongst voters from Congress to BJP was not only due to the dissatisfaction with the ruling UPA government, there was also a positive attraction amongst the voters for the BJP's as a party of national alternative and Narendra Modi as the leader. Till few years back not many saw Narendra Modi as a leader who should be India's Prime Minister, but his popularity as a leader or someone whom voters preferred as country's Prime Minister grew during last eight months or at best during last one year mainly after he was first declared chairman of the BJP's campaign committee in Goa meeting of the party and later on after he was declared the party's Prime Ministerial candidate. During the survey conducted in 2011, only 5 percent were willing to name Narendra Modi as country's preferred Prime Minister while at that time 19 percent were willing to see Rahul Gandhi as India's Prime Minister. But his popularity amongst common voters increased dramatically since January 2014 when 34 percent voters were willing to mention his name as country's Prime Minister while Rahul Gandhi's popularity graph declined to 15 percent. Modi's popularity increased further and close to the day of election, 36 percent voters mentioned his name as their preferred choice for country's Prime Minister, while Rahul Gandhi's popularity declined marginally to 14 percent. One can't deny media's contribution in Modi's growing popularity as survey clearly indicate, higher was the exposure to the media greater was the fan following for Narendra Modi. Amongst those highly exposed to media 44 percent preferred him as the Prime Minister while amongst those who hardly had any exposure to the media only 23 percent mentioned his name as their preferred choice for country's next Prime Minister. There seems to be a strong co-relation between level of media exposure of voters and their preferred choice of Narendra Modi as country's Prime Minister. Amongst those with low level of media exposure, 36 percent indicated that they would like to see Narendra Modi as the next Prime Minister of India.

The positive image of Narendra Modi shared amongst large section of voters also has an impact on the voting choices. Findings of the post poll survey indicate, of those who indicated voting for the BJP, 27 percent mentioned that they might have preferred voting for some other party if Narendra Modi was not the Prime Ministerial candidate of the BJP, while 48 percent voters mentioned, irrespective of whether Modi was the Prime Ministerial candidate or not, they would have voted for the BJP in 2014 Lok Sabha elections.


Besides other reasons, one of the main causes for Modi's popularity has been his ability to successfully convince large sections of Indian voters of the success of Gujarat as a model of a developed state. Findings of the survey clearly indicate, there is a shared view amongst the Indian voters that Gujarat is the most developed state. When asked to name which state is the most developed state in their opinion, 20 percent mentioned the name of Gujarat, way ahead of any other state. Only 4 percent people mentioned the name of Maharashtra and Kerala, 3 percent mentioned Delhi, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka while a large number of voters (48 percent) were unable to express their opinions on this question. While the data on social and economic development would hardly substantiate this view expressed by the common voters, but this is the shared perception of large number of voters, a perception which may have been developed by intense campaign by the BJP, the state government and Narendra Modi himself which was helped by the massive media attention which Narendra Modi received. Perception plays an important role in election and BJP and its leadership has been successful in creating a perception amongst large section of voters, if BJP would come to power, "*Achhe din Aayege*" ie good days will come for them.

Table 15: Leadership factor, Popularity rating of Narendra Modi

Year	Modi's popularity	Rahul Gandhi's popularity
2009	2	6
2011	5	19
2013	19	12
Jan-14	34	15
Mar-14	34	15
April-May 2014	36	14


(All figures in percent)

Chart 3.1: Modi's impact on Voting



Note: Figures are in percent

Chart 3.2: Modi's popularity increases with an increase in media exposure as compared to Rahul Gandhi's as depicted below:



(All figures in percent)

Table 16: People's perception about the most development state

Name of State	Figures in percent
Gujarat	20
Maharashtra	4
Kerala	4
Delhi	3
Tamil Nadu	3
Karnataka	3
No Opinion	48

Section V: Conclusion

Election in most of the instances is a means of political change. In a multi party political system election would result in victory and defeat for political party, it brings about change in government. If seen in this respect, the 2014 Lok Sabha elections may not seem unusual. It resulted in a change of government, from UPA government to the BJP government. But what makes this election different from others is the fact that this election not only brought about change in the government, it has changed the nature of electoral politics in India. The electoral politics in India for the past sixty years has been dominated by the anti Congress plank which at times had witnessed non Congress parties either forming alliance or coalition, or at least working out a seat sharing arrangement to avoid splitting of anti Congress vote with the single motive of defeating the Congress. Such alliance or seat-sharing arrangement were worked out between the parties at times keeping difference in ideology of these parties aside. The results of these elections have resulted in significant shift in the nature of electoral contest and political alliance in India. From non Congress polity, there is a sharp shift towards the non BJP polity. Both the Congress and the BJP failed to attract new alliance before the 2014 Lok Sabha elections barring few exceptions, but things seem to have changed after the election results. There is a complete U turn in the nature of political alliance from non-Congress to non-BJP. This began in a small way in Bihar where the two arch rivals Nitish Kumar and Laloo who opposed each other for the last fifteen years formed a grand alliance along with the Congress (Referred as Maha Gathjod) to oppose the BJP in Bihar. With initial success there is a strong possibility of the alliance being able to continue even for the assembly elections (provincial elections) due in the state in year 2015. While we do not see such moves in other state at this moment, but clearly the next one decade of electoral politics more so pattern of alliance would be dominated by the anti-BJP alliance a significant shift in Indian Politics.

What has triggered this shift in Indian politics is also the fundamental shift in the support base of political parties during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. The BJP which was seen as largely a party of the urban upper-middle class voters has expanded its support bases significantly amongst the rural voters and section of voters who have hardly voted for the party in the past. Barring the Muslims voters, voters from most of the other caste-communities shifted towards the BJP in a significant way. The tag of “catch all party” or a party with “an umbrella coalition” which was associated with Congress seemed to have shifted to the BJP. Parties in the past have won and lost elections, but the result of this election certainly goes beyond that, in many ways it has altered the nature of electoral politics in India.

Growth of Wage Labour in Punjab Agriculture: 1901 to 2011

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Abstract

Prior to the British rule in Punjab, there was no class of wage labourers in agriculture. The British annexed Punjab in 1849 and the traditional rent system; a share of output was replaced by fixed cash rent. Gradually, the village community got integrated in capitalist economy, and big farms became bigger through wealth accumulation and through land purchases and a sizeable number of peasants were reduced to the status of landless agricultural labourers. The de-industrialisation unleashed by the influx of factory made goods made the artisans redundant and they also started working as wage labourers on farms to earn a living. The proportion of agricultural labourers in agricultural population started increasing and reached 8.10 percent by 1901. It further increased to 14.40 percent by 1931. In the post independence period, the highest rise in the number of agricultural labourers came in the early phase of green revolution from 1961 to 1971; from 17.41 percent in 1961 to 31.93 percent in 1971. As a result of green revolution and commercialisation of agriculture, the proportion of agriculture labourers in agriculture rose to 41.40 percent by 2011.

I. Introduction:

Many scholars are of the view that prior to the British rule the class of modern wage labour in agriculture did not exist in India. Due to the non-availability of quantitative data on workforce prior to the British rule, scholars mostly make descriptive statements on a traditional village community and the composition of its working population. The traditional village community consisted of agriculturists, artisans and menials or kamins doing all sort of odd jobs. The agriculturists, artisans and menials constituted different castes. The menials provided their services to the agriculturists and in return they were given payments in kind (Banga, 1978:167). The payments were predetermined on the basis of custom of a village (Powell, 1972:17). The Marxist theory explains this there was division of labour for the production of commodities, but commodities were not sold, rather were consumed without any transaction in monetary terms (Marx, 1986:49) . Although, India was conquered and ruled by various invaders like Arabs, Turks and Mongols etc., but the economic structure of the village did not change much under their rule (Marx,1976:494). However, under the British rule caste based Indian traditional village community started disintegrating. The British rule destabilized the village community in

two ways. First, the institutional changes introduced especially into the land system and induction of fixed cash rent in place of kind rent changed the inter-relation between farmers and menials (Dutt,1947) and (Sen,1962). Secondly, the de-industrialisation of the country side and trade linkage with the outside world also resulted in changes in relations among various social groups in the village. The cottage industry of villages could not compete with the imported mill made products. So many workers in these cottage industries became redundant and shifted to agriculture for work (Bagchi,1976) . The emergence of private property rights in land market results in many ruined farmers selling their land and becoming agricultural labourers. Under the British rule these two reasons were generally mentioned by scholars as being responsible for the rise in the class of agricultural labourers in the rural areas (Sen,1962) .The first scholar (Patel,1962) who analysed the growth of wage labourers in Indian agriculture with the advent of British rule. He mentioned, “The traditional Indian society was integrated by agriculture and handicrafts, there was no room for the existence of independent and a distinct class of agricultural labourers who were hired by cultivators and were paid in cash or kind wages”. According to him the class of agricultural labourers emerged during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries in India. This hypothesis of Patel became widely accepted by many Indian scholars particularly by those with left leanings. But (Kumar, 1965) put forward a different view on this issue. She argued that in South India, members of certain lower castes were already, by and large, agricultural labourers at the onset of British rule. Similarly, (Krishnamurthy,1972) concluded that Patel did not follow the actual workers categories given in censuses of colonial period. For example he added unspecified labourers with the agricultural labourers. The estimates of Patel exaggerated the numbers of agricultural labourers. The author further pointed out that in the Indian union the proportion of male agricultural labourers increased only marginally from 24.1 percent to 24.6 percent between 1901 and 1961. Similarly, (Campbell, 1853) in one of the best accounts of India during the first half of the 19th Century referred to the fact that as “a rule farming was not carried on by hired labour”. Dutt noted that in 1842, Sir Thomas Munro (Census Commissioner) reported that there were no landless peasants in India (Dutt 1947). From all these studies, one may conclude that there might be agricultural labourers before the British rule, but the number of cash wage agricultural labourers of modern type emerged and increased only during the British period.

II. Emergence and Growth of Wage Labour in Punjab Agriculture: Pre Independence Period (1901-1931):

In the previous section we discussed the various views of scholars on the emergence and growth of wage labourers in Indian agriculture. Here in table 1 we have made an attempt to analyse how the number of wage labourers in Punjab agriculture increased in the first quarter of 20th century. Along with this the relative weight of agricultural labourers in total agriculture workers is also compared with other pre-partitioned regions of India. To analyse the growth of wage labourers in Punjab agriculture in the pre-independence period is rather

difficult due to various problems with available data. The definitions used for agricultural labourers differ somewhat from Census to Census; for 1901 and 1911 Census the information is available in terms of population supported, and for the Census of 1921 and 1931 for working population. In 1941, no Census was conducted due to World War-II. So we have used census data for the years 1901, 1911, 1921 and 1931 to trace out the growth of wage agriculture labourers in British Punjab. Although, the original source of data is various Census publication, but the reports availability is very scattered and moreover the original reports on Punjab have mutilated too. Therefore we collated tables from the well known study of Surindra J. Patel on the Growth of Agricultural Labourers in India and Pakistan. The data given in table 1 depict that in Punjab during the 1901-1931 period wage labourers as a proportion of total workers dependent on agriculture increased from 8.10 percent in 1901 to 14.40 percent in 1931.

Table 1

Growth of Wage Labour in British Punjab Agriculture (Year: 1901 to 1931)

Year	Number of Agricultural Labourers (Million)	Proportion of Agricultural Labourers in Agricultural Population (Percent)	Remarks
1901	1.20	8.10	Population Supported
1911	2.40	16.90	Population Supported
1921	0.70	12.90	Working Population
1931	1.00	14.40	Working Population

Source: Patel, 1952, p. 29

The different basis of figures for 1901, 1911, 1921 and 1931 makes it difficult to make a strict calculation of rate of growth of agricultural labourers over this period. However, quite reliable conclusions can be drawn separately for 1901 to 1911 and from 1921 to 1931. The figures for years 1901 and 1911 are comparable and exhibit that the number of wage labourers in Punjab agriculture doubled in these ten years. Similarly figures for 1921 and 1931 are comparable and show about 30 percent increase in the number of these labourers in Punjab. Therefore, we may reasonably conclude that during the first quarter of the 20th century the number of wage labourers in Punjab agriculture increased and their proportion in total agriculture workers also went up.

Table 2**Proportion of Wage Labour in Agriculture in Total Agricultural Population in British Punjab vis-a-vis Other Regions (Time Period: 1920)**

Province/Region	Agricultural Labourers as Proportion of Total Agricultural Population(Percent)
Punjab	14.5
United Provinces	21.8
Bengal	33.0
Central Provinces	52.0
Madras	54.0
Bihar and Orissa	35.0
Assam	25.0
Bombay	57.0

Source: Patel,1952, p. 65

In the next table 2, a comparison is made of proportion of agricultural labourers in total agricultural workers in Punjab with other provinces of British India. It is clear from information in this table that the class of agricultural labourers was relatively less developed in Punjab compared to other provinces. The data show that among all the provinces of India the proportion of agricultural labourers in total agricultural workers was the lowest in Punjab (14.50 percent) and the highest in Bombay presidency (57 percent) (Table 2). Both Madras presidency (54 percent) and Central provinces (52 percent) also show a very high proportion of agricultural labourers in total workers engaged in agriculture. The reason for this lower proportion in Punjab may be many, like incorporation of Punjab in British Indian market system much latter, (almost 100 years after Madras, Bombay and Bengal), existence of strong village communities in Punjab, and slower pace of commercialisation of agriculture in Punjab compared to the three presidency regions.

III. Emergence and Growth of Wage Labour in Punjab Agriculture: Post Independence Period (1961-2011):

The growth of agricultural labourers in Punjab in the post independence period is discussed in this section. In the 1951 census information on agricultural labourers was not collected, rather the available data are in terms of population dependent on various occupations. From 1961 onwards census data on number of workers in each of the standardised industrial categories are available and have been used to trace out the growth of agricultural labourers in Punjab. Even in these data there are definitional problems about

the female participation in full time work; so most researchers have been using the number of male agricultural labourers, we have adopted the same practice. The information on the number of male agricultural labourers and their proportion in total male workers in agriculture for the years 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 and 2011 is presented in table 3.

Table 3
Growth of Agricultural Labourers in Punjab

Year	Number of Male Agricultural Workers(Lakh)	Number of All Male Agricultural Labourers (Lakh)	Agricultural Labourers as Proportion of All Male Workers in Agriculture (Percent)
1961	17.89	3.20	17.41
1971	24.40	7.79	31.93
1981	28.04	10.47	37.34
1991	32.82	13.88	42.29
2001	28.67	11.04	38.51
2011	29.93	12.39	41.40
<u>Growth Rate (Per Year):</u> 1961-1971	3.15	9.30	-
<u>Growth Rate (Per Year):</u> 1971-1981	1.40	3.00	-
<u>Growth Rate (Per Year):</u> 1981-1991	1.59	2.86	-
<u>Growth Rate (Per Year):</u> 1991-2001	(-)1.34	(-)2.26	-
<u>Growth Rate (Per Year):</u> 2001-2011	0.43	1.16	-

Source: Census of India for various years.

Note: Male Agricultural Workers = Male Cultivators plus Male Agricultural Labourers.

It is visible from table 3 that the number of male agricultural labourers in Punjab increased by four times in five decades (1961 to 2011); from 3.20 lakh in 1961 to 12.39 lakhs in 2011. However, two different trends are visible over this period of five decades (1961 to 2011). From 1961 to 1971, when the green revolution was in the first phase, the highest rise by 9.30 percent per annum in the number of male agricultural labourers came. In the decade of 1991 to 2001 which is the period of economic reforms of Indian economy the number of male agricultural labourers in Punjab decreased by 2.26 percent annually. This latter trend is in line with and is part of the overall downward trend in total number of male workers engaged in farming (Table 3). This downward trend suggests that a new phase in Punjab agriculture has started whereby population engaged in farming has started decreasing. A similar pattern is observed in the proportion of male agricultural labourers in total male workers in agriculture. This proportion increased from 17.41 percent in 1961 to 41.40 percent in 2011. From 1961 to 1991 this proportion rose continuously from 17.41 percent to 42.29 percent; but since 1991 it started decreasing and came to 38.51 percent in 2001 and from onwards this it again increased by 2.89 percent in 2011. The main findings of the above discussion may be concluded as: A relatively small proportion of total agricultural workers, the number of agricultural labourers in Punjab increased at quite a fast rate in the post independence period and by 2011, (when Green Revolution has fully matured), almost two-fifth (41.40 percent) of workers engaged in agriculture were agricultural labourers.

IV. Caste Composition of Wage Labour in Agriculture in Punjab:

In Punjab most of the agricultural labourers belong to lower castes. Even after independence, the caste composition of agricultural labourers has not changed much; a majority still comes from the scheduled caste. This is clearly supported by information given in table 4 in which the share of scheduled castes in total agricultural labourers is given.

Table 4**Caste Composition of Agricultural Labourers in Punjab**

Year	Number of All Male Agricultural Labourers (Lakh)	Number of Scheduled Castes Male Agricultural Labourers (Lakh)	Proportion of Scheduled Castes in Male Agricultural Labourers (Percent)
1961*	4.83	3.41	70.60
1971	7.79	5.50	70.60
1981	10.47	7.54	72.02
1991	13.88	9.72	70.03
2001	11.04	7.46	67.57
2011	12.39	8.17	65.94

Source: Census of India (various years).

Note: 1961 Figures are for pre-organised Punjab as it existed in 1961.

Over the 1961 to 2011 period, the number of agricultural labourers in Punjab almost tripled, but the proportion of scheduled castes among them remained almost the same (about 70 percent). The scheduled castes are a group of many different castes, (who do not inter marry) and the proportion of agricultural labourers coming from these various scheduled castes is quite different. The caste wise composition of agricultural labourers is given in table 5.

Table 5
Proportion of Agricultural Labourers in Total Male Workers in various Scheduled Castes (Year: 2011)

Caste	Total Number of Male Workers	Number of Male Agricultural Labourers	Agricultural Labourers as Proportion of Total Male Workers	Share of the Caste in Total Male Scheduled Caste Agricultural Labourers
Mazhabi/ Mazhabi Sikh	769514	394341	51.25	46.37
Chamar*	586506	147347	25.12	17.33
Mahatam/ Rai Sikh	142904	68827	48.16	8.09
Balmiki/ Chuhra/ Bhangi	244341	62041	25.39	7.30
Adharmi	270102	38830	14.38	4.57
Other Castes	490508	139061	28.35	16.35
<u>Total Scheduled Caste (Male Workers/ Agricultural Labourers)</u>	2503875	850447	-	-

Source: Scheduled Caste Primary Census Abstract (2011).

Note: Chamar includes Jatia Chamar, Rehgar, Raigar, Ramdasi, Ravidasi, Ramdasia, Ramdasia Sikh, Ravidasia and Ravidasia Sikh.

It is quite interesting to note that the two main castes (among the scheduled castes) that provide maximum agricultural labourers to Punjab agriculture are Mazhbis and Chamar. Out of all the scheduled castes only these two castes have a share of 63% in total agricultural labourers. After these castes come Mahatam/Rai Sikh, Balmiki/Chura/Bhangi and Adharmi (Table 5). Out of all the agricultural labourers in Punjab (scheduled castes plus non-

scheduled castes) about 65% come from the scheduled castes households (Table 4). It is also interesting to note that majority of Mazabi/Mazabi Sikh caste male are working as agricultural labourers. In the case of Chamars only about 25% of males are working as agricultural labourers. So, Mazabi/Mazabi Sikh not only constitutes almost half of all agricultural labourers of the state, but more than of half of Mazabi/Mazabi Sikh males are employed as agricultural labourers.

V. Conclusions:

The 'patron-client' relationship in the village community of Punjab marginalised with the advent of the British rule. The monetisation of the land markets made many peasants landless and the de-industrialisation forced the artisans to leave their hereditary occupations. The landless peasants and redundant artisans swelled the number of wage labourers in agriculture. From the early 20th century to the middle of it the wage labourers in agriculture of Punjab increased by 6 percent. The process of rising agriculture labourers further strengthened in the post independence in Punjab during 1961-1971. This period was the early phase of green revolution and here the labourers increased by 9.30 percent per annum. It is interesting to note that out of all the agricultural labourers more than two third are from the scheduled castes. Among the scheduled castes two castes viz. Mazabi/Mazabi Sikh and Chamar constitute 63% of all the scheduled castes agricultural labourers in Punjab. Out of all the scheduled castes Mazabi/Mazabi Sikh dominate in the agriculture labour class of Punjab in terms of numbers as well as it being the main occupation of this caste.

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Bringing Estranged Siblings Together: Peacebuilding Between India And Pakistan

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Abstract

India and Pakistan's turbulent relationship is a story that hardly needs any reiteration. Years have passed with two countries remaining at loggerheads with each other. Political leaderships on both sides of the border have been largely unsuccessful in bringing about any major changes. While the efforts to restore peace and co-operation between India and Pakistan are on for quite some time now at the governmental level and has attracted a reasonable amount of scholarship, it is the peace building and reconciliation initiatives at non-governmental and grass root level which has remained largely under researched. Elite level organisations, people to people contact, women's initiatives, print and social media campaigns- all these create a space where an alternative paradigm to Indo- Pak relations can be established and discussed. These initiatives play as important a role in rekindling ties between two estranged nations as high level talks do. This paper will cast a glance at such initiatives of reconciliation and peace building and will argue that despite failure of strategic talks, such initiatives must not stop.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN: A TUMULTUOUS RELATION

Both India and Pakistan have shared a rather uncomfortable relationship ever since their independence in 1947. Partition of territory was accompanied by partition of hearts. Hindus and Muslims, who stayed together for centuries altogether, were now going about killing and maiming each other. This started a never ending episode of suspicion and hostility not just between India and Pakistan but also between two communities of Hindus and Muslims. There were problems related to the division of assets and liabilities, demarcation of boundaries etc. which aggravated the sour relations between two nations. (Ahmed, 2003) Instead of revelling in the happiness of achieving freedom from British colonisers, there was slaughter and killings to welcome the newly born independent nation.

Pakistan and India attained freedom from British colonial rule in 1947. Based on Jinnah's 'two-nation theory', it was decided that Muslim majority areas of erstwhile India will constitute a new country of Pakistan and Hindu majority areas will form the new territory of India. While implementing this idea, Punjab and Bengal were the two major states which

were divided in order to create a new territory of Pakistan. The partitioning process has been a source of great tension between India and Pakistan. The territory of Kashmir has remained a contentious issue with both the countries laying its rightful claim over Kashmir. There have been many attempts from both the sides to resolve the issue of Kashmir peacefully and amicably. However, all the efforts have failed and the issue of Kashmir remains as contentious as ever. A popular notion is that until and unless a mutual and agreeable resolution to this issue will be arrived at, it will not be possible for both the nations to attain normalisation in their relations.

J&K became an integral part of Indian union after its ruler Raja Hari Singh signed an Instrument of Accession whereby it agreed to become a part of India. Pakistan, however, refused to accept this process and considered it to be based on fraud and violence. That Pakistan is not able to convince itself to accept this arrangement is clear from the violent and aggressive stance and its repeated aggressions against India. India and Pakistan have fought four full fledged wars, out of which at least two have been directly related to Kashmir issue. Apart from this, numbers of proxy wars have been fought between the armed forces of two nations on border areas. Kashmir has been virtually turned into a fortress because of the disturbances between India and Pakistan with normal life suspended for a long period at regular intervals.

Terrorism has been another bone of contention between the two nations, of late. Pakistan is considered to be safe havens for terrorist groups such as Al- Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad etc. India has been a perpetual and central target of all these terrorist groups. Innumerable civilians have been killed in these attacks and there has been incalculable loss of property and assets. Pakistan has been accused of providing monetary and material support to these groups and pitting them against its rivals. At another level, India is suspicious that Pakistan is sponsoring and aiding separatist groups in India and has been abetting them to create discontent in India. Punjab separatists, Kashmiri separatists, Naxalites have all been indicted for having links with Pakistan. These issues have further intensified the ill-will between two countries and have deteriorated relations furthermore.

There have been quite a few efforts at governmental level to bring both the countries on negotiating tables and talk the differences out. These efforts have not been very successful. International organisations have also been made a medium of resolving the disputes between two countries, not to much avail however. Apart from ministerial and organisational level talks, there have been some initiatives by non-governmental organisations, citizen groups and social media groups to create parallel informal spaces where peace building efforts between the two warring countries can take place. This paper will attempt to study these initiatives. The focus here will be on people's initiatives as opposed to government's initiatives. But before moving on to the discussion of these initiatives, it is important that we spare some moments to discuss about theoretical framework of peacebuilding.

PEACEBUILDING: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Post-conflict peace building is a newly emerging concept that Boutros-Ghali defines as “an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” (United Nations, 1996) Peace building encompasses various lines of work including “political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes.” (Lerche, 2000) According to Luc Reyhler and Arnim Langer, sustainable peace is characterized by “the absence of physical violence; the elimination of political, economic and cultural forms of discrimination; self- sustainability; a high level of internal and external legitimacy or approval; and the propensity to transform conflicts constructively.” (Reyhler & Langer, 2003) According to Lambourne, peace building entails those activities and processes that focus on the root causes of the conflict rather than just the effects; support the rebuilding and rehabilitation of all sectors of war torn society, encourage and support interactions between all sectors of society in order to repair damaged relations and start the process of restoring dignity and trust; recognize the specifics of each post conflict situation; encourage and support the participation of indigenous resources in the design, implementation and sustainment of activities and processes, and promote processes that will endure after the initial emergency recovery phase has passed. (Lambourne, 2004)

John Paul Lederach, one of the major contributors to peacebuilding research, has made three observations about classical peace building initiatives in his book “Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies”:

- Classical peacebuilding activities tend to over emphasise on short term tasks without adequate focus on long ranging goals necessary to sustain any macro level achievements made in this respect.
- There is supremacy of hierarchical approach to peacebuilding instead of organic approach. Much of the focus is centred on top level leaders and the macro level political activities.
- Classical peacebuilding concerns itself with process of transition to normalcy. While such a process is integral, peacebuilding entails us to move beyond transition to transformation which is a more comprehensive approach involving social, economic, socio-psychological and spiritual changes.

Based on these observations, Lederach formulated a definition of peacebuilding as “an array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflicts towards more sustainable, peaceful relationships.” The idea here is to bring to the light the initiatives of local institutions that contribute to the growth and maintenance of peace. This idea has been drawn from Mennonite peacebuilding tradition which strongly emphasizes on the need for long term relationship building as a primary component of achieving sustainable peace. (Lederach, 1997) Lisa Schirch also offers important insights into peacebuilding research

in her book “Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning: Towards a Participatory Approach to Human Security”. She opines that peacebuilding prevents, reduces, transforms, and helps people to recover from violence in all forms while at the same time empowers people to foster relationships at all levels to create structural justice. She further goes on to define the mechanism of peacebuilding which, according to her, coordinates the activities of a wide range of actors at all levels of society over a period of months, years and sometimes even decades and that it is necessary to have different and collaborative approaches for successful peacebuilding to take place. (Schirch, 2013)

Kenneth Bush provides an all encompassing definition of peacebuilding activities. He states that, “In the broadest sense, peacebuilding refers to those initiatives which foster and support sustainable structures and processes, which strengthens the prospects for peaceful co existence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, recurrence, or continuation, of violent conflict. The process entails both short and long term objectives, for example, short term humanitarian operations, and longer term developmental, political, economic and social objectives.” (Bush &Keyman, 1997)

PEOPLE’S INITIATIVES TO BRING PEACE

Strained and confrontational relationship between India and Pakistan can be traced back to the inception of the career of these two countries. But, the yearning for friendly relation and interaction between the two countries is also as old as that. While the governments of both the countries made efforts towards this end which could at best be termed as hollow and have, in fact, made every possible effort to undermine the initiatives striving at normalisation of relations; people of India and Pakistan were meanwhile making some real, substantial efforts in this regard. A number of people’s delegations of different denominations- cultural, political, lawyers, writers, trade unionists, women’s rights activists, students, scientists, artists, academics, sportspersons, businessmen and so on- at the unofficial level, tried to keep that urge for Pakistan- India friendship alive. The incipient people-to-people contacts between the two countries directly address the core of India-Pakistan conflict: the problem of incompatible national identities. (Ayres, 2005)

High Profile Non- Governmental Initiatives

There have been efforts by elite strata of society to open up avenues where healthy and sound discussion can take place as to how can the longstanding issues between India and Pakistan is resolved amicably and with the least use of force. A series of initiatives have been undertaken by intellectuals, eminent journalists, scholars and other such units of Indian and Pakistani society to do their bit in easing the relations between warring neighbours.

In April 1984, ‘The Muslim’, an English language newspaper of Pakistan extended an invitation to number of renowned Indian journalists and intellectuals to visit Islamabad for a conference with their Pakistani counterparts. The aim of this conference was simple yet powerful, to break the stalemate between two countries and open up areas for debate

and discussion, albeit in a very small way. (Kutty, 2004) This was followed by writers from both India and Pakistan meeting in Delhi under the aegis of Academy of Fine Arts and Literature to take a poetic and literary way to conflict resolution. Seven years later, they were to meet again in Karachi in a more organised fashion under the banner of 'Pen for Peace', the title itself tellingly highlighting the motives of this gathering.

In 1990, large number of eminent Pakistani academics, lawyers and jurists, political activists, parliamentarians, scientists, writers, poets, and representatives of various professional bodies discussed the issues which, if remained unresolved, could lead to fourth war between India and Pakistan. The warning bells seemed prophetic as India and Pakistan did fight a fourth war in 1999 at Kargil. (Mubashir, 2003) Later in the same year, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi organized a seminar at Goa, India where it was agreed to organize a South Asian Dialogue, a yearly conference of scholars to meet once in a year in each country for next five years. This was aimed at giving some continuity to the initiatives and efforts. The strategic objective of the dialogue was to be: 'Peace, Development and Cooperation'. The conference took place year after year and served an extremely useful purpose of arriving at a consensus on many basic issues.

Grassroot level initiatives

Unfortunately, the above mentioned initiatives kept themselves confined to high profile elite strata of the society and didn't fostered much of a participation from common people. Hence, a need was felt for such initiatives where people to people contact element is more pronounced. The first in a series of such initiatives was labour initiatives. An interesting point to note is that labour initiatives often went beyond the bilateral issues and included within its fold the larger capitalistic conspiracies which they felt is acting as a setback to the economic and political liberty of third world or developing countries. So the worker representatives from different branches of the same companies operating in India and Pakistan met and discussed about various issues bothering both the sides and gave a call for a joint action. At such gatherings, a call was made for opposition to the World Bank, IMF-GATT/WTO dictations and demands for South Asian governments to establish economic and political links within the region. Simultaneously, call was given for an immediate end to the futile and destructive arms race and settlement of all the longstanding disputes amicably and peacefully without use of force. Emphasis was also put on removal of all restrictions on travel and trade between the two countries which they felt would facilitate an unhindered process of people to people contact. And lastly, it was decided to put up joint platform to resist the growing onslaughts of the IMF and World Bank, agencies of hegemonic capitalistic world order, to undermine the economic and political sovereignty of developing world. (PILER, 2003)

As these people to people conversations grew in number, many epiphanies came to the fore. For instance, a group of 25 persons from India and Pakistan met in Lahore on 2 September 1994 and after a long round of deliberation and discussion, came to the

conclusion that strained relations between the two countries is being deliberately maintained by the ruling elite in utter disregard to what people want. This small group later formally established itself as Pakistan- India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy (PIPFPD), which was to play a very substantial role in keeping alive these people to people negotiations.

Needless to say, Kargil war of 1999 proved to be a major setback for all such peacebuilding initiatives. The animosities between the two countries were accentuating by leaps and bounds. There was complete break of links between the two countries and establishing contacts became next to impossible. However, some high minded individuals felt that the need for peace building is, as matter of fact, most wanting at this juncture and, therefore, they took major initiatives in this direction in the aftermath of Kargil. A series of people-to-people exchanges at various levels continued in the first quarter of the year 2000, such as a team of Pakistani peace activists visiting India, a college level students delegation from India visiting Pakistan, an Indo-Pak Soldiers' Initiative for Peace (IPSIP) meeting in Delhi, a conference in Dhaka to plan the formation of a South Asian Peace Coalition, and a Women's Initiative for Peace in South Asia (WIPSA) delegation visiting Pakistan from India, exchange visits of Pakistani and Indian youth sponsored by the Youth Initiative for Peace and many other such programs and initiatives to rekindle the ties between the people of India and Pakistan and to achieve the final aim of easing of tensions between the two countries.

Women's Initiatives

There are particular roles that women's peace building initiatives can play in facilitating conflict transformation processes across hostile boundaries. Women's group have played a critical role at local as well as international level in providing constructive and holistic perspectives on peace and security. Women's experience of a violent conflict is quite different to that of men's experience. Violent conflicts affect women in ways that are different and more magnified than those on men. Rape and sexual assaults become common during the times of conflict. In fact, women's bodies are seen as the site of a particular community's honour and therefore, being able to violate a woman's body is seen as synonymous to violating the honour and integrity of the antagonistic community. Also, women's group have been able to transcend the discussion on peace building past traditional forms of security and have included within the fold of security a discussion on more covert and structural forms of violence such as domestic violence, sexual violence, etc. As Rita Manchanda notes, women are more likely to see a continuum of violence because they experience the connected forms of domestic and political violence that stretches from the home, to the street and to the battlefield. (Manchanda, 2011)

Communication between women from India and Pakistan can be dated back to the early 1980's when a range of issues brought them together on one platform and pushed them to initiate partnerships. These partnerships revolved around issues which women from both the countries faced- issues such as public and domestic violence against women, human

rights, the environment, militarization of the region and its impact on women's lives and livelihoods. Groups such as WISCOMP (Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace) and WIPSA (Women's Initiative for Peace in South Asia) held on to peace building initiatives between two countries at a time when all other diplomatic and civil society efforts were drowning in war rhetoric and suspicion in the aftermath of 1999 Kargil war. Bus rides between the two countries, known as 'bus for peace', is the most common way whereby women representatives from both the countries engage in discussion over long term resolutions of conflicts and bring to the fore arguments that are otherwise missed. (Sewak, 2004) Despite significant contributions, women's voices remain largely absent from negotiation table which raises question as to how durable and coherent the peace building initiatives can be if they do not take into account the experiences and perspectives of about half of the population of both the countries.

Media initiatives

After years of inertia, Indian media is taking concerted efforts to bridge the gap that has been created between the two countries. Both print media and online media, particularly in India, have been playing quite a proactive role in creating a space for dialogue and opening up the deadlock that has set the peace building initiatives back. It is worth noticing that India- Pakistan discord plays out as much at psychological level as it does at territorial or strategic level, therefore, well intentioned social media campaigns go a long way in addressing this paranoia that resides in the minds of Indians and Pakistanis and also in debunking the myth that the citizens of both the countries are akin to blood thirsty predators who would harm each other at the first available opportunity. In fact, many of these initiative played an important role in giving face to the perceived 'other' and made people realize that those who live across the border are as much human as they are.

A very important initiative in this regard was a campaign launched by Google titled 'Google Search: Reunion'. The advertisement shows a granddaughter locating a long lost friend of her grandfather who lives in Pakistan through Google search engine. The story touched a million hearts and made people realize that contrary to popular beliefs, it is possible for people of both the countries to be friends. A similar intentioned campaign was launched by a social media brand called 'AIB'. The campaign was titled 'When India spoke to Pakistan' whereby youngsters from India were made to speak to their counterparts in Pakistan. As the two sides spoke to each other, the nature of conversation was as 'normal' as it can get. Talks revolved around movies, food, actors etc, and there was not a hint of animosity between the two parties. The video ends with a sarcastic yet a powerful remark which says 'That is why India and Pakistan should never talk to each other' which brings to the fore the power that people to people diplomacy and peacebuilding initiatives can have.

'Amanki Asha', a peace building campaign launched by two major media houses Jang Group and Times of India of Pakistan and India respectively, is another laudable attempt at normalisation of relations. The campaign has built up a counter narrative in terms of

bringing to light the stories of cooperation, the folks of brotherhood and anecdotes of love and peace. Amanki Asha can be easily said to be one of the most organised efforts at energizing peace between the two countries. A line from a joint statement issued by Jang Group and Times of India at the initiative's website sums it all, "The media in India and Pakistan speaks directly to the hearts and minds and stomachs of the people. It can help in writing a final chapter, adding a happy twist to a story that seemed headed for tragedy. It can do so by shaping the discourse and steering it away from rancour and divisiveness."¹

CONCLUSION

British introduced Indian subcontinent to their infamous policy of 'Divide and Rule' and in fact made India a laboratory to test the efficacy of the principle. The results were there for all to see. Hindus and Muslims, who had co-habited same space for many years started conceiving themselves as different 'nations'. It was no longer possible for people with assumingly disparate world views to stay together, they told us. India was partitioned and Pakistan, a Muslim nation was carved out of it. Never again will these two set of people go about visualizing a common future. Last nail in the coffin has been thrust. However, somewhere a pang remained where people from both the countries wished to revive the bonds that their forefathers shared. It is the result of this agony and anguish which resides in the minds of millions of people whose lives were turned upside down because few political leaders were not able to satiate their hunger for power within the existing setting.

Post- independence and partition, things have been going from bad to worse. Political leadership on both sides of the border have been incapable of bringing about any substantial resolutions to the issues of conflict. Terrorism has further intensified the situation and made it more intractable. Presumably supportive stance of Pakistan towards terrorist groups lurking safely within the country is what irks India most. Increase in the tension along the line of control in Kashmir is an evidence of deteriorating condition.

Today, India-Pakistan relation is at its worst. Governmental efforts at normalcy have reached its saturation point and status quo reeks of stagnancy. The flawed concept of national security propounded and endorsed by state on both sides, renders irrelevant the needs of common people. This situation, therefore, necessitates an even stronger activism originating from the people's level and a citizen inspired pursuit of peace. And even as strategic and ministerial level talks fail one after the other, it is important that these non-governmental and people to people initiatives should go on unabated. We must not cease to create spaces, howsoever small, where constructive discussions can take place.

¹ Amanki Asha, Joint Statement by Editors of Jang Group and Times Of India.
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Charmakara In Ancient India

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Abstract

The paper reports on the theories of origin, evolution and the role of Chamars in Ancient India. The paper focuses on the Charmakaras a group among Atishudras who were untouchables and considered outcastes. Traditionally they were found working in leather, hide and skin. Their touch was considered polluting. Charmakaras were found in every region however only a small number continued to derive their income from the traditional occupation and the majority became employed as agricultural labourers and in menial jobs.

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar in his book 'Who were the Shudras?' describes *Shudras* as one of the Aryan communities of the solar race. He tells that there was a time when the Aryan society recognised only three *Varnas*, namely, *Brahmin*, *Kshatriyas* and *Vaishyas*. The *Shudras* did not form a separate *Varna*. They ranked as part of the *Kshatriya Varna* in the Indo-Aryan society. There was a continuous feud between the *Shudra* king and the *Brahmins* in which the *Brahmins* were subjected to many tyrannies and indignities. As a result of the hatred towards the *Shudras* generated by their tyrannies and oppressions, the *Brahmins* refused to perform the *Upanayana* of the *Shudras*. Owing to the denial of *Upanayana*, the *Shudras* who were *Kshatriyas* became socially degraded, fell below the rank of the *Vaishyas* and thus came to form the fourth *Varna* (Ambedkar, 1948, pp. iv-v).

Ambedkar also gives the theory which says that untouchables were the followers of Buddhism. Ambedkar called untouchables as Broken Men, and mentioned that Broken Men did not like *Brahmins* because the *Brahmins* were hostile towards Buddhism. Untouchability was imposed by *Brahmins* on Broken Men because they were not leaving Buddhism. Thus, he stated that one of the reason of untouchability lies in the hatred and contempt which the *Brahmins* had against those who were Buddhist (Ambedkar, 1948, p. 78).

Omvedt interprets the dalit movement to be progressive due to its working and poor-peasant-agricultural labourer base, but it was hindered by 'petty-bourgeois' leadership. Marxist's saw this movement as 'divisive' and dangerously pro-British (Omvedt, 1994, p. 14).

'Aryan theory of race' was originated by European Orientalists, propagated by British administrators and then followed by Jotiba Phule and later radicals. According to this theory middle and low castes such as *Shudras* and *Atishudras* (outcaste) were the descendants of 'non-Aryan' original inhabitants, where as *Brahmans*, *Kshatriyas* and *Vaishyas* were the descendants of Indo-European (Aryan, Vedic) conquerors (Omvedt, 1994, p. 23).

Raj Kumar in his book “History of the Chamar Dynasty” mentions that the Chamar word was derived from the Sanskrit word ‘*Charmakara*’, which means worker in hides, or cutter in hides. He also noticed that the Chamars and *Chambhara* in the Indo-Aryan regions, were more than a leather-working caste, they were agricultural labourers (Kumar, 2008, p. 39).

A. B. Mukerji in his book “The Chamars of Uttar Pradesh” stated that the word Chamar had been acquired from the Sanskrit word ‘*Charmakara*’ which meant a worker in leather, hide, and skin. Since animal power was used in farming throughout India, the Chamars or their equivalents were found in every region. But the more important reason of their widespread distribution has been their employment as agricultural labourers. Only a small number derived their income from the traditional occupation, while the majorities were engaged as agricultural labourers and urban labourers. Almost from the early period of Aryan occupation of the Gangetic plain and permanent plough agriculture, the bulk of the Chamars had been engaged in agricultural labour and menial jobs. In addition to the carrying away of the dead cattle, the Chamars processed the hides and skins into leather and then worked as cobblers. They were traditional employees, day labourers, and tenants and rarely proprietary cultivators. The Chamars were engaged in a large variety of jobs. Their womenfolk acted as domestic help and midwives to the upper caste families. Some of them were said to be engaged in witchcraft. But originally, whatever might have been the occupation, the Chamars were also associated with agriculture (Mukerji, 1980, p. 19).

During *Rig-vedic* time there was mention of tanners (Briggs, 1920, p. 11). The tenth *mandala* of the *Rigveda* refers about the origin of *Varnas*, *Varna* is divided into four classes which is based upon the division of the body parts of *Purusa*. Mouth- *Brahman*, arms- *Ksatra*, thighs- *Vaisya* and feet- *Sudra*. *Brahman* was the most powerful and first class of the society. He was supposed to have ability to propitiate the gods by *mantras*. All the upper three classes practiced the orthodox Vedic faith and performed Vedic sacrifices. Those who were not allowed to perform the sacrifices or believed in Vedic gods were put down as *Dasas*, also called the *Sudra* (Mishra, 1982, p.1f.). In the later Vedic age full-fledged caste-system was concretized. The term *Varna* came to be used for castes moulded in rigidity, though they were not as rigid in the post-Vedic period. The four principal castes were the *Brahmanas*, the *Ksatriyas*, the *Vaisyas* and the *Sudras*, but sub-castes were also emerging. The sub-castes of chariot-makers, the smiths, the leather-workers, the carpenters, the washer men, the potters, the drummers, the ploughmen, the astrologers and the hand-clappers etc. began to be formed (Mishra, 1982, pp. 23-24). The leather-workers at that time did not have the proprietary right in the land, *Rajanya* had the control of the life of the *Charmakaras*, who could kill him at will (Mishra, 1982, pp. 25-26). Ambedkar mentions that, Veda Vyas Smriti states that *Charmakaras* comes under the category of *Antyajas* who eat’s cow’s flesh (Ambedkar, 1948, p. 81).

Caste System finds reference in India’s mythological stories, there is reference of *Chandala*, for instance, according to a story *Trisanku* was king of the *Ikshvakus*, he asked

his family priest *Vasishtha* to perform a sacrifice in order to go to *svarga*, but *Vasishtha* refused, so he went to the one hundred sons of *Vasishtha* and they also said the same. The king got angry and said that he will go to another priest. The sons of *Vasishtha* got angry and cursed *Trisanku* to become a *Chandala*. He become a *Chandala* and lost everything. He went to *Visvamisra* where he was performing *Tapas* in the south, *Visvamisra* took pity upon him and officiated as his priest saying: 'I will make you go to heaven even with the *rupa* or form of a *Chandala*.' Thousand of *rishis* came for the sacrifice but the sons of *Vasishtha* did not come and ridiculed the idea of a *Chandala* performing a sacrifice with a *Kshatriya* as priest and of *Brahmans* attending it and eating *Chandala's* food. Hearing this *Visvamisra* cursed them to become decrepit and deformed *Mushtikas* eating dead bodies, and one of them name *Mahodaya*, to become a *Nishada* for a long time. At the end *Trisanku* went to heaven with his body, but *Indra* hurled him down. *Visvamisra* then created a new set of seven *Rishis* and other stars for the south and was about to create a new *Indra* and a new set of *Devas*, but the *Devas* respectfully told him that it was impossible for a man to go to heaven with his body. *Visvamisra*, said "I do not like to break my word. Let there be a heaven of *Trisanku* with his body. Let the stars created by me stand firmly in the sky beyond the path of *Vaisvanara* as long as the universe lasts. Let *Trisanku* shine among the stars even with his head down and let all the stars follow him." The *Devas* granted this (Aiyangar, 1983, pp. 77-78).

Vishnu Purana states that caste was based on occupation (Puranas, 1971, p.41). In *Atharvaveda*, there was reference of five races and existence of four *Varnas* in the society, where *Brahmanas* have the supremacy and the other castes perform their ascribed traditional duties. Society in that time was divided into two broad classes—*Aryans* and *Sudras* or *Aryans* and *Dasa*. *Aryans* were again divided into three classes: *Brahmana*, *Kshatriya*, and *Vaishyas*. The *Sudras* served other *Varnas* for their livelihood and *Dasas* were also employed in agriculture (Bali, 1981, pp. 293-299).

Shat-path Brahmana belonging to white *Yajur-veda*, states that crow, dog, woman and *Shudra* were four *Anrit Yonis* or false species. *Shat-path Brahman* and *Manu*, both have treated woman and *Shudras* together with animals as a class. *Atharvan-veda* and *Aitareya Brahman* both have reference that states *Shudras* could be killed at will. *Taittireeya Brahman* states that *Manu's* views were as good as medicine (Kurundkar, 1993, pp. 75-76).

The *Garuda Purana* states that *Varnashrama Dharma* was characterized by the duties of the four classes and the four stages in life. It says that *Shudras* earn their living as artisan and their duty was to serve the other three classes (Debroy and Debroy, 1994, p.p. 388-89). The *Vayu Purana* has references of *Chandalas* and it is mentioned that they were outcastes. *Chandogya Upanishad* too has reference of *Chandala*, and it says "Vedic tradition makes it taboo to offer remnants of what one eats to a *Chandala*, an outcaste" (Prasad, 2006, p. 397).

Charmakara existed in the ancient times as the division of *Sudra*. *Sudra* was the fourth *Varna* in the *Varna* system and the duty of the *sudras* was to serve the upper three castes (Nagar, 2011, p. 17). There were two types of *Sudras*, touchables and untouchables. *Charmakara* were the untouchables and they were considered outcaste, their main occupation being leather workers. Different historians have different opinions regarding the origin of untouchability. Narhar Kurundkar states that the untouchability existed during the time of *Manusmriti*, he was not sure about the time period of *Manusmriti*, but he estimated the probable date as between 200-300 A.D. Tenth chapter of *Manusmriti* have the reference of *Charmakara* which was a *Shudra* caste. *Charmakara* used to live outside the town, they were given food in segregated dishes and were not allowed to enter the town at night, during the day when they enter the town were supposed to wear clothing and other symbols, so that their caste could be identified. All these references indicate that during the time of *Manusmriti*, *Charmakaras* used to live outside the town. They were not allowed to live within the four walls of the town. It was considered that they pollute food, vessels, plates, clothing and other objects of use by sight or touch. Other people became impure by touching them and therefore, they needed to cleanse themselves by bathing after even a chance contact to them.

B. R. Ambedkar explained untouchables to be “people who are treated as an entity beyond human intercourse and whose mere touch is enough to cause pollution?” (Ambedkar, 1948, p. i) He further says that “untouchability is the notion of defilement, pollution and contamination.” There were two main reasons of the origin of untouchability: first, was the disgust and hostility of *Brahmins* against the Broken Men (who belonged to an alien tribe) who were Buddhist, and second, the habit of beef-eating by the Broken Men after it was given up by others. One should be careful in identifying impure with untouchables, there was a difference between untouchables and impure. Ambedkar mentions that the Impure came into existence during the time of Dharam Sutras, whereas untouchability emerged by 600 A.D. Untouchable pollutes every one whereas impure pollutes only the *Brahmins*. Touch of the untouchables causes pollution all the time, whereas the touch of impure causes pollution only at the time of ceremonial occasion. According to Ambedkar, Chamars at one time was impure, but because of not giving up their habit of eating-beef at the time when cow became sacred and beef- eating became a sin, only then the Chamars were demeaned to the level of untouchables (Ambedkar, 1948, pp. 140-42).

Narhar Kurundkar in his book, found nine different groups into which all of the *Shudras* seem to have been divided. The first contained Buddhist and Jains. The second group consisted of tribals and gypsies. The third group was of those who became *Shudras* due to nonperformance of rituals. The fourth group consisted of children born within a single caste, but out of adultery. The fifth group contained of sinners and criminals from the three higher *Varnas*. The sixth group contained slaves. The seventh group contained children born out of unlawful *Pratilom* marriages (a lower *Varna* man marrying a higher *Varna* woman) within people of different *Varnas*. The eighth group contained children of

certain *Anulom* (a higher *Varna* man marrying a lower *Varna* woman) marriages. The ninth group consists of those *Shudras* who had existed before *Anulom* and *Pratilom* marriages began. 'Groups from six to nine suffered most humiliation through history.' All of the above mentioned groups were *Shudras* though only some among them were untouchables. Most of the untouchable castes belong to the seventh kind, and those castes were *Charmakara*, *Sairandhra*, *Sopak*, *Pandusopak*, *Ahindak*, *Dhigvan*, *Chandala* and others. *Charmakara* was the product of *Pratilom* marriage, because of which they were out casted from the main stream of society. The Dalit group of castes of present day are the *Shudras* in the seventh group (Kurundkar, 1993, pp. 56-58).

Kautilya's *Arthashastra* has reference of *Chandala*, and it states that "Heretics and *Chandalas* shall live beyond the burial grounds" (Kautilya, 1951, p. 54). In Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, the social order was based on *Varna* and *Ashram* system. *Shudras* were recommended to perform other duties along with serving *Brahmans* and they could elevate themselves by living with the *Brahmans*. Kautilya's *Arthashastra* recommends *Shudras* to assist *Vaishyas* as agricultural labourers, herdsmen or as trader's servants (Kohli, 1995, p.p. 36-37). Kautilya favoured the recruitment of all the four *Varnas* in army, *Kshatriya* army, *Vaishya* army or a *Shudra* army. Kautilya considered *Shudras* as an integral part of the *Aryan* community

In Kautilya's *Arthashastra* there was mention of weapons which was made up of leather such as *musala* (a leather cover or bag filled with cotton or wool, to protect the towers, roads, etc., against stones thrown by enemies. Some say that it is a mat of bamboo bark covered with leather), *asphatima* (a leather bag with a rod to produce high sound), and *charma* (a kind of covering called *vasunandaka* and mace of leather) (Kautilya, 1951, pp. 110-112).

The weapons mentioned above were made by leather workers. They lived outside the town. Their touch was considered polluting. Ramnarayan S. Rawat in his book 'Reconsidering Untouchability: Chamars and Dalit History in North India' stated that the Chamars were considered untouchable, they used to work as *begar* (unpaid labor) in the form of agricultural work, they also worked as leather worker and used to provide personal services to zamindars and government officials (Rawat, 2012, p. 122).

Outcastes have existed in the society and they were considered as untouchables. "According to *Apastamba* it was sinful to touch, speak to or look at a *Chandala*, and penances were prescribed for this." The Chinese traveler Hieun-Tsang noticed that the outcastes were segregated outside the towns and villages. Fa-Hien also noticed the same thing, who stated that the *Chandalas* "live away from other people and when they approach a city or a market, they beat a piece of wood in order to distinguish themselves. Then people know who they are and avoid coming into contact with them" (Aiyer, 1976, p. 84). Different historians have different point of view regarding the origin and development of *Shudras*. The *Vishnu Dharma-sutra* (compiled between the third and the fourth centuries BCE.), for the

first time coined the term 'untouchable' (*asprasya*), thereby legalizing the *pariah* status of a vast section of *Sudra* toilers. The medieval legal pundits, Raghunandana of Bengal (fifteenth century CE.) and Nagabhata of Maharashtra (eighteenth century CE.), said that only two castes existed in the *Kali* age, namely, *Brahmins* and *Sudras* (Patil, 1982, p.3).

Through the references made above we came to know that *Chandalas* existed in ancient times and they were considered outcaste because of their unclean occupation. *Charmakara* were an important caste among the *Shudras*. Kautilya had mentioned about the different leather weapons used in the wars. Similarly there was reference of *Charmakarain* Rig-Vedic period, post-Vedic period and in *Manusmriti*. All the above sources highlight that *Charmakara* existed in ancient times and their main occupation was of leather working and agricultural labourer. They used to live outside the town and were considered untouchable.

In the modern period, Chamars belong to a lower level in the hierarchy of Scheduled Castes and the other castes in general. Their origin in the occupational class of leather-workers and in the non-Aryan tribal group and their food habits of eating pork, chicken, and beef have pushed them to a lower social status. As a consequence they lived in their own hamlets which were set apart from the upper castes or the main settlements (Mukerji, 1980, pp. 19-20). But, with the coming of Babasaheb Ambedkar, the Chamars became politically active. Later on governmental policies, education, constitutional safeguards and awareness have helped in the progress of the Chamars. After independence leaders such as Jagjivan Ram, Kanshi Ram, Mayawati, Kumari Selja, and Meira Kumar took up the cause of the Chamars. Today, the Chamars have become an economically, politically, and socially, a strong viable group with a sense of identity.

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Early Buddhist presence in the Indian capital and the adjoining areas

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Abstract

Buddhist and Jaina tradition in the early 6th century BC revealed the presence of 16 powerful states (solasa mahajanapadas). In the Anguttara Nikaya list of following mahajanapadas are given: Kasi (Kashi), Kosala (Koshala), Anga, Magadha, Vajji (Vrijji), Malla, Chetiya (Chedi), Vamsa (Vatsa), Kuru, Panchala, Machchha (Matsya), Shurasena, Assaka, Avanti, Gandhara and Kamboja. Jatakas mention that prior to the period of Buddha, three powerful kingdoms existed Pancala, Kuru, Kekaka. Kuru kingdom was 300 leagues in extent and seven leagues in circumference. It is also recorded in the Atthavannana (commentary) of the Somanassa Jataka that Kuru kingdom extended as far as Uttarapancala which was a town in Kururattha with Renu as its king.

Kuru Kingdom covered present day Delhi, Indian state of Haryana, Meerut regions and some other neighbouring regions. It had Indraprastha as its capital. The people of Kuru during the time of Buddha had the reputation of being virtuous. According to Kurudhamma Jataka they had earned the reputation of having good wisdom and sound health. It is believed that the intellectual and spiritual level of the people in general was so high that the Buddha chose to deliver those discourses which were deep in philosophical and spiritual thoughts and ideas. During the early part of 19th century some people were found to be living in the neighbouring parts of Delhi who appeared to follow customs which appeared to be closely related to early Buddhism. As per the evidences available, it may be concluded that the capital of India may have been an important centre of Buddhism. The paper attempts to present evidences confirming that assertion.

Delhi the capital of India once known as Indraprastha is said to have a strong historical background. According to some legends at one time this land was a forest, filled with snakes and was popularly known as Khandva forest. Old records refer to it as Khandvaprastha or forest region on the banks of river Yamuna. It is believed that as per the records of Mahabharata, Indraprastha was the capital of the kingdom led by the Pandavas and it is they who converted Khandvaprastha or Khandvapatta into a beautiful city comparable to the pearly heaven of Lord Indra of Hindu mythology. The city was decorated with gardens waterfalls Asoka, Pipal, Champa, Palash, Amaltash, Rajvriksha trees.

According to the Buddhist and Jaina tradition in the early 6th century BC there flourished, 16 powerful states (solasa mahajanapadas) In the Anguttara Nikaya list of following mahajanapadas are given: Kasi (Kashi), Kosala (Koshala), Anga, Magadha, Vajji (Vrijji), Malla, Chetiya (Chedi), Vamsa (Vatsa), Kuru, Panchala, Machchha (Matsya), Shurasena, Assaka, Avanti, Gandhara and Kamboja.

Jatakas mention that prior to the period of Buddha, three powerful kingdoms existed Pancala, Kuru, Kekaka. Kuru kingdom was 300 leagues in extent and seven leagues in circumference. It is also recorded in the Atthavannana (commentary) of the Somanassa Jataka that Kuru kingdom extended as far as Uttarapancala which was a town in Kururattha with Renu as its king.

Kuru Kingdom covered present day Delhi, Indian state of Haryana, Meerut regions and some other neighbouring regions. It had Indraprastha as its capital. It is believed that Purana Qila in Delhi is located at the site of the legendary city of Indraprastha. Researchers now confirm¹ that up till 1913, a village called Indrapat existed within the fort walls. The ruling dynasty of Indapatta belonged to Yuditthila Gotta. The Sutasoma Jataka mentions a king called Dhananjaya Koravya whose son was the Bodhisattva named Sutasoma. The Ratthapala Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya mentions a philosophical discussion that had taken place between the chieftain of Kuru named Koravya and the Thera Ratthapala, who belonged to a noble family of Kuru. It is believed that when Thullakotthika, a town of Kurus and the birthplace of Thera ratthapala was being visited by the Buddha during one of his tours to Kuru Land,² Ratthapala, the son of the leading clan, after listening to the sermons of the Buddha came to the conclusion that “As I understand, the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, it’s not easy, living at home, to practice the holy life totally perfect, totally pure, a polished shell. What if I, having shaved off my hair and beard and putting on the ochre robe, were to go forth from the household life into homelessness?”³ And later after taking permission from his parents, Ven. Ratthapala became one of the arahants. It is reported that the chieftain Koravya at the time of Buddha had developed a park called Migacara where Thera Ratthapala had sojourned when he happened to visit his parents. That was done purely to keep his promise made to his parents that after he had gone forth from the household life into homelessness, he was required to pay visit to his parents.

The people of Kuru during the time of Buddha had the reputation of being virtuous. According to Kurudhamma Jataka they had earned the reputation of having good wisdom and sound health. It is believed that the intellectual and spiritual level of the people in general was so high that the Buddha chose to deliver those discourses which were deep in philosophical and spiritual thoughts and ideas. It was owing to the same reason Buddha had delivered some of his most profound discourses like the Mahanidana sutta, Mahasatipatthana sutta, Ratthapala sutta, Magandiya sutta, Ananjasappaya sutta, the Somanassa sutta, Ariyavasa sutta⁴ etc. in Kammasadamma, a nigama (commercial township during the time of the Buddha) Buddha is said to have visited the town more than once and had sojourned there.

¹ Goodearth Eicher, Delhi City Guide, Delhi Tourism, 1998. p. 62

² Cf Majjhima Nikaya, 11, p.54 and Theragatha, II, p.30

³ <http://www.accesstosight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.082.than.html> last accessed on 7.8.2016

⁴ SinghSanghasen, ‘The Kururattha and the KuruDhamma in the early Pali literature’, in ‘Buddhism its various manifestations’, by Madan Ram Gurumukh, Mittal publications, 1999, New Delhi, p72

Saadhs or 'Hidden Buddhists'

During the early part of 19th century some people were found to be living in the neighbouring parts of Delhi who appeared to follow customs which appeared to be closely related to early Buddhism. In all probability, they might be the lineages of virtuous inhabitants of the Kuru region or Hinayanists of the Ashoka times. In the later period, to save themselves from persecutions they might have continued living there as Pracchand Boudhs or 'Hidden Buddhists.' In the Proceedings of Church Missionary Society it is written "These strangers were called saadhs. They existed as a distinct sect about 50-60 years; having withdrawn themselves from the authority of the Brahmins."⁵ "The Brahmins always persecuted the Saadhs"⁶. The chief seats of the Saadh sect were found to be Delhi, Agra, Jypore and Farrukhabad but there were several of the sects scattered all over the country. An annual meeting usually was planned at one or the other of the cities. The practice appears familiar to the practice in Buddhism of organizing Sangitis or councils in order to settle various matters. Just to save themselves from the attacks, all parade of worship was being avoided, for fear of being located and getting persecuted. "Alms were required to be unostentatious, they were not to be done lest they should be seen of men."

In keeping with the precepts of Buddhism, they abstained from intoxicants like tobacco, paun, opium and wine. They were required to abstain from all luxuries. The due regulation of the tongue was considered to be the principle duty. They were very particular about good conduct and remained involved in trade activities. They rejected and abhorred all kinds of idolatry. Their name for God was 'Satguru' or true teacher as Buddha never proclaimed himself to be a god but a Teacher. They remain hidden yet on certain occasion came down the hill to spread the message of Buddha.

They assembled on the day of every full-moon day. It may be pointed out that full moon bears special significance in Buddhism. Uposatha days were held on full moon days. The Uposatha Day was instituted by the Buddha at the request of King Bimbisara and the Buddha instructed the monks to give teachings to the laypeople on this day, and told the monks to recite the Patimokkha every second Uposatha day.⁷ On the occasion of new-moon and full-moon Uposatha, in monasteries in the presence of four or more bhikkhus, the local Sangha were required to recite the Patimokkha. Before the recitation started, the monks confessed any violations of the disciplinary rules to another monk or to the Sangha.⁸

⁵ Proceedings of the Church Missionary Society for Africa and the East Church Missionary society, 1818, printed by Bensley and Son, Fleet street, published for the Society by LB Seeley, 169, Fleet Street and J Hatchard, Piccadilly. p92

⁶ *ibid.* p93

⁷ Rhys Davids & Oldenberg (1881), pp. 240-41. Also see Khantipalo (1982a) and Pali English Dictionary (Rhys Davids & Stede, 1921-25, p. 152).

⁸ See, for instance, Buddhadatta (2002), p. 63, and Bullitt (2005).

‘On these occasions whole of saadhhs who resided within a convenient distance, female included, (a reflections on principles of equality in Buddhism) met together, each person furnished according to his means, flour, ghee, milk, sugar, (practice of community dining or inter dining again draws attention to adherence to the teachings of equality of Buddha) Part of the congregation was employed during the day in making those materials into bread; while others conversed on the affairs of the community or investigated any complaints which may be forwarded against their people. In the evening, bread was being placed upon a small elevation and after a short extempore prayer it got divided among guests. A vessel containing sherbet called ‘the cup of fellowship’ was also being passed around and the remainder of the night was spent in rehearsing verses in praise of the ‘Sut Gooroo’ and listening to legendary stories of the founder and directions for the moral conduct’.⁹ The said practice also appears to be a familiar Theravada Buddhist practice.¹⁰ Through that practice attention is drawn to the fact that Buddha for being communicative and impactful himself used to narrate stories with a hidden moral message. Jataka stories too emphasized on moral precepts forbidding falsehood, dishonesty, all dissolute practices and flagitious actions. So much of emphasis on ‘right action’, reminds one again of the eightfold path of Buddha.

Offenders were punished by means of excommunication, the duration of which was proportioned to the atrocity of crime. They had no regular priesthood that was perhaps, primarily to discourage any kind of tyrannical rule as those of Brahmins. Those men, who in each particular division happened to be considered most respectable and could read, repeat the hymns and relate their traditions were being constituted as their chief. There was an emphasis on each according to merit and no hereditary rule prevailed like the caste system. This hints at the democratic practice that prevailed within the sangha. The ‘Saadhhs’ excluded from their religious system all the Hindu deities, rejected with abhorrence the use of images and held that the incarnation of Vishnu to have been great conquerors or some disinterested and famous benefactors of mankind by whom they have been idolatrously exalted into the seat of God.

They considered the pilgrimages as folly and had no faith whatever in the efficiency of ablutions, neither did they practice them at all except for the purpose of cleanliness.

⁹ The Baptist Magazine, Vol XI London, Printed by J Barfield Wardour Street, SOHO and sold by W. Whittemore, Paternoster-Row

¹⁰ Describing his experience of Uposatha day in Thailand, Khantipalo (1982a) writes: “Early in the morning lay people give almsfood to the bhikkhus who may be walking on alms round, invited to a layman’s house, or the lay people may take the food to the monastery. Usually lay people do not eat before serving their food to the bhikkhus and they may eat only once that day.... Before the meal the laity request the Eight Precepts [from the bhikkhus] which they promise to undertake for a day and night. It is usual for lay people to go to the local monastery and to spend all day and night there.... [In monasteries where] there is more study, [lay people] will hear as many as three or four discourses on Dhamma delivered by senior bhikkhus and they will have books to read and perhaps classes on Abhidhamma to attend.... In a meditation monastery, most of their time will be spent mindfully employed – walking and seated meditation with some time given to helping the bhikkhus with their daily duties. So the whole of this day and night (and enthusiastic lay people restrict their sleep) is given over to Dhamma.

They did not receive the doctrine of transmigration or pretend to any authentic knowledge of the creation of the world. They fully expected a future judgement which would establish the virtuous and the holy in a state of uninterrupted happiness.

They believed that “to overcome the wicked one was an arduous task: it was to walk upon the edge of sharp scimitar; therefore, seat yourself in the vessel of knowledge of the Holy Teacher and you shall be transported beyond disquieting waves.”¹¹ The facts hint that they were well aware of the fact that Brahmanism, which they saw as the ‘wicked one’ had defeated them and they still hoped that a day would come that religion of Buddha based on morality would reign again.

The above said facts belie the allegations hurled on Muslims that they were totally responsible for the destruction of Buddhism. Muslim invasion began sometime in the tenth and eleventh century. Bakhtiyar Khilji destroyed the Vihara and Nalanda University in the 12th century¹².

Ambedkar on invasions on Buddhism

While it is true iconoclastic seal of Muslim invaders did enormous harm to Buddhism, Dr Ambedkar did not hold them entirely responsible for the total annihilation of Buddhist monks and Buddhism. In fact there were very few Buddhists left in India for the Turks and Afghans to persecute. The task of annihilating the Buddhists had already been accomplished. It has been said by Charles Eliot and Radhakrishnan that Brahmanism had killed Buddhism in a fraternal embrace.¹³ Even before them, Swami Vivekanand had said that “Hinduism threw away Buddhism after taking its sap”¹⁴

Dr Ambedkar was of the view that:

“Muslim invasions are not the only invasions worth study. There have been other invasions equally if not of greater importance. If Hindu India was invaded by the Muslim invaders so was Buddhist India invaded by Brahminic invaders. The Muslim invasion of Hindu India and the Brahminic invasions of Buddhist India have many similarities. The Mussalman invaders of Hindu India fought among themselves for their dynastic ambitions. The Arabs, Turks, Mongols and Afghans fought for the supremacy among themselves. But they had one thing in common-namely the mission to destroy idolatry. Similarly the Brahminic invaders of Buddhist India fought among themselves for their dynastic ambitions. The Sungas, Kanvas and the

¹¹ Missionary register Seeley, Jackson & Halliday, 1819, London, published by LB Seeley, 169, Fleet Street, p87

¹² Elliot and Dawson: “History of India as told by its own historians (1869) Vol II: p 306

¹³ Joshi LM, Discerning the Buddha, A study of Buddhism and Brahmanical Hindu Attitude to It, 1983, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, pxvi.

¹⁴ Completed Works of Swami Vivekanand, 8 vols, Mayavati Memorial Edition, Calcutta, 1962-65 vol. VIII, p. 104

Andhras fought for supremacy among themselves. But they like the Muslim invaders of Hindu India had one object in common that was to destroy Buddhism and the Buddhist Empire of the Mauryas.¹⁵

The Muslim invaders destroyed only outward symbols of Hindu religion such as temples and Maths etc., they did not extirpate Hinduism nor did they cause any subversion of the “principles or doctrines which governed the spiritual life of the people. The effect of the Brahminic invasions was a thoroughgoing change in the principles which Buddhism had preached for a century as true and eternal principles of spiritual life and which had been accepted and followed by the masses as the way of life.”¹⁶

“Brahminism acquired by its invasions political power to annihilate Buddhism and it did annihilate Buddhism. Islam did not supplant Hinduism. Islam never made a thorough job of its mission. Brahminism did, it drove out Buddhism as a religion and occupied its place.”¹⁷

It may be remembered however, that there were many Brahmins among the followers of Buddha who sincerely worked for the promotion of Dhamma based on principles of egalitarianism and non-violence. Yet there were thousands among them who had been nourishing a grudge against Buddha and his Dhamma and did not refrain from weakening it from within. Ironically, in the reviving of Buddhism in India in the modern times, scholars like Pandit Rahul Sankrityayan, Dharmarand Kosambi, erudite scholar Jagannath Upadhyay, Dr LM Joshi, and India’s first Prime Minister Pandit Nehru who belonged to Brahmin family and many others left no stone unturned.

Buddhism had completely vanished from the land of its origin. Some Buddhist Bhikkhus to escape massacre fled off to the hills and states where Buddhism still flourished. Many more chose to survive under different names, ever afraid to exhibit their loyalty to Lord Buddha and his Dhamma. The ‘saadhs’ found in and around Delhi, seem to be the ‘Prachhan Boudhs’ or ‘Hidden Buddhists’ because as evidences reveal Delhi or Indraprastha of earlier times must have been an important centre of Buddhism once upon a time.

It is because of the same reason that one finds edict of Asoka planted in Srinivaspuri in Delhi or Indraprastha near Kalkaji temple close to Bahapur village South Delhi. In Meerut and Haryana which also formed part of the Kuru kingdom one also finds Asokan pillars which reflects upon the significance of the place from the point of view of Buddhism.

Asoka Pillars at Delhi

The pillars were later transferred to Delhi by Feroze Shah Tughluq. The 14th century Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi by Shams Siraj Afif gives an account of the columns today known as

¹⁵ Dr Baba Saheb Ambedkar writings and speeches vol 3

¹⁶ Ibid 274

¹⁷ Ibid 274

the Delhi Topra and Delhi Meerut pillars. Afif tells us that Sultan Firoz Shah Tughluq noticed the pillars at Topra in modern Haryana and Meerut¹⁸ in modern UP (situated in between 'Indraprastha' or present time Delhi and Hastinapur) in the course of his military campaigns and that he was so impressed by them that he decided to transport them to Delhi. If Feroz Shah Tughluq would not have shifted the pillars to Delhi, history of revival of Buddhism in India would have taken a different course altogether. It is said; the splendor and beauty of those two structures enthralled him so much that he did not rest until they were shifted and installed in his palace at Firozabad and named his prized possession Minar-i-Zarin. The Meerut pillar was installed in Firuz Shahi's Kushak-i-Shikar or Hunting Palace located opposite Bara Hindu Rao Hospital on the northern ridge near the University of Delhi. It is believed that the Great Buddhist Emperor Ashoka erected the pillar in Meerut in the 3rd century BC. This fact is attested by the inscription on the pillar, which states that the monument was removed from Meerut to Delhi by Firoz Shah in 1206 A.D. The existence of this pillar and the discovery of Buddhist remains within the city near Jama Masjid area, leave little room for doubt that Meerut had once been an important centre of Buddhism at the time of Ashoka, although no mention of the place is made by Chinese travelers, which possibly points to its decay at an early date.¹⁹

Haryana as an important centre of Buddhism

A manuscript of an anonymous work called the Sirat-i-Firuz Shahi painted illustrations on the moving of the Topra pillar erected by Ashoka in Haryana and its installation in its new home in Delhi. It is believed that Buddhism continued to exist in Haryana as late as about the 14th century which is proved by the recovery of an image from a temple at the Taraori in district Karnal showing Buddha seated on a lotus pedestal in bhumi-sparsha mudra.²⁰ Apart from that an eighth century bronze image of Buddha in bhumi-sparsha-mudra was being found in Hansi, a sandstone head of Buddha from Sanghi in district Rohtak of the same period was being recovered, a broken Buddha head from Rohtak and another from Adi Badri datable to ninth century indicated that Buddhism did not disappear altogether from that part of the country.²¹ Ancient Buddhist texts also refer to Buddha's long journey from Hastinapura to Gandhara via Rohitaka, Mahangara and Srughna. Of those places, Rohitaka appeared to be undoubtedly the modern Rohtak and Srughana which had been correctly

¹⁸ From the plaque near the Pillar. On the ridge near Bara Hindu Rao Hospital in Old Delhi: Ashoka Pillar, *this pillar of Ashoka (C 263-232 B.C) brought by Firoz Shah Tughluq from the neighborhood of Meerut, was set up by him in his "Hunting Palace" called Kushak-i-Shikar in AD 1365. The contemporary historians describe the complicated transport of this pillar from its original site to DELHI by the river: It broke into 5 pieces in an explosion during Farruk Siyar's reign (A.D.1713-1719). And its inscribed portions were later sawed off and sent to the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta. In 1866 they were received back and all the broken pieces were joined together and the restored pillar was again put up here in 1867. The Pillar now measures 10M in Height. Inscribed in Brahmi Script and written in the Prakrit Language, this inscription of Ashoka contains his messages and instructions for promoting the Dharma and the welfare and happiness of the people.*

¹⁹ Meerut: A Gazetteer, Being Volume IV of the District Gazetteers of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Compiled and Edited by HR Neville, ICS, Allahabad; Printed by F Luker, Supdt., Govt. Press, United Provinces, 1904.

²⁰ Buddhist India Rediscovered, Aruna Deshpande, JAICO publishing House, 2013, Mumbai p138

²¹ Ibid., 138

identified with Sugh near Jagadhri. Several of the places which historians mention could be traced to the trail that Buddha walked in Haryana. Pillars and remnants of stupas found in Hisar, Hathin, Bhuna, Chaneti, Jhajjar and Karnal are vital links to the Buddha's trail," says Vijay Vardhan, secretary of the department who has also authored its latest publication - Buddha's trail in Haryana.²²

"Hieun Tsang describes in detail three Buddhist monasteries with more than 700 Hinayanists at Thanesar. He records details of a stupa built by King Ashoka of 300 feet height. The remains of the stupa still exist in a neglected and dilapidated state on the elevated ground between the Brahma Sarovar and the Kurukshetra University," says Vardhan.²³

Hieun Tsang refers to presence of ten stupas in that area alone. An Ashokan stupa situated about 5 kilometres north-west of Sugh which was being discovered at Chaneti might well have been one of the stupas referred to by the Chinese pilgrim. Its shape resembles the Shashpur and Sharamarajika stupa of Taxila and its remains indicate that it must have been big. The stupa was being restored by the department in collaboration with the Archaeological Survey of India. Remains of a Kushana monastery also have been excavated to the south-west of the Sugh and it may have been one of the five sangharamas referred to by Hieun Tsang.²⁴

Buddhism is said to have flourished in Haryana which formed part of the Kuru kingdom, during the reign of Ashoka. It continued to be an important religion during the Sunga, Indo-Greek, and Sakhya rule and touched its all time high in Haryana during the Kushana period²⁵.

Idol worship in Buddhism

Some scholars are of the view that Islam came out as the enemy of the 'But'. The word "but" is an Arabic word and means an idol. 'But' according to some scholars is the Arabic corruption of the word Buddha. Thus the origin of the word indicates that in the Muslim mind idol worship had come to be identified with the religion of the Buddha. To the Muslims they were one and the same thing. The mission to break the idols thus became the mission to destroy Buddhism. But there can also be no denial of the historical fact that Islamic Lands of today once nourished and nurtured Buddhism.²⁶It may be pointed out that

²² <http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/haryana-traces-buddha-s-trail-in-the-state/1011114/last> accessed on 6.8.16

²³ <http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/haryana-traces-buddha-s-trail-in-the-state/1011114/last> accessed on 6.8.16

²⁴ <http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/haryana-traces-buddha-s-trail-in-the-state/1011114/last> accessed on 6.8.16

²⁵ Buddhist India Rediscovered, Aruna Deshpande, Jaico Publishing House, 2013, Mumbai, p139

²⁶ "A Korean monk Hui-ch'ao who visited Bamiyan in 727 AD mentions that there the monks practice the Great and Little Vehicles. The king is Iranian but he and his chiefs and the people are very devoted to the Three Jewels (Buddhism). This account of the Korean monk is the only report which clearly informs us of the existence of the Mahayana school of Buddhism in Bamiyan. At other places too Hinayana and Mahayana both flourished side by side. Throughout the history of Buddhism in Afghanistan, the Theravada Buddhism appears to have been predominant in early centuries and it is only in later period that Mahayana could become more popular."- C.S. Upasak, (*Excerpt from the Maha Bodhi, printed in 1984 Vol. 92*) Early Buddhism in Afghanistan, Submitted by zhenliang on Sat, 11/01/2003 - 07:00.

Buddhism was being introduced into Afghanistan as early as 537BC. “We know the story of Tapassu and Bhallika that come across in the early Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit texts is almost identical. They are said to have been touring merchants (Sattavaha) and met the Buddha under the Rajayatana tree at Bodha-Gaya while coming from Ukkala in the eighth week after his Enlightenment. They offered him Madhugolaka or sweet ball which the Buddha accepted. After that they took refuge in two Jewels (ratna) the Buddha and the Dhamma (not Sangha as it was yet to be founded) and thus became the first lay-devotees or Upasakas of the Buddha. In the Anguttaranikaya Atthakatha 1.207, it is mentioned that the Buddha gave them eight handfuls of his hair which they took to their town, Asiatanjana and built stupas there. Again in the Theragatha Atthakatha it is related that they again visited the Buddha at Rajagaha where Tapassu and Bhallika were touring merchants (Sattavahas) of north or north-west of Indian sub-continent and had met the Buddha. And if the accounts of Huen-Tsang be given any credence, it appears plausible that their homeland was located somewhere near Balkh, the ancient Bahlika at the far end of the north-western Afghanistan. It has also been suggested that the name Bhallika is a derivative from the town Bahalika. Dr Lokesh Chandra on the basis of the Vibhanga Attakatha has pointed out that bhallika is a kind of copper enumerated under the eight kinds of Pisaca-lohani, or the metals found in the Pisaca country, a land in the north-western India. Again Kamsa country got the name because bronze or copper was available there and Asitanjana was the capital of that country. He has also pointed that Bhallika got the name from the town Bahalika. In all probability, it appears that Tapassu and Bhallika were the merchants from Balkh area and they were the first persons who took the message of the Buddha to Afghanistan even during the life-time of the Lord, although not as missionaries. And thus, Balkh appears to be first region where the teachings of the Buddha arrived. It is known from many sources that north-western region of Indian sub-continent was known to the people of eastern India. During the time of the Buddha, Taxila was a renowned centre for learning of many sciences. We know the story of Jivaka Komarabhacca, the celebrated physician of Magadha who got his training in medical science at that place. Many princes and nobles were also there learning different sciences when Jivaka was studying there. The area across the Khyber Pass, which was called Uddyana or Udyana in ancient days and is now the easternmost part of Afghanistan in the Province of Ningarahar with its capital Jelalabad, was a part of Gandhara province in ancient times. It is mentioned by Huen Tsang that a Sakyan prince migrated to Uddyana after the extermination of Vidudhabha. Later this Sakyan prince became the king of this country. He had a son Uttarasena by name, who could obtain the relics of the Buddha soon after the Mahaparinibbana of the Buddha and built a stupa over it. This stupa was seen by Huen Tsang. Sir Auerel Sien has identified it with a stupa at Shankardar in the Swat Valley, which was once a part of Uddyana. Huen Tsang also mentioned that he was greeted by the king of

Bamiyan who is supposed to have belonged to the Sakyan race. The story of the Sakyan migration from eastern India, although known from late sources, appears to be a fact. And if their migration to Udyana, as they migrated elsewhere, be taken to be true, the message of the Buddha reached the eastern part of Afghanistan even during the life-time of the Buddha. We have found the skull relics of the Buddha from Hadda and his tooth relics from Dauranta. Both these places are near Jelalabad. Fai-hien and Sung Yun also witnessed the skull relics of the Buddha and worshipped them. Another relic casket with inscription was found at Wardak located in this very area. All these antiquities discovered from this area lead us to infer that Jelalabad or Uddyana was an important centre of Buddhism from the very beginning.

In the second Buddhist council which was held at Vesali one hundred years after the mahaparinibbana of the Buddha is also significant in this context. It is said that a section of the early Theravada Sangha branched off on this occasion. They are known as Mahasanghikas, probably because they were in large number. They migrated from Magadha into two streams. One went to south India and the other to north India and settled in Udyana. There they were again divided into five groups viz Ekavyvaharika, Kaukulika or Kurullaka, Bahusrutiya, Pranjativadin and Lokuttaravadin. In the Chinese translation of Sariputraparipricchasastra, the Lokuttaravadins are said to have resided at Uddyana with the Sarvastivadins the Mabisasakas, Dharmaguptas and Kasyapiyas.

Again, we find in the Pali texts that Thera Sambhuta Sanavasi, an old monk who had received his Upasampada under Ananda Thera, played an important role in the Second Buddhist Council. There we also find him coming from Ahogangapabbata for joining the Council's deliberations. His main place of residence was Mathura. He also moved to Kipin where he stayed for some time. Kipin has been identified with Kapisa, modern Begram in Afghanistan. Why Sambhuta Sanavasi moved to Kipin from Mathura is now known. When he reached Kipin, he was held in great esteem. Huen Tsang witnessed his hemp or Sana robe in nine parts dyed in red, enshrined in a monastery near Bamiyan. Sambhuta Sanavasi was the supporter of early Theravada views and opposed the Mahasanghikas as we find at the time of Second Buddhist Council. It therefore, appears probable that when the Mahasanghikas had established their stronghold at Uddyana, Sambhuta Sanavasi also decided to move to that area and settled at Kipin. We also know from Huen Tsang's account that Lokuttaravadins were a predominant section of Buddhist Sangha at Bamiyan. It is very likely that Sambhuta Sanavasi might have visited Bamiyan from Kipin in order to establish the early Theravada Buddhism in opposition to the Lokuttaravadins who had their stronghold there. It may be mentioned here that Bamiyan is not very far from Kapisa or Kipin.

It may be inferred that in all probability Buddhism reached Afghanistan at a very early time of its foundation. It reached there soon after the Second Buddhist Council, if not earlier; i.e., hundred years after the Mahaparinibbana of the Buddha. The Mahasanghikas established their centre at Uddyana and Lokuttaravadins at Bamiyana and probably Sambhuta Sanavasi was able to establish some centres of early Theravada at Kipin and at Bamiyan.”

Udyana (or Uddiyana in Swat) once boasted of its 1,400 monasteries and 18,000 monks.²⁷ It is believed that “Even though a real threat to the existence of Buddhism arose with the defeat of the last Sassanian ruler in AD 642 by the Arabs, it is believed that the encounter between Buddhism and Islam did not result in immediate destruction of monasteries or in anything like the horrible massacres of monks that occurred later in north India”.

As far as the issue of associating religion of Buddha with idol-worship was concerned, it may be remembered that Buddha never proclaimed himself to be a God and after his death, he desired his teachings to be followed in right earnest. He also suggested that his teachings may be tested before following. He denied the conventional concept of God and affirmed the possibility of liberation entirely by personal efforts and assiduous labour upon oneself. He by all means refuted outer worship. From the beginning, he censured all rituals and other outer actions. Nowhere in his teaching is there even a hint of personal worship. He had said, “The Teaching is salvation not because it was given by Buddha and because it liberates, the pupil who follows Me, clinging to the edge of my garment, is far from Me and I from him .Why? Because this disciple does not see Me. Another one may live hundreds of miles distant from Me and inspite of this be close to Me and I to him. Why? Because this disciple understands the Teaching: understanding the Teaching, he understands Me.” (Itivuttaka p.90)

He was also against ostentatious rituals promoted by Brahmanism. It then becomes a rare possibility that he would have himself supported idol worship.

In fact initially for the same reason “monks themselves were least interested in the artistic activities. But it is believed later on those propagating Buddhism in Central Asia were soon to be followed by the artists from the northwest India. A Buddhist text speaks of an artist travelling from Puskaravati (Charsadda) to the neighbourhood of what is today Tashkent to embellish a monastery, in Miran, in eastern Chinese Turkestan, the name of the

²⁷ Joshi Lalmani, Studies in Buddhistic Culture of India, during the seventh and the eighth centuries AD, Motilal Banarsi Dass, first edition 1967, second edition 1977, Reprinted 1987, Delhi, p299

painter is mentioned as Tita, apparently identical with the Latin Titus, thus showing western connections.”²⁸

It was at Gandhara that the Hellenistic traditions combined with influences from India and Iran brought about one of the turning points in the history of Buddhist art.

Upto that period the Buddha himself had not been represented naturalistically. A footprint, a parasol, a bodhi tree had been used to indicate his presence. But it is at Gandhara and other important centre of Mathura, the image of the Buddha appears for the first time.”²⁹ According to Xuanzang, the first stupa which was to preserve the first relics of Buddha after the attainment of his Buddhahood was that built by Trapusa and Bhallika’s two merchants who hailed from a place called Asitanjana near Balkh region. The Mahavagga, an early text of the Pali Vinaya Pitaka, mentions that they offered Madhugolaka (or Madhupindika or sweet ball, probably prepared out of dry fruits as to be used for a long time when on journey) to the Buddha. This was the first morsel that the Buddha took after his Enlightenment. On this occasion, the Buddha gave them his first sermon and they entreated the Buddha to take them as his Upasakas or lay devotees.³⁰ After giving his hair relics it is believed he also gave them instructions of building a stupa, he folded his robes into squares, piled them and then topped it off with his inverted bowl (T.2087, 51:873a=Eng.trans.,Li1996:36) Buddhism and Islam existed side by side for centuries in many places, for instance in Bamiyan, where the ruler embraced Islam during the late 8th century, and it is where Buddhist monasteries were still functioning more than a hundred years later. Even long after remarkable revival of Buddhism was possible at Merv in the days of the Mongol invasion of the 13th century. Indeed close contacts seem to have persisted between the two religions over a long period of time. Some of the Buddhist texts have been identified that were translated into Persian by a Muslim author of the 14th century, thus showing that Buddhism was still alive at that time in Iran. In the field of architecture, Buddhism even influenced some of the characteristic building types of Islam. The theological schools (madrassah) for instance seem to have developed on the model of Buddhist monasteries.”³¹

²⁸ Oskar Von Hinuber, *Expansion to the North: Afghanistan and Central Asia in Buddhism-Buddhist Monks and Nuns in society and culture*, Thames Hudson, 1984, p105,

²⁹ *Ibid* p.105

³⁰ Upasak Prof CS, *Miscellaneous series II, History of Buddhism in Afghanistan*, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath, Varanasi, 1990, p206

³¹ Oskar Von Hinuber, *Expansion to the North: Afghanistan and Central Asia in Buddhism-Buddhist Monks and Nuns in society and culture*, Thames Hudson, 1984, p107

Buddhist Archeology in Delhi

A major breakthrough came in the history of Buddhism when in 1837 with the decipherment of the script on the Feroze Shah's pillar or lat by James Prinseps. A major Prinseps reading of what is today known as the Brahmi script and that its Prakrit language was the precursor of Pali and Sanskrit combined with the realization that the inscription carved on the fourth pillar newly discovered in northern Bihar was to all intents a copy of what was written on the pillars in Delhi and Allahabad. That led directly to the revelation that all the edicts found carved on large boulders and smoothly polished pillars throughout Indian subcontinent was the work of one man who called himself Piyadassi or 'Beloved of the Gods.' In that same year in 1837, the civil servant George Turnour in Ceylon produced the first translation of the ancient chronicle of the island known as Mahavamsa which revealed that Piyadassi was another name for the India's Buddhist Emperor Ashoka the Great. Prinsep presented his findings at a meeting of the Asiatic society of India. This generated academic interest and pioneered the movement for revival of Buddhism.

The tomb built by Illutmish in 1231 AD contained a number of massive lintels and an upright stone of railing pillar (vedika-stumbha) built into it which appears to have once adorned Buddhist stupa or religious edifice in the vicinity of Mehrauli (Delhi) towards the end of the 4th century or beginning of the 5th century AD. All of them carved in white spotted red sand stone remain now preserved in the Gupta gallery of the National Museum at New Delhi (nos, L457 to L461) They were acquired in the year 1963. These carved specimens from Delhi region seemed to have an important bearing on art traditions in the vicinity of Delhi during the Gupta period. It was few years ago that a number of early stone reliefs were found embedded into the masonry of a medieval Muslim structure at Delhi namely the tomb of Sultan Ghari distant about 8km southwest of Qutub Minar on the Mehrauli Palam Road. The impact of Buddhism appears to have survived in the other areas of Delhi as well. This is very well corroborated by the discovery of Sunga 2nd century BC railing pillar from the excavations at Mehrauli in 1912. It contains an excellent representation of salabhanjika.³² It bears a close affinity with the contemporary carvings from Bharhut and Sanchi. The existing stone relief measuring about 43 inches in height remains now preserved in the National Museum at New Delhi (No. 59.539; fig)

The original figure was broader but it was reconverted for a subsequent use. On both sides there were carved oval socket holes for the crossbars, the preserved socket measuring about 30.5 in height and 10cm in width, all that was enough to prove the existence

³² Agrawala VS, A New Yakshi image from Mehrauli, Journal of UP Historical Society XXIV-XXV 1951-52 p 191f and plate (Represented in VS Agrawala studies in India Art Varanasi 1965, p102f) It was previously exhibited as No. A 29 in the fort museum at Delhi)

of an enclosure for some religious structure probably a stupa in the vicinity of Mehrauli. Artistically, also the carving of the yaksi figure is quite exquisite and charming. A few Sunga terracotta human figurines were being excavated from the the Purana Qila area in Delhi.

Concluding, it can be said that as per the evidences available, the capital of India was once an important centre of Buddhism. The followers of Saadh sect and finding of Asokan edict and other Archaeological evidence confirm that Delhi and its adjoining areas which formed the Kuru kingdom had a Buddhist presence of remarkable significance in the early times.

Trans-Border Trading Routes and Development of Trade in Kinnaur District, (H.P) with Special Reference to Kinnaura Tribe

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Abstract

The Kinnaura tribal community has been considered to be one of the Scheduled Tribes of the State of Himachal Pradesh under the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution by the President of India as per the Scheduled Areas (Himachal Pradesh) order, dated 21st November, 1975. The Kinnaur district derived its name from a tribe called as Kinnaura tribe also known as Kinners having a mongoloid origin. The inhabitants of the region have deep roots in Indian mythology, legend and literature. The region formerly a part of the native state of Bashahr, was known as Chini Tehsil of Mahasu district. On 1st May 1960 it came into being as an independent district comprising Chini Tehsil and fourteen villages of Rampur Tehsil of the earlier Mahasu district which now form a part of Shimla district. Kinnaur region is on the international border with the Tibet region of China which makes it strategically important border area in respect of Indo-China relation. The very sustenance of the people depends upon their economy. One of the main occupations of the people of Kinnaura tribe has been trade. Kinnauras had trade relations with the neighbouring areas from time immemorial. With the changing political dimensions and economic situations the trade growth in the area went through certain phases. The present study intends to recreate the broad picture of the trading activities carried out in past, and how it suffered a setback after the Chinese occupation of Tibet and inhospitable geographical conditions, which led to slow growth of trade activities in the area. In the study both secondary and primary sources such as gazetteers, census records, statistical data, travelogues, and newspaper reports has been used. The survey was conducted in the area to substantiate the study. Both qualitative and quantitative method has been adopted to bring out an objective analysis on the subject. In recent years with government initiative and opening up of the area to the world, the trade activities got build up, yet the region has lot of potential for enhanced trade activities, for which some added measures need to be taken.

The barter system of trade was used initially by Kinnaura traders, along with an age-old system of inter-family dealings between different communities. The institution has survived numerous years as an integral part of the traditional social set up for the inherit quality of the mutual benefit. It has been the traditional sanctified symbiotic system,

on which the local socio-economic set up has been subsisting. Under this system, the people have been mutually exchanging the commodities surplus with them for their own use, and not for being traded away. In fact, until the establishment of colonial administrative set up, very little trade and commerce in the modern sense of term existed in most of the hill states (Minhas, 1998, p.112).

Early Trade Routes and Travellers

Most of the trade in the past was carried along bridle paths laid in the valley, mountain spurs and high mountain passes leading to different centers. The “silk road” has been the most famous network of trade routes as it connected China, Central Asia, and India. *Shipki La* was part of the ancient silk route established during the rule of China’s Han dynasty. Indo-China trade was conducted through *Shipki La*, this mountain pass connected Himachal’s remote Kinnaur district to China’s, and it is still in use. Manirang pass was the historical trade route, it led to the Ropa village in Kinnaur. Initially the Kinnauras and Spitiens exchanged produce through this high route. The pass is now in complete disuse as trade is carried out via motorable roads (Kapadia, 1999, p.127). There are other significant, ancient trade routes between these regions, one such trade route, known informally as the “wool road”, connected the plains of the Punjab in India to Tibet, Central Asia and China. The “woolroad”, which was really merely a donkey track, was the traditional main trade route in the region, and was so important that it was later widened to motorable width to boost trade in the region and came to be known as the Hindustan-Tibet road. It was believed, that if some moderate assistance in opening the roads through the most difficult passes be given, a very direct and easy intercourse might be opened between the plains, on the banks of the Satluj and the Chinese dominions on the north-east of the Himalayan range (Singh, 1998, pp.190-91).

All travellers in the course of 19th centuries like Fraser, Alexander Gerard, Thomas Thomson, Rahul Sankrityayan, A. Wilson and many others spoke of the Kinnaur trade and how it had brought affluence in the area. James Fraser made a detailed enquiry about the trade and manufacturers of Bushahr in 1814 (Datta, 1997, p. 55). Fraser observed in the journal of his tour through Himalayas, the favourable circumstance of extensive trading forays of the Kanauras which arose chiefly from the country’s geographical situation and the peculiarly commercial turn of its people. Traders from Kinnaur had to suffer several hardships, Fraser felt that want of capital, as well as difficulty of access cramped their speculations (Singh, 1998, pp. 190-91). The traders from Kinnaur carried trade not only with the plains and the neighbouring Chinese provinces, but they were also chief carriers between Gartok (trade market in Tibet), Ladakh and Kashmir, and even pushed their commercial enterprises as far as Lhasa (Tibet). They also exchanged commodities, with the merchants of the neighbouring states. Fraser met several people who had from their youth been engaged in their commercial enterprises (Datta, 1997, p. 55). European travellers mentioned that polyandry was frequent, thus it freed at least one brother who could be absent for long periods from their homes (Negi, 1976, p. 22).

Kennedy in 1824 has remarked “in Kunawar the people chiefly subsist by trade... the prosperity of Bussahir mainly depends upon this trade”(Bajpai, 1981, p. 86). Alexander Gerard pointed out in 1841 “The Koonawurees are all traders and their chief riches consist in large flocks of sheep and goats that furnish them with wool, together with raisins, they exchange for grains”(Gerard, 1993, p. 79). According to Sir H. David Kinnauras have been very enterprising people. “The people of the north are active traders, proceeding to Leh for *charas* and to Gardok for shawl wool, giving in exchange money, clothes and spices. The mountain paths are scarcely practicable for laden mules, and merchandise is carried chiefly on the backs of sheep and goats”(Minhas, 1998, pp. 68-69). According to Thomas Thomson “the Rampur town has a good deal of trade with Tibet, principally in shawl wool and is the seat of a small manufacture of white soft shawl cloth” (Ibid., p. 113). Cunningham too holds a similar view and has pointed out that the people of Kinnaur dominated both the long distance as well as local trade (Chauhan, 2000, p. 117). Punjab Government Records of 1911 shows that the Kinnauras were engaged in trade and commerce. Prosperity of these people was chiefly due to trade (Minhas, 1998, p. 70).

T.S Negi called traders of Kinnaur “of a sort” as though they had been practicing trading over the numerous generations, yet they lack, mostly speaking, the grasping instinct and the amassing passion of the born money-lover. A strict balance sheet might often have shown either a loss or only a thin margin of profit. Fine accounting has never been an average Kinnaura strong point. However satisfaction of trading and travelling was always there (Negi, 1976, p. 22). The early explorers and officials had hoped that with the construction of Hindustan- Tibet and other hill roads, import of shawl wool and other articles into the Shimla Hill States would increase enormously (Datta, 1997, p. 325). Thus all these remarks made by different travellers at different point in time depict that Kinnaura as traders had established a reputation of being honest, enterprising and reliable. It also provides evidence that people of Kinnaur were indulging in trading activities from very beginning. Their reach was extensive, as they visited different countries despite having inadequate means of transportation.

History of Trade in Kinnaur

The Rajas of Bushahr and the former rulers of Kinnaur recognized fairly the importance of trade from very beginning. Soon after the Gurkha War in 1815, the British East India Company made enquiries about the trade potential of the hill regions, particularly of the Bushahr state (Bajpai, 1981, p. 86). Trade in Bushahr state was dominated by the people of Kinnaur (Chauhan, 2000, p. 117). As prospects of income was little in Kinnaur region at that time, thus Kinnauras indulged in trade for additional earnings.

Trade with Neighbouring States and Tibet: In winter many Kinnaurians used to visit Rampur with wool, and few went to the plains to purchase merchandise for the markets of Garoo (Gartok) and Leh, and also visited the fair at Haridwar. All their merchandise went

upon horses, mules, asses, yaks, goats, and sheep; many rode upon horseback (Gerard, 1993, p. 80). They not only went to nearby Tibetan territories, whereas numerous out of them annually went to central Tibet, to Yarkand, Lahore, Delhi and Calcutta and to Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal (Negi, 1976, p. 23). Trade with Ladakh was also much in progress. Silver was purchased at Ladakh and was sold in Bushahr, (Bajpai, 1981, p. 87), and saffron was brought from Kashmir (Verma, 2002, p. 28).

Trade and commerce relations between Kinnaur and Tibet were mentioned in detail in Settlement Report drafted for the old Chini tehsil of erstwhile Bushahr State (*Gazetteer of India* 1971, p. 184). In the Shimla District Gazetteer, it is stated that the inhabitants of three out of the five *parganas* of Kinnaur i.e. *Tukpa*, *Shva* and *Shaikar* traded directly with Tibet (Chauhan, 2000, 135). In the Tibetan-Ladakh-Mughal war of 1681-83, Raja Kehri Singh of Bushahr had sided with Tibet and forced its ruler to enter into a commercial treaty. No transit duty was levied on the goods exported to Tibet and there were little or no restraints on traffic along the Hindustan- Tibet road (Verma, 2002, p. 28). Before proceeding far in the Tibetan-Ladakh marts, the traders were required to obtain licenses from the authority and get them registered at Wangtu in Bushahr. It was formally a custom that each trader should exchange presents with the Garpon's governors at Gartok on every visit to Tibet. Paraws i.e. the posts were maintained at different places, so that the traders and travellers could spend the night safely (Minhas, 1998, p. 74). At one time it is said that more than 150 Kinnauras households regularly engaged themselves in trading activities, besides 250 other families' travelled occasionally to Tibet every year to exchange on barter system products, from their respective areas (*Gazetteer of India* 1971, p.184). Formerly the people of Kinnaur used to visit Western Tibet, along with their flocks of goats and sheep during the summer months. They used to come down even to Amritsar during the winter months to sell Tibetan goods and buy whatever they felt had a market back in Tibet and elsewhere (Rahul, 1969, p. 39).

The chief imports from Tibet comprised of *pashm*, *beangi* wool, goats and sheep, salt, borax, *numdahs*, carpets and *charas*. *Nerbussee* a medicinal drug reckoned a cure for snake bite and most disorders was brought from Nepal (Verma, 2002, p. 28). It was sold to Kinnauras at 3 pieces for a rupee. Goat producing shawl wool were purchased at the rate of two rupees each and sold for 3 rupees in Kinnaur (Bajpai, 1981, p. 87). The sheep and goats, wheat and even rice were imported. The merchandise for the Tibetan customers used to be cereals, fruits, cloth, *gur*, sugar and other portable necessities of life and civilization (Negi, 1976, p. 22). From Kinnaur area the *ghee* trade seems to have a different direction and moved towards Tibet and Ladakh (Singh, 1998, p. 194). Kinnaur and a few other places in Shimla hills were rich in iron ore. The former supplied smelting iron to Spiti and even exported it to Tibet (Ibid., p. 187). Much of opium was sent to plains, a portion of it was probably carried to Tibet and Ladakh through Kinnaur and Lahaul respectively (Ibid.,

p. 196). Traditionally trade and commerce relations between Kinnaur and Western Tibet had largely depended on export of the produce of the plains and import of wool, *pashmina*, goats and sheep, gold dust and precious stones (*Census 1991*, p. 18). Chini traders sold foodgrains, sugar, cloth etc in Tibet (*Gazetteer of India 1971*, p. 184). The only attempted assessment of trade with Tibet was made by J.D Cunningham. He evaluated the export trade from Tibet to Rampur in rough monetary terms as Rs 55,529 in 1837; 66,763 in 1838; 91445 in 1840 and 19,679 in 1841 respectively.¹

Imports and Exports Items

The prosperity of the state and in particular of the people of the Kinnaur depended on the import-export business. The Kinnauras used to import several items of trade from the Indian plains and exported them to Tibet and Ladakh on substantial profits (Minhas, 1998, p. 70). Salt and wool were imported from far off Tibet, they were the chief commodities of barter. Fraser in his account of the early 19th century refers to salt import into Kinnaur from Tibet. This is further supported by the reference contained in the State Gazetteer (Singh, 1998, p. 199). They imported from Gartok rock salt the people of Kinnaur take it in barter for drug (a sort of raisin) and wheat at equal quantities. Salt when brought from Kinnaur to Rampur sold per seer for 4 seer rice (Bajpai, 1981, p. 173). An importer of wool was also mentioned by Fraser, he refers to the blankets sent out to the other hill states (Singh, 1998, pp. 190-91). Talking about imports Gerard mentioned that the Kinnaurians used to bring back Kesur or saffron, coarse shawls manufactured in Ladakh, Numdas or felts, Dochuks, ingots of silver, *soom* a kind of blanket dyed red and blue, *thermas*, *goodmas*, *punkhees* and *pushmeenas*, woollen stuffs, shawl wool, *bulghar* or *bulkhal* or skins of red Russian leather, Tincal and Borex (Gerard, 1993, p. 182). Beangee, the produce of the tartar sheep and goats, gold dust, tea, a few shawl goats and Beangee sheep, a large tartar dog of a very ferocious breed which guard their flocks from panthers, leopards, and other wild beasts, were also imported (Ibid., p. 184).

Numbers of things were exported from Kinnaur, in the beginning, Fraser refers to the export of "corn" from Kinnaur to "Bootan" (Singh, 1998, p. 201). Traveller Gerard had mentioned the export import business of the Kinnaur people in detail. He mentioned the items of exports "the Koonawurees take to Ludak, Kharwa strong red and white cotton cloths, *chintzes*, a little broad cloth, silks, *gongs* (metallic instrument used by Lamas in their devotion), copper, brass pots, matchlocks, straight swords, *sabres*, shields, bows and

¹ Jogishvar Singh. (1990) edited "A brief survey of village gods and their moneylending operations in Kinnaur district of Himachal Pradesh; along with earlier importance of trade with Tibet". *Wissenschaftsgeschichte und gegenwärtige Forschungen in Nordwest-Indien*. Edited by Gudrun Meier and Lydia Icke-Schwalbe.

Heidelberg: Retrieved from <http://www.ladakhstudies.org/filesresources.html>. 25RROL3singh.pdf p. 246.

arrows, knives, scissors, spectacles, looking glasses, and *sunkhs* (sacred shells used by the Hindus and Lamas)”(Gerard, 1993, p. 181). Crystals, precious stones, sandal-wood, *porwa* or vessels of juniper-wood made at Sangnam and Ropa was an item of export from Kinnaur(Singh, 1998, p. 194). Other items being indigo, oil, tobacco, rice, wheat, barley, walnuts, apples, raisins, almonds, *shungtee* or *neoza*, pistachio nut, cardamoms, *misree*, *goorh*, *cheenee* and *shakur*, four different kinds of sugar, sheep and goat and *rakh*, a spirituous liquor distilled from the grape in Kinnaur(Gerard, 1993, p. 182).The Kinnauras used to take same things to Gartok, as they brought to Leh, with the exclusion of goats and sheep, which were abundant in that country (Bajpai, 1981, p. 173). The principle exports included wool, *patu*, blankets, *pashmina*, *neoza*, *zira*, asafetida (*heeng*), *bhojpatra*, opium, *kadu*, *patish*, *dhoop*, honey, *ghee*, apricots, raisin, yak’s tails and *mohra*. To Tibet mostly cotton cloth, coarse and fine agricultural instruments, sugar, sugar candy, firearms, horseshoes, saddles, swords, *sabres*, shields, knives, scissors was exported (Verma, 2002, p. 28).

Trade in Colonial Times

After establishing their control over the Shimla Hill States, the British encouraged the import of shawl-wool from west Tibet into their possessions. The company established a small commercial centre at Kotgarh in the Bushahr state, where shawl wool was brought by the traders in small quantities from Tibet through Kinnaur. The article on its arrival here was packed and sent to England. But soon Tibetan authorities prohibited the Europeans crossing the frontier and did not allow export of shawl-wool into territories. After being encouraged by the British Government, the people of Kinnaur found to their advantage to extend their commerce in wool. They started improving some of the most frequented footpaths which passes through Kinnaur(Datta, 1997, pp. 56-57).

In the summer of 1821, Gerard noticed that several places that were formerly scarcely practicable for travellers ‘had been repaired so as to be passable with some difficulty by loaded sheep, several of which were brought to Rampur, which had scarcely ever been attempted before. In July 1821, during his halt near the Shipkila, Gerard heard many complaints from the Kinnauras about the need of having a direct communication between the banks of the Satluj. The Sango Bridge near Namptoo had broken in 1819 by the decay of rock that supported it and the only intercourse between contiguous tracts of country of an hour’s journey was by circuit of six or seven days. Gerard remarked that such a state of affairs was not conducive to the promotion of trade and this was a matter of attention of the Government, and one in which a little British influence would have the positive effects. The transit of shawl wool by this route was of itself a consideration, worthy of support and without which the present experimental arrangements, for the supply of the market will be unfairly estimated. Without the good roads, and a facility of access, no commercial and trading intercourse can be advantageously maintained (Ibid., p. 57).

Trade after Independence

Number of people recorded engaged in trade and commerce in Kinnaur in the year 1961 were just 91 male members(*Census of India 1961*, p. 158). The flourishing Indo-Tibet trade till 1962 offered rich alternative avenues of employment to Kinnauras working as mule transporters, between the two regions. It has been their traditional occupation for many generations. Groups of villages and distinct areas have had their fixed marts in Tibet. The traders had advantage over traders elsewhere, as the rates at which they barter their goods, have been fixed by an old agreement, inscribed on a copper plate. Fluctuations in the market, mainly the result of supply variation, did not affect them(Chopra, 1984, p. 116). The seasonal mobility was born, out of geographic compulsions and the border situation of the areas. With the occupation of Tibet by the Chinese and imposition of rigid restrictions, like refusal to accept transactions in any other currency, except Chinese for which there were no banking facilities(*Gazetteer of India*, 1971, p. 185). The once flourishing trade gradually diminished and finally discontinued, when the border was sealed as a consequence of Indo-China war of 1962.

The interruption of the Indo-Tibetan trade affected the people, who chiefly depended on trade for their livelihood, especially the people of upper Kinnaur. This political development however, did not cause much of an adverse effect on the local economy; the former traders soon indulged in some or the other ventures. Re-orientation of economy came about mostly through cash crops and fruit culture. Further, road construction and opening up of the area in 1989 provided needed diversification. Though Kinnauras especially those living in upper Kinnaur believe that their economic salvation lies in the restoration of tax free trade with Tibet. It must be pointed out here that Kinnauras are sympathizers of Tibetans but are opposed to Chinese, whose aggression and occupation of Tibet put an end to their old trade with neighbouring Tibet(Chib, 1984, p. 48).

(Chopra, 1984, p. 117)observed that in views of traders they should have been allowed for a couple of years more and then given the chance to taper off instead of being abruptly cut. Also the restriction was not applied uniformly, and the timed information seems not to have been sent to the valleys that the export of wheat and rice to Tibet had been banned by the Government of India. The policy seems not to have been uniform either about the routes or commodities. There were several loopholes in the policy initially.

Government Initiatives

The Rajasthan Weight and Measures (Enforcement) Act, 1958 was extended to Himachal Pradesh by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. After 1962, 1st April the use of old weight became illegal under the statutory act. The metric system of weight and measures has now come in vogue(*Gazetteer of India* 1971, p. 191). For the rehabilitation of the displaced traders, the government had started co-operative marketing and supply federation through which traders can obtain loans for their business etc. Two

societies have done substantial rehabilitation work, they are Rang Foch Simant Cooperative Society with headquarters at Pooh has been transporting supplies, for the local people as well as the army. Also Kinnaur District Cooperative Transport Society has been transporting goods to the remote areas of Kinnaur in jeeps and trucks. Some are getting engaged in alternate business, such as opening of shops, owing of improved breeds of sheep etc. Grant of interest-free loans is greatly helping in mitigating their problems of resettlement. To meet the requirements of wool for the people of the area for domestic consumption, the Animal Husbandry Department has started sheep breeding farms and sheep wool extension centers at different places(*Gazetteer of India* 1971, p. 185).

With the development of the means of communication and availability of the vehicular transport, centers of business are springing up at Kalpa, Karchham and Tapri. The cooperative societies, small production cum training centers and Khadi Gram Udyog centers are looking after the local products like *gudmas*, shawls, wool, *neoza*, *zira* etc. for the purpose whole district has been covered with activities to raise the marketing texture. There are wholesale dealers along the National Highway at Wagtu, Tapri, Pawari, Jhula and Pooh(Ibid., pp.188-189). With a view to subsidizing the transport charges of foodgrains, a transport subsidy was sanctioned by the government in 1960-61. Subsidized as well as non-subsidized foodgrains are processed from outside the district to meet the local demand of the people. Foodgrains and other essential commodities are distributed through fair price shops, at comparatively cheaper rates. Such shops are located at Wangtu, Nachar, Tapri, Sangla, Kalpa, Morang, Pooh and Kanum. These are supervised by the district inspector circle inspectors of the Cooperative Department(Ibid., p. 190).

For the dissemination of trade news, radio is mentionable as daily broadcasts were made from All India Radio, Shimla, on wholesale prices, weekly review of prices showing their trend, which greatly help the producer, consumers and the traders. A few newspapers in circulation provide information about the trend of prices. The agricultural marketing section of the Agricultural Department, Himachal Pradesh issues a monthly bulletin, for circulation in the district offices, which contain information on current wholesale prices, price trends of different agricultural commodities etc. a fortnight bulletin indicating trend of prices is published by the Director of Economics and Statistics, Himachal Pradesh. There is no merchant and consumer association, not even labour association so far in the area(Ibid.,).

Number of people recorded engaged in trade and commerce in Kinnaur in the year 1961 were just 91 male members which according to 1971 census increased to 349 persons. Thus the percentage of workers involved in trade and commerce in Kinnaur were 1.16 percent by 1971(*Statistical Outline of Himachal Pradesh*, 1977,pp. 32-33). On 7th September 1993, after a gap of thirty one years a trade agreement was signed between the Indian prime minister and his Chinese counterpart. It provided for the resumption of inter-

border trade between the two countries, mainly on the traditional lines. India according to agreement, may import wool, goatskins, *pashmina*, yak tails, goats, sheep, horses, salt, china clay, butter and silk in exchange for the traditional Indian merchandise. In pursuance of that agreement, trade between the two countries was once again resumed on 16th July 1994, at Jiuba the venue of trade-mart in Tibet. On that occasion 63 Indian traders crossed over the Tibetan territory from Chuppan in Namgia village of Kinnaur (point fixed for trading in Indian side) with 27 mule-loads of traditional commodities of trade, besides some new items. Incidentally no Chinese trader could reach the mart on that occasion for sudden collapse of a bridge at Lapshak on the Satluj and blockade of track (Minhas, 1998, p. 152). Even now Tibetan traders are hesitant to travel to India, in the wake of Chinese security restrictions on the borders. Also the Tibetans visiting India are being seen with suspicion in China, more because Tibet's spiritual and the temporal head the Dalai Lama was given asylum by the Indian government, after he fled from Tibet in 1962, when the Chinese troops marched to Lhasa. It was however hoped that the inter-border activities will pick up once again at Jiuba in Tibet and Chuppan in India.

Current Scenario

Percentage of persons recorded engaged in trade and commerce in Kinnaur by 1991 are 2.32 percent. The percentage of Males doing trade activities are 3.36 percent and percentage of females involved were just 0.21 percent (*Census* 1991, p. XIV). In Nichar, Kalpa and Pooh it was noticed that there was no increase in retail. Traders partially agree that there had been development of priority sectors in Kinnaur (Gupta, 2007, p. 161). The traders seemed unsatisfied with the schemes implemented by the Government as these schemes have not benefitted them immensely.

With time the export and import items of the area have also altered. Now the main items exported from Kinnaur are apples, apricots, potato, walnuts, almonds, *neoza*, certain herbal roots and *dhoop*, timber, (*Census* 1991, p. 18) and *rajmash*. *kuth sanssuria lappal* is a cash crop cultivated mainly in Kinnaur and other parts. It has been established that the roots of this plants have great medicinal value and can also be used as an insecticide. It is exported to countries like Japan, Hongkong, Vietnam, UK, U.S.A and France at a high remunerative rate of about Rs 6,000 per tonne (Chauhan, 1997, p. 326). The district imports cotton cloth, food grains, sugar, leather goods, utensils, and other materials of daily use (*Census* 1991, p. 18). The article of import outnumbered those exported.

The 400-year-old Lavi Fair which started initially in the name of *Loi*, (a kind of local blanket) is losing its charm with improvement in communication, ensuring year-round availability of essential goods, even in the remotest of villages. In the olden days, when the barter system was in vogue, the *Lavi mela* was an international fair. Traders from as far as Nepal, Kandhar, Tibet and China, besides India, converged on Rampur where tribesmen exchanged their produce for salt, tea leaves *jaggery* and other necessities. The fair has

undergone a sea change in recent years, with a large-scale entry of modern goods which are edging out traditional items like *pashmina* wool, *kalazira*, *chilgoza*, walnut, almonds and other dry fruits. In fact, these items, which dominated the fair for centuries, are now confined to a small section of the *mela* (The Tribune, 2000).

The trade route sealed in 1962 was re-opened in 1994 as a result of an agreement between India and China. With that some restrictions and preventive measures were taken from both sides. Total volume of trade in first year touched Rs 37 lakh (Hindustan Times, Nov, 2013). Presently for maximum period of 72 hours only Indian traders can stay at Tibet for trading. *Shipki* Trade Centre is a meeting place for Indian and Tibetan traders. There are arrangements of shelter for Indian traders, but like before they cannot visit villages of Tibet and have to display their items at the stalls assigned. The trading pass is valid for 6 months i.e. from June to November. These restrictions have been laid by Chinese government, so that there is no exploitation and use of grazing grounds by Indian traders. There was 2 % tax in around 1986, later increased to 3 percent, now it is 10%. Discontinuation of import of *chiggu* (*pashmina* goat) to India has been made. Still barter system is in practice, though currency is also used on borders. Shri Amar Singh Negi, age 83, resident of Namgia village of Kinnaur traded with Tibet between the years (1994-2000). He believes that the quality of product imported from Tibet has decreased over years. There was only marginal profit in trade. Thus he believes that other economic avenues are more suitable for the Kinnauras in present time.

Travel Pass





Figure 1: Travel Pass belongs to Shri Amar Singh Negi, Issued by Government of India.

After witnessing slowdown for almost 20 years, the Indo-China trade through historic *Shipki La* Pass in Kinnaur district has entered the new productive phase. The trade lately has touched new heights despite some restrictions imposed by Centre. The twelve new trade items, including carpets, spices, handloom goods, herbal medicines, shoes and readymade garments, were added to the list in 2012 by the central government(*The Tribune*, 2015). Earlier, the trade was limited to 15 items. In 2012, goods worth Rs 90 lakhs were exported by the 45 Indian traders who made 180 trips into Tibet through the *ShipkiLa* Pass. From Tibet's side, goods worth Rs 62 lakhs were imported into India. According to officials of Industries Department, Indian exports through the pass were Rs. 7.6 crores between June and November in 2013. Despite the ban on livestock items which were considered as major component of Indo-China trade. Indian tobacco topped the trading list previously, while an industries official said that lately hand-woven Indian carpets were in high demand in China, as due to labour shortage in China it mostly concentrates, on machine-made carpets. The Indian government had been insisting on china to reduce import duty on carpets from 20 % to 5%(*Hindustan Times*, Dec, 2013).



India-China cross-border trade through *Shipki La* in the year 2015 had total turnover of over Rs 9.72 crore, the highest ever since it resumed in 1994. The trade registered a growth of 22% as goods worth Rs 4.36 crore were imported from China, while items worth Rs 5.36 crore were exported. In 2014, the trade between the two neighboring countries registered a turnover of Rs 7.32 crore. In 2015, Indian-woven carpets, shawls, blankets and *ayurvedic* medicines were in high demand in China. Cashmere wool, a fibre obtained from

cashmere goats reared in remote areas of Tibet, was much preferred by the Indian traders. Besides, yak hair, which is used for making ceremonial whisks and adorning deities across Kinnaur, Lahaul-Spiti, Shimla, Kullu and Mandi districts, topped the trading list. The figures, collected by the industries department in Kinnaur, reflected high demand for China-manufactured ready-made garments.

According to government officials in Kinnaur one of the major reasons for the trade taking the leap is that, the government had given import export code (IEC) - necessary for import and export of goods - to the traders. In the absence of the IEC, the traders had to pay Rs 25,000 each to the customs department -a temporary post at Namgia - for a single cross-border trade(*Hindustan Times*, Dec,2015).Kinnauri traders though are not fully satisfied with quality of the products imported from Tibet, and with the increase in tax over years.

Suggestions

- To boost the trade prospect in future, more items can be added in the import and export list. It can include the tribal artifacts, handicrafts and restriction on livestock trade could be lifted which would lead to substantial increase in imports and exports.
- Road development can give further push to the production of goods and to the trade of Kinnaur.
- Better range and quality of things, high yield of fruit products can prove helpful for traders to improve their economic condition further.
- Moreover to impetus the inter-border activities the formalities undergone while issuing trading license/passes, security restrictions could be made more lenient. It will encourage more people to indulge in trading activities without any kind of hesitation.

Conclusion

The Kinnaura people from time immemorial have inclination towards trading activities. They even reached far off places despite the insufficiency of roads and proper transportation. Due to low key in India-China relations after Indo-China war of 1962 the trade activities in Kinnaur were affected to some extent. With the Government initiatives and schemes trade was once again encouraged. Lately it has been observed that Kinnauri produces have made a market for themselves especially through cash crops and fruit culture. Due to the growing popularity of Kinnauri products, they have managed to attract many traders from all over India like Delhi, Punjab, and Mumbai. These traders sometimes collect the product right from their doorsteps. It has made trading process easier, as they don't have to worry about the transportation and getting their product safely to the market. Moreover they don't have to depend on the middleman, which sometimes was the cause for their exploitation. They also get highly paid which has improved their economic condition. With government initiatives inter border trade with China has started, flourishing in recent years which will prove beneficial to Kinnaur and its people.

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Effect Of Paired Reciprocal Reading On Deficits In Reading Comprehension Among Children

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To be able to read is a boon and to comprehend what has been read is a bigger boon. For being able to read in any language, one should have had listened to that language in infancy and early childhood, one should have good sight reading skills, good visual perception and visual sequencing skills. Reading is one of the essential skills which a human being must possess in present times. Good reading comprehension increases chances of good achievement in most school subjects. Hence importance of reading comprehension and determining ways to enhance it can never be overestimated.

Researchers have devoted attention to the area of reading since long. Lot of research has been directed to investigate effectiveness of collaborative and cooperative set ups in various areas of school learning. Paired learning is one such set up. Sometimes it is also referred to as partner reading. In this study reciprocity in paired reading was a key element in the process of intervention.

Johnson, Johnson and Smith (1991) pointed out that during the past 90 years; more than 600 studies have been conducted using cooperating learning with different age subjects, in different subject areas and in different environments. We know far more about the efficacy of collaborative learning than we know about lecturing.

Johnson, Maruyama, Johnson, Nelson and Scon (1981) conducted a meta-analysis of 122 studies related to cooperative learning. They concluded that there was strong evidence for the superiority of cooperative learning in promoting achievement over competitive and individualistic strategies.

Collaborative learning has been found to be an effective technique for a) reading comprehension (Stevens, Slavin and Farnish, 1991; Klinger, Vaughn and Schumm, 1998; Rahman, 2001; Klinger, Vaughn, Arguelles, Hughes and Leftwich, 2004 and Vaughn, Klinger, Swanson, Boardman, Roberts, Mohammed and Stillman-Spisak, 2011), b) English Grammar (Yadav and Garcha, 2013), c) reading achievement in inclusive class room (Frank and Kathleen, 2008), for achievement in Science (Pandey and Kishore, 2003), and for Environmental science and English (Bansal, 2014) and many other school subjects beside these.

MacGillivray and Hawes (1994) noted that partner reading requires students to rely less on the teacher and more on themselves. Their class participated in a 5-month study with an ethnically diverse student population. From field observations, the researchers developed role sets to assign to students. For example, coworkers, fellow artists, teacher/student, and boss/employee were some of the role sets utilized. The students then began to fill these roles at the time of peer reading. The role sets helped the researchers see patterns during peer reading that offered insights into how children viewed themselves and their reading process. They found that students enjoyed reading and writing with each other, discussing the books, and role-playing. The social interaction had a positive impact on the researchers' classroom.

Daley (2005) also found that mutual book talks instead of individual writing responses help students comprehend text. Cox (2010) used partner reading successfully to increase reading comprehension scores.

Paliscar and Brown (1984) developed reciprocal teaching. It is a cooperative technique that allows for student pairs to participate in a dialogue about text. Partners take turns reading and asking questions from each other and receiving immediate feedback. Such a model allows students to use important metacognitive techniques such as clarifying, questioning, predicting, and summarizing. It embraces the idea that students can effectively learn from each other. Reciprocal teaching as a technique for reading comprehension has been found to be effective (Paliscar & Brown, 1984; Westera & Moore, 1995; Bess, 1998; Cooper & Greive, 2009; Dilorenzo, 2010; Freihat & Makhzoomi, 2012; Namaghi & Shahhosseini, 2011) for a variety of settings.

The present study was conducted to find out the effect of paired reciprocal reading on deficits in reading comprehension among students of sixth grade in English language. Based on literature available, researchers hypothesized that paired reciprocal reading will enhance reading comprehension among subjects.

IMETHODOLOGY

The study was experimental in nature. It was conducted in a school of Barpeta district in Assam.

DESIGN: The study made use of pre test- post test control group design with one experimental group. Subjects in this group experienced intervention of paired reciprocal reading in English. Length of each session was about half an hour.

SAMPLE:

Size: Sample comprised 20 subjects of VI grade who had sub-average level of reading comprehension.

Nature: In present research, subjects were studying in sixth grade. Both boys and girls were part of the sample. Their age ranged from 12-13 years.

Procedure of sample selection: One school was selected randomly from a list of schools. Subjects with deficits in reading comprehension were selected purposively by administering a paragraph in English to them having ten questions at the bottom. Each question was assigned two marks. The mean obtained by the class was 13.2. Children who scored below mean score were selected. This led to identification of 29 subjects with reading comprehension deficits. 20 subjects were selected randomly out of these identified subjects. Out of these twenty subjects, ten each formed experimental and control group. Allotment of subjects to experimental and control group was done randomly.

Technique of sample selection: One school was selected randomly from a list of schools. From a total sample of 29 children with reading comprehension deficits, selected purposively, 20 children were taken randomly for the study. Ten subjects each were allotted randomly to experimental and control groups.

TOOLS AND MATERIALS : A test to assess reading comprehension was prepared. A paragraph containing a story was written with ten questions to be answered by subjects. These questions would assess the reading comprehension of the subjects. Each question was assigned two marks.

For intervention, 10 paragraphs were chosen from text book of English of class sixth standard of Assam. These paragraphs were to be learnt by each pair by reciprocal reading. Care was taken to select the paragraphs with average difficulty level. This ensured that learning material was not beyond the capability of children with reading comprehension deficits.

PROCEDURE OF DATA COLLECTION:

10 children of experimental group were divided into five pairs. Pairing was done after considering reading capabilities as mentioned by Daley (2005). To start with, each pair had two academic tasks to be performed, one for each member of the pair. The students were rotated once to be members of other pairs after completion of at least one pair of tasks so that each pair of subjects had taken turns to read. This redistributed the benefits of interactive potentials of subjects. Students were free to choose any task, while taking care not to repeat and to complete all ten tasks.

Reciprocal reading meant students working in pairs, the teacher and the taught. Essential elements were- reading a passage by both, the student (the taught) to provide summary, the other student(teacher) to clarify on the basis of summary (if need be), the taught to provide answers to questions specified at the end of the passage. Repetition of all steps for another passage after reversing the roles was done. Both contributed to success of each other.

Each member of the pair assumed the role of teacher for one task and role of student for another task. An academic task comprised learning paragraph by reading and answering the questions thereafter. Number of questions in each task varied from six to nine. Researchers ensured that each pair understood the task before commencement of experimental sessions. Number of sessions which each pair took to complete total ten paragraphs varied, though not to large extent. Minimum number of sessions taken to learn was ten.

Scores on reading comprehension test administered to identify subjects initially served as pre-test also. After intervention of paired reciprocal reading using 10 paragraphs, same reading comprehension test was administered to subjects for obtaining post test measures of reading comprehension.

Ten children in control group continued their routine learning of English language. Care was taken to prevent diffusion from taking place, till the end of experiment, i.e. post test.

II DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

To analyze data, mean, standard deviation and student's t-test have been used. To compare pre test and post test scores of a group, t-test for co-related means was used whereas to compare control group and experimental group t-test for independent means was used.


Following table presents details of means and variability

Table I Details of means and variability

Groups	Pre-test	Post test	Difference
Experimental	10.23(1.27)	13.10(1.22)	2.87
Control	11.50(1.43)	12.00(1.55)	0.50
Difference	1.27	1.10	

Difference in mean scores of experimental and control group is in favor of control group at the time of pre-test. This difference reversed at the time of post-test in favor of experimental group. The variability in experimental group reduced slightly from pre-test to post test stage whereas in control group it increased from pre-test to post stage. The means of experimental and control group are different in the beginning at pre-test stage, with control group having higher value with higher variability also. At the time of post test, control group had lower mean score with higher variability whereas experimental group had higher mean score with lower variability. Both the groups gained from pre test to post test stage.

Fig. 1 Mean Scores of groups and stages of testing



Above graph shows that experimental group despite having a lower score at the time of pre-test, gains to have a much higher score after treatment of paired reciprocal reading, at the time of post test as compared to control group. There is an increase in mean score in case of control groups also. The increase in control group at the post-test is speculated to be due to incidental learning or diffusion (Vockel and Asher, 1984) despite care taken by researchers. It also could be due to practice effect after pre test or sensitization to pre-test.

The details of various comparisons which have been made to know the effect of reciprocal paired reading on reading comprehension are given in Table II.

Table II- Various comparisons across stages and groups

Sr. No.	Comparison	t-ratio	Significance
1	Pre-test of experimental And control group	2.00 (df= 18)	NS
2	Pre test post test of Experimental group	10.8 (df= 9)	0.01
3	Pre test post test of Control group	1.22 (df= 9)	NS
4	Post test of experimental and control group	1.75 (df= 18)	NS

The experimental and control groups differ at pre test stage, though not significantly (comparison number 1). The two groups also do not differ significantly, at post test stage (comparisons at no 4).

For experimental group, the change in scores from pre-test to post test, is highly significant (comparison no 2, $t=10.8$, $df=9$, $p<0.01$). This finding corroborates the findings from many other studies ((Paliscar & Brown, 1984; Westera & Moore, 1995; Bess, 1998; Klinger, Vaughn & Schumm 1998; Rehman, 2001; Cooper & Greive, 2009; Cox, 2010; Dilorenzo, 2010; Namaghi & Shakhosseini, 2011; Vaughn et. al, 2011; Freihat & Makhzoomi,

2012; Bansal, 2014). This finding also fulfills the objective the researchers started with. It confirms the hypothesis postulated in the beginning.

In case of control group the change of scores from pre-test to post test is not significant (comparison no 3). The fact that subjects in control group did not improve significantly when tested after a length of time (during which time experimental continued for other group) proves that subjects in experimental group did not improve incidentally or due to contemporary history or maturation etc. They improved only due to experimental treatment. Moreover, the threats to validity, if any, operated similarly for both the groups due to random selection and allotment. The threat of secondary variables emerging out of differences related to school variables and socio economic status operated minimally, because subjects were from one school.

The only significant difference in all four comparisons in Table II is between the pre-test and post-test scores of the experimental group, which amply brings out the fact that reciprocal paired reading is effective in ameliorating the deficits in reading comprehension. The children do not experience any threat of knowledge of failure when they function with their class mates for academic performance. Among equals, fear factor does not play. The group is small (only two); the fear of others' laughing on failure does not prevail. Element of reciprocity makes it social learning.

Social interaction has a positive impact on classroom (MacGillivray & Hawer, 1999). Learning is also 'fun' when the teacher is from among equals. The premise of social interdependence theory posits that the way in which goals are structured determines how individuals interact, which in turn creates outcomes (2003). Findings of present research support this. Positive interdependence lead to better outcomes as compared to control group where there has been no effect to organize any interdependence.

Generalization of findings is cautioned due to small size of sample from one school only. A larger, well spread sample is advocated. Researchers intend to use and advocate instruction in paired reading approach in the future to improve students' reading comprehension. The researchers believe that longer duration of the paired reading will have better magnitude of positive effect on reading comprehension..Students will find that learning is becoming fun and school will become an interesting place to be in.

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Book Reviews

History of the Santals of Jungle Terai (1800-1855)

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Surendra Jha & Shiv Shankar Raut, **History of the Santals of Jungle Terai (1800-1855)- Revisited**, 2015. (Price 480¹, 196 +X Pages)

Study of the past in a special manner, done through a “historical method” has shown a tendency to give more importance to constructionist history where framework and theory are primarily important. The evidences come, necessarily in case of History, but those evidences often are employed at the service of the theoretical requirements. This has created a kind of difficulty for readers and researchers who look for a reliable story of the past and are not concerned about the soundness of a theory. The tribal history area is also affected by this. Invariably, the reader can glean through the bio-details of the author and what is written on the flap and he can get what is coming in the book. On tribal history of Jharkhand there is another problem; the historians are expected to tell the story from one side, the tribal side where from the tribals have always been wronged and they have never done any wrong. In this situation, the book –History of the Santals of Jungle Terai by Surendra Jha and Shiv Shankar Raut comes as a historical work which, with all its deficiencies, has tried to tell the complex and reliable history of Santal’s plight and their heroic struggle of 1855.

Jha and Raut have introduced the region of this study –present Santhal Parganas – and looked, primarily, to give an account of genesis, result and the nature of the Santal revolt. The book begins with a critical observation about Ranajit Guha and his Subaltern followers by saying that, “the Subalterns’ have wrongly attributed ...(separate political consciousness) to all the peasant movements –be it tribal or non-tribal... they have overlooked many facts of local history...” (p.4). Here, tribals have a tradition of political consciousness. In the past, they had a state structure of their own and they had cherished the memory of it generation after generation... the non-tribals had no such memory.” (p. 5) Jha and Raut assert that, “the writings on Tribal Revolts have been prejudiced by the concepts developed by colonial rulers.” They have critiqued the “comparative method” idea of the idea of tribals as “Noble Savages” and the idea that “the primitive purity (of tribals) was diluted by the process of sanskritization and mediation of non-tribals”. (p. 57-58; pp.164-65) The simplistic model of colonial perception about the tribals served to justify the Raj and the role of missionaries as the protectors of the tribals. To Jha and Raut, “Colonial discourse is so intimately with us that it’s categories and modes of comprehension are still in our subconscious thinking.”

In this book, clearly written with closeness to archival records, there is a very good account of the political development of the area. It is interesting and important to note that in the area called as Santhal Parganas the Santals seemed to have settled first after Permanent Settlement ! They were brought in the region by zamindars to clear the forest. Later, with migration from Cuttak, Manbhum, Chotanagpur, Hazaribagh, Palamu and Rewa the number of Santals increased in the area. Till the Santals came the area had been homelands of the Malers and Malpaharias, notorious robbers and cattle lifters. There were efforts to win over these tribals by the British officials and ultimately, in 1833 the Government demarcated the area surrounding the Rajmahal hills as Damin-i-Koh. It was after 1830s, the outsiders' encroachment started to affect the lives of the Santals and ultimately in June 1855 the revolt broke out.

Why revolt began and how it spread are dealt dispassionately. The reasons –the mahajans like Kenaram Bhagat and Becharam Bhagat, who committed all kinds of atrocities, corrupt administration, the threat on land, which, by now, had become very dear to the Santals, the leadership of Sido and Kano, tribal grievances against Indigo planters and other factors have been dealt in this book. After this, there is a fairly good account of the course of revolt : From 30 June, 1855, when about ten thousand Santals met to listen to Thakur's announcement till 10 November, 1855 when the whole area was swept by 8,000 troops.

In giving the details, the book does not hide the details which are most difficult to fit in their frames for theory driven history writings. One passage can be quoted here:

“It was not war; they (tribals) did not understand yielding. As long as their national drums beat, the whole party would stand, and allow themselves to be shot down. Their arrows often killed our men and we had to fire on them as long as they stood. When their drum ceased, they would move for a quarter of a mile then their drums began again and they calmly stood till we came up and poured a few volleys into them. There was not a sepoy in the war who did not feel ashamed of himself.” (Major Jarvis)

The tribals' brutality has also been dealt with:

When a mahajan fell into their hands, they first cut off his feet with their pharsas (battle axes) with the taunt that this was four annas in the rupee, then cut off their legs at the thigh to make up eight annas and then cut him into two at his waist to make up twelve annas and finally took off his head to complete the sixteen annas shouting 'pharkati' i.e., a full quittance.

Authors have found Ranajit Guha's contention that the insurgents' violence was seldom indiscriminate incorrect. They have mentioned that, "In Pakur town the Santals killed invalid and old man and also a lame man without any reason." Their contention is that Santa violence was blind and discriminate. Taking a dig on Guha the book has, at one point, said that, "Prof Guha might not have been aware of this historical fact that 'Damin-i-Koh' was created for the protection of the Paharias and not the Santals."

The joy of reading this book is that it speaks plainly. But sometimes, the book contends two different positions on the same issue. Paharis had been referred as notorious robbers earlier but in conclusion it is said that the British writers view of branding Paharias as habitual robbers is prejudiced. "The Hill men had lived for centuries in this region peacefully. They had developed their own political system and they were under the control of Zamindars." (p.173)

It is obvious that this book needed a good editing hand before publication. There are typographic errors and repetitions. But, if one keeps in mind the hazards of publications in our country where good press doors are often closed to regional scholars, scholars like Jha, who have put in decades of labour in archives studying tribal history, are left with their own resources to write and get them published, one can be considerate. Anybody who is interested in knowing the reliable and complex historical account of tribal history will find a book of this kind very useful. In the academic historical circles names like Surendra Jha or Suchibrata Sen are not frequently mentioned but these scholars have put in years of their labour studying the history of tribal movements of this region and their contributions should be appreciated. This book is a welcome addition to historical literature on Santal revolt.

At the Crossroads of Culture and Literature

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Suchorita Chattopadhyay & Debashree Dattaray (eds.), *At the Crossroads of Culture and Literature*, (Delhi: Primus Books, 2016) pp.viii+187

At the Crossroads of Culture and Literature is all about the nature and future of Canadian Studies in India. The prime objective explicit in the compendium is to rethink and interrogate the ‘culture-literature’ nexus which constitutes the core of much of the currently evolving scholarship in Canadian Studies in India. Together the book proffers an opportunity to fellow ‘Canadianists’ in India and Canada prompting them to reflect purposively on the past emphases and future directions of Indian scholarship on Canada; and upon that seeks to redraw new trajectories and imperatives for strengthening further the tradition of Canadian Studies in India situated as it is at the intersection of as yet undefined realms and ramifications of culture and literature.

Canadian Studies in India as an “area study” programme is ostensibly a multi-layered and inter-disciplinary academic enterprise based largely on comparative research methodology. As an area study programme, it is recent in origin yet widely recognized as nascent with rich latent potential. No wonder, in a time span of a brief three decades (since its inception in mid-1980s in India), Canadian Studies has captured the imagination and attention of a host of scholars with different disciplinary orientations across the country, and has secured a distinct visible place in the Indian academia. Today a sizeable number of Indian universities offer not only ‘taught’ courses but also doctoral/post-doctoral research facilities in Canadian Studies. Auguring well, there is considerable transnational academic traffic between India and Canada testifying to the importance of the Canadian Studies in tertiary curriculum.

A number of socio-political and economic factors—including the presence of a large number of South Asian Diaspora—explain the mutuality of affinity between India and Canada. However, what goes beyond and binds the interests of scholars in the two countries is the uniqueness of the literary tradition and values in both the ‘regions’ which, above all, not only recognizes but also respects the voice of the “other” unlike the hegemonic literatures of the West. In the process, the evolving Canadian culture—like the Indian cultural tradition—is replete with multiple affiliations and identities in sharp contrast to the sonorous “settler” culture resonant throughout the literary history of North America and Western Europe.

Indeed, as the editors of the compendium succinctly posit, the book “marks an attempt to study the contemporary trends in Canadian literature while keeping in mind the processes of socio-cultural metamorphosis which have given birth to them” (p.2). Moving away from the past emphases of perceiving Canadian culture as an out-growth/offshoot or an after-growth of the hegemonic Western culture, the central thrust of the book is to question the very basic notion of a “monolithic Canada”. It seeks instead to put in place a framework firmly anchored on the perception of “many Canadas”.

Viewed thus, the book *At the Crossroads* is indeed a clear call for ‘Canadianists’ both in India and Canada (including Indian immigrant ‘Canadianists’) to move past the hegemonic political and economic modes of categorization that dominated the 20th century social policy approach, be it towards the aboriginals or the immigrants and towards a future where, besides national boundaries, local, regional and aboriginal cultural boundaries too need to be etched and taken cognizance of in any effort at redefining and re-evaluating the composite Canadian culture. As the editors of the book underline at the very outset the underlying objective is “to trace the inadequacies of existing socio-cultural and literary history in relation to Canada as a nation as perceived within the context of the Indian academia” (ix).

Towards this laudable task, the contributors to the book have focused on two major areas as their focus: Canadian Aboriginal Studies and the South-Asian Canadian Diaspora studies. Reasons for selecting these two major areas are not far to seek. For, as the editors of the book very rightly assert, these two themes are of crucial significance to both countries in their divergence from the normative category of ‘whiteness’.

Given the prominence of these themes such as aboriginality and diaspora in contemporary political and academic discourse in both subcontinents—Canada and India, the essays in the book bring to fore for discussion an array of issues which are subsumed in these themes. To cite a few, issues ranging from migration, displacement, global uprootedness, diaspora, legal and illegal immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers—their antecedents, destinies and destinations as well as their alternative identities and how these complex occurrences establish and destabilize the notion of identity which is not only communal but also national and now ‘glocal’ in nature. All these, according to the essayists, need to be incorporated as additional untapped untrodden resources for restructuring and developing Canadian Studies, sketching thereby a new different trajectory as it currently evolves at the beginning of the 21st century. Furthermore, since all these new affiliations and identities in the Canadian cultural ambience are products of specific socio-political milieu—themselves constantly changing—the authors call for careful reflection and deliberation by ‘Canadianists’ both in India and Canada.

Thematically well-structured, the compendium—comprising a dozen brief crisp essays spread on a large canvas and appositely titled: *At the Crossroads of Culture and Literature* is not to be read as an annotated catalogue and critique of recent writings of Indian and Indian-Canadian scholars on culture and literature highlighting their inanities and inadequacies. On the other hand, it is to be looked at as guide and a road map for building Canadian Studies on solid foundations. The compendium is a well-conceived, very thoughtfully-crafted and a concerted attempt by a team comprising members of the faculty, research staff and the Canadian mentors of the Centre of Canadian Studies of Jadavpur University presenting a critical exegesis of Canadian Studies as it is evolving in India—all with a view to firm up the foundation and enrich further the scholarly tradition of Canadian Studies in India.

The authors of the papers, each in their own way highlight communities, knowledge systems and values which in the past have largely been ignored or were disregarded by scholars from both India and Canada in their efforts at interpreting and identifying Canada. Against these past narratives, the essays here in the book admittedly, serve as purposive examples of how to engage in evolving innovatively an inclusive and diverse scholarship on Canada. Even more, the contributors to this compendium deserve to be credited for underlining the diversity of voices that need to be incorporated in our approach to unravelling the future and nature of the Canadian culture as it is evolving in the 21st century.

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