

## A Critique of Analytical Moral Philosophy

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*In this article, I have set out to examine critically an important discussion in the recent ethical theory, first started by Prichard and further reinforced by D. Z. Phillips. In my view, our ethical judgments are inextricably linked with, in fact, based upon, our conception of the nature of man. I shall argue that Prichard was making a mistake in assuming that in showing the just life in a man's interest, we were ipso facto being supplied with a reason or motive for living that way. What he did see correctly was that acting and living justly could not logically be done from ulterior motives. However, there need not be any question of acting from ulterior motives when it is shown that living the just life is man's greatest source of happiness. To show this would mean to show that those activities that impart the greatest happiness and contentment to man, are central to our conception of what it is to be a man, and that such activities constitute the basis of our judgment of a man's moral worth, too. Thus, hedonism leads to a dead end so far as morality is concerned. It is argued that our moral judgments are necessarily based on our philosophical conception of man and human nature in the metaphysical underpinning of our ethical theory.*

Much before we start investigating important questions regarding the analytical moral philosophy, we need to ask ourselves: Are reflections about what is advantageous to us different from or bound up with the reflections regarding the way in which we ought to morally conduct ourselves? Plato was quite unequivocal over this question, as he sought to answer this question within the wider framework of social justice and/or injustice. He was of the view that our reflections are often bound up with such considerations and, therefore, hinge upon our understanding of the life of justice, and not injustice. He believed that it was such a conception of life that convinced a man about how an individual needed to integrate his life into the larger goals of social justice to be able to benefit from them in terms of his personal happiness and contentment. He says, "He who commits injustice is ever made more wretched than he who suffers it."<sup>1</sup> Contrary to this position of Plato, Prichard<sup>2</sup> in particular and deontologists in general, claim that reflections on how we ought to conduct ourselves morally are independent of our reflections about who we are but are dependent upon the specificities of the moral situations in which we often find ourselves. Prichard says: "Right action is that which is morally suitable to the situation in which an individual finds himself."<sup>3</sup>

Prichard asserted that the mistake most of the moral philosophers made was of assuming that the principal query of morality is to furnish a man with justification for acting morally. It is this claim, Prichard avers, that Glaucon and Adeimantus make of Socrates in *The Republic* and it also lies behind the moral writings of almost all the philosophers down the ages, with the possible exception of Kant. According to Kant, "Morality is an informal public system applying to all rational persons, governing behavior that affects others, and has the lessening of evil or harm as its goal."<sup>4</sup>

For Kant, the moral rule is the only way to find entry into life. Subject to its categorical imperatives, an individual is a member of intelligible or super sensible world -- the world of pure reason. As he exerts his will, he lives, moves, and realizes his being in that nominal world from which, as intelligence, he is eternally shut out. As he listens to the voice of duty, and admits the absolute and inflexible simplicity of its claim upon his life, he feels that he is greater than what he knows, and thus welcomes the business of his life as the appropriate inheritance, and constitutes himself, indeed, with the idea that, first of all, he is a member of the society and a citizen of the logical world. There too, he finds the goodly fellowship of universal intelligence, and becomes at once a legislator and a subject in the kingdom of pure reason. Prichard, however, asserted that reaction to this query remained restricted to what was demonstrably intolerable, and as a result, the query was an illegitimate one. His emphasis primarily was that any justification for performing the moral actions was either the justification of a moral nature or else, a non-moral nature.

In addition, any alternative of a justification given beyond these two would simply be intolerable. If the justification given does not manifest itself in the moral principles, the justification would, *ipso facto*, fail to influence us that we ought to act for its reasons (*i.e.*, in the sense that we are morally compelled to act for that justification). However, if the justification given is an ethical one, then clearly it would be circular. Prichard, thus, concluded that it was a mistake to inquire for a justification to do what we ought to do from the moral point of view. It is from Prichard's own interpretations of self-righteously 'right' actions and his contentions about the segregation of rights and wrongs from individual interests that his ideas have taken hold. Kurt Baier has made it into a dominant theme of his book, *The Moral Point of View*, and now it has become a tenet of virtually every work in 'Ethics.' He says: "Of course, what I have just said presupposes that the account of moral thinking I have given is correct. In one respect, at any rate, I am confident that it is on the right track; it gives both a sketch of a way of practical reasoning and a defense of the claim that, that way is a moral reasoning."<sup>5</sup>

Scholars like Stephen Toulmin, R. M. Hare, P. H. Nowell Smith, Marcus Singer, and W. K. Frankena tend to endorse this viewpoint, rather emphatically. Yet my contention is that there is a misconception in moral philosophy and that it is so because of logical separation of the 'reflection' from 'moral action.' To a certain extent, our advantage is that the 'reflections' often guide the manner in which we ought to conduct ourselves, morally. R. M Hare says: "At any rate, the first step that the moral philosopher has to take, in order to help us think better (*i.e.* more rationally) about the moral questions, is to get to understand the meanings of the words used in asking them; and the second step, which

## A CRITIQUE OF ANALYTICAL MORAL PHILOSOPHY

follows directly from the first, is to give an account of the logical properties of the words, and thus of the canon of rational thinking about moral questions.<sup>6</sup> The supposition governing the general debates of individual interest vs. morality is: To what degree are we in a position to state that a particular individual is acting in his own interest and how much advantage it gives him to act in a manner different from those who act ethically. I believe that it certainly won't take much 'reflection' to understand as to what degree we are assuming a thing when we talk of some person 'acting' and that it is far from being as simple as it often appears.

The principal reflection regarding what is in one's interest or to one's advantage, of course, hinges upon what one's happiness essentially consists in. If one were to say that a person's happiness will be the direct consequence of his acting in one manner rather than in another, then acting in that particular manner, it may be claimed, is decidedly in that person's benefit. However, this manner of negotiating the issue would have important consequences for preserving the distinction between individual interest and morality. Certainly, there is no logical restriction upon one's happiness, which is derived from living purely in accordance with the general principles of morality. In other words, it is quite possible that one may find happiness in acting morally, in living the just life, and that were this to bring him into conflict with his wealth, health or even his very life, he would happily sacrifice all of these. And if this is really so, the supposed dissimilarity between acting morally and acting in one's interest becomes insignificant.

Without a doubt, numerous people would be quite happy despite the fact that there is a clash between acting morally and acting in individual interest. Moreover, what makes a person happy varies from person to person and so it hardly makes sense to leave out acting in that manner which we may recognize to be 'moral' in this category. The reality is that people act in many distinctive ways. Some of these ways of acting make them happier than others. Apart from this, what we need to take into account is that anything that makes a person happy also contributes to the reflection that decides as to what extent it will be in that person's benefit. Therefore, it won't be very difficult to understand and recognize that there is no contradiction between the moral actions and those of the individual interest. It is for this reason that one individual wins wealth, health and pleasure from his interest and the other loses it for the sake of the moral pleasure.

If this is so, then why do we make the necessary distinction between acting morally and acting beneficially? One's happiness is, after all, an important reflection for deciding as to what actually contributes to or takes away from one's self-interest. In this case, there is no abstract irrationality — really, it often is the case — that acting morally makes a person happy even though in the process he may come into conflict with acting in a manner that takes into account what it is to be beneficial. One can, certainly, draw the logical conclusion that it may also be beneficial behaviour. However, this cannot be used to substantiate the fact that moral behaviour merely has an accidental relationship with the beneficial behaviour. For, as we have already understood, living morally may, to an extent, be nothing more than something in which one's happiness truly consists. Then moral behaviour for such

a person will inevitably be beneficial. Therefore, making such a logical point does nothing to differentiate the 'ethical behaviour' from the 'beneficial behaviour.'

What I have tried to argue so far is that acting morally cannot be made distinct from acting in one's interest, because what a person derives as a means of his happiness can be described as an 'open choice' or an 'open question.' One must be acting in one's interest if one's happiness is to be found in acting in such a manner. Acting morally may be what one's happiness consists in, yet for such a person, living a moral life will necessarily be in his own interest. However, there is one difficulty regarding this last point I have made. There is a definite clash of interest between acting morally and acting for one's personal interest. A circumstance which has become typical of exemplifying what it indicates to act morally is one where we are asked if it would be right to assume, even put at risk, the happiness of others. But if this last point, which I have proposed is sound — which would show Prichard to be making a fallacy in moral philosophy by insisting upon a fundamental distinction between 'advantageous behaviour' and 'moral behaviour' — we seem to be left with rather perturbing conclusion that such a situation would count little, if at all, for illustrating the nature of a moral action. For here, the implication seems to be that acting in one's interest must be fundamentally distinct from acting morally.

To state this problem differently, we could suggest that such actions are ethically important as do not necessarily explain a basic division between acting morally and acting in one's personal interest. To indicate this, we simply need to recognize that the only way to further investigate this question requires that we discuss the well-being of others against our own welfare as it would be in our own interest. We have to evaluate this as a quality, the existence of which would serve as a touchstone of an individual's happiness. Independently of any conclusion about what kind of behaviour promotes an individual's happiness, we need to recognize that happiness consists not so much in grasping a concern for oneself as being beneficial to others or grasping a concern for others. It is only on the basis of such a conclusion that it is possible for us to validate this perception that allows us to speak of someone else's benefit. The crucial reflection to view here is that some conclusions must first be made i.e. we must keep in mind the possible results of taking certain steps.

What has categorically prevented certain philosophers from taking into consideration this matter is the categories of understanding we often formulate in relation to a person's action and comprehension of his motives for doing such a thing or why he has done 'this,' 'that' and the 'other.' In order to comprehend that X has been helping Y for the reason that he was hopeful that Y would, in turn, invite him to some party might be a reason strong enough for his helpful attitude in a particular situation. But it doesn't in any way suggest that we shall always be happy in doing what we do, without assuming it to be true, and without our own reasons for deriving happiness from it. If one acknowledges that 'doing' to a certain extent has made him happy, it does not follow that he has done it because he wanted to be happy. He may have done it as a matter of course, or because he wished to help somebody. So perhaps, sometimes somebody does something not for the sake of his own pleasure,

## A CRITIQUE OF ANALYTICAL MORAL PHILOSOPHY

rather he just does it as his moral duty — that motivates him, and this is the reason why he performs it.

The failure to see this truth is probably tied in Prichard's rejection of the task that Plato has set for himself in *The Republic*. It would really be a paradoxical claim that through our obligations towards others, we often fulfill our own life-goals because this is how we benefit others and ourselves and also make ourselves happy by doing what we do. Clearly, Prichard is right in saying that this is not why we ought to meet our obligations. Even Socrates claims that our justification for meeting our obligations is the happiness, we know, we are in a position to derive from doing them. Contrary to Thrasymachus, what he suggests is that it is in our benefit to meet our obligations. This is very much in consonance with maintaining that one's justification for being 'just' ought not to be happiness or benefit one will derive from being so. If it is a fact, as Socrates emphasizes it is, it would be beneficial to enjoy all those qualities that make one happy. And if, indeed, the quality of joy is such a wonderful feeling that in order to possess it, one must look to the happiness of others without looking to one's own, one may find happiness in possessing it and may, *ipso facto*, become one's reason or motive for possessing it, too.

I started off by challenging Prichard's division between self-interest and morality. I did this on the ground that living morally may or may not be in somebody's interest. Prichard's argument was that it was a mistake to ask for a justification for living morally. If it is morally right to do something, or there is some way of living that is morally right, then it is right to live with that manner and that it makes no sense to ask why it is true. According to Prichard, one can have a justification for living morally that will be beneficial for a person to do so. However, my argument has not been that one should ask for a justification for doing what one ought to do or for living the way one ought to live. Rather my argument has been that there is nothing in Prichard's argument, which will indicate that living morally will not necessarily be in one's interest. For this reason, we are inclined to accept that Plato was right when he tried to demonstrate it in moral philosophy. The point is that such a demonstration need not necessarily require that the motive or justification of self-interest be supplied for being moral. To reveal that living morally may be in one's interest and does not require anything else outside itself is to show why one ought to live that way. Plato's argument, I believe, works the other way round. He tries to show how man ought to live. This, for him, is logically the 'primary reflection.' However, what is significant in Plato is that, for him, reflections of what is in one's interest or where one's happiness lies are logically dependent upon the knowledge of how a person takes interest or where one ought to live. When Glaucon presents the case for injustice, he asks Socrates "...not be content merely to prove that justice is superior to injustice but explain how one is good, the other evil, in virtue of the *intrinsic* effect each has on its possessor, whether God or men see it or not."<sup>7</sup>

In other words, the problem is not to reveal the reason for being just and so hold out a promise that what one will get is 'beneficial,' but rather that being just is in itself beneficial. Briefly, the just way, being the only way in which one ought to live, is itself be shown to beneficial. As opposed to

Thrasymachus, Socrates is of the view that there is no ready-made formula for determining what is in a person's interest and that the problem of justice which, I take it, is for Socrates the problem of how a person ought to live — must be solved before we are in a position to speak about what is in a person's interest. Moreover, this being so, it will not be the case the way Prichard believes that in showing the just life to be the source of a person's happiness, that person is thereby being supplied with a motive or justification for living such a life. The reason and motives in accordance with which a person lives are themselves to be included in our judgment of how a person lives; if he is living justly, his justifications and motives for acting will be somewhat peculiar to such a life. Justifications and motives, therefore, being a part of what our judgment of a just life consists in, do not always reveal the just life to be beneficial, as we often supply ourselves with a justification or motive for living so.

At this juncture, I would like to point out what categories or propositions Prichard is concerned with, and which the other philosophers have misguidedly tried to ignore. Undoubtedly, he is concerned with categories of duty, principles and right — and not with evaluative propositions in general. A principle of duty is a principle that could be specified in this form: "X ought to do A" (or "A is obligatory" or "A is a lies of duty, but they also specify some other propositions, almost all, and for the most part, those of the forms, "X is good" and "X is a virtue". So "Pleasure is good" would be an evaluative expression of views, since it makes use of the predicate "good", but it is not an expression of views of duty, as it does not point out a manner of how some representative is required to carry out the duties. Prichard's claim, then, is identified thus: 'Other moral philosophers have made an attempt to derive principles of duty from other facts which were not main contents of duty — sometimes these other facts have been descriptive, and from time to time, they have been evaluative, but in case these are made into a form of achievement, the whole idea might have been misconceived. Having said this, let us make use of the term "morality" to refer to the principles of duty.

Second, we ought to differentiate between 'common sense moralities' and 'philosophical morality.' Common sense morality is the body of categories of duty that are firmly acknowledged (allowing for exceptions on the part of some psychopaths and some philosophers), completely or clearly, prior to an argument and philosophical training. For example, one ought not to tell lies, one ought to keep harmony in feelings, one ought not to take antagonistic action against others without irritation — and these are all aspects of common sense morality. "Philosophical morality," on the other hand, directs the reflection of an important person to theories and make-believe systems of philosophers so as to illuminate the nature of morality as to what one ought to do. Philosophical morality results from the twists and turns that are often an outcome of dialectic and analysis. Prichard's criticism is directed against philosophical morality. Common sense morality does not rely on any kind of inaccuracy; common sense morality is a body of absolutely good, rational comprehension. It is philosophical morality that relies on inaccuracy; and this inaccuracy is frustrating as we have to make sense of morality through our familiarity with the legal processes or through something else.

Third, we ought to make a distinction in terms of two possible methods of trying to bear out the

## A CRITIQUE OF ANALYTICAL MORAL PHILOSOPHY

truth of moral principles. One might try to validate the truth of a moral principle by deriving it from other principles of duty and/or from 'ought' conclusions about hypothetical cases (thought experiments). For example, someone asserts that people ought not to have abortions; (a) to have an abortion is to murder a person, and (b) one ought not to murder people. This sort of belief, in broad spectrum, is not a mistake. What would be a mistake is try to validate the truth of moral contents in the sense of deriving them from non-moral principles. That is, if someone tried to point out that we ought not to murder people and that he trusts fully some opinion in which the premise does not contain any principles of duty, it would be a mistake on his part, and in that event his perception is bound to fall through. This is what moral philosophers have very frequently done throughout its long history.

According to Prichard, the 'motive philosophers' have attempted to search out this kind of conjecture to demonstrate the truth of morality, and also the manner in which the people often express their aversion while carrying out their duties. At first, we become conscious of a variety of duties, instinctively. In contrast, we commonly find these duties irritating, and so we begin to ask, "Why must I do these things?" Certainly, we may even be lured into rejecting such a morality. It is the moral nature of life that arises then to answer the question and to make obvious to the moral skeptics that in reality a person may perform these things only because he is expected to subscribe to a notion of wide-ranging duties.

In the view of rationalism, perhaps, this is a mistake, in the first place, that the mission is impossible to carry out; it is not possible to receive an 'ought' opinion from non-moral point of view. Moreover, in the second place, it is not essential to derive 'ought' statements from non-moral premises, because familiar sense morality in itself is a body of initial understanding and our reason will be able to perceive the truth of certain principles of duty, just as we, in a straight line, can perceive the truth of the law of identity or of Euclid's axiom, "The shortest path between any two points is a straight line."

Plato furnishes positive instances of Prichard's thesis about the nature of moral philosophy. *The Republic* is, in fact, an effort to achieve an answer for moral skeptics. Thrasymachus is of the view that in this determination, justice is only the prerogative of the stronger and that to be unjust is superior and wiser, as long as one can get away with it, and that it would be more of a challenge to the idea of justice than an effort really to define it. That is, even though Thrasymachus' thesis is phrased as a meaning of "justice." But somehow, this also means deviating from the ordinary meaning of the phrase as it is quite clear that we often disapprove, especially when we make such pronouncements as 'Justice is an imaginary fiction, a world of make-believe created by the rulers, and the morality is a kind of practical joke they play upon their subjects in order to advance their (the ruler's) interests.

Voicing their difference of opinion, Glaucon and Adeimantus explain that it is not justice *per se* that is attractive, but only the quality of justice. It is logical that the answer to the immoralist or a moralist is Socrates' task. But the task of emphasizing that justice is advantageous for its own sake gets blended with the notion of what justice is, and in all this, all that Plato observes is that 'justice' is

always advantageous for the just person. For that reason, the resulting dialectic aims at an appearance of what the just person is and how he, for all times, is better off in comparison with the unjust person; and this is the entire justification for why we should be just, as far as Plato's ideas are concerned.

At present, this mode of thinking fails on two counts. First, the evidence that a just person is forever much better off than the unjust person is certainly not an easy proposition to accept or endorse. It basically involves Plato's interpretation of justice as a kind of inner harmony of the soul; this state is then said to be essentially beautiful but the relationship of this situation with the outward appearance of behavior which we usually believe as just action is then made morally suspect and also not demonstrated on any account. Plato never correctly demonstrates why a person, who is governed by reason and has inner harmony, does not lie, steal, and harm other people. He takes this to mean that he fails to distinguish between 'justice' as he defines it and 'justice' in the sense of specific types of action that Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus wanted him to provide the evidence for.

However, it is not possible to provide a higher reason for Plato's line of analysis. For instance, on the basis of his logic, it can not be argued that if the just life always benefits a person, then why a person doesn't look upon just action as an end in itself, and also as a means of personal gratification. From this it doesn't necessarily follow that a person is always gratified when he/she acts in a just manner. This can simply be demonstrated through an analogy: if we were to say that it is in the interest of a person to sleep for eight hours at night and that he would be better off if he were to do so, it doesn't necessarily mean that a person has a moral duty to sleep for eight hours. The latter part of the conclusion could be inferred only if we were given the argument that when a person sleeps, he provides the benefit of security to others as he doesn't steal during that period. This would be an attempt to derive a sense of morality from hypothetical imperatives, which given the fallacious nature of the exercise, is highly undesirable.

Bishop Butler's effort at providing an evidence of 'morality' appear more reassuring, as he is determined to move morality back to self-interest and remains quite inflexible while doing so. He asserts that rather than derive morality from 'our nature,' right action is intended to be that which accords with our nature in a certain perception, while irrational measures go against our nature. That is, our nature can be used as an illustration of the non-evaluative thoughts, which can easily be demonstrated with the help of an analogy of 'watch' that Butler gives. He says that the watch is believed to have a nature, a function, and in much the same manner we, the human beings, too, have a nature or function. It is vital to understand that the rationalization of a watch's nature is to tell time, and it is not that we, the watchers, prefer to practice it for that very objective. According to Butler's point of view, the rationale is that part of a watch which distinguishes watch-like understanding from the watch that is made to tell time. This is a quality inherent in the watch: that we can perceive through an investigational analysis of the watch itself.

Butler makes it obvious that the underground set of laws to conceive an evaluative deduction comprehends something more than the reflection of our nature. Yet it is far from obvious why we



## A CRITIQUE OF ANALYTICAL MORAL PHILOSOPHY

always have to act in accordance with our nature. For instance, if I were to realize that it is in my natural behavior to fight other people, and though such a nature is feasible, it doesn't necessarily follow that every time I see a person, I must start flexing my muscles, adopt aggressive postures or express an innate blood lust. Does it follow from this that I must go out this very minute and start punching other people's noses? Of course, my predisposition might become evident in the most natural manner in terms of my terrifying features, just right for threatening my antagonists. Butler would assert that this is not, in fact, in the nature of a human being. He believes that in the actual world, we all tend to be more peaceful and cooperative in our social life. Though this in itself may not become the basis of our morality or reason enough for us to act in a moral sense, but if some human being has a different 'nature' in Butler's sense; we would still hold him down to the same set of duties as others.

In other words, Bishop Butler's contentions appear to suffer from the same misconceptions that have already been demonstrated by the earlier philosophers. It would be a folly to infer from the premise that if 'A' is submissive by nature, then in all situations, 'A' would act in accordance with his submissive nature. Moreover, Butler offers no answer to the query, "Why should I act according to my nature?"

Thus, it would not be right to assume that 'nature' never changes. Though Butler is unable to furnish a sound philosophy of the foundational principles of duty, his reason is that the sense of right and wrong remains in the natural bent of mind and also enables us to exercise control over self-inclinations and self-love. Like Plato, Butler believes that our most important ideas concerning our judgments of right and wrong are influenced by our widespread notions of morality. Prichard also points out that with the passage of time we develop an understanding of our sense of right and wrong acts, duly in accordance with the familiar notions of morality. This is just another way of saying that Butler's broad spectrum 'theory of virtue' doesn't function at all.

In fact, utilitarianism is a starting point of the main beliefs about responsibility, for the simple reason that it does not draw evaluative conclusions from the descriptive premises. It tries to discover main beliefs of responsibility from the premise that if an action produces greatest good of the greatest number then it must be a good action, and it is on this basis that utilitarian beliefs give legitimacy to what the right action is. But at the same time, it has to be observed that this manner of substantiation of the main beliefs of responsibility suffers from the same set of difficulties that have been enumerated earlier.

Both Hume and Mill go overboard in their attempt to reveal that from the standpoint of the principle of utility, it becomes abundantly clear that in all situations we ought to act in a just manner. But both the writers justify their position by swinging back and forth between the 'act-utilitarianism' and the 'rule-utilitarianism.' In other words, they propose that we first come across a proposition or an idea of 'act-utilitarianism', and then we describe it as a 'rule' or answer the question why we ought to follow the principles of justice. However, they do not seem to ponder over all possible alternative sets

of laws that we could pick in lieu of the well-known sense of what are the most important beliefs of justice. We could, for example, make a choice of rule of an act, such as, "Act justly, especially when you cannot hope to stimulate greater utility by acting in an unjust manner," and, even for the rule-utilitarianism, this would have to be accepted as the best rule to take on, and so it is, "Act justly." As a result, utilitarian bent of mind says that it would be permissible and even obligatory to break promises, steal, kill, and otherwise contravene the main beliefs of widespread sense of morality at any time so that greatest happiness of the greatest number could be produced. This is also necessary if various well-known thought-experiments have to be offered as proof of these results, which could be treated as counter-offensives.

Apart from this, the utilitarian twist of mind also claims a premise that "one at all times ought to demonstrate self-reliance as the absolute good." So even if he were to claim that this is the first ethical principle, he would still not be able to answer Prichard's criticism. His inability to interpret it in a correct perspective stems from the premise that good is the only basic duty and the only principle sufficient to acquire the acknowledged maxims of justice. In this context, it is pertinent to mention that both Bentham and Mill publicly admit that the principle of advantage should be taken as the fundamental principle of morality and that it does not require any proof. Even if we want to promote happiness, it would be sufficient as the first principle and if, it is so, it does not need to be demonstrative — then why should the principles of justice not square with our personal beliefs. Or why does a 'utilitarian action' perceive that a just action requires to be defended, whereas the humanitarian one does not?

"One should always seek to maximize the good," so that one's principle of duty is comprehended in the sense that it fails to give exact consideration to this matter. It is for this reason that Prichard is often criticized for his total misunderstanding of this matter. Bentham's misinterpretation over this point becomes evident in his opening claim that the "right" is nothing but miserable "submission to the principle of benefit," which makes the principle of utility analytic. Even G.E. Moore admits that a demonstrative explanation of the naturalistic fallacy moves forward by acknowledging the moral correctness as an attribute of human actions for furnishing the extraordinary good.<sup>8</sup>

So, then what do we say about Plato's argument? My claim has simply been that for a given person, a moral life may result in a logical and beneficial existence. I have demonstrated that acting and living morally would be the main source from where the personal happiness of the man is likely to spring. Moreover, on the basis of these justifications, I have tried to establish that such a person would experience pleasure only if he acts in accordance with the known norms of human justice, as the unjust deeds would make him gloomy and sad. So Plato's is right in arguing that that the just life is the source of a person's happiness, though on the face of it, it may appear to be absurd. A person may grow up to hate justice and love injustice. His satisfaction may come only from the gratification of his fundamental biological needs and thus, he may satisfy himself by following his own will, and may not care at all about other people's needs and interests. On the contrary, he may enjoy himself by making others suffer hardships and use them to satisfy his whims. Following Plato, is it really possible for us

## A CRITIQUE OF ANALYTICAL MORAL PHILOSOPHY

to assume that a person who delights in making other people suffer would be happier than the one who lives justly?

It can be argued in Plato's defense that the meticulous form of pleasure, which a person is likely to derive from such acts, shall bind him to our moral status. I am of the view that a person's cheerfulness itself tells us as to what extent his nature, disposition and temperament determine his moral value. This is not to assert that in judging a person as someone 'immoral,' we are bound to find out why he cannot be happy. In fact, all such phrases as 'true happiness' or 'real happiness' do not necessarily make a distinction between one person's happiness and that of another. It may be said that in verbal communication, what 'really' makes a person happy largely has to do with how a person speaks of a certain form of happiness rather than the moral position he adopts. In a more positive sense, it may be observed that only in case of a moral person do we judge the actions on the basis of what is right, rather than what gives the maximum happiness. What I mean to suggest is that in mapping out the nature of the just person or the nature of the morally worthy individual, we are in fact, mapping out those norms, which are essential in our conception for a moral person. It is obvious that Plato also conceived this idea along these lines. And it is from this definition of the just person that we may derive Plato's description of the nature of a person.

So for Plato, there is a necessary correlation between acting justly and being happy. Thus the idea of genuine happiness or 'true happiness' lies in accordance with those norms we consider as central to our conception of individual. If his happiness is thus derived, is it not, in a rather straightforward sense, more genuine than that of a person whose happiness has been derived, say, from behaving like some animal other than human? It is sometimes argued that in agreeing with the idea that a 'satisfied' pig does not enjoy greater happiness than a 'dissatisfied' one, Socrates says that no concession is to be made to the non-hedonistic criteria of value. So if we were to understand why it is so, Socrates does not have an idea about the desires and inclinations of a pig. He might indeed be unhappy if he were subjected to the form of happiness a pig enjoys. Unfortunately, however, the implications of this reply have not been fully understood. In particular, it seems to me, that the consideration of the happiness a creature enjoys depends upon considering the kind of creature it is. If Socrates is unhappy with what makes a pig happy, so would a pig be unhappy with what makes Socrates happy. And this being so, we should, I think, quite naturally be led to distinguish the happiness a creature enjoys from genuine happiness that springs from those activities we consider central to our conception of the kind of creature one is.

It is this reflection, I believe, which lies behind Plato's argument in *The Republic*. If the just man, as Plato claims, behaves in accordance with the activities that we considered central to our conception of what it is to be a man, we are bound to judge a person's happiness as more genuine than the happiness that springs from the behavior we would not consider so. In his excellent paper, *On Morality's Having a Point*,<sup>8</sup> Phillips has made an admirable attempt to show that it is always important to take into consideration the "background" which attends moral beliefs and principles. To quote him extensively on this point:

“If we take note of the role of reasons in morality, we shall see that nothing can be counted as a moral belief. After all, why does one regard some rules as moral principles, and yet never regard others as such? Certainly, we can see the point of some rules as moral principles, but in case of others, we cannot. How is the point seen? There is a great deal in the suggestion that it is to be appreciated in terms of background, *which* attends moral beliefs and principles. When rules, which claim to be moral rules, are devoid of this background, we shall find ourselves puzzled. And we do not know what is being said when someone claims that the given rule is a moral rule.”<sup>9</sup> Moreover, this “background” I believe, is the background that consists in the conception of man and what his true happiness is.

To be moral, in a philosophical perception, is to be in position to pinpoint a manner of fulfilling our desires without reducing the rights of others to fulfill theirs. In this perception, morality is mainly a socio-materialistic conviction, enabling us to achieve pleasure as the chief focus.

The religious concept of morality is, indeed, in complete contrast to this. And to be religiously moral, is to improve will-power by checking our desires and controlling our spirit for the purpose to accomplish our elevated position as a human being, ethically inheriting the Kingdom of God, and really, the whole world that has been put in our service. As a result, the two approaches, the philosophical and the religious, are contradictory and create dissimilar human beings. Materialistic philosophy has fashioned a materialistic man who searches for instantaneous pleasure, an instantaneous materialistic honor for all human activities. Therefore, man’s ‘temporal’ frame of reference is to be seen in terms of his approach to reality and the time he proportionately spends on the pursuit of the ‘pleasure of the instant.’ Whereas the pleasure is oriented towards the ‘instant’ and is temporary in nature, the time is continuously in a state of flux. Without a doubt, such an individual tends to perceive ‘time past’ somewhat illogically, making an affective response to it. The greater the accomplishment of his wishes, the greedier and hungrier he becomes. He bets on time, with no possessions for the future. As a moral human being, he believes that death is bound to come without prior notice; and, as the brief moments give him fulfillment, enabling him to escape death temporarily; he lives in apprehension which expresses itself in conflicting desires.

One, who has faith, tends to have a different set of mental and emotional predispositions, and a different perception of ethics, based essentially upon different set of human observations. He perceives temporal pleasures as worthless and often in his perception, finds himself answerable and subject to death. In his view, worldly life is an examination in which if he gets through, he shall be rewarded with a high rank in the world hereafter. To him, life is a journey and the world, a temporary station, where we stay awhile, and in the end, death comes, regardless of whether it gives us pleasure or dismay, and is the result of actions, good or bad. For such a man, God is the only omnipotent, who rules over them and decides everything on His own. If all the people take a decision to be beneficial to Him or go against Him, they can not accomplish anything that was not predetermined. He believes that a man must not boast over the worldly gains or be dejected by the materialistic disasters.

## A CRITIQUE OF ANALYTICAL MORAL PHILOSOPHY

In Islam, a person, by nature, has an awareness of the universally valid moral norms. To every person, this awareness is potentially given, even though actually distorted by culture, education, and his existential estrangement from his true being. The divine law is creatively present both in the laws of nature and in the natural moral laws of the mankind. A person, who performs morally vicious actions, experiences a sense of estrangement from, and contradiction of, his essential being. According to the Holy Qur'an, the original nature of person is essentially good, which is contrary to the Christian idea that person is born sinful. The Islamic teachings contend that person is born pure and in the best of moulds. The Holy Qur'an says: "We created man in the finest mould. Then we reduced him to the lowest of the low, except for those who have *Imaan* and do the right actions; they will have a wage which never fails."<sup>10</sup>

The most important moral of the Holy Qur'an is that we must give a helping hand to the individual to improve his character in the most beneficial manner, to add force to his obligations and amalgamate his relationship both with the Creator and with the creatures. The Qura'nic morality is not merely an abstract ideal, conceived just in the name of Gods and Goddesses; it symbolizes a rule of life that a living force reveals itself in every aspect of human life. The Holy Qur'an focuses attention on the basic moral uplift and elevation of a person as the vicegerent of God on earth. This image suggests that intellect and conscience are capable of making a real difference between good and evil. The real moral strength of the Qur'anic theology is that it posits morality as the only belief of the "Divine Existence." The perception of "Divine existence everywhere" thus opens a person's eyes and ears to the moral claims implicit in any real situation.

Morality is an inner quality, a property of motive or intentions rather than mere consequence or outward form of one's actions. The moral sensation of the Holy Qur'an organizes comprehensively the necessities and obligations of a person, rather than competing with the existing standards of ethical judgment. The idea of righteousness, the prized possession of a Muslim, is the ever-present sense of moral conscientiousness, an inner calling that is both intimately personal and ineluctably the institutional, too.

To conclude, one may say that leading a moral life and a so-called aimless life of happiness appears to be somewhat like the two brands of wine; "one wills to drink the worldly wine, whereas the other, wishes to drink "*Koosar*" in the world to come. No one denies that the moral person will be happy and that the man who lives a so called life of happiness will find himself gloomy and sad. It would simply be the case that for him living the just life or living morally would be the starting point from which his happiness shall ultimately spring. For such a person, there is no inconsistency between what he finds better and interesting in this world and what he finds just and morally good. To judge whether a person is a morally worthy individual, we have to judge the reasons and motives for his actions as well. And this is how we gather the meaning of his morality, too, which, in any case, is the chief aim of his life. It is in this context that I have argued how Prichard was essentially committing a mistake. Prichard understood that in viewing the just life to be in a person's interest we were, *ipso facto*, being

supplied with a justification or motivation for living in that manner. What he did perceive in the approving manner was that acting and living justly could not logically be done for underlying motives. But at the same time, there could be no question of acting from ulterior motives, especially when it is revealed that living the just life is a person's greatest source of happiness.

In claiming that a person's extraordinary happiness is a matter of logic, which is required to be commonly understood, as specific acts bring it into existence. The logic of happiness thus lies in the belief that a person will be happy only if he finds everything as he wants it to be, or if he gets those things he considers most important for him. For the person with the inclinations and desires of a pig, happiness will come when he is able to live like a pig. He could then be said to be happy. When we compare the happiness of such a man with that of a person who has the inclinations and desires of what it is to be a person, then we should distinguish between 'true happiness' and 'false happiness.' In addition, the point of difference is not that such a person's happiness is greater in degree, but that such a person's happiness is different in kind.

If we carefully reflect upon the world, there are three principles of acting: power principle, pleasure principle and moral principle. According to power principle, every person tries to oppress every other person. According to pleasure principle, every one desires to live happily in this world. When moral principles dominate in a society, everyone can live happily for the reason that power principle will nowhere be found without human intervention. For this reason, we must make efforts to uphold the moral principles in the world, as all Holy Scriptures stress upon morality.

### Notes & References

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