

Babur's Relations with the Ruling Elite and Tribes of the Punjab

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Scant attention has been paid by historians to study Babur's relationship with the ruling elite and tribes of the Punjab as a powerful factor that contributed to the victory of his small army over Ibrahim Lodi's huge army at Panipat. The present paper, utilizing contemporary as well as later sources, attempts a careful study of Babur's efforts to wipe out opposition in the Punjab before a final confrontation with the Lodi forces. Applying both cool diplomacy and as well as force Babur had subdued the locally entrenched various tribes of the Punjab such as the Yusufzais, Niazaais, Janjuha, Ghakkar, Biluchis as well as some Afghan nobles of the Lodi sultanate of Delhi. Thus Babur's conquest of Hindustan was not just an outcome of his casual daring expedition but of a well thought out plan, its energetic execution and sound diplomacy.

The foundation of the Mughal rule in India by Babur from his base in Kabul can be better understood with the perspective of his relations with the ruling elite and the various regional tribes of the Punjab prior to his gaining a decisive victory over Ibrahim Lodi's huge army at Panipat on April 21, 1526. Though modern works on Babur have dealt with Babur's early military expeditions in India, but their interpretation takes scant notice of his attitude and policy towards the ruling elite and the chiefs of various tribes of the Punjab as well as their response and reaction that finally inspired him to conquer Hindustan and establish his rule. The present paper seeks to focus on these aspects on the basis of Babur's own account and the information contained in other Mughal and non-Mughal contemporary and later sources.

Contrary to what might appear on the surface, Babur's conquest of Hindustan was not just an outcome of his casual daring expeditions but of a gradual and well thought out plan, systematic military operations as well as sound diplomacy. It is amply clear from his statement in *Baburnama* to the effect that ever since he captured Kabul (1504) "it had been in his mind to move onto Hindustan but this had not been done for a variety of reasons."¹ A careful survey of the account of his reported expeditions to India also point to this fact. In fact whether it was a military operation against the refractory Afghan tribes of Afghanistan or move against Hindustan he would first get himself acquainted with the terrain, the position and strength of his adversaries and other necessary details and a military operation would be launched after discussing all the pros and cons. Up to the year 1519, besides his preoccupation with Samarqand and later Qandhar, Babur also took effective steps to keep the refractory and marauding Afghan tribes in check. During this period he was not only able to make the road between Kabul and Adinapur (Jalalabad) safe by building strong points or castles at strategic points and stationing garrisons, but also to establish his hold over the Bannu, Sawad and the areas along the Indus river.²

It was from the year 1519 onward, when he was increasingly confronted with the threat of the overwhelming Uzbek power, limited resources and small area of the dominions of Kabul and Ghazni insufficient to provide for all the Timurid *mirzas* (princes), *begams* (ladies) and *begs* (nobles) gathered around him, that Babur seriously thought of crossing the Sind-water into Hindustan which promised both a richer booty and a safer retreat.³ Being descendant of Timur, Babur sought to justify his expeditions on India asserting his claim on the territory of Hind conquered by Timur in 1398 and subsequently held either by the Timurids or by their dependents.⁴ However, instead of making any deeper thrust into the Indo-Gangetic plain all at once, he decided to move cautiously in this direction in view of his limited financial and military resources, as well as the political conditions of central Asia.

It is interesting to note that Babur's first move towards Hindustan in 1505 was conceived after the arrival of Yar-i-Husain, son of Darya Khan, at Kabul from Bhira.⁵ It may be pointed out here that during the 15th century the region of Kabul with its Indian dependencies of Bhira, Khushab, Chinab and Chiniot situated on the border-land of Delhi Sultanate were held by the descendants of Timur, viz. Qaydu, Sayurghatumish, Sultan Masud Kabuli etc. The above mentioned Darya Khan along with his two other brothers, Baba Qabuli and Apaq Khan (Ghazi Khan), were very powerful and influential nobles of Sultan Masud Ali whom they had eventually deposed and got hold of Kabul, Zabul and the above mentioned Indian possessions in 1440 A.D. Subsequently with the rise of Abu Said Mirza, the Timurid regained control of Kabul and Zabul, while the sons of Ali Beg were left only with the above mentioned Indian possessions. Later on, after Abu Said's death, the sons of Mir Ali Beg gained ascendancy and control over the young prince Ulugh Beg. But Ulugh Beg eventually become independent with the help of Afghans and, thus, Ali Beg's sons again had to confine to the Indian possessions. At the time Babur occupied Kabul, Sayyid Ali, son of Apaq Khan and grandson of Ali Beg, was holding the territory of Bhira, Khushab and Chinab under the Lodi suzerainty.⁶ Obviously any move by Babur toward Hind posed a threat to Sayyid Ali. Though Babur doesn't tell us the object of Yar-i-Husain's above mentioned visit to Kabul, it may be safely presumed that he had come to solicit Babur's support and help against his cousin, Sayyid Ali.

After referring to Yar Husain's visit to Kabul, Babur writes: "When a few days later, the army had been mustered, person acquainted with the country were summoned and questioned about its every side and quarter. Some advised a march to the plain (Dasht), some approved of Bangash, some wished to go into Hindustan. The discussion found settlement in a move on Hindustan."⁷ Thus in the month of Saban, 910 AH (Jan. 1505 A.D.) Babur's army set out in the direction of Hindustan. Yar-i-Husain accompanied Babur in this campaign. Marching via Adinapur and Qush-gumbaz, the army crossed the Khaibar pass and made a halt at Jam (presumably Jamrud). However the plan to cross the Indus river into Hindustan was changed in favour of a march towards Kohat on a strong representation from one Baqi Chaghinani, whom Babur trusted a great deal at that time, supported by some Kabulis who assured rich booty from the wealthy tribesmen of that region. Consequently the army marched to Kohat which was laid to plunder. The booty obtained, however, was much below the expectation. As for the further move, Babur decided to return to Kabul after overrunning the Bangash and Bannu area. Learning about the decision, Yar-i-Husain made a petition to Babur that "if royal orders were given me

BABUR'S RELATIONS WITH THE RULING ELITE AND TRIBES OF THE PUNJAB

for the Dilzaks, the Yusufzai, and the Gigyais, these would not go far from my orders if I called up the Padshah's swords on the other side of the water of Sind." The *farman* he petitioned for was given and he was allowed to go from Kohat.⁸

Yar-i-Husain's company proved of no great help for Babur during this campaign. But subsequently he used the above mentioned *farman* of Babur in collecting a following of the Dilzaks, the Yusufzais and also a few Jats and Gujars. This force however was not strong enough to attack his cousin's (Sayyid Ali's) dominions. Hence he began to harass and levy toll tax on the roads by force in the Kacha- Kot (near Hasan Abdul) area. Interestingly, when Baqi Chighinani, who was mainly responsible for diverting Babur's campaign from Jam towards Kohat, left Babur's service much against the latter's wishes and proceeded towards Hindustan along with his men, Yar-i-Husain blocked the road, made the whole party prisoner, killed Baqi and took his wife.⁹ He thus manifested his loyalty to Babur.

Another result of Babur's above mentioned campaign and Yar-i-Husain's allegiance to him was that it all created a big alarm in the territories of Bhira, Khushab and Chinab, then held by Sayyid Ali (Yar-i-Husain's cousin) under Lodi suzerainty. Hearing of Babur's campaign, Sayyid Ali panicked and left Bhira for Sherkot crossing the river Jhelum (Bahat). Subsequently, the Afghan suspected him of leaning towards Babur. Consequently, giving way to his 'fears and anxieties' he surrendered his territories to Daulat Khan, the Lodi governor of Lahore, who put these territories under the charge of his own eldest son, Ali Khan.¹⁰

However, Babur's first definite move on Hindustan could materialize only in 1519, when after capturing Bajaur he decided to cross the Sind-water, the compelling factor being the fact that "nothing to count had fallen into his soldiers' hands during the three or four months of campaigning". For this reason, he decided in favour of a quick march on Bhira though his advisors were feeling unprepared for an expected prolonged conflict with the Lodis.¹¹ The expedition manifests Babur's military genius, his assessment of enemy's position and his diplomatic skill. His campaign in the Bangash and Bannu areas had aroused no serious military reaction and he also seems to have realized the unpreparedness of his opponents. The expedition was meticulously arranged. A light contingent was prepared and necessary steps were taken to cross over the Indus. At the same time he took steps to secure the friendship of the local tribes.

Babur tried methods of both peace and force to secure the allegiance of the local tribes and the ruling elite. He writes: "As it was always in my heart to possess Hindustan, and as these several countries, Bhira, Khushab, Chinab, and Chiniut had once been held by Turk, I pictured them as my own and was resolved to get them into my hands, whether peacefully or by force. For these reasons it being imperative to treat these hillmen well, the following order was given: 'do not hurt or harm to the flocks and herds of these people, nor even to their cotton-ends and broken needles!'"¹²

The people of the salt range and the country between Bhira and Nilab were under the control of two local Muslim tribes, Jud and Janjuha. Babur came into contact with the local chiefs for the first time in the Koh-i-Jud (salt range) area before he occupied Bhira. As the hereditary rulers of the border region, the chiefs of these tribes seem to have acknowledged just nominal and superficial allegiance to the Lodi Sultan through the governor of Lahore. Babur writes that their chiefs' position and

authority was based on kinship ties and they ruled as per their ancient customs. Their principle headmen took the title of Rai while the younger ones were styled Maliks. The body of the chiefs' retainers was composed of the clansmen and followers. As the Janjuha headmen were the maternal uncles of Langer Khan Niazi, who was now a faithful servant of Babur, his services were used in securing their allegiance. Accordingly, Langer Khan was sent to Malik Hast (Asad), the Janjuha chief. Being made hopeful of Babur's favour and kindness, Malik Hast waited on Babur and offered a horse.¹³ After two days, on February 22, 1519, when Babur entered Bhira another chief, Sangar Khan Janjuha, came, offered a horse to Babur and did obeisance. As the Janjuha chiefs submitted peacefully Babur ordered his soldiers not to molest or plunder these people.¹⁴

Satisfied with the nominal submission of the Janjuhas, Babur moved on Bhira. After passing the Hamtatu pass, he dispatched Abdur Rahim, his *Shaghawal* (chief scribe), along with some local people who had meanwhile waited on him with gifts, to Bhira demanding peaceful submission through the message: "The possession of this territory by a Turk has come down from of old; beware not to bring ruin on its people by giving way to fear and anxiety, our eye is on this land and on this people; raid and rapine shall not be."¹⁵ A little later, these above mentioned emissaries were followed by Langer Khan with few Afghan headmen, who had come to do obeisance. After crossing the pass, Babur arranged his troops in left and right and the centre and as they approached the town, Ali Khan, who held this territory under his father, Daulat Khan Lodi, the governor of Lahore, presented a horse and a camel as an offering and did obeisance through his Hindu lieutenant, Diwa, son of Saktu, and some other notables.¹⁶ It seems Babur allowed Ali Khan Lodi and his followers to leave for Lahore peacefully. Entering Bhira, Babur summoned the headmen and *chaudharies* of Bhira and settled a sum of 400000 *shahrukhies* as the price of peace (*mal-i-aman*), and appointed his officers to collect the amount.¹⁷

Babur had, meanwhile, sent Haider, his standard messenger, to meet the Biluchis between Bhira and Khushab. The Biluchis responded with a peaceful submission, offering a horse. This was followed by a dutiful letter from the people of Khushab. Shah Hasan Arghun was then sent as an envoy to Khushab to demand the country which 'from of old had depended on the Turks'.¹⁸ Having settled the terms of peace amicably, he returned after some days with a part of money settled on the people of Khushab.¹⁹ Meanwhile it was reported to Babur that some of his soldiers had transgressed his order and resorted to plunder the people of Bhira. Consequently, some of these culprits were put to death, while others were paraded around the camp with their noses chopped off.²⁰ As there was some delay in collecting the settled amount, Babur appointed four experienced officers dividing the country into four districts in order to accomplish the task of collection without any overrunning and plundering.²¹ Another development favouring the invader was the arrival of Minuchihr, son of Sayyid Ali, the former ruler of Bhira territory, to Babur's camp at Bhira. Tatar Khan Kakar (Ghakkar) had tried to dissuade him from joining with Babur. He also tried to enlist his services giving his daughter in marriage to him, but he escaped him and joined Babur's service.²² Thus establishing his hold over the territory around Bhira and having secured the support of the hardy warrior tribes, Babur took steps for the administrative control over the territory. He entrusted the charge of Bhira to Hindu Beg, and Shah Muhammad, his brother, Dost Beg and some others were left to assist him. A suitable army comprising the Turk and local soldiery with increased allowances and pay was left with him. To Langer Khan, whom

BABUR'S RELATIONS WITH THE RULING ELITE AND TRIBES OF THE PUNJAB

Babur describes as the 'prime cause and mover of this expedition', was bestowed the charge of Khushab with a standard. He was instructed to help Hindu Beg. Others appointed to assist Hindu Beg were Minuchihr Khan, his relation Nazar-i-Ali and the Janjuha chiefs, Sangar Khan and Malik Hast.²³

Having thus settled the affairs of Bhira, Babur left for Kabul. On his way back he took steps to subdue the Ghakkar chiefs of the mountainous tract adjoining Kashmir, between Bhira and Nilab. The Ghakkar chiefs had subjected other smaller tribes of the area like the Jats, the Gujars and others akin to them. They were at constant struggle with the Jud and Janjuha tribes. Babur likens the headship and authority of the Ghakkars, to that of the Janjuhas, it being based on kinship and descent. At the time Babur moved on Bhira their headship rested with Tatar Khan and Hati Khan, both sharing common descent. While Tatar Khan was obedient to Daulat Khan Lodi, Hati Khan, whose territory was closer to mountains, was turbulent. Torrent beds and ravines were their strongholds. When Babur was still at Bhira, Hati had made a surprise attack on Tatar, killed him and had taken possession of his territory along with his stronghold of Parhala, and his wives and belongings.²⁴ While Babur was on his return march from Bhira, the Janjuha chiefs made a fervent appeal to him to chastise the Kakars, their old foes, who used to plunder their territory and were thus a source of constant anxiety. Accordingly a punitive expedition was launched under the guidance of Sarupa, a Gujar servant of Malik Hast acquainted with the Kakar territory. Hati was besieged in the stronghold of Parhala. Hard pressed, Hati made good his escape. Shortly afterwards, his kinsman, Parbat, waited on Babur with tribute and a horse. The envoy was favorably received.²⁵ A few days later when the same envoy returned with another offering from Hati, Babur sent a sword, a *khillat* and a letter of encouragement for him in response.²⁶ Babur gave the charge of the territory of Qarluq Hazara, Hati, Ghiyas-wal etc. to Mohammad Ali Jang Jung, and thereafter returned to Kabul via Peshawar.²⁷

The net result of this campaign was quite impressive. The invader was able to subjugate the whole territory from Bajaur and Sawad down to Bhira and Khushab. Important tribes of the area, often at war with each other and some also divided among themselves, like the Yusufzais of upper Sawad, the Niazaais of Bannu, the Janjuhas and the Kakars were easily subdued and they become allies of the Timurids. The weakness and unpreparedness of the Lodis, caused due to their mutual suspicion and internal turmoil, was also exposed. The expedition carried out with the compelling factor of raising resources or at best to recover the territories of Bhira, Khushab, Chinab and Chiniot, held up to a little earlier time by the Timurid kings of Kabul, ended with a resolve to conquer India. Obviously for this reason Babur was advised by his Begg, while still at Bhira, to send an envoy, Mulla Murshid, with letters (*khattlar*) for Daulat Khan Lodi and Sultan Ibrahim Lodi, demanding the territories once conquered by Timur. However, Daulat Khan neither saw the envoy nor allowed him to go to Delhi.²⁸ It seems he couldn't reconcile himself to the loss of Bhira, which had exposed his weakness and lowered down his prestige at the Lodi court. His failure to defend the frontier areas of the sultanate could even be a suitable ground for his dismissal from the royal service.

As soon as Babur left for Kabul, Daulat Khan's officers marched to Bhira against Hindu Beg, the Mughal governor. Babur himself writes: "No sooner our back turned than a mass of Hindustanis and Afghan gathered, disregarded us and not listening to our words, moved against Hindu Beg in Bhira. The local people also went over to the Afghans. Babur's officers, Hindu Beg and Langar Khan etc.,

were not strong enough to check the opponents. They retreated to Khushab but were unable to face the formidable opposition. By April 1519, they were finally driven back to Kabul."²⁹

Babur's preoccupation with the Afghan tribes of Afghanistan and his efforts to conquer Qandhar prevented any punitive expedition to Hindustan for the time being. Next year (1520) Babur again invaded India. This time he not only recaptured Bhira but also pushed on as far as Sialkot, killing people indiscriminately at certain places like Sayyadpur (Eminabad).³⁰ But Daulat Khan Lodi remained inactive. It might have offended Sultan Ibrahim Lodi who asked the governor to come to the royal audience at Agra. But Daulat Khan got frightened and pleading illness sent his son, Dilwar Khan to Agra on his behalf. Finding the Sultan annoyed with his father over his failure to defend the border territory, Dilwar Khan ran away to Lahore without seeking any royal permission. This led to open hostility between Sultan Ibrahim and Daulat Khan.³¹

Daulat Khan now set out to overthrow the Sultan himself. Winning over a number of nobles posted in the Punjab, he entered into an alliance with Babur and also invited Alam Khan Lodi, son of the former sultan Bahlul Lodi, and a possible rallying point against the Sultan, from Gujarat where he was living as a refugee since the reign of Sultan Sikandar Lodi.³² As is evident from Daulat Khan's subsequent behavior, his alliance with Babur had the object of obtaining the Mughal help and not the supplanting of the Afghan rule by the Mughals. It might be pointed out here that Daulat Khan Lodi's long association with the Punjab had made him a popular figure and, if backed by Sultan Ibrahim Lodi, he could easily mobilize the public against the invader.³³ But his strained relations with the Sultan³⁴ and his wavering attitude towards the Mughals did away with the possibility of a strong opposition against the invader.

Before Babur reached Hindustan in 1523, a royal army dispatched under Bahar Khan had expelled Daulat Khan and his dependents from Lahore and forced them to seek refuge with the Biloch chiefs of Multan. Alliance with the hill tribes, the Janjuha, the Biloch and the Kakar, facilitated Babur's rapid advance on Lahore which he easily occupied overcoming the stiff resistance offered by the Lodi army under Bahar Khan. Babur again had to face and defeat the Lodi army at Depalpur. At both the places, the invader satisfied his vanity and anger by massacring people indiscriminately.³⁵ Soon afterwards, Daulat Khan Lodi came from Multan and visited the Mughal camp along with his sons Dilwar Khan and Ghazi Khan. Babur received them with courtesy and honour exempting them from bowing down before him. But he could not win over Daulat Khan to his side. Making an outward show of loyalty, Daulat Khan tried to divide and thus weaken Babur's forces. But his son, Dilwar, on account of his realistic view about Babur's motives in India or due to a sense of envy towards his brother, Ghazi Khan, now his father's favourite, reported the real intentions of his father. Babur got Daulat Khan and Ghazi Khan imprisoned but later released them and assigned them only the *parganas* of Sultanpur, Jalandur etc. instead of restoring Lahore and its dependencies, they aspired for. Therefore they resolved to fight against both Sultan Ibrahim and Babur, and fled to the hills.³⁶

Soon after Babur returned to Kabul, Daulat Khan and Ghazi Khan, having collected 20,000 to 30,000 troops, captured Kalanaur and hard pressed the Mughals in Sialkot and Lahore³⁷. Their threats led to Babur's fifth and last expedition on India (1526). Encouraged by the rising power of Daulat Khan and Gazi Khan, Alam Khan Lodi, meanwhile, had tried to persuade the Timurid nobles posted in the

BABUR'S RELATIONS WITH THE RULING ELITE AND TRIBES OF THE PUNJAB

Punjab to join him in attacking Delhi. But Babur had wisely cautioned his men against Ghazi Khan and had asked them to demand Ghazi Khan to send his younger brother Hazi Khan with his son as hostage either to Kabul or Lahore before extending any help to them. Rebuffed by Babur's officials, Alam Khan made a common cause with Ghazi Khan and other Afghan chiefs. But their attempt on Delhi was repulsed by Sultan Ibrahim Lodi. Later they fell out among themselves and Alam Khan joined with Babur.³⁸

All this encouraged Babur to make a direct thrust on Delhi. On his way he had to face no opposition of the local tribes except a minor scuffle with the Jats and Gujars near Sialkot. Writing about the incident Babur remarks, "If one goes into Hindustan the Jats and Gujurs always pour down in countless hordes from hill and plain for loot in bullock and buffalo. These ill-omened peoples are just senseless oppressors!. Formerly their doings did not concern us much because the country was an enemy's, but they began the same senseless work after we had taken it. When we reached Sialkot, they fell in tumult on poor and needy folks who were coming out of the town to our camp, and stripped them bare. I had the silly thieves sought for, and ordered two or three of them cut to pieces."³⁹

Defeated and driven away by the royal army and faced with Babur's march from the west, Daulat Khan and Ghazi Khan withdrew to their hill fortresses for refuge. As a strong force under them could disrupt his supply lines, Babur wisely thought of destroying their strength before confronting Ibrahim's army. In January 1526, Babur forced Daulat Khan surrender his strong fortress of Malot (Milwat). A short later, Daulat Khan passed away in disgrace, while his son Ghazi Khan succeeded in making good his escape to Delhi to be pardoned by the Sultan. He also participated in the battle of Panipat, where perhaps he died fighting.⁴⁰ Dilawar Khan, Daulat's other son, and Alam Khan still remained with the Mughals. Dilawar, whom Babur had honoured with the title of *Khan-i-Khana*, gave whole hearted support to Babur and remained loyal even to his successor, Humayun.⁴¹ Alam Khan's co-operative attitude towards Babur, suggests that the latter had promised a fair deal in return for his services. Subsequently, however, after his victory over Rana Sanga and his allies, Babur sent Alam Khan to Badakhshan as a prisoner, but he managed his escape with the help of Afghan merchants and reached Gujarat safely.⁴²

Impressed with Babur's victory and his dealing with local tribes, other important Afghan nobles holding *iqtas* in the Punjab had also begun to entertain doubts about Ibrahim's future. Prominent among them were Baban Khan Lodi, Malik Ismail Jilwani, Mahmud Khan Nuhani, Shaikh Jamal Farmali and Mian Sulaiman Farmali. On Babur's advance towards Delhi they retired to the Thar desert. But unable to take any firm decision or a concerted action they fell out among themselves.⁴³ Baban Khan and Malik Ismail Jilwani opened a dialogue with Babur desiring to meet him. Baban waited on Babur at Ambala. Being compelled by Babur's men to bow down before him, Baban felt insulted, and being disgusted escaped from the Mughal camp.⁴⁴ Malik Ismail, however, reconciled to Babur and continued in the Mughal service.⁴⁵

Thus before Babur's small yet well equipped force met and defeated Ibrahim's vast army at Panipat (April 21, 1526), opposition to the Mughals in the Punjab had been completely suppressed. Important tribes of the Punjab like the Yusufzais, Niazaies, Janjuhas, Biluchis, Kakars (Ghakkar) etc. had been subdued or had become allies of the Mughals. For this Babur used methods of both peace and

force. Thus his conquest of Hindustan was not just an outcome of a few daring expeditions, but the result of his carefully planned and skillfully executed military expeditions, coupled with diplomatic skill of high order.

Notes

1. Babur, *Baburnama*, Trans. A.S.Beveridge, reprint, 1970. Delhi, 1, 377-78.
2. *Ibid.* 1, 207-8, 372, 382, 411.
3. *Ibid.* 1, 228, 345-6(f.n.), 378.
4. *Ibid.* 1, 380, 382.
5. *Ibid.* 1, 228.
6. *Ibid.* 1, 382.
7. *Ibid.* 1, 229.
8. *Ibid.* 1, 229-31.
9. *Ibid.* 1, 250-51.
10. *Ibid.* 1, 382-83.
11. *Ibid.* 1, 378.
12. *Ibid.* 1, 380.
13. *Ibid.* 1, 379.
14. *Ibid.* 1, 380, 383.
15. *Ibid.* 1, 381.
16. *Ibid.* 1, 381-82. Subsequently, Diwa Hindu and another Hindu were taken as prisoner to Kabul perhaps due to some rebellious activities, but were released and sent back with suitable honour after taking considerable ransom. *Ibid.* 1, 399.
17. *Ibid.* 1, 383.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.* 1, 388.
20. *Ibid.* 1, 383.
21. *Ibid.* 1, 384.
22. *Ibid.* 1, 386.
23. *Ibid.* 1, 388-89.
24. *Ibid.* 1, 387.
25. *Ibid.* 1, 389-91.
26. *Ibid.* 1, 392-93.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.* 1, 384-85.
29. *Ibid.* 1, 399. But Abul Fazl accuses Hindu Beg and his officers of carelessness. *Akbarnama. 1973.* Trans., H.Beveridge, reprint Delhi, 1, 93.
30. *Ibid.* 1, 428-29.
31. Ahmed Yadgar. 1960. *Tarikh-i-Shahi*, Hindi tr. S.A.A.Rizvi, *Mughalkalin Bharat: Babur*, Aligarh, 448-49. Also I.H.Siddiqi. 1969. *Some Aspects Of Afghan Despotism in India*. Aligarh, 50-51.
32. *Baburnama*, 1, 440; *Abdullah, Tarikh-i-Daudi*, Hindi tr. S.A.A.Rizvi, *Mughalkalin Bharat: Babur*, 444-45.
33. I.H.Siddiqi, *Some Aspects Of Afghan Despotism in India*, 53-54.
34. Daulat Khan's father Tatar Khan, being appointed *muqta* of all the trans-Sutlej *sarkars*, i.e Sialkot, Lahore and Dipalpur, had firmly established Afghan pre-eminence in the Punjab. He even aspired for sovereignty during the last years of Bahlol Lodi's reign in which effort he was finally defeated by prince Nizam Khan (later Sultan Sikandar) near Ambala. Sultan Sikandar removed Tatar Khan from power but later made his son, Daulat Khan, governor of Lahore. (Rizquallah Mushtaqi, *Waqiat-i-Mushtaqi*, Hindi tr. S.A.A.Rizvi, *Uttar Taimurkalin Bharat*, Aligarh, 1958, 1, 146, 162.; I.H.Siddiqi, *Some Aspects Of Afghan Despotism in India*, 2-3). Tatar Khan's descendants could not forget their claim over Lahore and Punjab and this fact also explains their conflict with the Lodi Sultans.
35. *Baburnama*, 1, 441.
36. *Ibid.* 1, 442. It may be pointed out here that Dilawar's maternal uncles belonged to the *pargana* of Jaswal in the hills near Milwat (Malot). *Ibid.* 1. II, 461-62.
37. *Ibid.* II, 451.

BABUR'S RELATIONS WITH THE RULING ELITE AND TRIBES OF THE PUNJAB

38. *Ibid.* II, 454-58.
 39. *Ibid.* II, 454.
 40. *Ibid.* II, 458-61; Firishhta, *Tarikh-i-Firishhta*, Eng. tr. John Briggs. 1929. *History of the rise of Mahomedan power in India*, London, II, 27-28.
 41. *Baburnama*, II, 567; I.H.Siddiqi, *Some Aspects Of Afghan Despotism in India*, 101-02.
 42. I.H.Siddiqi. 1983. *Mughal Relations with the Indian Ruling Elite*, Delhi, 7.
 43. *Ibid.* 8.
 44. *Baburnama*, II, 464, 466, 468.
 45. *Ibid.* II, 677, 679.
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